LABELLA v NORTHERN INC
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
No. 14493 I N THE SUPREME COUKC O F THE STATE: O M3JTCANA F 1979 MICHAEL A. L B , A- J. R, Plaintiff and Appellant, BmINNORrHE.RN, a corporation, m., Defendant and Respondent. Appeal f r m : D i s t r i c t Court of the F i r s t J d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Honorable Gordon R. Bennett, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Hoyt and Lewis, Great Falls, frlontana John C. Hoyt argued, Great Falls, Wntana F r Respondent: o Kurt W. Kroschel argued, Billings, Wntana Suhnitted: March 26, 1979 Mr. Chief Justice Frank I. Haswell delivered the Opinion of the Court. Plaintiff appeals from an order of the District Court for Lewis and Clark County dismissing his complaint on the ground that suit was brought in an inconvenient forum. Plaintiff is a resident of Spokane, Washington and has been employed by defendant railroad since 1947. Defendant, a Minnesota corporation, is a common carrier doing business in Montana and throughout the northwest. Plaintiff alleges that while inspecting and engaging air hoses between freight cars in defendant's Spokane train yard he tripped on some loose boards and was seriously injured. He filed a personal injury suit in Lewis and Clark County District Court under the Federal Employer's Liability Act (FELA), 45 U.S.C. ยง51 et seq., and de- fendant moved to dismiss on the ground of forum non conveniens. After argument on the motion and consideration of both partys' affidavits, the District Court issued a memorandum decision and ordered the action dismissed. The trial judge noted the pertinent Montana case law and concluded that the application of forum non conveniens was within his discretion. State ex rel. Great Northern Ry. v. District Court (1961), 139 Mont. 453, 365 P.2d 512; Bracy v. Great Northern Ry. (1959), 136 Mont. 65, 343 P.2d 848. The issue on appeal is whether a District Court of this state may dismiss a FELA action because it deems itself an inconvenient forum. We hold that it may not. Simply stated: "The rule of forum non conveniens is an equitable one embracing the discretionary power of a court to decline to exercise the jurisdiction it has over a transitory cause of action when it believes that the action before it may be more appropriately and justly tried elsewhere." Leet v. Union Pac. R. Co. (1944), 25 Cal.2d 605, 609, 155 P.2d 42, 44. Under the doctrine, "a court may resist imposition upon its jurisdiction even when jurisdiction is authorized by the letter of a g e n e r a l venue s t a t u t e . " 330 U.S. Gulf O i l Corp. v. G i l b e r t ( 1 9 4 7 ) , 501, 507, 9 1 L.Ed 1055, 1062, 67 S.Ct. 839, 842. The p o l i c y b e h i n d t h e r u l e i s t o a l l o w t h e c o u r t t o d i s m i s s an a c t i o n when it f e e l s t h e c a u s e can be more e a s i l y d i s p o s e d o f I I i n another court. Once d i s m i s s e d , t h e a c t i o n i s n o r m a l l y com- menced anew i n a d i f f e r e n t , more c o n v e n i e n t forum. The a p p l i c a b i l i t y o f forum non c o n v e n i e n s t o FELA ac- t i o n s h a s p r e v i o u s l y been b e f o r e t h i s C o u r t . S t a t e ex rel. G r e a t N o r t h e r n Ry. v. D i s t r i c t C o u r t , s u p r a ; Bracy v. G r e a t I N o r t h e r n Ry., supra. I n t h o s e c a s e s d e f e n d a n t r a i l r o a d moved t o d i s m i s s on t h e ground of forum non c o n v e n i e n s and i n e a c h i n s t a n c e t h e t r i a l c o u r t d e n i e d t h e motion. I n Bracy a t 68, t h e t r i a l . . . has c o u r t " e x p r e s s e d d o u b t a s t o whether t h e d o c t r i n e I any a p p l i c a t i o n i n Montana," b u t r u l e d i f it d i d , t h e f a c t s of t h e case d i d not warrant i t s application. On a p p e a l , t h i s C o u r t ex- p r e s s l y d e c l i n e d t o d e c i d e i f t h e d o c t r i n e was v i a b l e . s u p r a a t 68. Bracy, The b a s i s o f t h e d e c i s i o n w a s t h a t , assuming t h e d o c t r i n e ' s e x i s t e n c e , t h e r e was no a b u s e o f d i s c r e t i o n i n f a i l i n g I n S t a t e e x r e l . G r e a t N o r t h e r n Ry., t o dismiss. was f o l l o w e d . The c o u r t s t a t e d : "We do n o t f e e l j u s t i f i e d i n t h i s instance t o establish the rule." ~ t h e r n Ry., s u p r a , Bracy S t a t e e x r e l . G r e a t Nor- s u p r a , a t 457. T h i s i s t h e o n l y c a s e t o come b e f o r e u s where a ~ i s t r i c t C o u r t h a s d i s m i s s e d an a c t i o n on t h e ground it c o n s i d e r s i t s e l f a n i n c o n v e n i e n t forum. W e a r e thus f o r t h e f i r s t t i m e squarely f a c e d w i t h t h e r e l a t i o n of forum non c o n v e n i e n s t o FELA a c t i o n s . S e c t i o n 6 of t h e FELA, 45 U.S.C. 856, reads a s follows: "Under t h i s c h a p t e r an a c t i o n may be b r o u g h t i n a d i s t r i c t c o u r t o f t h e United S t a t e s , i n t h e d i s t r i c t of t h e residence of t h e defendant. o r i n which t h e c a u s e o f a c t i o n a r o s e , o r i n which t h e d e f e n d a n t s h a l l be d o i n g b u s i n e s s a t t h e t i m e of commencing such a c t i o n . The i u r i s d i c t i o n o f t h e c o u r t s o f t h e United s t a t e s under t h i s c h a p t e r s h a l l be c o n c u r r e n t w i t h t h a t of - - - the courts of the several States." added. ) (Emphasis The District Courts of Montana clearly have jurisdiction. Whether they have discretionary power to dismiss is determined by state policy, as discussed infra, and by an examination of Congressional intent in enacting and later in amending the FELA. Ch. 149, 81 et seq., 35 Stat. 65 et seq. (1908), amended Ch. 143, S1, 36 Stat. 291 (1910). The refusal of the nation's railroads to compensate injured workmen was notorious; in a 1907 message urging Congress to pass the FELA, President Theodore Roosevelt noted: "The practice of putting the entire burden of loss to life and limb upon the victim or the victim's family is a form of social injustice in which the United States stands in unenviable prominence." 45 Cong.Rec. 4040 (1910). The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly noted that the FELA is to be given a liberal construction in favor of injured railroad employees so that it may accomplish humanitarian and See Urie v. Thompson (1949), 337 U.S. 163, remedial purposes. 69 S.Ct. 1018, 43 L.Ed 1282; Coray v. Southern Pacific Co. (1949), 335 U.S. 520, 60 S.Ct. 275, 93 L.Ed 208; McGovern v. Philadelphia & Reading R.R. (1914), 235 U.S. 389, 35 S.Ct. 127, 59 L.Ed 283; Steinberg, The Federal Employer's Liability Act and Judicial Activism: Policymaking by the Courts, 12 Willamette L.J. 79 (1975). In a Senate Committee Report, the purpose of the amendment to section 6 H.R. 17263, 61st Cong., 2d Sess. (1910), was said to be: . " . . to make entirely manifest the good faith of the legislature in the enactment of the employer's liability law, which places such stringent liability upon the railroads for injuries to their employees as to compel the highest safeguarding of the lives and limbs of the men in this dangerous employment. The tremendous loss of life and limb on the railroads is .. appalling . "It was the intention of Congress in the enactment of this law originally and it may be presumed to be the intention of the present Congress to shift the burden of the loss resulting from these casualties from 'those least able to bear it' and place it on those who can . . 'measurably control their causes'." Sen.Rep. No. 432, 61st Cong., 2d Sess., (1910), 45 Cong.Rec. 4041 (1910). . In reporting the bill out of committee, Senator Borah stated his objection to the law as it existed: "Plaintiff may sometimes be compelled to go a great distance in order to have his cause of action against the defendant by reason of the fact that now the action must be brought in the district in which the defendant is an inhabitant . . . ... " If this bill should be passed the law will be remedied in that respect, enabling the plaintiff to bring his action where the cause of action arose or where the defendant may be doing business. The bill enables the plaintiff to find the corporation at any point or place where it is actually carrying on business and there lodge his action, if he chooses to do so." 45 Cong.Rec. 4034-4035 (1910). The strength of the policy behind section 6 can be further gleaned from Congress' refusal to pass the Jennings Bill in 1947. It would have repealed most of section 6 and limited the forum choices of injured railroad workers to the district where the cause of action arose or where the plaintiff resided. If process could not be served in either of those places, an action could be brought where defendant was doing business. H. R. 1639, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., (1947). In the leading case on forum non conveniens, Gulf Oil Co. v. Gilbert, supra at 505, the United States Supreme Court noted : "It is true that in cases under the Federal Employers' Liability Act we have held that plaintiff's choice of a forum cannot be defeated on the basis of forum non conveniens. But this was because the special venue act under which those cases are brought was believed to require it." Citing Miles v. Illinois Central R. Co. (1942), 315 U.S. 698, 62 S.Ct. 827, 86 L.Ed 1129; Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. Kepner (1941), 314 U.S. 44, 62 S.Ct. 6, 86 L.Ed 28. Insofar as the federal courts were concerned, the "special venue act" lost its effect when 28 U.S.C. S1404(a) was enacted in 1948. That section provides: "For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might have been brought." The Supreme Court, in ex parte Collette (1949), 337 U.S. 55, 69 S.Ct. 944, 93 L.Ed 1207, 10 ALR2d 921, held that "any civil action" included suits brought in a Federal District Court under the FELA. Notwithstanding the strong policy favoring plaintiffs' forum selection, such actions were transferable under 28 U.S.C. 51404(a). When faced with the issue of a state court's power to dismiss a FELA case on the ground of forum non conveniens, the court followed Collett. It said a state was not compelled to entertain FELA cases brought in its courts but could, "According to its own notions of procedural policy . . . reject as it may accept, the doctrine [of forum non conveniens] for all causes of Southern Ry. Co. v. Mayfield (1950), action begun in its courts." 340 U.S. 1, 3, 71 S.Ct. 1, 2, 95 L.Ed 3, 7. But see, Pope v. Atlantic Coast R. Co. (1953), 345 U.S. 379, 73 S.Ct. 749, 97 L.Ed The policy of the State of Montana is clearly announced the State Constitution. "Courts of justice shall be open every person, and speedy remedy afforded for every injury of person, property, or character." 1972 Mont. Const., Art. 11, 516. This constitutional right is unrestricted by reference to residence or citizenship. Indeed, such qualification could not pass muster under the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Art. IV, 52 of the United States Constitution. Hicklin v. Orbeck (1978), 437 U.S. 518, 523-524, 98 S.Ct. 2482, 2487, 57 L Ed 2d 397, 403. The Montana legislature has provided. "A citizen of the United States who is not a citizen of this State has the same rights and duties as a citizen of this state who is not an elector.'' Section 83-407, R.C.M. 1947, now section 49-1-204 MCA. We fully recognize that the state is not constrained by federal law to reject the doctrine of forum non conveniens in FELA actions. However, we find the policy favoring the in- jured railroad worker's choice of forum to be highly persuasive. This, in addition to the state's "open court policy" compels this Court to hold the doctrine of forum non conveniens inapplicable to FELA suits filed in Montana District Courts. We repeat the warning set forth in State ex rel. Great Northern Ry., supra at 457. "If a substantial increase in this type of litigation is called to our attention in the future we will reexamine the situation in light of what we have herein stated." Our decision is a narrow one. We have not been confronted by the application of forum non conveniens in non-FELA cases and our holding today does not purport to deny or recognize the existence of the doctrine in cases where there is no strong policy favoring plaintiff's forum selection. Reversed and remanded. Chief Justice We concur: Justices C ' 1
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
