MEDHUS WILLIAMS REDDIG v DUTTE

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No. 14693 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1979 MELROY L. MEDHUS, JR., BEN WILLIAMS, BILLY G. REDDIG and LYNNE A. REDDIG, Plaintiffs and Appellants, KENNETH A. DUTTER, MARY E. DUTTER, THOMAS J. DEUTSCH, and JANET M. DEUTSCH, Defendants and Respondents. Appeal from: District Court of the Eleventh Judicial District, Honorable Robert Sykes, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellants: Hash, Jellison, O'Brien and Bartlett, Kalispell, Montana For Respondents: Moore, Lympus and Doran, Kalispell, Montana Warden, Walterskirchen and Christiansen, Kalispell, Montana Submitted on briefs: Decided: August 15, 1979 YOV 2 1 1979 J u s t i c e John Conway H a r r i s o n d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion o f t h e Court. Mr. Appellants i n i t i a t e d t h i s a c t i o n i n D i s t r i c t Court, t h e E l e v e n t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , t h e Honorable R o b e r t C . Sykes p r e s i d i n g , a s k i n g t h e c o u r t t o e n j o i n r e s p o n d e n t s from o b s t r u c t i n g a p p e l l a n t s ' use of a road t h a t crossed respondents' property. Appellants sought t o o b t a i n a decree g r a n t - i n g them a n easement a l o n g t h e r o a d . Appellants a l s o sought damages f o r i n t e r f e r e n c e w i t h t h e u s e of t h e r o a d , and a p p e l l a n t Medhus s o u g h t damages f o r t r e s p a s s t o h i s p r o p e r t y . Respondents f i l e d a c o u n t e r c l a i m a g a i n s t a p p e l l a n t Medhus f o r t i m b e r t r e s p a s s and s o u g h t an o r d e r r e q u i r i n g Medhus t o move a f e n c e e r e c t e d a l o n g t h e boundary o f t h e i r p r o p e r t y and t h e Medhus p r o p e r t y . The D i s t r i c t C o u r t found t h a t a p p e l l a n t s had a n e a s e ment f o r roadway p u r p o s e s a c r o s s a p o r t i o n o f r e s p o n d e n t s ' p r o p e r t y , b u t found no easement a c r o s s a n o t h e r s e c t i o n of t h e property. The c o u r t o r d e r e d a p p e l l a n t s be a l l o w e d t o remove some p e r s o n a l p r o p e r t y from t h e p o r t i o n o f t h e roadway a c r o s s which no easement was found. However, t h e c o u r t e n t e r e d no f i n d i n g s , c o n c l u s i o n s o r judgment c o n c e r n i n g a p p e l l a n t s ' trespass c l a i m . The c o u r t f u r t h e r found a p p e l l a n t Medhus had n o t comm i t t e d t i m b e r t r e s p a s s b u t had e r e c t e d a f e n c e on r e s p o n d e n t s ' property. The c o u r t o r d e r e d t h e f e n c e moved t o t h e c o r r e c t boundary l i n e . The D i s t r i c t C o u r t awarded c o s t s o f t h e s u i t t o r e s p o n d e n t s , i n c l u d i n g t h e c o s t o f a boundary s u r v e y done a t t h e r e q u e s t of r e s p o n d e n t s . A p p e l l a n t s a p p e a l t h i s judg- ment. Respondents Thomas Deutsch and J a n e t Deutsch a r e t h e l e g a l owners, and r e s p o n d e n t s Kenneth D u t t e r and Mary D u t t e r a r e t h e e q u i t a b l e owners, b e i n g p u r c h a s e r s under c o n t r a c t f o r deed, of c e r t a i n r e a l p r o p e r t y l o c a t e d i n F l a t h e a d County. The d i s p u t e d r o a d p a s s e s a c r o s s t h e i r p r o p e r t y . The D e u t s c h e s a c q u i r e d t h e p r o p e r t y i n 1964 from A. P . and Martha T. Marcoux. The Marcouxes conveyed t h e p r o p e r t y t o t h e D e u t s c h e s by a w a r r a n t y deed. The deed c o n t a i n e d l a n - guage r e f e r r i n g t o a n easement f o r r o a d p u r p o s e s a c r o s s t h e premises. The n o t i c e o f p u r c h a s e r s ' i n t e r e s t g i v i n g n o t i c e o f t h e c o n t r a c t under which t h e D u t t e r s h o l d t h e i r e q u i t a b l e i n t e r e s t t o t h e property c o n t a i n s s i m i l a r language. This p r o p e r t y w i l l be r e f e r r e d t o a s t h e " D u t t e r p r o p e r t y . " A p p e l l a n t Melroy Medhus owns r e a l p r o p e r t y t h a t l i e s e a s t of t h e D u t t e r p r o p e r t y and above it o n a m o u n t a i n s i d e . T h i s p r o p e r t y w i l l be r e f e r r e d t o a s t h e "Medhus p r o p e r t y . " A p p e l l a n t s B i l l y G. Reddig and Lynne A. Reddig a r e buying a p o r t i o n o f t h e Medhus p r o p e r t y under c o n t r a c t f o r deed. A p p e l l a n t Ben W i l l i a m s i s t h e owner of t h r e e p a r c e l s of r e a l p r o p e r t y which a r e e a s t o f b o t h t h e D u t t e r and Medhus prop- er t i e s . F o o t h i l l s Road, a p u b l i c highway, p a s s e s c l o s e t o t h e w e s t e r n boundary o f t h e D u t t e r p r o p e r t y . Near t h e s o u t h e r n boundary of t h e D u t t e r p r o p e r t y a d i r t and g r a v e l r o a d l e a v e s F o o t h i l l s Road and g o e s up t h e m o u n t a i n s i d e a c r o s s t h e Dutter property. T h i s roadway l e a v e s t h e D u t t e r prop- e r t y and e n t e r s t h e Medhus p r o p e r t y and forms a "Y" on t h e Medhus p r o p e r t y . The D i s t r i c t C o u r t found, a p p a r e n t l y f o r t h e s a k e o f c o m p l e t e n e s s , t h a t a l l of t h e a p p e l l a n t s had a n easement a l o n g t h a t roadway from t h e F o o t h i l l s Road t o t h e boundary o f t h e D u t t e r p r o p e r t y . An easement o v e r t h i s s e c t i o n of road w a s n o t asked f o r i n a p p e l l a n t s ' complaint. The n o r t h e r n brand of t h e "Y" c o n t i n u e s a c r o s s t h e Medhus p r o p e r t y and r e e n t e r s t h e D u t t e r p r o p e r t y f o r 300 f e e t whereupon i t r e e n t e r s t h e Medhus p r o p e r t y and c o n t i n u e s e a s t e r l y and up t h e m o u n t a i n s i d e o n t o t h e W i l l i a m s p r o p e r t y . The D i s t r i c t C o u r t found t h a t none o f t h e a p p e l l a n t s had a n easement a c r o s s t h i s 300 f o o t r o a d on t h e D u t t e r p r o p e r t y . The f o l l o w i n g diagram a p p r o x i m a t e s t h e p o s i t i o n of t h e p r o p e r t y of t h e p a r t i e s and r o a d i n d i s p u t e (marked " d i s p u t e d road" on t h e d i a g r a m ) : - - -- - - - - - - - - \ \ \ i MEDHUS Property granted easement. The u s e of t h e 300 f o o t r o a d marked " d i s p u t e d r o a d " on t h e diagram i s t h e c e n t e r of controversy i n t h i s case. A p p e l l a n t s do n o t c o n t e s t t h e p o r t i o n of t h e judgment o r d e r i n g them t o move t h e i r f e n c e , and r e s p o n d e n t s do n o t c h a l l e n g e t h e f i n d i n g of a n easement o f t h e o t h e r s e c t i o n of t h e road. The T r a b l i k p r o p e r t y marked on t h e diagram i s n o t i n - volved i n t h e c u r r e n t d i s p u t e . The r o a d was b u i l t i n 1933 by t h e Koenig b r o t h e r s , l o g g e r s working e a s t o f t h e D u t t e r and Medhus p r o p e r t i e s . B e f o r e c o n s t r u c t i n g and u s i n g t h e r o a d , t h e l o g g e r s g o t p e r m i s s i o n from C l a r e n c e Haines, t h e n t h e owner o f t h e Dutter property. The D i s t r i c t C o u r t found t h a t s i n c e t h e 1 9 3 0 1 s , t h e d i s p u t e d r o a d h a s seldom been used. The c o u r t found t h a t n e i g h b o r s used t h e r o a d f o r c u t t i n g f i r e w o o d o r C h r i s t m a s trees and members o f t h e g e n e r a l p u b l i c used t h e r o a d t o go up M i l l Creek t o h u n t , h i k e and g a t h e r h u c k l e berries. The b r i d g e o v e r M i l l Creek l e a d i n g t o t h e r o a d washed o u t f o r a p e r i o d o f t i m e and was r e p l a c e d i n t h e 1970's. D u t t e r b u l l d o z e d t h e r o a d s h u t i n 1978, l e a d i n g t o t h e i n s t i g a t i o n of t h i s s u i t . T h i s a p p e a l raises t h e f o l l o w i n g i s s u e s f o r o u r consideration : 1. Did t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t err i n f i n d i n g t h a t a p p e l - l a n t s d i d n o t e s t a b l i s h a p r e s c r i p t i v e easement a c r o s s t h e d i s p u t e d road? 2. Did t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t err i n f i n d i n g t h a t a p p e l - l a n t s d i d n o t e s t a b l i s h a n easement o f r e c o r d a c r o s s t h e d i s p u t e d road? 3. Did t h e ~ i s t r i c C o u r t err i n n o t e n t e r i n g f i n d t i n g s , c o n c l u s i o n s and a judgment on a p p e l l a n t s 1 t r e s p a s s claim? Did t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t err i n awarding c o s t s t o t h e 4. respondents? To e s t a b l i s h t h e e x i s t e n c e o f a p r e s c r i p t i v e easement, t h e p a r t y c l a i m i n g t h e easement must show open, n o t o r i o u s , e x c l u s i v e , a d v e r s e , c o n t i n u o u s and u n i n t e r r u p t e d u s e o f t h e easement c l a i m e d f o r t h e s t a t u t o r y p e r i o d . J a c k s o n ( 1 9 7 9 ) , - Mont. 1 - P.2d 1769, 1771; Hayden v . Snowden ( 1 9 7 8 ) , 1115, 1117, 35 St.Rep. , Mont. G a r r e t t v. - 36 St.Rep. , Mont. -, 576 P.2d 367, 369; T a y l o r v . P e t r a n e k ( 1 9 7 7 ) , 568 P.2d 1 2 0 , 1 2 2 , 34 St.Rep. 905, 909; Harland v. Anderson ( 1 9 7 6 ) , 169 Mont. 447, 451, 548 P.2d 613, 615. The c o n t r o v e r s y i n t h i s c a s e t u r n s on whether a p p e l l a n t s showed t h e u s e o f t h e d i s p u t e d r o a d by them and t h e i r p r e d e c e s s o r s i n i n t e r e s t was a d v e r s e r a t h e r t h a n permissive. I f a p p e l l a n t s f a i l e d t o show a d v e r s e u s e , t h e y have n o t e s t a b l i s h e d a l l t h e e l e m e n t s n e c e s s a r y t o p e r f e c t a n easement by p r e s c r i p t i o n and t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t r u l i n g on t h i s i s s u e must be upheld. I n Taylor, we s a i d : "Although a u s e p e r m i s s i v e i n i t s i n c e p t i o n may r i p e n i n t o a p r e s c r i p t i v e r i g h t , it c a n n o t do s o u n l e s s t h e r e i s a l a t e r d i s t i n c t and p o s i t i v e a s s e r t i o n of a r i g h t h o s t i l e t o t h e owner, which must b e b r o u g h t t o t h e a t t e n t i o n o f t h e owner, and t h e u s e c o n t i n u e d f o r t h e f u l l p r e s c r i p t i v e period. (Citations omitted.)" 568 P.2d a t 123. I n Wilson v. C h e s t n u t ( 1 9 7 4 ) , 164 Mont. P.2d 2 4 , 27, we a p p r o v i n g l y q u o t e d 2 Thompson on Real Prop- e r t y (1961 R e p l a c e m e n t ) , Easements, I1 I 484, 491, 525 8345, a s f o l l o w s : ... I f t h e u s e r began by t h e p e r m i s s i o n of t h e owner, i t w i l l n o t r i p e n i n t o a n a d v e r s e o r h o s t i l e r i g h t u n t i l n o t i c e of s u c h a d v e r s e u s e r i s b r o u g h t home t o t h e owner and t h e u s e r continued t h e r e a f t e r f o r t h e s t a t u t o r y period.'" S e e a l s o White v. Kamps ( 1 9 4 6 ) , 119 Mont. 102, 1 7 1 P.2d 343. Here, the testimony shows the use of the disputed road was originally permissive. Clarence Haines gave the Koenig brothers permission to build and use the road. Since the use of the road was permissive at its inception, to find a prescriptive easement here we must find in the record a distinct and positive assertion of a right to use the disputed road hostile to the owners by those claiming the easement. The record must also show the right was brought to the attention of the owners and continued use of the easement for the full statutory period. Looking to the record, we find occasional use of the road by hunters, hikers and neighbors cutting Christmas trees and gathering firewood. We have previously held this type of use insufficient to raise a presumption of adverse use. Taylor v. Petranek, supra, 568 P.2d at 123; Harland v. Anderson, supra, 169 Mont. at 451-452. Being insufficient to initially establish adverse use, this type of use does not represent the distinct and positive assertion of a hostile right brought home to the owner of the purportedly servient tenement necessary to transform originally permissive use into adverse use. Under these facts, the use of the road began permissively and continued to be permissive until Dutter blocked the road in 1978. Appellants, there- fore, did not establish the existence of a prescriptive easement across the Dutter property. The second issue raised by this appeal concerns the language in the deeds used to convey the Dutter propertyThe language in the deeds reads, "Subject, however to an easement for road purposes now existing over and across the herein described premises." The m a j o r i t y r u l e i s t h a t a n easement c a n n o t be c r e a t e d i n f a v o r o f a s t r a n g e r t o t h e deed. Wilson v . C h e s t n u t , s u p r a , 164 Mont. a t 492; s e e a l s o Annot., 1201-1202 (1963). 88 ALR2d 1199, I n t h e p r o p e r c a s e , however, w e w i l l d e p a r t from t h a t r u l e t o g i v e e f f e c t t o t h e g r a n t o r ' s i n t e n t . S t a t e of Montana, By and Through t h e Montana S t a t e F i s h and G a m e Commission v. C r o n i n ( 1 9 7 8 ) , 395, 399, 35 St.Rep. , Mont. 587 P.2d 1798, 1802; Wilson, 164 Mont. a t 492. The q u e s t i o n t h u s becomes o n e of d e t e r m i n i n g t h e i n t e n t o f t h e g r a n t o r s i n i n c l u d i n g t h e above l a n g u a g e i n t h e d e e d s . B e f o r e t h e c r e a t i o n o f a n easement i n a s t r a n g e r t o a conveyance w i l l be r e c o g n i z e d , t h e i n t e n t of t h e g r a n t o r t o c r e a t e t h e easement must be c l e a r l y shown. ( 1 9 7 8 ) , 145 Cal.Rep. Cushman v. Davis 791, 793, 80 Cal.App.3d 731. I f it a p p e a r s i t i s a s l i k e l y t h e purpose o f t h e c l a u s e i n t h e deed was t o p r o t e c t t h e g r a n t o r ' s w a r r a n t y of t i t l e a s t o r e s e r v e a n easement, w e w i l l n o t d e p a r t from t h e m a j o r i t y r u l e and f i n d a n easement. Wilson, 164 Mont. a t 492. To determine t h e i n t e n t of t h e grantor i n s i t u a t i o n s s i m i l a r t o t h e c a s e a t b a r , c o u r t s have c o n s i d e r e d t h e e x p r e s s l a n g u a g e o f t h e d e e d , Wilson, 164 Mont. a t 492; t e s t i m o n y by g r a n t o r s s t a t i n g t h e i r i n t e n t , W i l l a r d v. F i r s t Church of C h r i s t , S c i e n t i s t , P a c i f i c a ( 1 9 7 2 ) , 102 Cal.Rep. 739, 498 P.2d 987, 989; t h e f a c t t h a t t h e g r a n t o r r e c e i v e d l e s s v a l u e f o r t h e p r o p e r t y conveyed b e c a u s e o f t h e e x i s t e n c e of an e a s e m e n t , Mott v. S t a n l a k e ( 1 9 7 5 ) , 6 5 Mich.App. 668, and W i l l a r d , 498 P.2d a t 989-990; 440, 234 N.W.2d 667, and, t h e s u f f i c i e n c y of t h e d e s c r i p t i o n of t h e l o c a t i o n o f t h e easement and whether o r n o t t h e r e s e r v a t i o n names a dominant tenement, S t a t e of Montana, By and Through t h e S t a t e F i s h and G a m e Commission v . C r o n i n , s u p r a , 587 P.2d a t 399. Considering these factors here, we find the language contained in the deed almost identical to the language in ~ilson, where we held no easement had been reserved. Further, respondent Deutsch stated he knew the deed contained the language and had discussed it with appellant Bill Reddig, but that he did not know the implications of the language. Deutsch said he did know there was a road up to the home on the Dutter property that nobody other than the owners should be using. This testimony indicates that in executing the documents that passed equitable title to the property, Deutsch did not intend to create an easement. There is no testimony on the record showing any of the grantors of the Dutter property received less than full value for the land because of the existence of an easement. Finally, although the language of the deed does locate the easement, it fails to name a dominant tenement. Considering these factors together, here, as in Wilson, it is as likely the grantors intended to protect their warranty of title as to reserve an easement. Thus, the deeds do not establish an easement of record. The third issue raised by this appeal involves the failure of the District Court to enter findings, conclusions or a judgment concerning Count IV of appellants' complaint. This count alleges Dutter trespassed on the Medhus property while bulldozing the disputed road shut and damaged the property by removing gravel to build the Kelly bump that blocked the road. Appellants elicited testimony at the hearing on this case supporting the claim. The trial judge did not, however, enter findings, conclusions or judgment concerning the matter* The District Court should have made findings concerning this issue and entered a judgment accordingly. Claver v, Rosen- q u i s t ( 1 9 7 2 ) , 160 Mont. 4 , 1 3 , 499 P.2d 1235, 1240. W theree f o r e r e t u r n t h e matter t o t h e D i s t r i c t Court with i n s t r u c t i o n s t o e n t e r f i n d i n g s , c o n c l u s i o n s and a judgment on t h i s i s s u e . I n d o i n g s o , t h e c o u r t s h o u l d h o l d whatever f u r t h e r proceedi n g s , i f any, i t deems n e c e s s a r y . The f i n a l i s s u e r a i s e d h e r e d e a l s w i t h t h e award o f c o s t s t o respondents. MCA, S e c t i o n s 25-10-101 and 25-10-102, c o n t r o l t h e d i s p o s i t i o n of t h i s q u e s t i o n . Those s e c - t i o n s r e q u i r e t h e awarding of c o s t s t o t h e p l a i n t i f f s o r t h e d e f e n d a n t s i n c a s e s o f t h i s n a t u r e upon a judgment i n t h e i r favor. I n t h i s c a s e , t h e judgment g r a n t e d a p p e l l a n t s a n e a s e ment o v e r a p o r t i o n of r e s p o n d e n t s ' p r o p e r t y , b u t d e n i e d a p p e l l a n t s any r i g h t t o u s e t h e s e c t i o n o f r o a d o v e r which t h e a p p e l l a n t s prayed f o r a n easement i n t h e i r c o m p l a i n t . On remand, t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t may f i n d i n f a v o r o f a p p e l l a n t s o r r e s p o n d e n t s on a p p e l l a n t s ' t r e s p a s s c l a i m . The judgment s t a t e d r e s p o n d e n t s s h o u l d t a k e n o t h i n g by t h e i r c o u n t e r c l a i m b u t a l s o o r d e r e d Medhus t o move h i s f e n c e . Respon- d e n t s had r e q u e s t e d t h e f e n c e be moved a s p a r t of t h e i r counterclaim. The judgment t h u s found i n f a v o r of b o t h p a r t i e s t o t h e l a w s u i t on d i f f e r e n t i s s u e s i n v o l v e d i n t h e case. W e have p r e v i o u s l y h e l d t h a t a p l a i n t i f f need n o t r e c o v e r on a l l c l a i m s p r e s e n t e d by a c o m p l a i n t t o be e n t i t l e d t o c o s t s under s e c t i o n 25-10-101, MCA. J o n e s v . Great N o r t h e r n R a i l r o a d Company ( 1 9 2 3 ) , 68 Mont. 231, 242-245, 677-678. 217 P . 673, W e have a l s o a l l o w e d a d e f e n d a n t t o r e c o v e r c o s t s when o n l y p a r t i a l l y s u c c e s s f u l on a c o u n t e r c l a i m b u t t o t a l l y s u c c e s s f u l i n d e f e a t i n g t h e p l a i n t i f f ' s claim. Mungus ( 1 9 0 3 ) , 28 Mont. 357, 359-360, 72 P . Spencer v . 663, 664. We have n e v e r s q u a r e l y f a c e d , however, t h e i s s u e of awarding c o s t s i n a c a s e where t h e p l a i n t i f f p a r t i a l l y s u c c e e d s on t h e c o m p l a i n t and t h e d e f e n d a n t p r e v a i l s a s t o a p a r t of t h e counterclaim. I n the only case presenting t h e question, the Court decided i n favor of t h e defendant without discussion. Aronow v . H i l l ( 1 9 3 0 ) , 87 Mont. 153, 1 6 3 , 286 P. 1 4 0 , 1 4 4 . Montana a d o p t e d i t s c o s t s t a t u t e from C a l i f o r n i a . That s t a t e s t i l l h a s a s i m i l a r s t a t u t o r y s e t u p f o r awarding costs. S e c t i o n 1032, C a l . Code Civ. Proc. In interpreting t h e i r c o s t s t a t u t e s , t h e C a l i f o r n i a c o u r t s have come t o t h e s a m e r e s u l t r e a c h e d i n Aronow by d e t e r m i n i n g which p a r t y p r e v a i l e d on t h e main i s s u e i n c o n t r o v e r s y i n a case. Whiting v . S q u e g l i a ( 1 9 2 4 ) , 70 Cal.App. 990. 1 0 8 , 232 P . 986, I n Whiting t h e p l a i n t i f f s f i l e d a c o m p l a i n t and t h e defendant counterclaimed. The t r i a l c o u r t e n t e r e d a judg- ment g r a n t i n g t h e p l a i n t i f f s p a r t o f t h e r e l i e f t h e y req u e s t e d and t h e d e f e n d a n t p a r t o f h i s c l a i m w i t h c o s t s t o t h e defendant. Whiting, 232 P . a t 987. On a p p e a l , t h e award o f c o s t s w a s upheld under t h e c o s t s s t a t u t e based on t h e r a t i o n a l e t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t had p r e v a i l e d on t h e main i s s u e i n c o n t r o v e r s y and, t h e r e f o r e , judgment had been entered i n h i s favor. W h i t i n q , 232 P . a t 990. Given t h e u s e o f t h e main i s s u e i n c o n t r o v e r s y r u l e i n California i n interpreting cost s t a t u t e s s i m i l a r t o those i n Montana, w e now a d o p t t h e r u l e i n Montana f o r i n t e r p r e t i n g s e c t i o n s 25-10-101 and 25-10-102, MCA. If a plaintiff files a c o m p l a i n t i n a n a c t i o n covered by s e c t i o n 25-10-101, MCA, and s u c c e e d s o n l y p a r t i a l l y , t h e p l a i n t i f f i s e n t i t l e d t o costs. I f an a c t i o n i s f i l e d , t h e defendant counterclaims and s u c c e e d s i n h a v i n g t h e p l a i n t i f f ' s c l a i m t o t a l l y d e n i e d b u t o n l y r e c o v e r s a p o r t i o n of t h e r e l i e f demanded i n t h e counterclaim, t h e defendant should r e c e i v e c o s t s . If, however, a p a r t y i n i t i a t e s a l a w s u i t , t h e d e f e n d a n t c o u n t e r c l a i m s , and t h e judgment awards b o t h p a r t i e s p a r t o f t h e r e l i e f t h e y s e e k , t h e p a r t y p r e v a i l i n g o n t h e main i s s u e i n c o n t r o v e r s y i n t h e case must be a l l o w e d c o s t s . Applying t h i s r u l e t o t h e c a s e a t b a r , w e f i n d t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t c o r r e c t l y awarded c o s t s t o r e s p o n d e n t s . The main i s s u e i n c o n t r o v e r s y h e r e was t h e e x i s t e n c e o f a n easement a c r o s s t h e d i s p u t e d road. The c l o s i n g o f t h e r o a d p r e c i p i t a t e d t h e l a w s u i t a n d most o f t h e t e s t i m o n y a t t h e t r i a l concerned t h e e x i s t e n c e of a n easement over t h e road. R e s p o n d e n t s p r e v a i l e d on t h a t i s s u e . The c o s t s t a t u t e s t h e r e f o r e e n t i t l e d them t o t h e i r c o s t s o f s u i t , i n c l u d i n g t h e c o s t o f t h e s u r v e y n e c e s s a r y t o d e t e r m i n e boundary between t h e Medhus a n d D u t t e r p r o p e r t i e s . The judgment i s a f f i r m e d i n p a r t b u t remanded t o t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t w i t h i n s t r u c t i o n s t o e n t e r a judgment o n a p p e l l a n t s ' t r e s p a s s claim. W e concur: Cbref J u s t i c e i$&Z&+ Justices

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