BAHM v DORMANEN

Annotate this Case

Download PDF

No. 12949 I N THE SUPREME C U T O THE STATE O M N A A OR F F OTN 1975 JOAN M. BAHM, a s A d m i n i s t r a t r i x o f t h e E s t a t e of F A K BAHM, Deceased and RN i n d i v i d u a l l y a s r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of h e r s e l f and t h e minor c h i l d r e n o f FRAKBAHM, Deceased, P l a i n t i f f and A p p e l l a n t , R N L DORMANEN, O AD Defendant and Respondent. Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Fourth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Honorable E. Gardner Brownlee, Judge p r e s i d i n g . Counsel of Record : For Appellant : Johnson and F o s t e r , Lewis town, Montana Robert L. Johnson argued, Lewis town, Montana For Respondent : Garlington, Lohn and Robinson, Missoula , Montana Gary L. Graham argued, Missoula, Montana Submitted : Decided September 22, 1975 :Ec 0 1975 f M r . J u s t i c e Wesley C a s t l e s d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e Court. T h i s i s an a p p e a l By p l a i n t i f f i n a p e r s o n a l i n j u r y a c t i o n from a summary judgment f o r defendant by t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t , Missoula County, t h e Hon. E. Gardner Brownlee, p r e s i d i n g . P l a i n t i f f i n i t i a t e d t h i s s u r v i v a l and wrongful d e a t h a c t i o n a f t e r a head-on automobile c o l l i s i o n on U.S. Highway 93 south of Missoula i n v o l v i n g a v e h i c l e d r i v e n by h e r husband Frank Bahm, and a v e h i c l e d r i v e n by one William Nordahl on October 31, 1970. Nordahl and Bahm d i e d a s a r e s u l t of t h e a c c i d e n t . d r i v e n by Nordahl was owned by Jack Tripp. The v e h i c l e Defendant Dormanen was n o t p r e s e n t a t t h e c o l l i s i o n scene. The e v e n t s l e a d i n g t o t h e f a t a l a c c i d e n t r e v o l v e about a d e c i s i o n made by Nordahl and defendant Ronald Dormanen t o go on a hunting t r i p . T h i s d e c i s i o n was made w h i l e they were d r i n k i n g a t t h e Florence b a r i n F l o r e n c e , Montana. A f t e r d e c i d i n g t o go h u n t i n g , t h e two men proceeded t o S t e v e n s v i l l e where t h e y borrowed a pickup and h o r s e t r a i l e r from Jack Tripp. Dormanen then drove t h e pickup and h o r s e t r a i l e r t o ~ o r d a h l ' shome t o g e t Nordahl's h o r s e . Next Dormanen drove t h e T r i p p t r u c k t o Florence s o t h a t he could g e t h i s c a r and d r i v e i t home. home i n t h e T r i p p v e h i c l e . Nordahl was t o f o l l o w Dormanen The c o l l i s i o n between ~ a h m ' sv e h i c l e and t h e pickup d r i v e n by Nordahl occurred b e f o r e Nordahl reached Dormanen's home. Dormanen had a l r e a d y d r i v e n home i n h i s own c a r and d i d n o t l e a r n of t h e a c c i d e n t u n t i l l a t e r . A t e s t of Nordahl's blood i n d i c a t e d t h a t he was i n t o x i c a t e d a t t h e time of t h e a c c i d e n t . P r i o r t o b r i n g i n g t h i s a c t i o n , p l a i n t i f f brought a n o t h e r s u r v i v a l and wrongful d e a t h ' a c t i o n a g a i n s t Jack T r i p p and t h e E s t a t e o f William Nordahl, which was s e t t l e d o u t of c o u r t . I n t h e i n s t a n t c a s e , a f t e r t h e answer was f i l e d and d i s c o v e r y accomplished, defendant moved f o r summary judgment. After a hearing Judge Brownlee granted t h e motion which i s now b e f o r e t h i s Court on appeal. P l a i n t i f f c i t e s t h r e e a s p e c t s of t h e c a s e which s h e contends p r e s e n t genuine i s s u e s of m a t e r i a l f a c t making summary judgment improper. However, we need only d i s c u s s t h e a s p e c t of t h e c a s e r e l a t i n g t o t h e t h e o r y upon which t h e r i g h t t o r e c o v e r i s based t o determine t h e p r o p r i e t y of summary judgment here. I t i s w e l l e s t a b l i s h e d t h a t summary judgment pursuant t o Rule 5 6 ( c ) , Montana Rules of C i v i l Procedure, i s n o t a proper t o o l The burden of e s t a b l i s h i n g f o r r e s o l v i n g d i s p u t e d i s s u e s of f a c t . t h a t t h e r e i s no d i s p u t e d i s s u e of m a t e r i a l f a c t i s on t h e moving party. Flanagan v. Curran, 164 Mont. 262, 265, 521 P.2d 200 and cases c i t e d therein. Before t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t and i n t h i s Court, p l a i n t i f f a s s e r t e d t h a t defendant h a s n o t met h i s burden because f a c t u a l d e t e r m i n a t i o n s were r e q u i r e d t o r e s o l v e d e f e n d a n t ' s l i a b i l i t y under t h e t h e o r y of n e g l i g e n t entrustment. But, a f t e r examining t h e r e c o r d , we f i n d no f a c t s i n e x i s t e n c e o r o f f e r e d t o t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t which g i v e r i s e t o a genuine i s s u e of m a t e r i a l f a c t concerning n e g l i g e n t entrustment by t h e defendant. S p e c i f i c a l l y t h e t h e o r y of n e g l i g e n t entrustment provides t h a t t h e owner o r one i n c o n t r o l of t h e v e h i c l e and r e s p o n s i b l e f o r i t s u s e who i s n e g l i g e n t i n e n t r u s t i n g i t t o a n o t h e r can be h e l d l i a b l e f o r such n e g l i g e n t entrustment. Anno. 19 ALR3d 1175,1192. See Smith v. Babcock, 157 Mont. 81, 482 P.2d 1014, f o r a p r i o r t r e a t m e n t of t h e concept by t h i s Court. I n h i s memorandum t o t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t , defendant c i t e d evidence from d e p o s i t i o n s which he a s s e r t e d proved t h e absence of one o f t h e elements of n e g l i g e n t entrustment---the over t h e vehicle---because defendant. r i g h t of c o n t r o l i t had been loaned t o both Nordahl and P l a i n t i f f does n o t d i s p u t e this f a c t t h a t t h e v e h i c l e was loaned t o both men, b u t i n s i s t s t h a t defendant d i d have t h e p h y s i c a l power (by d e p r i v i n g Nordahl of t h e keys) t o prevent Nordahl from t a k i n g t h e t r u c k . This power p l a i n t i f f argues i s s u b s t a n t i a l enough c o n t r o l t o bottom l i a b i l i t y under n e g l i g e n t e n t r u s t m e n t . A l t e r n a t i v e l y , p l a i n t i f f advances t h e t h e o r y o f j o i n t e n t e r p r i s e a s a b a s i s f o r l i a b i l i t y , even i f Nordahl and defendant only shared c o n t r o l of t h e v e h i c l e . T h e r e f o r e , i t i s n e c e s s a r y t o determine t h e scope of t h e concept of c o n t r o l a s i t r e l a t e s t o n e g l i g e n t entrustment. W e look f o r guidance t o c a s e s from t h e s t a t e of Maryland where t h e t h e o r y of n e g l i g e n t entrustment has had a r e l a t i v e l y long h i s t o r y . I n a d o p t i n g n e g l i g e n t entrustment i n t h e c a s e of Rounds v. P h i l l i p s , 166 Md. 151, 170 A . 532, t h e Maryland c o u r t c i t e d Restatement of T o r t s , 5 260, a s s u p p o r t f o r t h e d o c t r i n e . That s e c t i o n i s now 5 390, 2 Restatement of T o r t s 2d, and i t s a p p l i c a b i l i t y was / r e a f f i r m e d i n t h e Maryland c a s e s of General V a l e t S e r v i c e , I n c . v. Curley, 16 Md.App. 453, 298 A.2d 190,192, and Curley v. General V a l e t S e r v i c e , I n c . , 270 Md. 248, 311 A.2d 231,237. 2 Restatement of T o r t s 2d, 5 390 provides: It One who s u p p l i e s d i r e c t l y o r through a t h i r d person a c h a t t e l f o r t h e u s e of a n o t h e r whom t h e s u p p l i e r knows o r has r e a s o n t o know t o b e l i k e l y because of h i s youth, i n e x p e r i e n c e o r o t h e r w i s e , t o u s e i t i n a manner i n v o l v i n g unreasonable r i s k of p h y s i c a l harm t o himself and o t h e r s whom t h e s u p p l i e r should expect t o s h a r e i n o r b e endangered by i t s u s e , i s s u b j e c t t o l i a b i l i t y f o r p h y s i c a l harm r e s u l t i n g t o them. II (Emphasis added.) Discussion following 5 390 s t a t e s i t i s merely a s p e c i a l a p p l i c a t i o n of 5 308, which provides: 11 It i s n e g l i g e n c e t o permit a t h i r d person t o u s e a t h i n g o r t o engage i n an a c t i v i t y which i s under t h e c o n t r o l o f t h e a c t o r , i f t h e a c t o r knows o r should know t h a t such person i n t e n d s o r i s l i k e l y t o u s e t h e t h i n g o r t o conduct himself i n t h e a c t i v i t y i n such a manner a s t o c r e a t e an unreasonable r i s k of harm t o o t h e r s . " (Emphasis added.) Comments t o 5 308, 2 Restatement of T o r t s 2d, i n d i c a t e c o n t r o l means : ** 'I* t h a t t h e t h i r d person i s e n t i t l e d t o p o s s e s s o r u s e t h e t h i n g o r engage i n t h e a c t i v i t y o n l y - b y t h e consent of t h e a c t o r , and t h a t t h e a c t o r h a s reason t o b e l i e v e t h a t by withholding consent he can prevent t h e t h i r d person from u s i n g t h e t h i n g o r engaging i n t h e a c t i v i t y . " (Emphasis added.) From t h e above s e c t i o n s and o f f i c i a l comments, i t i s c l e a r t h a t t h e b a s i s of n e g l i g e n t entrustment i s founded on c o n t r o l which i s g r e a t e r than p h y s i c a l power t o prevent. A s u p e r i o r i f n o t exclu- s i v e l e g a l r i g h t t o t h e o b j e c t i s a p r e c o n d i t i o n t o t h e imposition of t h e l e g a l duty. Defendant o f f e r e d t o t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t such proof a s t o e s t a b l i s h t h a t he d i d n o t have such e x c l u s i v e o r s u p e r i o r cont r o l of t h e T r i p p t r u c k . Thus, a s a m a t t e r of law, he was e n t i t l e d t o summary judgment u n l e s s p l a i n t i f f could overcome t h i s proof. p l a i n t i f f ' s p h y s i c a l c o n t r o l arguments a r e i n s u f f i c i e n t t o overcome d e f e n d a n t ' s proof i n view of t h e above d i s c u s s i o n . The only o t h e r b a s i s f o r r e v e r s i n g summary judgment, according t o p l a i n t i f f , i s t h e theory of j o i n t e n t e r p r i s e . Montana c a s e law h a s determined t h e elements of j o i n t v e n t u r e t o i n c l u d e a community of pecuniary i n t e r e s t a s w e l l a s j o i n t c o n t r o l . v. Neal, 165 Mont. 520, 530 P.2d 428, 432, 31 St.Rep. Rude 1033; KapLan v. Hauf, 158 Mont. 359, 366, 492 P.2d 213; Sumner v. Amacher, 150 Mont. 544, 554, 437 P.2d 630. Although p l a i n t i f f urges t h i s Court t o f i n d a community of pecuniary i n t e r e s t i n t h e planned h u n t i n g t r i p we can f i n d no evidence of a pecuniary motivation f o r t h e e x p e d i t i o n . Neal, supra. Rude v. I n a d d i t i o n t h e r e was n o t t h e r e q u i s i t e j o i n t c o n t r o l between Nordahl and defendant a t t h e time of t h e a c c i d e n t because Nordahl was d r i v i n g a l o n e . Hence, we f i n d t h e r e was s u f f i c i e n t c r e d i b l e evidence and no m a t e r i a l f a c t s t o t h e c o n t r a r y t o permit t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t t o g r a n t summary judgment t o defendant. Judgment i s a££irmed. We concur: Chief Justice

Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.

This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.