STATE v COOPER
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No. 14255 IN THE SUP= CCUI~TOF THE STATE OF mmm 1978 S A E O ICNIYUA, T T F P l a i n t i f f ax3 Respondent, -VS- WlLLIAM ORIE COOPER, Defendant and Appellant. Appeal f r m : D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Eighteenth Judicial D i s t r i c t , nora able Jack D. Shanstran, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appllant: Michael Sand argued, Bozeman, Mntana For Reqmndent : Hon. Mike Greely, Attorney General, Helena, mntana Sheri K. Sprigg argued, Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Mntana Donald White, County Attorney, Bozgnan, mntana Gregory R. Todd argued, Deputy County Attorney, B o z m , mntana Sdmitted: Decided: -1 I> , . ! Filed: - - I , _ r--t > - I - October 23, 1978 dkf? -- "3 a", J u s t i c e John Conway H a r r i s o n d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e Court. Mr. ~efendant was c h a r g e d by i n f o r m a t i o n w i t h one c o u n t of a g g r a v a t e d a s s a u l t and one c o u n t of a s s a u l t . A jury t r i a l w a s h e l d o n J a n u a r y 26 and 27, 1978, t h e Honorable J a c k D. Shanstrom p r e s i d i n g . A f t e r t h e jury returned a g u i l t y v e r d i c t on b o t h c o u n t s , d e f e n d a n t w a s s e n t e n c e d t o f i v e y e a r s on Count I and s i x months on Count 11, t h e s e n t e n c e s t o run concurrently. suspended. One and one-half y e a r s were t h e n Defendant a p p e a l s . Between 1:00 and 1:30 a.m. on D e c e m b e r 9, 1977, d e f e n - d a n t and f i v e f r i e n d s e n t e r e d t h e Sacajawea B a r , l o c a t e d i n t h e basement of t h e Sacajawea Motel i n T h r e e F o r k s , Montana. S h o r t l y t h e r e a f t e r , t h r e e Mexican-American b r o t h e r s , P a u l , David, and Caesar V i l l a r r e a l , e n t e r e d t h e b a r from t h e u p s t a i r s where t h e y w e r e s t a y i n g . named Tano, e n t e r e d sometime l a t e r . A f o u r t h Mexican-American, When d e f e n d a n t saw t h e s e men o r d e r a six-pack of b e e r and n o t i c e d one w a s n o t wearing a s h i r t , h e remarked: service." "No s h i r t , no s h o e s , no H e a p p a r e n t l y walked o v e r t o t h e men m u t t e r i n g t h i n g s a b o u t " s p i c s " and "wetbacks" and proceeded t o knock t h e s i x - p a c k o u t of t h e hands of P a u l V i l l a r r e a l . A scuffle ensued and o n e of t h e Mexican-American b r o t h e r s had a knife. Soon b a r s t o o l s and p o o l c u e s w e r e b e i n g used as weapons. A f t e r a s h o r t t i m e , d e f e n d a n t l e f t t h e b a r , went t o a c a r , and p i c k e d up a gun. H e f i r e d a t l e a s t one s h o t w h i l e on t h e s i d e w a l k n e x t t o t h e b a r e n t r a n c e . H e then r e e n t e r e d t h e b a r p o i n t i n g t h e gun and h e l p e d one of h i s f r i e n d s o u t of t h e bar. Defendant d r o v e t o Bozeman and w h i l e e n r o u t e threw t h e gun away. I t w a s never recovered. The n e x t a f t e r n o o n , D e t e c t i v e Bruce LaRue of t h e G a l l a t i n County s h e r i f f ' s department found a .25 c a l i b e r a u t o m a t i c c o l t p i s t o l c a r t r i d g e c a s e near t h e t o p of t h e s t a i r s where a w i t n e s s had s e e n d e f e n d a n t f i r e t h e gun t h e n i g h t b e f o r e . Defendant p r e s e n t s s i x i s s u e s f o r review which can be summarized and s t a t e d i n t h e f o l l o w i n g manner: 1. Whether t h e D i s t r i c t Court e r r e d i n g i v i n g I n s t r u c - t i o n No. 20 concerning t h e d e f e n s e of j u s t i f i a b l e u s e of force. 2. Whether t h e D i s t r i c t Court e r r e d i n g i v i n g I n s t r u c - t i o n No. 9 concerning i n t e n t . 3. Whether t h e D i s t r i c t Court e r r e d i n e x c l u d i n g t h e testimony of two d e f e n s e w i t n e s s e s . 4. Whether t h e D i s t r i c t Court e r r e d i n r e f u s i n g t o g i v e d e f e n d a n t ' s o f f e r e d I n s t r u c t i o n No. 1 2 . 5. Whether d e f e n d a n t was denied h i s r i g h t t o a f a i r and i m p a r t i a l t r i a l because of e r r o r s on t h e p a r t of t h e D i s t r i c t Court. 6. Whether t h e r e was s u f f i c i e n t evidence t o s u p p o r t t h e v e r d i c t s of g u i l t y . I n s t r u c t i o n No. 20 r e a d : "You a r e i n s t r u c t e d t h a t a d e f e n s e of j u s t i f i a b l e u s e of f o r c e i s an a f f i r m a t i v e d e f e n s e and t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t has t h e burden of producing s u f f i c i e n t evidence on t h e i s s u e t o r a i s e a r e a s o n a b l e doubt of h i s g u i l t . " Defendant contends t h i s i n s t r u c t i o n p l a c e s t h e burden of proving s e l f - d e f e n s e on him. The S t a t e contends t h i s i n s t r u c - t i o n p l a c e s t h e "burden of producing evidence" on d e f e n d a n t b u t n o t t h e "burden of p e r s u a s i o n " . The Montana County A t t o r n e y s A s s o c i a t i o n , a p p e a r i n g a s amicus c u r i a e , a r g u e s t h a t " a criminal defendant a s s e r t i n g t h e a f f i r m a t i v e defense of j u s t i f i a b l e u s e of f o r c e [should be] r e q u i r e d t o prove t h a t d e f e n s e by a preponderance of t h e evidence." The United S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t , i n t h e landmark c a s e of I n r e Winship ( 1 9 7 0 ) , 397 U.S. 358, 364, 90 S . C t . 1068, 1073, 25 L Ed 2d 368, 375, e x p l i c i t l y h e l d t h a t " t h e Due P r o c e s s C l a u s e p r o t e c t s [an] accused a g a i n s t c o n v i c t i o n e x c e p t upon proof beyond a r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t of e v e r y f a c t to n e c e s s a r y - c o n s t i t u t e t h e crime w i t h which he i s c h a r g e d . " (Emphasis added.) S u b s e q u e n t l y , i n a Maine homicide c a s e , t h e Supreme C o u r t h e l d t h a t " t h e Due P r o c e s s C l a u s e r e q u i r e s t h e p r o s e c u t i o n t o prove beyond a r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t t h e absence of t h e h e a t of p a s s i o n on sudden p r o v o c a t i o n when t h e i s s u e i s p r o p e r l y p r e s e n t e d i n a homicide c a s e . " p h a s i s added.) Mullaney v . Wilbur ( 1 9 7 5 ) , 4 2 1 U.S. (Em- 684, Defendant r e l i e s on Mullaney by analogy and a r g u e s t h e S t a t e s h o u l d be r e q u i r e d t o prove t h e absence of t h e " j u s t i f i a b l e u s e of f o r c e " t o c o n v i c t d e f e n d a n t of a g g r a v a t e d assault. Such a c o n t e n t i o n i g n o r e s t h e d i s t i n c t i o n between t h e s t a t u t o r y scheme o u t l i n e d i n t h e Mullaney c a s e and t h e s t a t u t o r y scheme p r e s e n t i n Montana. A s i m i l a r distinction was a d d r e s s e d by t h e Supreme Court i n P a t t e r s o n v. N e w York ( 1 9 7 7 ) , 432 U . S . 197, 97 S . C t . 2319, 53 L Ed 2d 281. In P a t t e r s o n t h e i s s u e was " t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y under t h e . Due .. P r o c e s s C l a u s e of burdening t h e d e f e n d a n t i n a N e w York S t a t e murder t r i a l w i t h p r o v i n g t h e a f f i r m a t i v e d e f e n s e of extreme e m o t i o n a l d i s t u r b a n c e a s d e f i n e d by New York law." P a t t e r s o n , 432 U.S. 2d a t 284. a t 198, 97 S . C t . a t 2320, 53 L Ed I n f i n d i n g t h a t r e q u i r i n g t h e defendant t o prove h i s a f f i r m a t i v e d e f e n s e by a preponderance of t h e e v i d e n c e d i d n o t v i o l a t e due p r o c e s s , t h e Supreme C o u r t s t a t e d : ... d e c l i n e t o adopt a s a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l "We i m p e r a t i v e , o p e r a t i v e countrywide, t h a t a s t a t e must d i s p r o v e beyond a r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t e v e r y f a c t c o n s t i t u t i n g any and a l l a f f i r m a t i v e de- f e n s e s r e l a t e d t o t h e c u l p a b i l i t y of an accused. T r a d i t i o n a l l y , due p r o c e s s h a s r e q u i r e d t h a t o n l y t h e most b a s i c p r o c e d u r a l s a f e g u a r d s be observed; more s u b t l e b a l a n c i n g of s o c i e t y ' s i n t e r e s t s a g a i n s t t h o s e of t h e accused have been l e f t t o t h e l e g i s l a t i v e branch. W t h e r e e f o r e w i l l n o t d i s t u r b t h e balance struck i n p r e v i o u s c a s e s h o l d i n g t h a t t h e Due P r o c e s s Clause r e q u i r e s t h e p r o s e c u t i o n t o prove beyond a r e a s o n a b l e doubt a l l of t h e elements i n c l u d e d i n t h e d e f i n i t i o n of t h e o f f e n s e of which t h e d e f e n d a n t i s charged. Proof of t h e n o n e x i s t e n c e of a l l a f f i r m a t i v e d e f e n s e s h a s never been cons t i t u t i o n a l l y r e q u i r e d ; and w e p e r c e i v e no r e a son t o f a s h i o n such a r u l e i n t h i s c a s e and apply it t o t h e s t a t u t o r y d e f e n s e a t i s s u e h e r e . " P a t t e r s o n , 432 U.S. a t 2 1 0 , 97 S.Ct. a t 2327, 53 L Ed 2d a t 292. S e c t i o n 94-3-112, 1 9 4 7 , provides t h a t " [ a ] R.C.M. d e f e n s e of j u s t i f i a b l e u s e of f o r c e , based on t h e p r o v i s i o n s of t h i s c h a p t e r i s an a f f i r m a t i v e d e f e n s e . " The accompanying commission comment a f f o r d s f u r t h e r c l a r i f i c a t i o n : "A d e f e n s e based upon any of t h e p r o v i s i o n s of t h i s c h a p t e r i s a n a f f i r m a t i v e d e f e n s e , and i f n o t p u t i n i s s u e by t h e p r o s e c u t i o n ' s evidence, t h e d e f e n d a n t , t o r a i s e i t a s an i s s u e , must p r e s e n t some evidence thereon." By denominating t h e j u s t i f i a b l e u s e of f o r c e a s an a f f i r m a t i v e d e f e n s e , Montana's s t a t u t o r y scheme does n o t r e q u i r e t h e p r o s e c u t i o n t o prove t h e absence of a f f i r m a t i v e d e f e n s e s beyond a r e a s o n a b l e doubt a s though t h e i r absence were an element of t h e crime charged. This p o i n t i s even more e v i d e n t when t h e elements of t h e crimes charged a r e d i s t i l l e d from t h e s t a t u t e s d e f i n i n g t h e o f f e n s e s . s e c t i o n 94-5-201 (1)( c ) , R.C.M. Under 1947, a person commits t h e o f f e n s e of a s s a u l t when he (1) purposely o r knowingly, makes p h y s i c a l c o n t a c t w i t h an i n d i v i d u a l , ( 3 ) when t h e c o n t a c t i s of an i n s u l t i n g o r provoking n a t u r e . t i o n 94-5-202(1) ( c ) , R.C.M. (2) Under sec- 1947, a person commits t h e o f f e n s e of aggravated a s s a u l t when he (1) purposely o r knowingly, i n another, ( 2 ) c a u s e s apprehension of s e r i o u s b o d i l y i n j u r y ( 3 ) by u s e of a weapon, ( 4 ) when such apprehen- s i o n i s reasonable. C l e a r l y , absence of j u s t i f i c a t i o n i s n o t an element of e i t h e r of t h e s e o f f e n s e s . That being t h e c a s e , we a r e l e f t w i t h t h e t a s k of reviewing I n s t r u c t i o n No. 20 t o s e e i f it i s c o n s i s t e n t w i t h Montana law. I n S t a t e v. Grady ( 1 9 7 5 ) , 166 Mont. 168, 175, 531 P.2d 681, 684, t h i s Court s t a t e d : "The law i n Montana i s t h a t a l t h o u g h t h e burden of p e r s u a s i o n remains on t h e S t a t e , i n o r d e r t o a v a i l himself of t h e a f f i r m a t i v e d e f e n s e of s e l f d e f e n s e , t h e d e f e n d a n t has t h e burden of producing s u f f i c i e n t evidence on t h e i s s u e t o r a i s e a r e a s o n a b l e doubt of h i s g u i l t . " C l e a r l y t h e n , t h e D i s t r i c t Court d i d n o t e r r i n g i v i n g I n s t r u c t i o n No. 20. Montana. I t i s a c l e a r s t a t e m e n t of t h e law i n The Montana County A t t o r n e y s A s s o c i a t i o n a r g u e s t h a t a g r e a t e r burden should be p l a c e d on a d e f e n d a n t - - t h a t i s , a d e f e n d a n t should be r e q u i r e d t o prove h i s a f f i r m a t i v e d e f e n s e by a preponderance of t h e evidence. I n s u p p o r t of t h i s c o n t e n t i o n t h e A s s o c i a t i o n p o i n t s o u t t h a t t h i s Court h a s a l r e a d y imposed t h a t burden f o r o t h e r a f f i r m a t i v e defenses. S t a t e v. ~ c K e n z i e (1978), P.2d 1205, 1233, 35 St.Rep. . , 581 759, 795 (mental d i s e a s e o r d e f e c t ) ; and S t a t e v. S t u i t (1978), P.2d 264, 267, 35 St.Rep. Mont Mont. , 576 313, 317 ( s e c t i o n 94-3-110, R.C.M. 1947, compulsion). T h i s Court h a s e x p r e s s l y s t a t e d t h a t t h e t e s t t o be used when c o n s i d e r i n g t h e a f f i r m a t i v e d e f e n s e of s e l f d e f e n s e i s " t h e burden of producing s u f f i c i e n t evidence on t h e i s s u e t o r a i s e a r e a s o n a b l e doubt of h i s g u i l t . " 166 Mont. a t 175, 531 P.2d a t 684. Grady, W e r e a f f i r m t h a t holding and hold t h a t when a c r i m i n a l d e f e n d a n t s e e k s t o a v a i l himself of t h e a f f i r m a t i v e d e f e n s e of t h e u s e of f o r c e i n d e f e n s e of a person p u r s u a n t t o s e c t i o n 94-3-102, R.C.M. 1947, he h a s t h e burden of producing s u f f i c i e n t evidence on t h e i s s u e t o r a i s e a r e a s o n a b l e doubt of h i s g u i l t . Defendant's second i s s u e f o r c o n s i d e r a t i o n concerns I n s t r u c t i o n No. 9: "You a r e i n s t r u c t e d t h a t t h e law presumes t h a t a person i n t e n d s t h e o r d i n a r y consequences of h i s voluntary a c t s . " Defendant a r g u e s t h i s i n s t r u c t i o n c r e a t e s a c o n c l u s i v e presumption of c r i m i n a l i n t e n t and i s t h e r e f o r e u n c o n s t i t u tional. The S t a t e responds f i r s t by p o i n t i n g o u t t h a t d e f e n d a n t d i d n o t o b j e c t t o t h e g i v i n g of t h i s i n s t r u c t i o n a t t r i a l ; second by p o i n t i n g o u t t h a t t h i s i n s t r u c t i o n has been approved by t h i s Court on a number of p r e v i o u s occas i o n s ; and t h i r d by a r g u i n g t h a t g i v i n g t h e i n s t r u c t i o n was not prejudicial. W have i n t h e p a s t c o n s i d e r e d t h i s i n s t r u c t i o n and e have decided t h a t it i s a proper i n s t r u c t i o n i n a c r i m i n a l See S t a t e v. McKenzie, 581 P.2d a t 1 2 2 2 , 35 St.Rep. case. a t 780. T h e r e f o r e , w e conclude t h e D i s t r i c t Court d i d n o t e r r i n g i v i n g I n s t r u c t i o n No. 9 t o t h e j u r y . Defendant's t h i r d i s s u e concerns whether t h e D i s t r i c t Court e r r e d i n e x c l u d i n g t h e testimony of two w i t n e s s e s , C h a r l e s Robinson and Mark Davis. Robinson's t e s t i m o n y , t h a t he had been a t t a c k e d i n t h e b a r by Mexican-Americans t h r e e months p r i o r t o t h e i n c i d e n t involved i n t h i s c a s e , was excluded a s being t o o remote i n time and because Robinson c o u l d n o t i d e n t i f y t h e p e r s o n s who a t t a c k e d him. Addi- t i o n a l l y , t h e r e was no proof whatsoever t h a t t h e p a r t i e s involved i n t h e a l t e r c a t i o n s were t h e same. This testimony was p r o p e r l y excluded. Robinson d i d n o t w i t n e s s t h e f i g h t involved i n t h i s case. H i s testimony, o f f e r e d i n s u p p o r t of d e f e n d a n t ' s d e f e n s e of j u s t i f i a b l e u s e of f o r c e , was i r r e l e v a n t under t h e s e circumstances. Davis' testimony, that he had seen a man named Tim Van Luchen leave the bar a week before this incident with a broken jaw, was also excluded by the District Court. De- fendant argues that Davis should have been allowed to testify with respect to statements made at that time by Van Luchen concerning how his jaw had been broken under Rule 803, Mont.R.Evid. The portions of that rule cited by defendant read: "The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is available as a witness. "(1) Present sense impression. A statement describing or explaining an event or condition made while the declarant was perceiving the event or condition, or immediately thereafter. "(2) Excited utterance. A statement relating to a startling event or condition made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event or condition." The time element is important under either of these exceptions. The fact that Davis did not perceive the event which caused the injury creates a problem with respect to this time element. Thus, the District Court's determination to exclude the testimony was not clearly erroneous. Assuming, for the moment, that the testimony should not have been excluded as hearsay, the testimony was clearly irrelevant. Like Robinson's testimony, Davis' testimony was offered as proof of defendant's state of mind when he entered the bar. But defendant's own testimony indicated that these prior events were either unknown to him or had no effect on his state of mind. Therefore, defendant was not prejudiced by the exclusion of Davis' testimony. Defendant's fourth issue concerns the District Court's refusal to give defendant's offered instruction number 12: "You a r e hereby i n s t r u c t e d t h a t a f t e r c o n s i d e r i n g and weighing t h e evidence and r e c o n c i l i n g any d i s c r e p a n c i e s i n t h e evidence, i f t h e r e i s any r e a s o n a b l e h y p o t h e s i s upon which you can base a v e r d i c t of n o t g u i l t y i t i s your d u t y t o r e t u r n a v e r d i c t of n o t g u i l t y . " Defendant c i t e s S t a t e v . F i t z p a t r i c k ( 1 9 7 4 ) , 163 Mont. 220, 225, 516 P.2d 605, 609, f o r t h e p r o p o s i t i o n t h a t " t o j u s t i f y c o n v i c t i o n on c i r c u m s t a n t i a l evidence, t h e f a c t s and c i r c u m s t a n c e s must n o t o n l y be e n t i r e l y c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h e o r y of g u i l t , b u t must be i n c o n s i s t e n t w i t h any o t h e r r a t i o n a l e ( i . e . reasonable) conclusion." In t h i s regard, d e f e n d a n t i s concerned w i t h t h e f a c t t h a t t h e gun he used when he r e e n t e r e d t h e b a r was never recovered. H e had argued t h a t t h e gun was a harmless t e a r g a s p i s t o l and n o t a r e a l gun. However, i n F i t z p a t r i c k t h e S t a t e proved i t s c a s e t o t a l l y by c i r c u m s t a n t i a l evidence. In the i n s t a n t case the g r e a t m a j o r i t y of evidence o f f e r e d a t t r i a l was d i r e c t evidence. C i r c u m s t a n t i a l evidence i n s t r u c t i o n s a r e only r e q u i r e d i n a c a s e which depends e n t i r e l y on c i r c u m s t a n t i a l evidence. S t a t e v. Mah Sam Hing ( 1 9 3 1 ) , 89 Mont. 178, 186, 295 P . 1014, 1017. It i s not error t o refuse circumstantial evidence i n s t r u c t i o n s i f t h e r e i s d i r e c t evidence i n t r o d u c e d a g a i n s t t h e defendant. S t a t e v. White ( 1 9 6 5 ) , 1 4 6 Mont. Defendant's f i f t h i s s u e , r e g a r d i n g t h e e f f e c t of e r r o r s by t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t , i s merely a summary of arguments we have a l r e a d y addressed i n t h e p r e v i o u s f o u r i s s u e s . W find e no m e r i t i n t h i s c o n t e n t i o n t h a t d e f e n d a n t was denied a f a i r trial. F i n a l l y , d e f e n d a n t contends t h e r e was n o t s u f f i c i e n t evidence t o s u p p o r t t h e v e r d i c t s of g u i l t y e n t e r e d a g a i n s t him. Again, d e f e n d a n t i s p r i m a r i l y concerned w i t h t h e e v i d e n c e s u p p o r t i n g h i s c o n t e n t i o n t h a t he a c t e d i n a j u s t i But, " [ w l h e t h e r t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s w e r e s u c h a s f i e d manner. t o j u s t i f y d e f e n d a n t ' s a c t i o n s i s c l e a r l y a q u e s t i o n of f a c t f o r t h e jury." S t a t e v. Larson ( 1 9 7 8 ) , 574 P.2d 266, 269, 35 St.Rep. 69, 73. Defendant's conviction i s affirmed. W e Concur: ~ 4 A %&?Q 8 Chief J u s t i c e Mont. I
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