BEEBE v JOHNSON
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No. 12536 I N THE SUPREME COURT O THE STATE O M N A A F F OTN D N L R. BEEBE, A d m i n i s t r a t o r O AD o f t h e E s t a t e o f Dorothy Beebe and Donald Beebe, PlaS-ntif £5 and A p p e l l a n t s , RllLPH JOHNSON and ALVIN F. SIHRER, Defendants and Respondents. Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court o f t h e F o u r t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Honorable Jack L. Green, Judge p r e s i d i n g . Counsel of Record: For Appellants : McGarvey, Morrison, White and Hedman, W h i t e f i s h , Montana Frank B. Morrison a r g u e d , W h i t e f i s h , Montana C h r i s t i a n , McCurdy, Ingraham and Wold, Polson, Montana F o r Respondent : Korn, Warden & W a l t e r s k i r c h e n , K a l i s p e l l , Montana Merrit N. Tdarden a r g u e d , and Gary G. C h r i s t i a n s e n a r g u e d , K a l i s p e l l , Montana Submitted: Decided: Filed : S E P 3 1914 May 24, 1974 SEP 3 1974 Mr. Justice John Conway Harrison delivered the Opinion of the Court . Plaintiff Donald R. Beebe secured a jury verdict in an action for damages for the wrongful death of his wife Dorothy and, in his representative capacity as administrator of her estate, maintained an action under the survival statute;and an action for personal injuries he suffered as a result of the same automobile accident which occurred in Lake County. Subsequently the district court of Lake County granted defendants a new trial. From the order granting defendants a new trial, plaintiff appeals. The issues on appeal are: 1 Did the trial court err in failing to grant defendants' . motion to set aside the verdict of the jury and enter a verdict for the defendants notwithstanding such verdict? 2. In the alternative, did the trial court err in vacating and setting aside the verdict of the jury and granting a new trial for one or more of the reasons set forth in the defendants' motion? 1 Plaintiff brought the action ( ) as administrator of his wife's estate for the wrongful death of his wife, (2) as administrator of his wife's estate under Montanats survival statute section 93-2824, R.C.M. 1947, and (3) for personal injuries to himself in the same accident. The jury awarded him this verdict: "To the estate of Dorothy Beebe, the sum of ...$ 33,705.65 "To Donald R. Beebe, as Administrator in his representative capacity for the heirs of Dorothy Eeebe the sum of $40,000.00 ................,..... "To Donald R. Beebe, Individually, the sum of.. 3,304.77". The automobile accident involved occurred midafternoon on February 24, 1969. The site of the accident was in front of the Elmo Store on U.S. Highway 93 in Lake County, Montana. Plaintiff and his wife had been to Kalispell on business and were returning home along the west shore of Flathead Lake when they came up behind two loaded logging trucks, which were also proceeding south. Dorothy Beebe was driving their 1966 Datsun automobile, while plaintiff was reading. Plaintiff testified he became aware of the first logging truck ahead of them shortly after they came around a curve north of the Elmo Store and that after following the truck for a short distance, his wife pulled out into the lane to their left to pass the truck. He estimated that just prior to pulling out to pass, they had slowed down from 45 to 35 miles per hour and, in order to pass, his wife had shifted into third gear which speeded them up to between 50 and 60 miles per hour during the pass. The first of the south bound logging trucks was driven by a R.obert Hanson. The truck ahead of him was owned by Alvin S. Sihrer and was driven by Ralph Johnson, both defendants herein. Hanson testified he had followed the Sihrer truck for some time, traveling at about 55 miles per hour coming around the turn north of Elmo and into the straightaway. That at that speed he was catching up to the truck ahead, for it had begun to slow down. This caused Hanson to slow down to around 45 miles per hour and at the same time closed the distance between the two trucks to several truck lengths-approximately 120 feet to 180 feet separating them just prior to the accident. Hanson further testified that at no time, from the top of the hill north of the Elmo Store to the point where the Sihrer truck turned off the highway in front of the store, did he see any brake lights or turning lights on the Sihrer truck. He indicated the rear of the Sihrer truck was visible to him at all times. He testified he had not seen the Datsun behind him until just prior to the accident and the first time he saw it the Datsun had pulled up alongside of the cab of his truck in the left or north lane of the highway. His testimony described what happened then: "Q. After yog gaw the Datsun, what movement, if any, did you/t6e Sihrer truck make? A. He was turning off. "Q. Where was he turning? A. Into the Elmo Store. "Q. Did.you continue to watch him as he went into the turn? "A. I was more or less watching the Datsun. * "Q. Jc Jc During t h e time t h a t t h e S i h r e r t r u c k was s t i l l on t h e highway, d i d you continue t o watch p him? A. U u n t i l she went around him, yes. "Q. And a f t e r she went around you, had the S i h r e r t r u c k turned a c r o s s t h e c e n t e r l i n e ? A. H had e s t a r t e d a c r o s s t h e c e n t e r l i n e when I f i r s t seen h e r . A t any time d i d you s e e any s i g n a l on t h e S i h r e r "Q. logging t r u c k ? "A. I did n o t n o t i c e any, no. II A summary of p l a i n t i f f ' s testimony n o t e s t h a t he was a passenger i n t h e Datsun driven by h i s w i f e , and t h a t p r i o r t o passing t h e f i r s t t r u c k , driven by Hanson, h i s c a r had slowed down but i n making t h e pass they speeded up t o approximately 60 miles per hour. It was then he f i r s t n o t i c e d t h e S i h r e r t r u c k t u r n i n g t o t h e l e f t i n t o t h e l a n e of t r a f f i c they were using t o make t h e pass. He t e s t i f i e d t h e S i h r e r t r u c k was s t i l l i n t h e southbound lane and t h a t t h e f r o n t wheel of t h e t r a c t o r had j u s t crossed over t h e c e n t e r l i n e . H f u r t h e r t e s t i f i e d t h a t a s they e pulled a b r e a s t of t h e Hanson truck and i n t o f u l l view of t h e S i h r e r t r u c k , j u s t before t h e a c c i d e n t , he saw no l i g h t s i n d i c a t i n g t h e S i h r e r t r u c k was t u r n i n g t o t h e l e f t . P l a i n t i f f ' s w i f e , Dorothy, s u f f e r e d m u l t i p l e i n j u r i e s which l e f t h e r paralyzed from t h e w a i s t down. She had numerous o p e r a t i o n s , spent considerable time i n h o s p i t a l s and u l t i m a t e l y died on November 16, 1970. P l a i n t i f f s u f f e r e d a broken arm and o t h e r i n j u r 5 e s which h o s p i t a l i z e d him f o r s e v e r a l weeks. A t t h e time of t h e accident p l a i n t i f f operated a w e l l d r i l l i n g business i n western Montana, o p e r a t i n g two of h i s own r i g s and l e a s i n g another. business. Because of t h e accident he was unable t o continue i n t h i s H i s w i f e had been h i s o f f i c e manager a s w e l l a s house- keeper and mother of h i s c h i l d r e n . Johnson, d r i v e r of t h e S i h r e r t r u c k , t e s t i f i e d t h a t a s he t r a v e l e d south he saw t h e Hanson t r u c k behind him; t h a t a s he came o f f t h e curve n o r t h of t h e Elmo S t o r e , he decided he wanted somet h i n g a t t h e s t o r e so he made preparations t o stop t h e r e ; t h a t he looked i n h i s r e a r view m i r r o r , saw t h a t t h e Hanson t r a c k was a reasonable d i s t a n c e away and saw another c a r behind t h e Hanson t r u c k which he estimated t o be a q u a r t e r t o h a l f a m i l e behind him; t h a t he put h i s s i g n a l l i g h t s on and s t a r t e d t o slow down; t h a t he began c r o s s i n g t h e c e n t e r l i n e and a s he d i d so he heard no horn o r any sound i n t h e a r e a a s he p u l l e d ogf t h e road t o park before t h e Elmo Store. H t e s t i f i e d a s t o what occurred a t t h a t time: e "Q. Did you ever s e e o r d i d you look again i n your r e a r view mirror while you were i n t h e course of turning i n t o t h e Elmo Store? A . Yes, I did. "Q. And where was your t r u c k a t t h a t time? A. The t r a c t o r i t s e l f was p r e t t y w e l l o f f t h e highway and t h e t r a i l e r was say, i n t h e l e f t hand lane. It was j u s t about t o leave i t and onto t h e driveway, "8. Your t r a c t o r was j u s t about o f f ? A. I t was o f f . The t r a i l e r was i n t h e l e f t hand lane. "Q. I n t h e northbound l a n e ? A . Right, approximately. And d i d you look i n your r e a r view mirror a t "Q. t h a t time? A. Yes, s i r , I d i d . "Q. And what d i d you observe? A. I observed t h e r e d Datsun a t t h a t time a s near a s I can r e c a l l r i g h t alongside t h e Hanson truck. And how f a r behind you was Hanson's t r u c k a t t h a t "Q. t i m e . A, Oh, I would say maybe t h r e e , maybe f o u r lengths. "Q. Truck l e n g t h s ? A. Yes, Truck lengths. He gained a l i t t l e maybe, not much. It was p r e t t y hard t o t e l l i n t h e mirror. "Q. W e l l , what a c t i o n d i d you take i f any? A. W e l l I had t o keep going. I d i d n ' t d a r e s t o p o r anything, So I went on i n t o t h e parking l o t , p u l l e d i n along t h e parking l o t t h e r e , which i s a guard r a i l and a s I s t a r t e d t o g e t out I seen-"Q. I w i l l g e t t o t h a t i n j u s t a moment. happened. A. --things I suppose--was i t necessary f o r you t o - - i t may "Q. sound l i k e a s t u p i d question and i t i s , but was i t necessary f o r you t o slow your t r u c k down? A. I had t o slow m t r u c k down q u i t e considerably. y II Q. And was your t r u c k going f a s t o r slow then when you saw t h i s Datsun t h i s second t i m e as you were p u l l i n g i n t o t h e parking a r e a i n f r o n t of t h e Elmo S t o r e ? A . I was g e t t i n g p r e t t y slow. "Q. A. Is i t easy t o s t o p a load t h a t b i g i n a s h o r t d i s t a n c e ? No, i t i s n ' t . "Q. When you have t o slow i t down? i t down p r e t t y gradually. A. You have t o b r i n g "Q. A l r i g h t . Then you proceeded on i n t o t h e parking a r e a i n f r o n t of t h e Elmo S t o r e ? A. Uh huh. I1 Q. You d i d b r i n g your t r u c k t o a s t o p ? A. Yes, I d i d , "Q. And then what d i d you do o r what happened? t h a t i s when I s t a r t e d t o g e t out. A. Well, "Q. And then what happened? A. Well, I seen a hub cap and I knew something had happened back t h e r e but I d i d n ' t know what. "Q. Did you hear any n o i s e ? A. opened t h e door where I could. Well, I d i d a f t e r I "Q. And what kind of n o i s e ? A. It sounded l i k e a bunch of r a t t l i n g beer cans o r something r o l l i n g down t h e road. "Q. What d i d you do? t h e truck. A. Well, I proceeded ID g e t on out of "Q. Did you look around o r anything? A . Yes, I looked j u s t through t h e window on t h e o t h e r s i d e and I seen t h i s c a r come r o l l i n g down t h e road. Was t h e r e anything ahead of t h e c a r r o l l i n g down "Q. t h e road t h a t you saw? A. A bunch of pieces. "Q. A. What do you mean p i e c e s ? Windshield, hubcaps. Could you i d e n t i f y them? "Q. And d e s c r i b e how t h e c a r was r o l l i n g . Was i t r o l l i n g end over end o r sideways o r what? A. It would be sideways l i k e t h i s ( i n d i c a t i n g ) . And how many times did i t r o l l t h a t you saw? A. Well, "Q. a s f a r a s I could t e l l about t h r e e from where I was a t . Did you observe any people i n connection with t h a t "Q. c a r ? A. Yes, a f t e r I was out and saw t h e c a r I run around t h e f r o n t of t h e t r u c k and she was thrown, t h e lady was thrown o u t i n t h e middle of t h e highway. 11 Concerning t h e s i g n a l l i g h t s , Johnson t e s t i f i e d they were on f o r some f i v e o r s i x t r u c k lengths (300) f e e t before he got t o t h e Elmo S t o r e turnoff and were on a f t e r t h e accident. O cross-examination Johnson t e s t i f i e d t h e s i d e mirror was n positioned i n such a way t h a t when t h e t r u c k was s t r a i g h t i n t h e road you could look behind and s e e s t r a i g h t behind; t h a t h i s t r a i l e r was j u s t ready t o break o f f t h e highway when he saw t h e Datsun alongside t h e Hanson t r u c k ; and t h a t he was i n t h a t p o s i t i o n when he, a t an angle, saw t h e Datsun c a r . There was c o n f l i c t i n t h e testimony concerning t h e p o s i t i o n of t h e S i h r e r t r u c k a t t h e time t h e Datsun began i t s turnovers. ~ e f e n d a n t s 'witnesses maintained t h e t r u c k was i n t h e Elmo S t o r e parking l o t a t t h e time t h e accident occurred. Hanson, t h e o t h e r t r u c k d r i v e r , d i s p u t e s t h a t testimony maintaining t h a t only a p o r t i o n of t h e S i h r e r t r a c t o r (cab) was over t h e c e n t e r l i n e when he f i r s t observed t h e Datsun a l o n g s i d e h i s cab; t h a t t h e Datsun d a r t e d i n between t h e f r o n t o f h i s t r u c k and t h e r e a r o f t h e S i h r e r t r u c k ; and immediately t h e r e a f t e r t h e ats sun's r i g h t wheels went o f f t h e shoulder of t h e h a r d t o p t r a v e l i n g t h u s l y f o r some d i s t a n c e b e f o r e r o l l i n g over t h r e e times. These d i s p u t e d f a c t s and o t h e r s presented by t h e v a r i o u s w i t n e s s e s were presented t o t h e j u r y , which r e t u r n e d a v e r d i c t f o r plaintiff. The p r i n c i p a l i s s u e b e f o r e t h i s Court i s whether t h e t r i a l c o u r t e r r e d i n g r a n t i n g defendants a new t r i a l . I n Morris v. Corcoran Pulpwood Co., 154 Mont. 468, 474, 465 P.2d 827, t h i s Court i n d i s c u s s i n g a d e n i a l of a motion f o r new t r i a l c i t e d Campeau v. Lewis, 144 Mont. 543, 398 P.2d 960: " ' S e v e r a l of t h e c a s e s c i t e d by t h e respondent d e a l w i t h a d e n i a l of a motion f o r a new t r i a l and then an a p p e a l t o t h i s c o u r t . I n such c a s e s t h e c o u r t h a s been somewhat r e l u c t a n t t o s e t a s i d e an a c t of d i s c r e t i o n of t h e t r i a l judge. I n t h e T r i p p c a s e [Tripp v. S i l v e r Dyke Mining Co., 70 Mont. 120, 224 P. 2721, f o r example, t h i s court refused t o d i s t u r b t h e t r i a l judge's decision t o deny t h e motion f o r a new t r i a l . However, i n t h e i n s t a n t c a s e t h e t r i a l judge d i d g r a n t a new t r i a l , t h e r e b y choosing n o t t o follow t h e f i n d i n g o f t h e j u r y . When t h e t r i a l c o u r t d e n i e s a motion f o r a new t r i a l and t h e r e b y i n d i c a t e s f a i t h i n t h e j u r y v e r d i c t we a r e more a p t t o r e f r a i n from d i s t u r b i n g t h a t o r d e r than where t h e t r i a l judge s e t s a s i d e t h e j u r y ' s f i n d i n g s and r e q u i r e s t h a t t h e f a c t s b e decided again. Where t h e t r i a l judge i s p r e s e n t e d w i t h evidence i n f a v o r o f t h e v e r d i c t , b u t proceeds t o g r a n t a new t r i a l , we f e e l i t i s our d u t y e t o t e s t t h e evidence a g a i n s t t h e v e r d i c t . W r e s p e c t t h e d i s c r e t i o n o f t h e t r i a l judge, b u t a r e o f t h e opinion t h a t i n t h i s c a s e he was unreasonable i n g r a n t i n g t h e new t r i a l . Of c o u r s e , t h e advantageous p o s i t i o n of t h e j u r y t o r e s o l v e t h e f a c t s does n o t remain when t h e y r e t u r n an ' i n c r e d i b l e " v e r d i c t . Casey v. Northern P a c i f i c Ry. Co., 60 Mont. 56, 198 P. 141; Cf. Adami v. Murphy, 118 Mont. 172, 164 P.2d 150, where t h e v e r d i c t f o r t h e defendant was an i n c r e d i b l e one. However, i n t h e i n s t a n t c a s e t h e r e i s nothing i n c r e d i b l e about t h e v e r d i c t f o r t h e defendant."' Such i s t h e c a s e b e f o r e u s ; w e f i n d n o t h i n g i n c r e d i b l e i n t h e verdict for the plaintiff. I n Campeau t h i s Court expressed i t s r e s p e c t f o r t h e d i s c r e t i o n of t h e t r i a l judge and i t s r e l u c t a n c e t o d i s t u r b a r u l i n g f o r a new t r i a l , b u t t h a t t h i s Court w i l l d i s t u r b an o r d e r g r a n t i n g a new t r i a l when i t appears t h e r e t o support the verdict. 429, 421 P.2d 710: i s s u b s t a n t i a l evidence p r e s e n t e d 0 ' ~ r i e nv, Great Northern R. Co., 148 Mont. E s t a t e of Maricich, 145 Mont. 146, 400 P.2d 873. Because we do n o t have t h e b e n e f i t o f t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s r e a s o n s f o r g r a n t i n g t h e new t r i a l we w i l l examine defendants' i. ?. 4 . motion f o r new t r i a l and t h e r e a s o n s f o r such presented t h e r e i n . ~ e f e n d a n t s p r i n c i p a l argument b e f o r e t h e t r i a l c o u r t and t h i s ' Court was t h a t t h e c a s e should n o t have gone t o t h e j u r y because of c o n t r i b u t o r y negligence by t h e Beebes. A t the close of p l a i n t i f f ' s c a s e , defendants made a motion under Rule 1 2 ( f ) , M.R.Civ.P., to s t r i k e c e r t a i n c o n t e n t i o n s made by p l a i n t i f f i n t h e p r e t r i a l o r d e r and f o r an o r d e r d i s m i s s i n g t h e a c t i o n on t h e grounds p l a i n t i f f had shown no r i g h t t o r e l i e f . The t r i a l c o u r t g r a n t e d one of t h e motions b e f o r e t r i a l b u t denied a l l o t h e r s . E s s e n t i a l l y defendants made t h e same argument f o r judgment n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g t h e v e r d i c t o r f o r a new t r i a l , t o w i t : That t h e evidence was i n s u f f i c i e n t t o submit the case t o the jury or t o j u s t i f y the verdict. During argument b o t h c o u n s e l s t a t e d t h a t i f t h e c a s e were s e n t back f o r r e t r i a l t h e r e would be no new evidence, f o r t h e c a s e had been f u l l y and a b l y submitted. Defendants a l s o contend i n t h e i r motion f o r a new t r i a l , t h a t t h e r e i s no support i n t h e evidence f o r t h r e e a l l e g a t i o n s of n e g l i g e n c e made by p l a i n t i f f contained i n t h e p r e t r i a l o r d e r . The c o u r t overruled d e f e n d a n t s ' motions t o s t r i k e t h e t h r e e a l l e g a t i o n s which were: (a) f a i l u r e t o s i g n a l a l e f t hand t u r n ; (b) f a i l u r e t o y i e l d t h e right-of-way t o t h e v e h i c l e operated by p l a i n t i f f ' s decedent and i n which p l a i n t i f f was a passenger; and ( c ) f a i l u r e t o keep a proper lookout. A l l t h r e e of t h e a l l e g a t i o n s l i s t e d a r e covered, i n t h e most p a r t , by t h e testimony of t h e two t r u c k d r i v e r s and p l a i n t i f f , Robert Hanson, t h e d r i v e r o f t h e t r u c k following t h e S i h r e r t r u c k was t h e key w i t n e s s . had a "ring-side" He was a t o t a l l y d i s i n t e r e s t e d w i t n e s s who s e a t and throughout h i s testimony b o t h on d i r e c t and c r o s s , he s a i d he saw no t u r n l i g h t s on t h e S i h r e r t r u c k . This testimony i s c o r r o b o r a t e d by p l a i n t i f f ' s testimony who a d m i t t e d l y was n o t paying t o o much a t t e n t i o n t o e i t h e r t r u c k u n t i l t h e c a r i n which he was r i d i n g came a b r e a s t of t h e Hanson t r u c k . In addition, defendant Johnson admitted h i s t a i l l i g h t s had mud on them. The j u r y could w e l l have b e l i e v e d t h i s testimony and have found t h a t t h e o p e r a t i o n s of t h e S i h r e r t r u c k v i o l a t e d two Montana s t a t u t e s , s e c t i o n 32-2167, R.C.M. 1947, t u r n i n g movements and req,uired s i g n a l s ; and s e c t i o n 32-21-133(b), R.C.M. 1947, d i s p l a y of lamps. A s t o (b), t h e f a i l u r e t o y i e l d t h e right-of-way, and (c) f a i l u r e t o keep a proper lookout, t h e Hanson testimony could be c o n t r o l l i n g i n s o f a r a s t h e j u r y was concerned. H i s testimony was t o t h e g e n e r a l e f f e c t t h a t when t h e Datsun was alongside h i s cab, t h e S i h r e r t r u c k ' s cab had j u s t crossed over t h e c e n t e r l i n e and i f t h i s was t h e s i t u a t i o n t h e d r i v e r of t h e S i h r e r t r u c k c l e a r l y v i o l a t e d ~ o n t a n a ' sright-of-way s t a t u t e , s e c t i o n 32-2121, R.C.M. 1947. The a l l e g a t i o n s of f a i l u r e t o y i e l d t h e right-of-way and f a i l u r e t o keep a proper lookout were submitted t o t h e jury. of-way i s defined by s e c t i o n 32-2121, R.C.M. 1947, a s being p r i v i l e g e of t h e immediate use of t h e roadway." Right- he The j u r y could w e l l have concluded from t h e evidence t h a t t h e Datsun was i n t h e passing l a n e a s u f f i c i e n t time p r i o r t o t h e time t h e S i h r e r t r u c k turned a c r o s s t h e c e n t e r l i n e o r t h a t had t h e d r i v e r looked back he could have tukned t o t h e r i g h t t o allow t h e Datsun t o pass. In addition, t h e testimony of d r i v e r Johnson t h a t h i s s i d e mirror focused s t r a i g h t back and t h a t he saw t h e Datsun a f t e r he had turned r a i s e d a question of how c r e d i b l e h i s testimony was a s t o t h e f a c t he saw t h e Datsun i n t h e mirror. A Ninth C i r c u i t Court c a s e , Bellon v. Heinzig, 347 F.2d 4 , 6, applying ~ o n t a n a ' ss e c t i o n 32-2167, R.C.M. 1947, i n a passing case, said: "* * * Does ordinary c a r e r e q u i r e a d r i v e r t o look t o t h e r e a r when he i s preparing t o t u r n l e f t , even though he i s i n a no-passing zone? I t has been held it does [ c i t i n g c a s e s ] , and we a r e n o t aware of any c o n t r a r y holdings. I I I n an Idaho c a s e s i m i l a r t o t h e i n s t a n t c a s e , Madron v. McCoy, 63 Idaho 703, 126 P.2d 566, 570, t h e Idaho c o u r t s t a t e d t h e d u t i e s of t u r n i n g motorists. There t h e t r u c k had slowed down, a s i n t h i s c a s e , and a s here d i d n o t g i v e a t u r n i n g s i g n a l . The c o u r t s a i d : "It would seem t h a t t h i s conduct, on t h e p a r t of t h e d r i v e r of t h e c a t t l e t r u c k , was tantamount t o saying t o t h e d r i v e r of any following t r u c k , t h a t he was slowing -- up t o allow t h e l a t t e r t o p a s s , at least until he reached t h e l i n e of i n t e r s e c t i o n . It would have been otherwise had he, a t any time given a s i g n a l of i n t e n t i o n t o t u r n e i t h e r t o t h e r i g h t o r t h e l e f t . The v e r y f a c t of reducing h i s speed, t o twof i f t h s of h i s previous speed, i n t h e space of 200 f e e t without g i v i n g any s i g n o r s i g n a l , would i n d i c a t e t o t h e average d r i v e r f o l l o w i n g him, t h a t t h e one so reducing h i s speed was i n t e n d i n g t o a l l o w t h e following c a r t o pass. The law r e q u i r e d him t o s e e and know, when he s t a r t e d t o t u r n , t h a t a c a r was following him; and what t h e law r e q u i r e s him t o (Emphasis know, i t w i l l assume t h a t he d i d know." supplied.) With r e s p e c t t o a proper lookout, t h e t r i a l c o u r t p r o p e r l y i n s t r u c t e d t h e jury. c o u r t ' s I n s t r u c t i o n No. 20 r e a d s : "YOU a r e i n s t r u c t e d t h a t p r i o r t o making a l e f t hand t u r n a c r o s s a l a n e of t r a f f i c on an open highway, t h e o p e r a t o r of t h e motor v e h i c l e so t u r n i n g , must keep a lookout both ahead and t o t h e r e a r t o d e t e r mine i f t h e r e a r e o t h e r v e h i c l e s i n t h e l a n e of t r a f f i c a c r o s s which he i n t e n d s t o t u r n * * *". See: Holland v. Konda, 142 Mont. 536, 385 P.2d 272. W e f i n d no m e r i t t o defendants' o b j e c t i o n s t o t h e p r e t r i a l o r d e r , n o r does i t s e r v e a s a b a s i s f o r g r a n t i n g defendants a new trial. W n e x t c o n s i d e r t h e c o u r t ' s g i v i n g of an imminent p e r i l e instruction. c o u r t ' s I n s t r u c t i o n No. 15 i s taken from B A J I 4.40, C a l i f o r n i a J u r y I n s t r u c t i o n s , and r e a d s : "A person who, without negligence on h i s p a r t , i s suddenly and unexpectedly confronted w i t h p e r i l a r i s i n g from e i t h e r t h e a c t u a l presence o f , o r t h e appearance o f , imminent danger t o himself o r t o o t h e r s , i s n o t expected nor r e q u i r e d t o u s e t h e same judgment and prudence t h a t i s r e q u i r e d of him i n t h e e x e r c i s e of o r d i n a r y c a r e i n calmer and more d e l i b e r a t e moments, H i s d u t y i s t o e x e r c i s e only t h e c a r e t h a t an o r d i n a r i l y prudent person would e x e r c i s e i n t h e same s i t u a t i o n . I f a t t h a t moment he does what appears t o him t o be t h e b e s t t h i n g t o do, and i f h i s c h o i c e and manner of a c t i o n a r e t h e same a s might have been followed by any o r d i n a r i l y prudent person under t h e same c o n d i t i o n s , he does a l l t h e law r e q u i r e s of him, although i n t h e l i g h t of a f t e r - e v e n t s , i t should appear t h a t a d i f f e r e n t c o u r s e would have been b e t t e r and s a f e r . " The defendants o b j e c t t o t h e t r i a l c o u r t s g r a n t i n g an i n s t r u c t i o n on 11 sudden emergencyH a l l e g i n g t h a t i n doing so t h e c o u r t was i n e r r o r due t o t h e f a c t t h a t t h e d r i v e r o f t h e Datsun was negligent. W d i s a g r e e f o r under t h e f a c t s i t u a t i o n h e r e t h e e d r i v e r o f t h e Datsun was n o t n e g l i g e n t , a f a c t t o b e decided by t h e j u r y , f o r she was l e g a l l y p a s s i n g when she suddenly was conf r o n t e d w i t h t h e respondent's t r u c k t u r n i n g i n f r o n t of h e r v e h i c l e . A s w i l l b e developed h e r e a f t e r she could n o t apply t h e b r a k e s and avoid h i t t i n g t h e t u r n i n g t r u c k ahead. So s h e chose t o dodge i n between t h e two t r u c k s i n hopes of avoiding t h e c o l l i s i o n . W e can t h i n k of no c l e a r e r set of circumstances f o r t h e g i v i n g o f an i n s t r u c t i o n on 11 sudden emergency1' than we have b e f o r e u s h e r e . Here, from testimony given by s e v e r a l w i t n e s s e s p l u s measurements, made by a highway patroman who a r r i v e d s h o r t l y a f t e r t h e a c c i d e n t , t h e j u r y could have found t h a t t h e Datsun was p a s s i n g t h e Hanson t r u c k ; t h a t t h e Hanson t r u c k was some 120 t o 180 f e e t behind t h e S i h r e r t r u c k ; t h a t t h e gap was c l o s i n g ; and, t h a t ~ i h r e r ' s t r u c k began t o t u r n l e f t over t h e c e n t e r l i n e i n f r o n t of t h e Datsun. That t h e Datsun, i f i t was t r a v e l i n g 60 m i l e s p e r hour, would have r e q u i r e d 240 f e e t of s k i d marks, p l u s 132 f e e t of perc e p t i o n and r e a c t i o n time, making a t o t a l of 372 f e e t f o r a t o t a l stopping distance. Most c e r t a i n l y , under t h e s e f a c t s , i n s t r u c t i n g on imminent p e r i l was proper. See March v, Ayers, 80 Mont, 401, 260 P. 702; Bogovich v. C.M.St.P, & P,R,Co., 122 Mont. 312, 203 P,2d 971. ~ e f e n d a n t s ' o b j e c t e d t o allowing e x p e r t testimony r e l a t i v e t o t h e s t o p p i n g d i s t a n c e of a 1966 Datsun t r a v e l i n g a t 60 m i l e s p e r hour. Defendants, throughout t h e t r i a l , contended t h a t t h e decedent d r i v e r of t h e Datsun w a s n e g l i g e n t i n t h e o p e r a t i o n of t h e a u t o mobile. P l a i n t i f f i n t r o d u c e d testimony o f a D r . Mark Jacobson, Chairman o f t h e Physics Department of t h e U n i v e r s i t y of Montana, t o show t h a t when decedent was confronted w i t h t h e t u r n i n g t r u c k had she chosen t o make a f u l l brake a p p l i c a t i o n , she would n o t have stopped b e f o r e s t r i k i n g t h e t r u c k . The purpose of such testimony w a s t o show i n r e t r o s p e c t t h a t decedent chose t h e c o r r e c t avenue of escape by a t t e m p t i n g t o maneuver t h e c a r t o h e r r i g h t and t o p a s s t o t h e r e a r of d e f e n d a n t s ' t r u c k . a p u b l i c s t r e e t o r highway t o e x e r c i s e o r d i n a r y c a r e a t a l l times t o avoid p l a c i n g himself o r o t h e r s i n danger; and t o u s e l i k e c a r e t o avoid an a c c i d e n t ; t o keep a proper lookout f o r t r a f f i c and o t h e r c o n d i t i o n s t o be r e a s o n a b l y a n t i c i p a t e d and t o maintain a proper c o n t r o l of h i s v e h i c l e . 5 I See Hanson v. Colgrove, 152 Mont. 161, 447 P.2d 486; Gunderson v , Nolte, 153 Mont. 208, 456 P.2d 282; Fawcett v , I r b y , 92 Ida. 48, 436 P.2d 714. I n a d d i t i o n , we n o t e t h a t d e f e n d a n t s ' proposed i n s t r u c t i o n s which were r e f u s e d were n e i t h e r a p p l i c a b l e t o t h e f a c t s nor t h e law of Montana. Also i n t h e i r motion f o r new t r i a l defendants questioned whether t h e j u r y was p r o p e r l y i n s t r u c t e d on t h e weight t o be given t h e testimony of v a r i o u s w i t n e s s e s , two The t r i a l c o u r t chose t o g i v e II c a u t i o n a r y i n s t r u c t i o n s 1 ' following t h e g u i d e l i n e s of " ~ o n t a n a J u r y I n s t r u c t i o n Guide", These were c o u r t ' s I n s t r u c t i o n s No. 3 and No. 5 , which f u l l y i n s t r u c t e d t h e j u r y on t h e weight of evidence. Defendants r e q u e s t e d t h e i r proposed i n s t r u c t i o n No. 31, which was r e f u s e d . T h i s Faas a d i s c r e t i o n a r y m a t t e r f o r t h e t r i a l c o u r t and t h e r e was no e r r o r . Did t h e t r i a l c o u r t err i n p e r m i t t i n g t h e damage testimony o f f e r e d by p l a i n t i f f ? P r i o r t o Krohmer v. Gbhl, 145 Mont. 491, 495, 402 P.2d 979, t h i s Court was aware t h a t i n most wrongful d e a t h a c t i o n s t h e problem of determining t h e v a l u e o f a d e c e d e n t ' s s e r v i c e s was both d i f f i c u l t and o f t e n s p e c u l a t i v e . I n Krohmer, r e c o g n i z i n g t h e need t o a s s i s t t h e j u r y i n i t s t a s k , t h i s Court held: *** " It appears t o u s t h a t i n t h i s p a r t i c u l a r c a s e t h e element of c o n j e c t u r e i s reduced s i g n i f i c a n t l y by t h e admission of e x p e r t testimony a s t o t h e p o s s i b l e f u t u r e of t h e decedent. I t a l s o appears t h a t t h i s e x p e r t testimony i s n o t only t h e b e s t evidence b u t t h e only evidence a v a i l a b l e i n t h i s c a s e t o prove f u t u r e earnings. II A h y p o t h e t i c a l question was asked D r . Jacobson based on t h e weight of t h e Datsun, t h e assumed speed, a f u l l brake a p p l i c a - D r . Jacobson using t i o n , plus t h e roadway conditions a t t h e t i m e . a s t h e c o e f f i c i e n t of f r i c t i o n t o be used i n h i s equation .55 f o r a w e l l t r a v e l e d highway and .6 f o r a l e s s t r a v e l e d road, was a b l e t o compute t h e skidding d i s t a n c e t o be 240 f e e t f o r t h e .55 coe f f i c i e n t of f r i c t i o n and 210 f e e t f o r t h e -6. ~ e f e n d a n t s 'objec- t i o n was based on t h e assumption t h e c a r was t r a v e l i n g 60 miles per hour and t h a t t h e r e would have been a f u l l a p p l i c a t i o n of t h e brakes. W f i n d no e r r o r f o r t h e question was asked t o r e f u t e defendants' e a l l e g a t i o n s of c o n t r i b u t o r y negligence and t h e r e was testimony t h e c a r was t r a v e l i n g about 60 miles per hour. Defendants' next contention i s t h e f a i l u r e of t h e t r i a l c o u r t t o give an i n s t r u c t i o n on assumption of r i s k . The defend- a n t s a l l e g e e r r o r i n t h e f a i l u r e of t h e t r i a l c o u r t t o i n s t r u c t t h e j u r y on t h e "assumption of risk". W f i n d no e r r o r f o r here e p l a i n t i f f was l e g a l l y attempting t o pass, i n a c l e a r passing l a n e with no oncoming t r a f f i c and could i n no way have assumed t h a t t h e lead t r u c k would t u r n i n t o her lane. This Court i n Hanson v, Colgrove, 152 Mont. 161, 447 P.2d 486, speaking on t h e elements of "assumption of r i s k " d o c t r i n e s a i d : " * d r k This defense r e q u i r e s (1) knowledge, a c t u a l o r implied, of a p a r t i c u l a r condition treati n g t h e r i s k , (2) a p p r e c i a t i o n of t h i s condition a s dangerous, (3) a voluntary remaining o r continuing i n t h e f a c e of t h e known dangerous c o n d i t i o n , and (4) i n j u r y r e s u l t i n g a s t h e usual and probable consequence of t h e dangerous condition, 1f Here t h e f a c t s f a l l f a r s h o r t of meeting t h e s e elements and w e f i n d no e r r o r i n t h e c o u r t s n o t i n s t r u c t i n g on I1 assumption of r i s k " See Gunderson v. Nolte, 153 Mont. 208, 456 P.2d 282; Fawcett v. Irby, 92 Idaho 48, 436 P.2d 714. However, t h e c o u r t d i d give an i n s t r u c t i o n on c o n t r i b u t o r y negligence and along with i t gave i t s I n s t r u c t i o n No. 18 which f u l l y covered t h e d u t i e s of decedent: "It i s t h e duty of t h e d r i v e r of any v e h i c l e using Here, following the statutory requirements of section 93-2810, R.C.M. 1947 (Plontana's wrongful death statute), and the holding in Krohmer the plaintiff sought to establish the value of the services of his wife as: 1. Services contributed to the well-drilling business. 2. Domestic services contributed by decedent. Plaintiff's witness Douglas Stam, manager of the Polson State Employment Service, testified that considering the services rendered to the business the going rate to replace a person such as decedent would be about $350 per month and if the replacement had five years experience, as had decedent, the wage rate would be about $500 per month. The same witness testified that domestic work was $2 per hour in the Polson area. With this testimony before the court, plus plaintiff ~eebe's estimate of the personal expenses of decedent, expert witness Dr. George B. Heliker was called. Dr. Heliker is a professor of Economics at the University of Montana whose specialization is labor economics. This Court in Krohmer in accepting his expert testimony added another dimension to Dr. ~eliker's career, for since that time he has appeared in numerous cases in Montana. In the instant case, using the methods and formulae approved in Krohmer , and with the founda- tional testimony of witnesses Stam and Beebe, Dr. Heliker testified that the loss of services both domestic and to the business, totaled $213,000. The jury returned a verdict of $40,000. See: Resner v. Northern Pacific Railway, 55. - t. Mon , 505 P.2d 86, 30 St.Rep. We find no error for this presentation is in accord with Krohmer and Resner. We have carefully examined defendants' objections to the trial court's failure to give certain of their proposed instructions, numbers 20, 25, 30, 31 and 36, and find no error. These instructions are either repetitious or were not applicable to the law or the facts of this case. For the foregoing reasons none of the grounds enunicated in d e f e n d a n t s ' motion f o r new t r i a l a u t h o r i z e s a new t r i a l . A.ccordingly, t h e o r d e r of t h e c o u r t g r a n t i n g defendants a new t r i a l i s vacated and s e t a s i d e . The j u r y v e r d i c t i n f a v o r o f p l a i n t i f f and t h e judg- ment a r e affirmed. Justice W Concur: e Justices. -. --a r J / Mr. J u s t i c e Wesley C a s t l e s d i s s e n t i n g : I dissent. The s t a t e m e n t of f a c t s i n t h e m a j o r i t y o p i n i o n i s n o t i n a c c u r a t e , b u t it i s t a i l o r e d t o f i t t h e r e s u l t r e a c h e d . A l l v e h i c l e s i n v o l v e d i n t h i s m a t t e r were p r o c e e d i n g i n a s o u t h e r l y d i r e c t i o n on U.S. n o r t h of Elmo, Montana. Highway 93 from v a r i o u s p o i n t s A s t h a t highway a p p r o a c h e s Elmo from t h e n o r t h , it t r a v e l s f o r a t l e a s t a m i l e and a h a l f o r two m i l e s i n a w e s t e r l y d i r e c t i o n b e f o r e e n t e r i n g a b r o a d , sweeping c u r v e t o t h e l e f t a t t h e o u t s k i r t s of Elmo. From t h i s c u r v e , t h e highway e x t e n d s i n a s t r a i g h t l i n e s o u t h e r l y f o r a d i s t a n c e o f more t h a n a m i l e , p a s s i n g t h r o u g h t h e s m a l l s e t t l e m e n t of Elmo. The "Elmo Cash S t o r e " f r o n t e d on t h e highway, f a c i n g w e s t , a c o n s i d e r a b l e d i s t a n c e s o u t h of t h e c u r v e . This accident took p l a c e a l m o s t i n f r o n t of t h a t s t o r e . Defendant Johnson was a t r u c k d r i v e r employed by t h e d e f e n d a n t S i h r e r and was d r i v i n g a S i h r e r t r u c k and t r a i l e r loaded w i t h l o g s from a l o g g i n g a r e a some t w e n t y m i l e s n o r t h of Elmo. R o b e r t Hanson was d r i v i n g h i s own l o a d e d l o g g i n g t r u c k a l s o i n a s o u t h e r l y d i r e c t i o n on Highway 93 and came up behind t h e S i h r e r t r u c k some two o r t h r e e m i l e s n o r t h o f Elmo on t h e s t r a i g h t s t r e t c h o f highway b e f o r e r e a c h i n g t h e c u r v e and f o l l o w e d it around t h e c u r v e and i n t o t h e town o f Elmo. A f t e r r o u n d i n g t h e c u r v e , Han- s o n became aware of t h e f a c t t h a t t h e S i h r e r t r u c k was s l o w i n g down t o t u r n i n t o t h e Elmo S t o r e . Both l o g g i n g t r u c k s were slow- ing a t t h a t t i m e . The Beebe c a r , a s m a l l f o r e i g n make cal1e.d a Datsun, came up behind these two l o g g i n g t r u c k s a t some p o i n t and a t some unknown r a t e of s p e e d . T h e p l a i n t i f f t e s t i f i e d t h a t he was a p a s s e n g e r w i t h his w i f e d r i v i n g and p a i d l i t t l e , i f a n y a t t e n t i o n t o h e r d r i v i n g a s h e was engaged i n r e a d i n g some m a t e r i a l . He f i r s t o b s e r v e d t h e Hanson t r u c k j u s t s h o r t l y b e f o r e t h e a c c i dent. A t no t i m e w a s Hanson aware of t h e Datsun f o l l o w i n g o r a p p r o a c h i n g from t h e r e a r u n t i l it s u d d e n l y a p p e a r e d , w i t h o u t warning and w i t h o u t sounding i t s h o r n , by t h e l e f t f r o n t f e n d e r o f h i s t r u c k a s it was a t t e m p t i n g t o p a s s . Highway Patrolman George Goggins, a w i t n e s s f o r t h e p l a i n t i f f , t e s t i f i e d t h a t t h e d r i v e r of t h e Hanson t r u c k , a n o t h e r p l a i n t i f f ' s w i t n e s s , t o l d him t h a t t h e S i h r e r t r u c k was some 250 t o 300 f e e t ahead o f t h e Hanson t r u c k when t h e Datsun a p p e a r e d by h i s l e f t f r o n t f e n d e r . Notwithstanding t h i s s u b s t a n t i a l d i s - t a n c e , t h e e v i d e n c e e s t a b l i s h e s t h a t t h e Datsun made a n a b r u p t t u r n t o t h e r i g h t , a t s u c h speed t h a t i t s l e f t t i r e s l e f t a d e f i n i t e mark i n t h e roadway f o r a d i s t a n c e of some 176 f e e t which mark proceeded t o t h e r i g h t s h o u l d e r o f t h e highway where t h e marks i n d i c a t e d t h a t t h e v e h i c l e had been s h a r p l y t u r n e d t o i t s l e f t , o v e r t u r n e d and r o l l e d o v e r and o v e r a n a d d i t i o n a l d i s t a n c e of some 228 f e e t b e f o r e coming t o a s t o p . Defendant Johnson, d r i v i n g t h e S i h r e r t r u c k , t e s t i f i e d t h a t a f t e r r o u n d i n g t h e c u r v e on t h e highway h e s t a r t e d t o slow down t o t u r n i n t o t h e Elmo S t o r e a s it was h i s i n t e n t i o n t o o b t a i n some c i g a r s and a Coke. A t t h a t t i m e t h e Hanson t r u c k was t h r e e o r f o u r t r u c k l e n g t h s behind him -- some 1 0 0 t o 240 f e e t . He g l a n c e d t o t h e r e a r i n h i s m i r r o r and saw a n o t h e r v e h i c l e a b o u t a q u a r t e r o f a m i l e behind him coming around t h e c u r v e . He t u r n e d on h i s s i g n a l f o r a l e f t t u r n and c r o s s e d o v e r t h e c e n t e r l i n e . When t h e t r a c t o r of h i s r i g was o f f t h e highway and i n t o t h e d r i v e way o f t h e s t o r e h e o b s e r v e d t h e Datsun a t t e m p t i n g t o p a s s t h e Hanson t r u c k . By t h e t i m e his r i g had c o m p l e t e l y c l e a r e d t h e r o a d and came t o a s t o p t h e Datsun t h e n was o b s e r v e d r o l l i n g p a s t t h e t r u c k and down the highway. Two i m p a r t i a l w i t n e s s e s i n t h e Elmo S t o r e , M r . and Mrs. Unzur, saw t h e S i h r e r t r u c k p u l l o f f t h e highway i n t o t h e d r i v e way of t h e s t o r e and s t o p . J u s t a s i t s t o p p e d and t h e d r i v e r g o t o u t , t h e y saw t h e Datsun c a r r o l l i n g down t h e highway. This t e s t i m o n y v e r i f i e d t h e t e s t i m o n y of Johnson. I n a d d i t i o n t o t h e t e s t i m o n y of d e f e n d a n t Johnson t h a t he s t a r t e d h i s l e f t t u r n a c r o s s t h e c e n t e r l i n e , with h i s l e f t t u r n s i g n a l l i g h t s o n , p l a i n t i f f ' s w i t n e s s Hanson t e s t i f i e d t h a t when he f i r s t o b s e r v e d t h e Datson by h i s l e f t f r o n t f e n d e r , t h e S i h r e r v e h i c l e was w e l l o v e r t h e c e n t e r l i n e i n t o i t s l e f t t u r n . A s k e t c h made by Hanson t h e day f o l l o w i n g t h e a c c i d e n t o f t h e r e l a t i v e p o s i t i o n of t h e v e h i c l e s shows t h e p o s i t i o n o f t h e S i h r e r t r u c k t o be w e l l o v e r t h e c e n t e r l i n e and i n t o i t s t u r n i n t o t h e s t o r e driveway a t t h e t i m e t h e Datsun a p p e a r e d by t h e f r o n t o f t h e Hanson t r u c k . There was no e v i d e n c e a t any t i m e t h a t t h e d r i v e r o f t h e Datsun e v e r a p p l i e d any b r a k e s o r a t t e m p t e d t o slow down. Following t h e a c c i d e n t t h e l e f t t u r n l i g h t on t h e l e f t m i r r o r of t h e S i h r e r t r u c k was s t i l l a c t i v a t e d and b l i n k i n g . Under t h e r u l e s c o n c e r n i n g new t r i a l g r a n t e d i n G a r r i s o n v. Trowbridge, 119 Mont. 505, 177 P.2d 464; Brennan v. Mayo, 1 0 0 Mont. 439, 50 P.2d 245; and Tigh v . C o l l e g e P a r k R e a l t y Co., 149 Mont. 358, 427 P.2d 57, w e have s a i d t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t w i l l n o t be r e v e r s e d e x c e p t on a m a n i f e s t a b u s e of d i s c r e t i o n . The majority opinion does n o t d i s c u s s nor d i s t i n g u i s h t h e s e cases; b u t r e l i e s on Campeau v . Lewis, 1 4 4 Mont. 543, 398 P.2d 960, t o decide i n t h i s case t h a t " t h e r e i s nothing i n c r e d i b l e about t h e b v e r d i c t f o r t h e defendant." Analyzing e a c h of the grounds f o r b o t h a motion f o r a judgment n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g t h e v e r d i c t and a motion f o r a new t r i a l shows c l e a r l y t h a t the t r i a l judge d i d n o t a b u s e h i s d i s c r e t i o n and t h e r e was no m a n i f e s t a b u s e of d i s c r e t i o n . The various contentions of the plaintiff and what this Court relied on to weigh the testimony and find that the verdict was not incredible show clearly that there is a serious lack of proof on plaintiff's part including the failure to signal a left hand turn, the failure to yield the right of way, failure to keep a proper lookout. All of the evidence, fairly appraised, shows that it was wholly insufficient to justify the verdict; and even more, the trial court should have stricken plaintiff's contention at the close of plaintiff's case. Yet, the majority opinion by taking the evidence most favorable to plaintiff, finds that the verdict was not "incredible". This would seem to be a new standard for orders granting new trials and would seem to eliminate any trial court discretion. The majority does not over- rule or distinguish Garrison, Brennan or Tigh, supra. Strangely, the majority uses an Idaho case, Bellon v. Heinzig, 347 F.2d 4, a federal case, to support its result, but that case is clearly distinguishable. Johnson did look to the rear. He had no reason to anticipate that the driver of the Datsun would be completely inattentive to the most obvious logging tmck making a turn. It goes without saying that a loaded logging truck making a left turn is conspicuous. I would go further to say that, under the evidence here, the driver of the small foreign car was contributorily negligent as a matter of law. The physical facts speak more loudly than any witness and establish that the Datsun was moving at such a speed its driver could not control it and established clearly that the proximate cause of the accident was that of the driver's own negligence. Much, much more could be said in this dissent as to why the district court was correct in granting a new trial, but it would be to no avail. This Court is apparently even approving an instruction on "sudden emergency" where the plaintiff is clearly negligent. Even the majority opinion concedes that the negligence of the plaintiff was a jury question. no sudden emergency doctrine should apply. If that be true, On this ground alone, the trial court was correct in granting a new trial. The major- ity opinion does not even discuss this issue other than to reject it. Clearly here, the trial court did not manifestly abuse its discretion. Just what the rule may now be in this Court's review of a trial court's order granting a new trial is highly speculative. U Justice
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