SCHOOL DIST NO 4 v COLBURG

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No. 12996 I N T E SUPREME C U T OF T E STATE O M N A A H OR H F OTN 1976 SCHOOL DISTRICT NO 4, Lincoln County, Montana, R e l a t o r and A p p e l l a n t , DOLORES COLBURG, Superintendent of P u b l i c I n s t r u c t i o n , S t a t e of Montana, and JAMES G. SICHTING, Respondents and Respondents. Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court o f t h e Eleventh J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Honorable Robert K e l l e r , Judge p r e s i d i n g . Counsel of Record: For Appellant : Smith, Smith & Sewell, Helena, Montana Chadwick H. Smith argued, Helena, Montana William A. Douglas appeared, Libby, Montana For Respondents : Hon. Robert L. Woodahl, Attorney General, Helena, Montana -- -- - W H + z f i W ~ ~ ~ - r C : 3 e ~ C a r r o l l C. Blend argued, Great F a l l s , Montana Fennessey, Crocker and Harman, Libby, Montana David W. Harman argued, Libby, Montana Submitted: ~ February 4 , 1976 Decided: fd:t.r .r . , : ~ a M r . J u s t i c e Wesley C a s t l e s d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e Court. T h i s appeal i s from a judgment of t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t , Lincoln County, which a f f i r m e d a d e c i s i o n of respondent S t a t e Superintendent of Public I n s t r u c t i o n i n a m a t t e r where a p p e l l a n t , Board of T r u s t e e s of School D i s t r i c t No. 4 , Lincoln County, dec i d e d n o t t o renew a teaching c o n t r a c t and t h e County Superintendent and t h e S t a t e Superintendent r e v e r s e d t h a t holding. The Board of T r u s t e e s of School D i s t r i c t No. 4 , Lincoln County, r e l a t o r and a p p e l l a n t , h e r e i n a f t e r r e f e r r e d t o a s T r u s t e e s , determined a t a ~ r u s t e e s ' meeting on March 20, 1972, t h a t t h e t e a c h i n g c o n t r a c t of James G. S i c h t i n g would n o t be renewed f o r t h e 1972-73 school y e a r . A l e t t e r from t h e D i s t r i c t Superintendent informed S i c h t i n g of t h i s a c t i o n taken by t h e T r u s t e e s . Following a r e q u e s t from S i c h t i n g f o r a statement o f r e a s o n s f o r t h e ~ r u s t e e s ' d e c i s i o n pursuant t o s e c t i o n 75-6104, R.C.M. 1947, t h e D i s t r i c t Superintendent r e p l i e d by a l e t t e r s t a t i n g s i x r e a s o n s f o r t h e t e r m i n a t i o n on A p r i l 1, 1972. A t s i c h t i n g l s request a hearing before t h e T r u s t e e s was h e l d A p r i l 24, 1972. A t t h a t hearing t h e Trustees r e a f f i r m e d t h e i r d e c i s i o n n o t t o renew ~ i c h t i n g ' sc o n t r a c t . That d e c i s i o n was appealed by S i c h t i n g t o t h e Lincoln County Superintendent o f Schools. P r i o r t o t h e h e a r i n g , counsel f o r t h e T r u s t e e s and f o r S i c h t i n g met i n an e f f o r t t o d e f i n e t h e i s s u e s t o be heard. Subsequently, a t t h e h e a r i n g c o u n s e l f o r t h e Trustees read a s t i p u l a t i o n i n t o t h e record. made no o b j e c t i o n t o t h e s t i p u l a t i o n . Counsel f o r S i c h t i n g When a t t h e h e a r i n g counsel f o r t h e T r u s t e e s i n t r o d u c e d l e t t e r s which r e l a t e d t o the s t i p u l a t i o n , S i c h t i n g ' s a t t o r n e y s t a t e d t h e y were a c c e p t a b l e "to show t h e procedural steps. 81 Following testimony o f w i t n e s s e s f o r both p a r t i e s , t h e County Superintendent r e v e r s e d t h e d e c i s i o n o f t h e T r u s t e e s because t h e l e t t e r of A p r i l 1, 1972 t o S i c h t i n g f a i l e d t o meet r e q u i r e ments o f s e c t i o n 75-6104. This d e c i s i o n was appealed t o t h e S t a t e Superintendent who affirmed t h e County Superintendent on August 10, 1972. The T r u s t e e s then sought t o have t h e d e c i s i o n s o f t h e S t a t e Superintendent and County Superintendent s e t a s i d e by t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t . That c o u r t remanded t h e m a t t e r t o t h e County Superintendent f o r f u r t h e r testimony r e g a r d i n g t h e s t i p u l a t i o n , and whether S i c h t i n g was given s u f f i c i e n t n o t i c e by t h e A p r i l 1, 1972 l e t t e r . T h e r e a f t e r t h e County Superintendent a g a i n r e v e r s e d t h e ~ r u s t e e s 'd e c i s i o n . On appeal t o t h e S t a t e Superintendent, t h e County s u p e r i n t e n d e n t ' s d e c i s i o n was a f f i r m e d . The n e x t p r o c e d u r a l s t e p was a p e t i t i o n f o r c e r t i o r a r i f o r review of t h e S t a t e S u p e r i n t e n d e n t ' s d e c i s i o n - * t a k e nby . t h e Trustees t o the d i s t r i c t court. Affirmance o f t h e S t a t e Superin- tendent's decision precipitated t h i s appeal. These i s s u e s a r e s e t f o r t h on a p p e a l , b u t a c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f I s s u e No. 3 i s a c t u a l l y d e t e r m i n a t i v e . W discuss the others e i n t h a t context. 1) Whether t h e l e t t e r of A p r i l 1, 1972, from D i s t r i c t Superintendent Watkins t o S i c h t i n g p u r p o r t i n g t o s t a t e t h e r e a s o n s f o r t e r m i n a t i o n was s u p p l i e d by t h e Board of T r u s t e e s of t h e School D i s t r i c t a s r e q u i r e d by s e c t i o n 75-6104, R.C.M. 2) 1947? Whether t h e l e t t e r of A p r i l 1, 1972, was a statement d e c l a r i n g c l e a r l y and e x p l i c i t l y t h e s p e c i f i c r e a s o n s f o r terminat i o n , a s r e q u i r e d by s e c t i o n 75-6104, R.C.M. 3) 1947? Whether a s t i p u l a t i o n e n t e r e d i n t o by t h e counsel of r e c o r d a t t h e h e a r i n g on May 1 6 , 1972, was b i n d i n g and e f f e c t i v e l y precluded c o n s i d e r a t i o n of t h e s e c t i o n 75-6104, R.C.M. 1947, r e - quirement t h a t t h e A p r i l 1, 1972 l e t t e r d e c l a r e " c l e a r l y and e x p l i c i t l y t h e s p e c i f i c reason o r r e a s o n s f o r t h e t e r m i n a t i o n of hfs services. * *.*." Simply p u t , t h e b a s i s f o r t h i s a p p e a l from t h e r e v e r s a l of t h e T r u s t e e s A p r i l 24, 1972 d e c i s i o n t o r e a f f i r m t h e i r e a r l i e r d e c i s i o n n o t t o renew ~ i c h t i n g ' st e a c h i n g c o n t r a c t r e v o l v e s about t h e ~ r u s t e e s 'compliance w i t h s t a t u t o r y procedures of n o t i f i c a t i o n t o the teacher. Only t h e h e a r i n g b e f o r e t h e T r u s t e e s on A p r i l 24, 1972, a c t u a l l y reached t h e m e r i t s of t h e r e a s o n s f o r t h e nonrenewal o f ~ i c h t i n g ' sc o n t r a c t . - 3 - W d i s c u s s f i r s t t h e m a t t e r of t h e s t i p u l a t i o n b e f o r e e t h e County Superintendent. There i s no d i s p u t e t h a t p r i o r t o t h e h e a r i n g c o u n s e l f o r t h e T r u s t e e s and counsel f o r t h e t e a c h e r met w i t h t h e County Superintendent concerning management o f t h e h e a r i n g . I t i s a l s o n o t d i s p u t e d t h a t t h e s e same c o u n s e l , w i t h t h e a d d i t i o n of Gary C h r i s t i a n s e n , co-counsel f o r S i c h t i n g , were p r e s e n t a t t h e h e a r i n g b e f o r e t h e County Superintendent on May 26, 1972. A t that time t h e County Superintendent r e a d t h i s statement i n t o t h e r e c o r d : " A t a p r e - h e a r i n g conference, t h e f o l l o w i n g s t i p u l a t i o n s were agreed upon by c o u n s e l o r s : " ( I ) That M r . S i c h t i n g , an I n d u s t r i a l A r t s Teacher i n t h e Libby J u n i o r High School, i s e n t i t l e d t o t h e p r o t e c t i o n of t h e Teacher Tenure S t a t u t e s ; "(2) That t h e Board of T r u s t e e s r e s o l v e d by m a j o r i t y v o t e of i t s membership t o t e r m i n a t e h i s s e r v i c e s a t t h e end of t h e c u r r e n t school y e a r , and t h a t he was s o n o t i f i e d ; " ( 3 ) That t h e r e a f t e r he r e q u e s t e d and r e c e i v e d a w r i t t e n s t a t e m e n t , c l e a r l y and e x p l i c i t l y d e c l a r i n g t h e s p e c i f i c r e a s o n f o r t e r m i n a t i o n of h i s s e r v i c e s ; "(4) That he then r e q u e s t e d a h e a r i n g b e f o r e t h e Board t o r e c o n s i d e r i t s d e c i s i o n ; "(5) That t h e Hearing s o r e q u e s t e d was h e l d and t h e Board r e a f f i r m e d i t s d e c i s i o n t o t e r m i n a t e h i s services. "It now becomes t h e d u t y of t h e County Superintendent t o determine t h e t r u t h of t h e c h a r g e s , and t h e i r s u f f i c i e n c y t o support t h e t e r m i n a t i o n . I n t h e t r i a l of t h i s i s s u e , t h e burden of proof i n i t i a l l y r e s t s upon t h e Respond e n t School Board, With t h a t , M r . Douglas, you may begin." (Emphasis s u p p l i e d . ) Counsel f o r S i c h t i n g r a i s e d no o b j e c t i o n t o t h e s t i p u l a tions. Statements from M r . C h r i s t i a n s e n o n l y c l a r i f i e d t h a t , h e was n o t p r e s e n t a t t h e prehearing conference and explained t h e p r e s e n t a t i o n of t h e summation of ~ i c h t i n g ' sc a s e . L a t e r a t t h e May 26, 1972 h e a r i n g , C h r i s t i a n s e n made t h i s s t a t e m e n t w i t h r e g a r d t o l e t t e r s r e f e r r i n g t o Items (2) and ( 3 ) of t h e s t i p u l a t i o n : "MR. CHRISTIANSEN: Your Honor, i f t h e s e a r e o f f e r e d s o l e l y t o show t h e procedural s t e p s , we have no o b j e c t i o n p I f t h e y a r e o f f e r e d t o show t h e proof o f any basis for the action, we would object to them on that grounds. "MR. DOUGLAS: Your Honor, or Mr. Superintendent, excuse me, we offer these only to show the procedural steps that were taken. "MR. CHRISTIANSEN: With that explicit understanding, we would have no objection"(Emphasis supplied.) Taken together with the understanding of the stipulation indicated by Mr. Christiansen in his deposition, it appears clear that counsel intended to limit the issues to be considered at the hearing before the County Superintendent. On review of the State superintendent's affirmance of the County superintendent's decision, the district court was bound by the stipulation of the parties unless contrary to law, court rule, or public policy. Capital Nat. Bank of Sacramento v. Smith, 62 C.A.2d 328, 144 P.2d 665. Here, both parties agreed the issue to be resolved was the substance and truth of the charges against Sichting and whether they merited his termination. Of such a stipulation the Supreme Court of Kansas in Manhattan Bible College v. Stritesky, 192 Kan. 287, 387 P.2d 225,228, said: "* * * A stipulation that only one issue, or only particular issues, are involved authorizes entry of judgment for the one party or the other as the stipulated fact or issue is decided. ik * * Where parties by stipulation prescribe the issues on which the case is to be tried, they are estopped from thereafter asserting that the case was tried or submitted on the wrong theory; and a stipulation of this nature, unlike a stipulation which merely eliminates a single issue, amounts to a binding waiver or elimination of all i.ssues not included. I I In the instant case, counsel for Sichting waived any objections to the sufficiency of the notice in the April 1, 1972 letter; such waiver of an advantage of any provision of a law intended solely for his benefit is proper. Section 49-105, R.C.M. 1947; Shea v. North-Butte Min. Co., 55 Mont. 522, 538, 179 P. 499; Commercial Credit Co. v. O'~rien,115 Mont. 199, 216, 146 P.2d 637. Thus the district court erred, as a matter of law, in basing its judgment on a conclusion of law concerning a claim not within the stipulation made by the parties concerning the issue to be determined. Frye v. Switzer, 145 Colo. 401, 359 P.2d 370,371. Further discussion of the sufficiency of the notice in the April 1, 1972, letter is unnecessary in view of our determination the parties stipulated to its completeness. Next, we consider the conclusion reached by the district court that the statement of reasons given to Sichting by the District Superintendent did not satisfy the requirement of section 75-6104, R.C.M. 1947, which provides that such a statement shall be supplied by the Trustees. In our view such an argument exalts form over substance. The stipulation noted heretofore states in part : That the Board of Trustees resolved by "2 () majority vote of its membership to terminate his services at the end of the current school year, and that he was so notified". (Emphasis supplied.) It cannot be disputed then that the Trustees did resolve not to renew ~ichting's contract. Considering whether the delegation of the statutory responsibility to notify the teacher was proper, we take note of the discussion in the Anno. 92 ALR2d 751,763: "The statutes requiring that a teacher who is to be discharged, or whose contract is not to be renewed, be given notice of the matter, ordinarily specify the person or officials to give the notice in question, and the sufficiency of such notice has sometimes been attacked, although with little success, on the ground that the action was taken by one other than the authorized officials." (Emphasis supplied.) The annotation cites two cases. In Baugh v. Board of Education, 244 Ala. 522, 14 S.2d 508, and Knickerbocker v. Redlands High School District, 49 Cal.App.2d 722, 122 P.2d 289, the courts held that notification of a decision already reached by the school board and sent by the superintendent did not constitute an improper delegation. The superintendent's action here was purely a ministerial one by the chief executive officer of the Trustees. Hence the conclusion of the district court on this issue was error, as a matter of law. In sum, section 75-6104, R.C.M. 1947, was fully complied with by the Trustees in their action notifying Sichting of the nonrenewal of his teaching contract. There is thus no legal basis for the reversal of that decision by the County Superintendent and the subsequent affirmance of the County Superintendent by the State Superintendent. Similarly, it was reversible error for the district court on certiorari to base its judgment on noncompliance with the procedures provided for in that statute and for it to neglect a valid stipulation of the parties. The judgment of the district court is reversed and the cause remanded for entry of judgment in accordance with this opinion and the ~rustees'decision of April 24, 1972. d \ +I ,.- - We Concur: I F 9 - ~<>+8, fa:,'< i , - d,. -* Chief Justaice ~~ddWp!L* Justices.

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