STATE EX REL DEPT OF HWYS v PUB
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No. 12765 I N THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1974 THE STATE OF MONTANA, ACTING BY AND THROUGH THE DEPARTMENT O F HIGHWAYS OF THE STATE OF MONTANA, P l a i n t i f f and A p p e l l a n t , PUBLIC EMPLOYEES CRAFT COUNCIL OF MONTANA, REPRESENTING THE MONTANA D I S T R I C T COUNCIL OF LABORERS, THE J O I N T COUNCIL OF TEAMSTERS NO. 23, THE MONTANA MACHINISTS COUNCIL , OPERATING ENGINEERS , AND PA INTERS ; V I R G I L BUETTNER AS PRESIDENT OF S A I D COUNCIL AND JAMES L. MURRAY AS SECRETARY-TREASURER OF S A I D COUNCIL, D e f e n d a n t s and R e s p o n d e n t s . Appeal from: D i s t r i c t C o u r t of t h e F i r s t J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , H o n o r a b l e P e t e r G. M e l o y , Judge p r e s i d i n g . C o u n s e l of R e c o r d : For A p p e l l a n t : Jack H o l s t r o m argued, and D a n i e l J. S u l l i v a n appeared, H i g h w a y Legal D e p a r t m e n t , H e l e n a , M o n t a n a For R e s p o n d e n t s : H i l l e y and L o r i n g , G r e a t F a l l s , M o n t a n a B e n j a m i n W. H i l l e y argued and E m i l i e L o r i n g argued, G r e a t Falls, M o n t a n a N o v e m b e r 18, 1974 Submitted: Decided : DE C 9 x 7974 - M r . Chief J u s t i c e James T. Harrison d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e Court. This c a s e involves a s t r i k e by approximately 285 teamsters, operating.eagineers, machinists, l a b o r e r s , and p a i n t e r s employed by a p p e l l a n t Montana Department of Highways t o perform a l l highway maintenance f u n c t i o n s on i n t e r s t a t e , primary, and c e r t a i n secondary roads i n t h e Butte, Great F a l l s , Missoula, Bozeman, and Helena a r e a s , These employees were r e s p o n s i b l e f o r t h e r e p a i r , r e c o n d i t i o n i n g , and g e n e r a l upkeep of roughly 3,000 miles of roads. Their major d u t i e s were: removing snow and i c e from t h e t r a v e l e d s u r f a c e s and applying t r a c t i o n m a t e r i a l s such a s sand and chemicals; patching, r e s u r f a c i n g , and regrading road s u r f a c e s ; r e p a i r i n g b r i d g e s and o t h e r highway s t r u c t u r e s ; r e p a i r i n g , replacing, o r i n s t a l l i n g snow fences, c u l v e r t s , d i t c h e s , fences, t r a f f i c s a f e t y devices, s i g n s and s i g n a l s , g u a r d r a i l s , and t r a f f i c d e l i n e a t o r s w i t h i n right-of-way l i m i t s ; s t o c k p i l i n g t r a c t i o n m a t e r i a l s f o r snow season u s e ; r e p a i r i n g and maintaining roads i d e r e s t a r e a s , l i t t e r b a r r e l s , and campsites; r e p a i r i n g and maintaining s t a t e motor pool v e h i c l e s , snow plows, road p a t r o l s , c a t e r p i l l a r s , and o t h e r equipment u t i l i z e d i n a p p e l l a n t ' s maintenance o p e r a t i o n s ; and performing s e r v i c e s during emergencies, such a s a s s i s t i n g stranded m o t o r i s t s , removing o b s t r u c t i o n s (overturned v e h i c l e s , rock s l i d e s , e t c , ) , and providing t r a f f i c c o n t r o l , Of n e c e s s i t y , t h e s e a c t i v i t i e s w e r e performed on a 24 hour b a s i s . The s t r i k e by respondent Public Employees C r a f t Council a g a i n s t a p p e l l a n t occurred on January 21, 1974, and a p p e l l a n t a p p l i e d t o t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t of Lewis and Clark County t h e same day f o r a temporary r e s t r a i n i n g o r d e r p r o h i b i t i n g t h e s t r i k e . The d i s t r i c t c o u r t granted a p p e l l a n t ' s request and scheduled a show cause hearing t o determine whether t h e s t r i k e should be permanently enjoined. Respondent f i l e d a motion t o dismiss a p p e l l a n t ' s complaint, and a show cause hearing thereon was scheduled f o r March 28, 1974. At the hearing on the motion to dismiss, the allegations contained in appellant's complaint--including those relating to disruption of highway maintenance programs and injury to the health, safety, and welfare of the traveling public--were admitted. It should be noted here, however, that the issues before us and discussed hereafter in this opinion, do not involve injury to the health, safety and welfare of the traveling public. Nevertheless, the district court granted the motion to dismiss and dissolved the temporary restraining order. Appellant appeals from that order. There is but one issue: Did the district court err in determining that the maintenance employees of the Hontana Department of Highways have the right to strike under ~ontana's PublicEmployees Collective Bargaining Act ? The portion of the Public Employees Collective Bargaining Act in dispute, section 59-1603(1), RCM ... 1947, provides: "Public employees shall have and shall be protected in the exercise of, the right of self-organization, to form, join or assist any labor organization, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing on questions of wages, hours, fringe benefits, and other conditions of employment and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection. free from interference, restraint or coercion. " (~mphasisadded). This language is almost idential to that found in the Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act), 1947, which at 29 U.S.C.A., 5 157, provides: "Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist in labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection * * *. " (Emphasis added). The phrase "concerted activities" does not appear in any other Montana statute, and this Court has never been called upon to interpret it. The phrase first appeared in the Norris-LaGuardia Anti-Injunction Act, 1932, at 29 U.S.C., 5 102; then in the National Labor Relations Act (Wagner Act), 1935, at 49 Stat.449, 452; and again in the Taft-Hartley Act, 1947, 29 U.S.C.A., 5 157. Consequently, some forty years of federal interpretation is behind this language. The United States Supreme Court, as well as innumerable lower federal courts, has consistently held that It concerted activities" includes strikes. Automobile Workers v. ~ ' ~ r i e n , U.S. 454, 94 L ed 978, 70 S.Ct. 781; Bus Employees 339 v. Wisconsin Board, 340 U.S. 383, 389, 71 Sect. 359, 95 L ed 364; Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, 348 U.S. 468, 75 S.Ct. 480, 99 L ed 546. These cases all involved state legislative attempts to limit the right to strike in the private sector. The Supreme Court found such efforts to be in conflict with the protections afforded by the Taft-Hartley Act and thus unconsitutional under the Supremacy Clause (Article VI) of the United States Constitution. In Bus Employees, the Supreme Court stated: "We have recently examined the extent to which Congress has regulated peaceful strikes for higher wages in industries affecting commerce. Automobile We noted Workers v Ol~rien,339 U.S. 454 (1950). . that Congress, in 5 7 of the National Labor Relations Act of 1935, as amended by the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, ex ressly safeguarded for employees in such industries the F:right * * * to engage in * * * concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, e.g., to strike. t It Appellant contends that a different interpretation of "concerted activities" ought to prevail here, since public rather than private employees are involved. The California Supreme Court considered the same proposition in Los Angeles Metropolitan Transit Authority v Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, 8 Cal.Rptr. 1, . 355 P.2d 905, 997. In that case the Los Angeles Metropolitan Transit Authority Act created a public authority for transportation of passengers in a four county area in and around Los Angeles. Stats. 1957, ch. 547, as amended by Stats. 1959, ch. 519. Sub- division (c) of section 3 6 of that Act provided that employees of the . Transit Authority had the right, among others, to engage "in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection." When the employees struck, the Transit Authority sought a declaratory judgment that they were without the legal right to strike because they were public employees. The c o u r t held unequivocally t h a t t h e g r a n t of t h e r i g h t t o engage i n I1 concerted a c t i v i t i e s f f meant t h e same t h i n g f o r public employees a s i t d i d f o r p r i v a t e employees, t h a t i s , i t included t h e r i g h t to strike: "When l e g i s l a t i o n has been j u d i c i a l l y construed and a subsequent s t a t u t e on t h e same o r an analogous s u b j e c t i s framed i n t h e i d e n t i c a l language, i t w i l l o r d i n a r i l y be presumed t h a t t h e L e g i s l a t u r e intended t h a t t h e language a s used i n t h e l a t e r enactment would be given a l i k e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . This r u l e i s a p p l i c a b l e t o s t a t e s t a t u t e s which a r e patterned a f t e r f e d e r a l s t a t u t e s . [Citing c a s e s ] Although t h e c a s e s which have i n t e r p r e t e d t h e i t a l i c i z e d words involved p r i v a t e employees, t h e a c t before us i n c o r p o r a t e s t h e exact language, c o n s i s t i n g of 16 words, found i n t h e e a r l i e r s t a t u t e s , and i t i s u n l i k e l y t h a t t h e same words would have been repeated without any q u a l i f i c a t i o n i n a l a t e r s t a t u t e i n t h e absence of an i n t e n t t h a t they be given t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n previously adopted by t h e c o u r t s . I1 W t h i n k s i m i l a r standards of j u d i c i a l c o n s t r u c t i o n apply i n e t h e present case. For example, s e c t i o n 19-102, R.C.M. 1947, pro- vides : "Words and phrases used i n t h e codes o r o t h e r s t a t u t e s of Montana a r e construed according t o t h e context and t h e approved usage of t h e language; b u t t e c h n i c a l words and phrases, and such o t h e r s a s have acquired a p e c u l i a r and a p p r o p r i a t e meaning i n law, o r a r e dekined i n t h e succeeding s e c t i o n , a s amended, a r e t o be construed according t o such p e c u l i a r and a p p r o p r i a t e meaning o r d e f i n i t i o n . " (Emphasis added). - A f t e r more than f o r t y years of c o n s t r u c t i o n by f e d e r a l and s t a t e courts, II concerted a c t i v i t i e s " i n d i s p u t a b l y has become a l a b o r law t e r m , a t e c h n i c a l phrase which has a p p r o p r i a t e meaning i n law". 11 acquired a p e c u l i a r and That meaning includes s t r i k e s . Appellant may wish t h a t t h e s t a t u t e read otherwise but t h i s Court i s n o t a t l i b e r t y t o amend our s t a t u t e s . S t a t e v. Midland National Bankel= Mont. 339, 343, 317 P.2d 880. This Court con- cludes t h a t ~ o n t a n a ' s l e g i s l a t u r e meant t h e phrase "concerted a c t i v i t i e s " t o have a meaning i d e n t i c a l t o t h a t found i n analogous s t a t u t e s of o t h e r j u r i s d i c t i o n s . To hold otherwise would f l a u n t a c a r d i n a l p r i n c i p l e of s t a t u t o r y c o n s t r u c t i o n . This conclusion i s r e i n f o r c e d by t h e f a c t t h a t employees under ~ o n t a n a ' sC o l l e c t i v e Bargaining Act, Sections 59-1601 through 59-1616, R.C.M. 1947, a r e nowhere p r o h i b i t e d from s t r i k i n g . Two other classes of Montana public employees---nurses and teachers-have specific restrictions or bans on their right to strike. sections 41-2209 and 75-6120(2) (c) , R.C.M. See 1947. We comment further that the purposes expressed in the nurses, teachers and public employees acts are similar. section 41-2201, R.C.M. expressed If* ** As to the nurses, 1947, enacted in 1969, the purpose was to encourage the practice of mutually and peace- fully agreeing upon the establishment and maintenance of desirable employment practices * * *." In the teachers act, section 75-6116, R.C.M. 1971, the purpose was expressed I ' *** 1947, enacted in to establish procedures which will facilitate and encourage amicable settlement of disputes.I' In the public employees act, section 59-1601, R.C.M. enacted in 1973, the purpose was expressed "* * * 1947, to encourage the practice and procedure of collective bargaining to arrive at friendly adjustment * * *." If the legislaturehd intended to limit respondent's right to strike, it could have done so expressly as it did with nurses and teachers, since as heretofore shown all this legislation had the same expressed purpose. Since respondent had the right to strike specifically granted its members by the legislature, the order of the district court dismissing the complaint and dissolving the temporary restraining order is affirmed. 4 - .i . - --------------:- - ,--, -r-lii,,----- 1 Chief Justice. , I
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