SEDLACEK v AHRENS

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NO. 12722 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1974 VERNON D SEDLACEK, . Cross Appellant, and SIGNE M SEDUCEK, . Plaintiff and Respondent, EDWARD A AHRENS, DOROTHY G AHRENS and . . CLAYTON E AHRENS, . Defendants and Appellants. Appeal from: District Court of the Seventh Judicial District, . Honorable L. C Gulbrandson, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellants : Hutton, Sheehy and Cromly, Billings, Montana John C Sheehy argued, Billings, Montana . For Respondent: Morrison, Ettien and Barron, Havre, Montana J o Chan Ettien argued, Havre, Montana Submitted : November 14, 1974 Decided : Filed : E 3 0 $954 C DEC 3 0 '414 Mr. J u s t i c e Frank I . Haswell d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion o f t h e C o u r t . Following a n automobile-motor b i k e a c c i d e n t , t h e a u t o - mobile p a s s e n g e r sued t h e minor m o t o r c y c l i s t and h i s p a r e n t s f o r h e r p e r s o n a l i n j u r i e s and t h e a u t o m o b i l e d r i v e r sued i n a s e p a r a t e a c t i o n f o r damages t o h i s c a r . Two judgments were e n t e r e d i n t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t of McCone c o u n t y f o l l o w i n g a c o n s o l i d a t e d n o n j u r y trial: (1) Judgment f o r t h e p a s s e n g e r a g a i n s t a l l d e f e n d a n t s . ( 2 ) Judgment a g a i n s t t h e d r i v e r i n f a v o r o f a l l d e f e n d a n t s . The p a r e n t s of t h e minor m o t o r c y c l i s t a p p e a l from t h e f i r s t judgment and t h e d r i v e r c r o s s a p p e a l s from t h e second judgment. On J u l y 2 8 , 1966, a t a b o u t 4 : 0 0 p.m. C l a y t o n Ahrens, a 1 2 y e a r o l d , was d r i v i n g a Honda motor b i k e s o u t h on Montana Route 1 2 i n McCone County. Vernon S e d l a c e k was d r i v i n g a C a d i l l a c , i n which h i s w i f e S i g n e was a p a s s e n g e r , i n t h e same d i r e c t i o n behind t h e motor b i k e . A s t h e C a d i l l a c approached a p o i n t on t h e highway a b o u t 600 f e e t b e f o r e r e a c h i n g t h e a c c i d e n t s c e n e , t h e C a d i l l a c slowed from a b o u t 7 0 m i l e s p e r hour t o a b o u t 60 m i l e s p e r hour and t h e n p i c k e d up speed a s it p r e p a r e d t o p a s s t h e motor b i k e . C l a y t o n Ahrens d i d n o t s i g n a l h i s i n t e n t t o t u r n l e f t and Vernon S e d l a c e k d i d n o t sound n i s horn u n t i l he was i n t h e a c t of p a s s i n g . A s C l a y t o n Ahrens was making h i s l e f t t u r n , Vernon S e d l a c e k a p p l i e d t h e b r a k e s and p u l l e d l e f t on t o t h e s h o u l d e r r of t h e highway c a u s i n g t h e ~ a d i l l a c t o o l l . I t came t o r e s t on i t s t o p w i t h t h e f r o n t end on t h e pavement and the r e a r end half i n t h e l e f t borrow p i t . I t a p p e a r e d from marks on t h e C a d i l l a c t h a t t h e motor b i k e had c o l l i d e d w i t h t h e r i g h t r e a r f e n d e r of the car. The motor b i k e was owned by C l a y t o n A h r e n ' s f a t h e r who had p u r c h a s e d i t t e n d a y s b e f o r e t h e a c c i d e n t . C l a y t o n was u s i n g i t on Montana Route 1 2 w i t h o u t t h e knowledge of h i s p a r e n t s , Edward and Dorothy Ahrens, and a g a i n s t t h e i r i n s t r u c t i o n s t h a t he n o t go o u t upon t h e highway when u s i n g t h e motor b i k e . Signe Sedlacek received personal i n j u r i e s i n t h e a c c i dent. The C a d i l l a c w a s e x t e n s i v e l y damaged. C l a y t o n Ahrens r e - c e i v e d o n l y s u p e r f i c i a l i n j u r i e s and Vernon S e d l a c e k was n o t injured. Signe Sedlacek f i l e d a personal i n j u r y a c t i o n a g a i n s t C l a y t o n Ahrens and h i s p a r e n t s . Vernon S e d l a c e k f i l e d a n a c t i o n t o r e c o v e r damages t o h i s C a d i l l a c . Both a c t i o n s were f i l e d i n t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t of McCone County and c o n s o l i d a t e d f o r t r i a l . Judge L. C . Gulbrandson t r i e d t h e c a s e w i t h o u t a j u r y . He e n t e r e d f i n d i n g s of f a c t and c o n c l u s i o n s of law: (1) t h a t C l a y t o n Ahrens was n e g l i g e n t i n making a l e f t t u r n o f f t h e h i g h way w i t h o u t s i n n a l i n g ; ( 2 ) Vernon S e d l a c e k was c o n t r i b u t o r i l y n e g l i g e n t i n d r i v i n g a t a speed g r e a t e r t h a n was r e a s o n a b l e under t h e e x i s t i n g c o n d i t i o n s and i n f a i l i n g t o sound h i s horn p r i o r t o passing; ( 3 ) t h a t Edward Ahrens was l i a b l e f o r t h e i n j u r i e s s u f f e r e d by S i g n e S e d l a c e k by p r o v i d i n g a motor v e h i c l e t o C l a y t o n Ahrens who was a p e r s o n f o r b i d d e n by s t a t u t e t o o p e r a t e a motor v e h i c l e b e c a u s e of h i s a g e ; a n d , ( 4 ) t h a t S i g n e S e d l a c e k s u f f e r e d $4,800 damages by r e a s o n o f h e r i n j u r i e s . Judgment was e n t e r e d i n f a v o r o f S i g n e S e d l a c e k a g a i n s t C l a y t o n Ahrens and h i s p a r e n t s f o r $4,800, p l u s c o s t s . A separate judgment was e n t e r e d i n f a v o r of a l l d e f e n d a n t s a g a i n s t Vernon S e d l a c e k d e n y i n g damages t o t h e C a d i l l a c . Edward and Dorothy Ahrens, C l a y t o n ' s p a r e n t s , a p p e a l from S i g n e S e d l a c e k ' s $4,800 judgment a g a i n s t them; C l a y t o n Ahrens d o e s n o t a p p e a l from t h i s judgment. Vernon S e d l a c e k c r o s s a p p e a l s from t h e judgment denying him r e c o v e r y f o r damages t o t h e C a d i l l a c . Clayton's p a r e n t s contend t h a t n e i t h e r i s l i a b l e f o r t h e i n j u r i e s t o S i g n e S e d l a c e k under t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s f i n d i n g s and conclusions. A t t h e o u t s e t , we n o t e t h e r e a r e no f i n d i n g s n o r con- c l u s i o n s of t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t t h a t s u p p o r t any l i a b i l i t y on t h e p a r t of Dorothy Ahrens. The d i s t r i c t c o u r t s o p r o v i d e d i n t h e concluding paragraph of i t s findings: "WHEREFORE, l e t Judgment be e n t e r e d i n f a v o r of t h e p l a i n t i f f , Signe Sedlacek, a g a i n s t t h e d e f e n d a n t s , C l a y t o n E. Ahrens and Edward A . Ahrens, i n t h e sum of $4800 and h e r c o s t s . " The judgment was i n a d v e r t e n t l y e n t e r e d a g a i n s t a l l d e f e n d ants. The name of Dorothy Ahrens i s o r d e r e d s t r i c k e n from t h e judgment t o conform t o t h e f i n d i n g s and c o n c l u s i o n s . Two s t a t u t e s of Montana's Motor V e h i c l e Code a r e r e l e v a n t t o a d i s c u s s i o n o f Edward Ahrens' l i a b i l i t y : S e c t i o n 31-156, R.C.M. 1947, p r o v i d e s : "(1)No p e r s o n s h a l l c a u s e o r knowingly p e r m i t h i s c h i l d o r ward under t h e a g e o f e i g h t e e n ( 1 8 ) y e a r s t o d r i v e a motor v e h i c l e upon any highway when s u c h minor i s n o t a u t h o r i z e d h e r e u n d e r o r i n v i o l a t i o n of any p r o v i s i o n s of t h i s a c t . " S e c t i o n 31-127, R.C.M. 1947, p r o v i d e d a t t h e t i m e of t h e accident : "The board s h a l l n o t i s s u e any l i c e n s e h e r e u n d e r : "(1) To any p e r s o n , a s a n o p e r a t o r , who i s under t h e a g e o f s i x t e e n ( 1 6 ) y e a r s , w i t h t h e s e exceptions: " ( b ) t h e board may i s s u e a r e s t r i c t e d l i c e n s e a s h e r e i n a f t e r p r o v i d e d t o any p e r s o n who i s a t l e a s t t h i r t e e n (13) y e a r s of a g e * * *." Edward Ahrens c o n t e n d s t h a t he i s n o t l i a b l e b e c a u s e (1) he d i d n o t knowinqly p e r m i t h i s son C l a y t o n t o d r i v e t h e motor b i k e upon t h e highway i n v i o l a t i o n of s e c t i o n 31-156, and ( 2 ) t h e l i c e n s i n g s t a t u t e d o e s n o t f o r b i d a minor below l i c e n s i n g a g e t o d r i v e a motor b i k e on p r i v a t e p r o p e r t y . Edward's c o n t e n t i o n s m i s s t h e p o i n t . The b a s i s of h i s liability is entrustment of the motor bike to a person not qualified to operate it on a public highway. Liability is not predicated on knowingly permitting Clayton to drive the motor bike on the highway in violation of section 31-156. The relevant basis of liability was expressed in this language by the district court : "The defendant, Edward Ahrens, by providing a motor vehicle to Clayton Ahrens who was a person forbidden by statute to operate a motor vehicle because of his age, is liable for injuries caused to the plaintiff, Signe Sedlacek, by the negligent operation of the motor bike by Clayton Ahrens." Licensing statutes such as section 31-127, R.C.M. 1947, prohibiting the issuance of an operator's license to a minor below a prescribed age are enacted under a state's police powers in the interests of public safety. One of the objects of such statutes is to protect users of the highways from inexperienced and immature drivers. Charbonneau v. MacRury, 84 N.H. 501, 153 A. 457, 73 ALR 1266. Such statutes are legislative declarations that minors under licensing age are incompetent drivers and do not possess sufficient care and judgment to operate motor vehicles on the public highways without endangering the lives and limbs of others. Schultz v. Morrison, 91 Misc. Rep. 248, 154 N.Y.S. 257, aff'd 172 App.Div. 940, 156 N.Y.S. 1144; 7 Am Jur 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic B 107. The fact that such a minor deviates from the consent given and exceeds its limitations will not relieve the provider from liability. § 8 Am Jur 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic 575; Shrout v. Rinker, 148 Kan. 820, 84 P.2d 974; Strout v. Polakewich, 139 Me. 134, 27 A.2d 911. Liability is not bottomed on agency or imputed negligence where the scope of consent or authority may play a significant role. Respondeat superior and the family purpose doctrine are alien considerations. The act of the provider himself is the basis of liability--placing an unlicensable minor in possession of an instrumentality which in his immature and incompetent hands becomes dangerous to other motorists the licensing statute is designed to protect. Counsel for defendants have cited three cases under similar facts where other courts have held the parent is not liable. Fitiles v. Umlah, 322 Mass. 325, 77 N.E.2d 212; Prewitt v. Walker, 231 Miss. 860, 97 S.2d 514; Marron v. Helmecke, 100 Colo. 364, 67 P.2d 1034. All are distinguishable. Fitiles and Marron involved an agency relationship of employer-employee with scope of employment and consent the controlling elements in regard to liability. Prewitt involved imputed negligence arising from the parents' signatureson a minor's application for a driver's license. We affirm Signe Sedlacek's judgment against Edward Ahrens. The thrust of the crossappeal is that Vernon Sedlacek could not have been contributorily negligent because (1) the accident happened the way Sedlaceks testified and not the way Clayton said it did; (2) in any event, neither excessive speed nor failure to sound the horn prior to passing proximately caused the accident. The first point simply involves a conflict in the evidence. We have consistently held under such circumstances that this Court cannot substitute its weighing of the evidence for that of the trial court. When there is a conflict in the evidence, the findings of the trial court are presumed to be correct if supported by substantial credible evidence. Rose, Mont - . , City of Missoula v. 519 P.2d 146, 31 St.Rep. 191. The second point involves causation. Vernon Sedlacek's contention, as we understand it, is that Clayton Ahrensl negligence was the sole proximate cause of the accident and that neither e x c e s s i v e speed nor f a i l u r e t o sound h i s horn p r i o r t o p a s s i n g on t h e p a r t of Vernon S e d l a c e k c o n t r i b u t e d t o t h e c a u s e of t h e accident. E x c e s s i v e speed by S e d l a c e k c o u l d have c o n t r i b u t e d a s a p r o x i m a t e c a u s e of t h e a c c i d e n t under t h e e v i d e n c e . "But f o r " s u c h e x c e s s i v e speed t h e C a d i l l a c c o u l d have been s t o p p e d s h o r t o f a c o l l i s i o n , o r a t l e a s t s h o r t of t h e d i t c h . s a i d of t h e horn. The same may be "But f o r " S e d l a c e k ' s f a i l u r e t o sound h i s horn s u f f i c i e n t l y i n advance of p a s s i n g , C l a y t o n would have been warned of t h e o v e r t a k i n g C a d i l l a c i n t i m e t o a v o i d t u r n i n g i n i t s p a t h . The " b u t f o r " t e s t i n d e t e r m i n i n g p r o x i m a t e c a u s e h a s been approved i n Montana. S z t a b a v . G r e a t Northern Ry., 147 Mont. 1 8 5 , 4 1 1 P.2d 379. Haney v . Mutual Creamery Co., does not support Sedlacek here. 67 Mont. 278, 215 P. 6 5 6 , Haney s i m p l y h e l d t h a t under t h e e v i d e n c e of p l a i n t i f f , he was n o t c o n t r i b u t o r i l y n e l g i g e n t a s a m a t t e r of law and t h e q u e s t i o n s h o u l d be s u b m i t t e d t o t h e j u r y . The judgments of t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t , a s m o d i f i e d t o e l i m i n a t e Dorothy Ahrens, a r e a f f i r m e d . Justice We c o n c u r : ,, -, .. c ; .- - -,;~-a-i,~~----=--~-%--h- ' Chief J w t i c - e Mr. Justice Wesley Castles dissenting in part and concurring in part: I concur in striking the name of Dorothy Ahrens from the judgment. I also concur in affirming the judgment on the crossappeal of Vernon Sedlacek. I dissent to the affirmance of the judgment against Edward Ahrens. The majority opinion holds the basis for li- ability as being negligent entrustment of a motor bike by the parent to a person disqualified from operating it on a public highway. In my view, the district court's conclusion relied upon by the majority is not a conclusion of negligent entrustment but rather one of vicarious liability. The majority reasons that: Since Clayton was under thirteen years of age and was legally incapable of obtaining a driver's license, he was incompetent as a matter of law from operating a motor vehicle and the Ahrens should have known such fact. However, when this statute is viewed together with sec- tion 31-125(a), R.C.M. 1947, which forbids the operation of a motor vehicle without a license "upon a highway in this state", it can be readily seen that the law declares a person under thirteen to be incompetent only for the purpose of driving upon a highway. There is no law in Iontana which prevents any un- licensed person from operating a motor vehicle upon private real property. It is common knowledge that children raised on Montana farms begin to drive motor vehicles and farm implements on and about the farm at an early age. The Ahrens' permission and knowledge of Clayton's use of the motor bike extended only to the farm premises, not to the highway. We would have an entire- ly different situation had the Ahrens provided Clayton with the motor bike for use on the highway or where such use could have been reasonably expected to occur. This Court has rejected the family purpose doctrine. Clawson v. Schroeder, 63 Mont. 488, 208 P. 924; Smith v. Babcock, - 8 - 157 Mont. 81, 482 P.2d 1014. P l a i n t i f f s a l s o r e l y on Edward Ahrens' p l e a of g u i l t y t o a v i o l a t i o n of s e c t i o n 31-156, R.C.M. 1947, which p r o h i b i t s a p e r s o n t o knowingly p e r m i t h i s c h i l d o r ward t o d r i v e a motor v e h i c l e upon any highway when such minor i s n o t a u t h o r i z e d . While t h e p l e a i s a d m i s s i b l e a s e v i d e n c e of t h e p r o p o s i t i o n t h a t Edward knowingly p e r m i t t e d C l a y t o n t o d r i v e on t h e highway, i t i s not conclusive. S i k o r a v. S i k o r a , 160 Mont. 27, 3 3 , 499 P.2d 808. The d i s t r i c t c o u r t found t h a t "Clayton was u s i n g t h e Honda bike m o t o r / a t t h e t i m e o f t h e a c c i d e n t on t h e highway * * * w i t h o u t t h e knowledge of t h e p a r e n t s , and a g a i n s t t h e i r i n s t r u c t i o n s t h a t he n o t go o u t upon t h e highway i n u s i n g s a i d motor b i k e . " T h i s f i n d i n g i s f u l l y s u b s t a n t i a t e d by t h e e v i d e n c e . I would a l s o h o l d a s a m a t t e r of law t h a t t h e e v i d e n c e p r e s e n t e d by p l a i n t i f f s d o e s n o t p r e s e n t any i s s u e of n e g l i g e n t entrustment. The s o l e e v i d e n c e which c o u l d p o s s i b l y l e a d t o a f i n d i n g of n e g l i g e n t e n t r u s t m e n t i s : t h e motor b i k e was i n f a c t e n t r u s t e d t o C l a y t o n ; h i s p a r e n t s knew C l a y t o n w a s t w e l v e y e a r s o l d ; C l a y t o n had had no t r a i n i n g o r i n s t r u c t i o n i n t h e d r i v i n g of a motor b i k e p r i o r t o it b e i n g e n t r u s t e d t o him t e n d a y s e a r l i e r ; and, Edward p l e a d g u i l t y t o a v i o l a t i o n of s e c t i o n 31156, R.C.M. 1947. Clayton w a s s p e c i f i c a l l y i n s t r u c t e d t o only u s e t h e motor b i k e around t h e farm and n o t t o go on t h e highway. The r e c o r d i s d e v o i d of any e v i d e n c e a s t o C l a y t o n ' s h a b i t s o r c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s which would i n d i c a t e t h a t h i s p a r e n t s knew o r s h o u l d have known t h a t C l a y t o n would v i o l a t e t h e i r i n s t r u c t i o n s o r was u n a b l e t o p r o p e r l y o p e r a t e t h e Honda. The d i s t r i c t c o u r t s p e c i f i c a l l y n e g a t e d t h e g u i l t y p l e a by f i n d i n g t h a t t h e p a r e n t s were w i t h o u t knowledge of C l a y t o n ' s u s e of t h e motor b i k e on t h e highway. On t h e s e f a c t s , viewed i n a farm s e t t i n g , t h e r e i s n o t even a n i n f e r e n c e of n e g l i g e n c e . U - 9 - Justice

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