RUDE v NEAL KERR

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No. 12526 I N T E SUPREME C U T O T E STATE O MONTANA H OR F H F 1974 DEAN A. RUDE, P l a i n t i f f and Respondent, JAMES N A and WILBERT KERR, EL d / b / a KERR TRUCKING SALES, Defendants and Appellants. Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Fourth ~ u d i c i a lD i s t r i c t , Honorable Jack L. Green, Judge p r e s i d i n g . Counsel of Record: For Appellants : Gough, Booth, Shanahan and Johnson, Helena, Montana Murphy, Robinson, Heckathorn and P h i l l i p s , K a l i s p e l l , Montana 1. James Heckathorn, argued, K a l i s p e l l , Montana Goldman, McChesney and Datsopolous, Missoula, Montana Ronald B. MacDonald argued, Missoula, Montana For Respondent: H a r r i s , Jackson and Utick, Helena, Montana Andrew J. Utick argued, Helena, Montana Worden, Thane, Haines and Williams, Missoula, Montana ~ h e l & o nC. Williams argued, Missoula , Montana Submitted: Decided : November 12, 1974 3 0 i974 Mr. Justice Frank I. Haswell delivered the Opinion of the Court. This is an appeal from a judgment entered in the district court, Lake County, in an automobile accident damage suit. Plaintiff Dean A. Rude was the driver of a Chevrolet involved in a collision with a Ford driven by defendant James Neal, in which the owner defendant William Kerr was a front seat passenger. The accident occurred about 6:40 p.m., September 16, 1970, in front of Sam White's Bar on U. S. 12 near Elliston, Montana. Rude was driving east toward Helena when the west- bound Ford driven by Neal made a left turn across the highway to enter the private driveway at the bar. Rude applied his brakes, but was unable to avoid the collision. All three parties were injured in the accident. Rude filed a complaint, alleging the negligence of Neal and imputing that negligence to Neal's passenger Kerr on the basis of joint venture. The complaint also charged Kerr with negligence on his own part. Kerr crossclaimed against Neal, alleging gross negligence and counterclaimed against Rude alleging negligence on his part. The jury returned a verdict award- ing $10,000 to Rude in his claim against Neal and Kerr. The jury denied Kerr's claims and, in response to special interrogatories, found that: 1. Neal was negligent and his negligence was the proximate cause of the accident. 2. Neal was neither grossly negligent nor guilty of willful, wanton, or reckless conduct. 3. Rude was not negligent. 4. Kerr was negligent and his own negligence was the proximate cause of his own injuries. 5. Neal and Kerr were engaged in a joint venture at the time of the accident. Neal and K e r r a p p e a l from t h e combined judgment and t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t ' s d e n i a l o f t h e i r motions f o r judgment n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g t h e v e r d i c t o r a new t r i a l . by N e a l w i l l be c o n s i d e r e d f i r s t . 1. The i s s u e s r a i s e d They a r e : Did t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t e r r i n i n s t r u c t i n g t h e j u r y on Montana law p r o h i b i t i n g d r i v i n g on t h e l e f t s i d e o f t h e r o a d i n a no-passing zone o r when a p p r o a c h i n g t h e c r e s t of a g r a d e ? 2. Did t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t err i n a d m i t t i n g o p i n i o n t e s t i m o n y a s t o t h e speed of t h e v e h i c l e s and t h e c a u s e of t h e accident? Although N e a l a l s o p r e s e n t s argument on t h e i s s u e of j o i n t v e n t u r e , h e a d m i t s n o t b e i n g p r e j u d i c e d by t h a t a l l e g e d e r r o r . W t h e r e f o r e w i l l c o n s i d e r t h a t i s s u e when w e d i s c u s s K e r r ' s a p p e a l . e Neal does n o t s u g g e s t t h a t t h e i n s t r u c t i o n s complained of a r e a n i n c o r r e c t s t a t e m e n t of t h e law. It i s apparent t h a t they merely s e t f o r t h t h e r e q u i r e m e n t s of s e c t i o n s 3 2 - 2 1 5 6 ( a ) ( l ) and 32-2157, R.C.M. 1947. N e a l a r g u e s , however, t h a t t h o s e s t a t u t e s do n o t a p p l y t o l e f t t u r n s i t u a t i o n s . H e contends t h a t giving t h o s e i n s t r u c t i o n s , oombined w i t h g i v i n g a n i n s t r u c t i o n making s t a t u t o r y v i o l a t i o n s n e g l i g e n c e a s a m a t t e r o f l a w , amounts t o a d i r e c t e d v e r d i c t on t h e i s s u e of Neal's n e g l i g e n c e . S e c t i o n 32-2156, R.C.M. 1947, p r o v i d e s , i n p e r t i n e n t part: I' ( a ) N o v e h i c l e s h a l l a t any t i m e be d r i v e n t o t h e l e f t s i d e c f t h e roadway under t h e f o l l o w i n g conditions: '1. When a p p r o a c h i n g t h e c r e s t o f a g r a d e o r upon a c u r v e i n t h e highway where t h e d r i v e r ' s view i s o b s t r u c t e d w i t h i n s u c h d i s t a n c e a s t o c r e a t e a hazard i n t h e event another v e h i c l e m i g h t a p p r o a c h from t h e o p p o s i t e d i r e c t i o n * * S e c t i o n 32-2157, R.C.M. *". 1947, a s amended by S e c t i o n 1, C h a p t e r 97, Laws of Montana, 1957, and i n e f f e c t a t t h e t i m e of t h i s a c c i d e n t , provided: "(a) The commission is hereby authorized to determine those portions of any highway where overtaking and passing or driving to the left of the roadway would be especially hazardous and may by appropriate signs or markings on the roadway indicate the beginning and end of such zones and when such signs or markings are in place and clearly visible to an ordinarily observant person every driver of a vehicle shall obey the directions thereof. " (b) Where signs or markings are in place to define a no-passing zone as set forth in paragraph (a) no driver shall at any time drive on the left side of the roadway within such no-passing zone or on the left side of any pavement striping designed to mark such no-passing zone throughout its length." Both statutes provide that, under certain circumstances, no vehicle shall be driven on the left side of the road "at any time". Here, Neal turned left,in a no-passing zone within 500 feet of the crest of a hill. However, we are not persuaded that these statutes apply. In Wilburn v. Simons, 302 Ky. 752, 196 S.W.2d 356, 358, the Kentucky court dealt with statutory provisions virtually identical to section 32-2156, R.C.M. 1947. In applying their statute, the court said: " * * * It is the duty of a car driver to keep off the left side of a highway when he approaches the crest of a hill. KRS 189.340. While this does not mean that a driver could not turn left to enter a driveway just in front of the crest of a hill, yet it does mean, we think, that a driver should necessarily exercise care under these circumstances and turn at a reasonably safe angle.* * * " In Green v. Boney, 233 S.C. 49, 103 S.E.2d 732, 66 ALR2d 1370, the South Carolina court was called upon to apply a statute similar to section 32-2157, R.C.M. 1947. That court held that it was not always negligence to turn left across a yellow barrier line for the purpose of entering a private driveway, but depended upon the circumstances of each case. While Rude has urged that we not follow this rationale, he has cited no c a s e s holding t h a t s i m i l a r s t a t u t e s p r o h i b i t l e f t t u r n s . I n 1957, t h e Montana l e g i s l a t u r e amended s e c t i o n 32-2157, R.C.M. 1 9 4 7 , a d d i n g t h e s e c o n d p a r a g r a p h a s i t a p p e a r s i n t h e S e c . 1, Ch 97, L. 1 9 5 7 . s e c t i o n quoted above. The t i t l e o f t h a t a c t is: "An A c t t o Amend [ S e c t i o n 32-2157, R.C.M. 19471 by P r o h i b i t i n g P a s s i n g Over Pavement S t r i p i n g D e s i g n a t i n g No-Passing Zones * * *". ( B r a c k e t e d words and e m p h a s i s s u p p l i e d ) . The l e g i s l a t u r e ' s i n t e n t t o p r o h i b i t p a s s i n q i s f u r t h e r e v i d e n c e d by t h e p o s i t i o n i n g o f t h i s s e c t i o n w i t h o t h e r s d e a l i n g w i t h o v e r t a k i n g and p a s s i n g . ( S e c t i o n s 32-2153 t h r o u g h 32-2157, R.C.M. 1 9 4 7 ) . S t a t u t e s g o v e r n i n g l e f t t u r n s a r e g r o u p e d t o g e t h e r elsewhere i n t h a t c h a p t e r . 1947). ( S e c t i o n s 32-2104 t h r o u g h 32-2167, R.C.M. F u r t h e r m o r e , t h e v e r y p h r a s e " n o - p a s s i n g zone" s u g g e s t s a p r o h i b i t i o n of p a s s i n g , n o t t u r n i n g . The s e c t i o n g o v e r n i n g N e a l ' s l e f t t u r n h e r e i s s e c t i o n 32-2167, P.2d R.C.M. 1947. I n Sumner v. Amacher, 150 Mont. 544, 437 630, w e r e c o g n i z d t h a t t h i s s t a t u t e g o v e r n e d a l e f t t u r n made i n a n o - p a s s i n g z o n e , a l t h o u g h t h e i s s u e s r a i s e d t h e r e were n o t t h e same a s i n t h e i n s t a n t c a s e . Here t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t d i d g i v e a n i n s t r u c t i o n b a s e d on s e c t i o n 32-2167, R.C.M. 1947, b u t e r r e d i n a l s o g i v i n g t h e two i n s t r u c t i o n s c o v e r i n g d r i v i n g on t h e l e f t s i d e o f t h e roadway. When combined w i t h t h e i n s t r u c t i o n t h a t s t a t u t o r y v i o l a t i o n s a r e negligence a s a m a t t e r of law, t h e e r r o r was c l e a r l y p r e j u d i c i a l . McDonough v . S m i t h , 86 Mont. 545, 284 P. 542; 1 3 B l a s h f i e l d , Automobile Law a n d P r a c t i c e , 3 r d E d . , S463.3. Neal a l s o c o n t e n d s t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t e r r e d i n a l l o w i n g S g t . Dale Hanson o f t h e Montana Highway P a t r o l t o e x p r e s s h i s o p i n i o n a s t o t h e s p e e d o f t h e v e h i c l e s and t h e c a u s e o f t h e accident. The c h a l l e n g e i s n o t t o S g t . H a n s o n ' s e x p e r t q u a l i f i - c a t i o n s , b u t t o t h e a l l e g e d i n s u f f i c i e n c y o f t h e e v i d e n c e upon which h e b a s e d t h o s e o p i n i o n s . S g t . Hanson was t h e i n v e s t i g a t i n g o f f i c e r , a r r i v i n g a t t h e s c e n e a p p r o x i m a t e l y one h a l f hour a f t e r t h e a c c i d e n t t o o k place. H e observed t h e r o a d and w e a t h e r c o n d i t i o n s , measured t h e s k i d marks, viewed t h e damage done t o t h e v e h i c l e s , quest i o n e d w i t n e s s e s a t t h e s c e n e and t h e p a r t i e s l a t e r . Based on t h i s e v i d e n c e and c h a r t s which he had been t r a i n e d t o u s e , he e s t i m a t e d t h a t Rude was t r a v e l i n g a t a p p r o x i m a t e l y f i f t y m i l e s p e r hour b e f o r e he a p p l i e d h i s b r a k e s . He concluded t h a t Neal was t r a v e l i n g a t a p p r o x i m a t e l y t w e n t y - f i v e m i l e s p e r hour when h e began h i s l e f t t u r n . H e a l s o t e s t i f i e d t h a t i n h i s opinion speed was n o t a f a c t o r i n t h i s a c c i d e n t , b u t t h a t it had been c a u s e d by N e a l ' s f a i l u r e t o o b s e r v e oncoming t r a f f i c and h i s f a i l u r e t o y i e l d r i g h t of way. The p r e c e d i n g p a r a g r a p h i s o n l y a summary of t h e r a t h e r e x t e n d e d t e s t i m o n y of t h e o f f i c e r . O t h e b a s i s of t h e e n t i r e n t r a n s c r i p t , w e f i n d t h a t S g t . Hanson was p r o p e r l y q u a l i f i e d a s a n e x p e r t , and was i n p o s s e s s i o n of s u f f i c i e n t f a c t s t o w a r r a n t t h e c o n c l u s i o n s which he s t a t e d . A s t h i s Court r e c e n t l y noted i n Pachek v . Norton C o n c r e t e Co., 160 Mont. 1 6 , 4 9 9 P.2d 766, e x p e r t opinion evidence i s admissible i n explaining t h e cause of a particular accident. The d i s t r i c t c o u r t d i d n o t err i n ad- m i t t i n g it h e r e . Kerr, t h e passenger i n Neal's v e h i c l e , a l s o appeals. He a l l e g e s t h e following e r r o r s : 1. The d i s t r i c t c o u r t e r r e d i n i n s t r u c t i n g t h e j u r y on t h e l a w of j o i n t v e n t u r e . 2. The d i s t r i c t c o u r t e r r e d i n i n s t r u c t i n g t h e j u r y t h a t a p a s s e n g e r ' s f a i l u r e t o warn h i s d r i v e r of imminent d a n g e r can be c o n t r i b u t o r y n e g l i g e n c e i n an a c t i o n a g a i n s t t h a t d r i v e r . 3. There was i n s u f f i c i e n t e v i d e n c e t o s u p p o r t a f i n d i n g of Kerr's c o n t r i b u t o r y n e g l i g e n c e . The c h a l l e n g e t o t h e i n s t r u c t i o n on j o i n t v e n t u r e i s n o t t h a t it i s a n i n c o r r e c t s t a t e m e n t of t h e law, b u t t h a t t h e r e was i n s u f f i c i e n t e v i d e n c e t o p r e s e n t t h e i s s u e t o t h e j u r y . The e l e m e n t s which must be p r e s e n t b e f o r e j o i n t v e n t u r e c a n be found have been s u c c i n c t l y s t a t e d i n Sumner v. Amacher, 150 Mont. 544, 554, 437 P.2d 630, where t h e C o u r t s t a t e d : "The e l e m e n t s which are e s s e n t i a l t o a j o i n t v e n t u r e a r e * * *: (1) a n a g r e e m e n t , e x p r e s s o r i m p l i e d among t h e members of t h e group; (2) a common p u r p o s e t o be c a r r i e d o u t by t h e group; ( 3 ) a community of p e c u n i a r y i n t e r e s t i n t h a t p u r p o s e among t h e members; and ( 4 ) a n e q u a l r i g h t t o a v o i c e i n t h e d i r e c t i o n of t h e e n t e r p r i s e , which g i v e s a n e q u a l r i g h t of c o n t r o l . I' See a l s o , Rae v. Cameron, 1 1 2 Mont. 159, 1 1 4 P.2d 1060; Restatement, T o r t s 2d, S491, Comment (c) . Although Neal would have b e n e f i t e d by a f i n d i n g of j o i n t v e n t u r e , b o t h by h a v i n g h i s c o d e f e n d a n t s h a r e t h e burden of a p o s s i b l e judgment and by u s i n g i t a s a d e f e n s e a g a i n s t Kerr's c r o s s c l a i m , Neal t e s t i f i e d t h e r e w a s no j o i n t v e n t u r e . Kerr t e s t i f i e d t h e r e was no j o i n t v e n t u r e . Both Neal and K e r r d e n i e d any common p u r p o s e o r community of p e c u n i a r y i n t e r e s t i n t h e t r i p which ended i n t h e c o l l i s i o n . The o n l y agreement e x p r e s s e d was t h a t Kerr a g r e e d t o r i d e a l o n g t o " g e t away from m [Kerr's] b u s i n e s s f o r a day and e n j o y t h e y outing". The o n l y e v i d e n c e i n t r o d u c e d which even r e m o t e l y sug- g e s t s a community of p e c u n i a r y i n t e r e s t w a s t h a t on a t l e a s t one p r e v i o u s o c c a s i o n , Kerr had t r a v e l e d t o a c o n s t r u c t i o n s i t e t o s e e t h e t y p e of u s e t h e c o n t r a c t o r would make of t r u c k s r e n t e d from K e r r . Although c o u n s e l f o r Rude made v a l i a n t e f f o r t s t o e l i c i t f u r t h e r i n f o r m a t i o n from N e a l , K e r r , and b u s i n e s s a s s o c i a t e s o f K e r r , t h e r e i s s i m p l y no s u b s t a n t i a l e v i d e n c e s u p p o r t i n g a common p u r p o s e o r community of p e c u n i a r y i n t e r e s t . Accordingly, w e h o l d t h a t t h e r e was i n s u f f i c i e n t e v i d e n c e , a s a m a t t e r of law, t o submit t h e i s s u e of j o i n t v e n t u r e t o t h e j u r y . McDonough v . Smith, 86 Mont. 545, 284 P. 542; 1 3 B l a s h f i e l d , Automobile Law and P r a c t i c e 3d 3d., § 463.3. F i n a l l y , w e c o n s i d e r K e r r ' s c l a i m of e r r o r i n t h e i n s t r u c t i o n s on t h e q u e s t i o n of K e r r ' s c o n t r i b u t o r y n e g l i g e n c e and t h e s u f f i c i e n c y of t h e e v i d e n c e t o s u p p o r t a f i n d i n g of c o n t r i b utory negligence. Although t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t d i d err i n i t s i n s t r u c t i o n s on d r i v i n g on t h e l e f t s i d e of t h e r o a d and on j o i n t v e n t u r e , t h a t e r r o r d i d n o t t a i n t t h e j u r y ' s f i n d i n g s t h a t Rude was n o t n e g l i g e n t and N e a l was n o t g r o s s l y n e g l i g e n t . Thus K e r r c a n n o t r e c o v e r on h i s c o u n t e r c l a i m a g a i n s t Rude i n any e v e n t . L i k e w i s e , Kerr c a n n o t r e c o v e r a g a i n s t h i s h o s t , Neal, b e c a u s e t h e j u r y found t h a t Neal was n o t g r o s s l y n e g l i g e n t o r r e c k l e s s i n h i s o p e r a t i o n of t h e Ford under Montana's g u e s t p a s s e n g e r s t a t u t e . S e c t i o n 32-1113, R.C.M. 1947. T h i s b a r s any r e c o v e r y by Kerr a g a i n s t Neal, i r r e s p e c t i v e of K e r r ' s freedom from n e g l i g e n c e . W e a f f i r m t h e judgments i n f a v o r of Rude and Neal r e s - p e c t i v e l y on K e r r ' s c o u n t e r c l a i m and c r o s s c l a i m . Rude's claim a g a i n s t Kerr. W e dismiss W v a c a t e t h e judgment of Rude a g a i n s t e Neal and remand t h a t c l a i m t o t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t f o r a new t r i a l . Justice W concur: e A - >3- / ' ...............................

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