STATE v HAWKINS
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
No. 12686 I N THE SUPREME COURT O F THE STATE OF MONTANA 1974 THE STATE O MONTANA, F P l a i n t i f f and Respondent, -VS - SHERMAN P. HAWKINS, Defendant and A p p e l l a n t . Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e T h i r t e e n t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Honorable R o b e r t H. Wilson, Judge p r e s i d i n g . Counsel of Record : For Appellant : S a n d a l l , Moses, Cavan and Kampfe, B i l l i n g s , Montana D. Frank Kampfe a r g u e d , and A. C l i f f o r d Edwards a r g u e d , B i l l i n g s , Montana F o r Respondent : Hon. Robert L. Woodahl, A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l , H e l e n a , Montana John P - A t k i n s , A s s i s t a n t A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l , a r g u e d , Helena, Montana Harold F. Hanser, County A t t o r n e y , B i l l i n g s , Montana C h a r l e s A. B r a d l e y , Deputy County A t t o r n e y , a r g u e d , B i l l i n g s , Montana Submitted: DecideQEC - - F i l e d :PTr:) ,++ i ' b Clerk September 1 3 , 1974 2 I. M r . J u s t i c e Gene B. Daly d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e Court. This i s an appeal from a f i n a l judgment of conviction a f t e r a jury v e r d i c t of g u i l t y of murder i n t h e f i r s t degree i n t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t , Yellowstone County, i n connection with t h e s l a y i n g of defendant ' s w i f e , Sandra Hawkins. This appeal p r e s e n t s b u t one i s s u e f o r t h i s Court's review: The r e f u s a l by t h e t r i a l judge t o give a d d i t i o n a l i n s t r u c t i o n s t o t h e j u r y during i t s d e l i b e r a t i o n . The f a c t s a r e n o t i n d i s p u t e and a p p e l l a n t agrees t h e c o u r t properly i n s t r u c t e d t h e j u r y , p r i o r t o d e l i b e r a t i o n . The j u r y r e t i r e d f o r d e l i b e r a t i o n a t 4:53 p.m.; a.m., a t 12:40 t h e c o u r t ordered t h e jury i n t o t h e courtroom and proceeded i n t h i s manner: "THE COURT: Ladies and Gentlemen of t h e J u r y , I d o n ' t want you t o i n d i c a t e t o m i n any way what e your vote may be a t t h i s point o r which way your vote may be, b u t I want t o a s k you i f you t h i n k t h a t you a r e c l o s e t o reaching a v e r d i c t a t t h i s t i m e . "JURY F R M N Yes, Xour Honor, I t h i n k t h a t we OE A : a r e f a i r l y c l o s e . I mean i t i s n ' t t h a t lopsided. "THE COURT: The reason t h a t I am asking t h i s i s t h a t it has been a long day f o r a l l of you, I know, and some of you probably have g r e a t endurance, physical and otherwise, than o t h e r s because of age and various t h i n g s , and t h i s i s what I am concerned about, and t h i s i s why I was i n q u i r i n g a s t o whether o r n o t you t h i n k you a r e c l o s e t o a v e r d i c t . "JURY F RM N OE A: May I ask a q u e s t i o n , s i r ? "THE COURT: No, t h e law won't permit t h a t . I f you have any questions t h e law r e q u i r e s t h a t you submit t h e question t o m e i n w r i t i n g and I w i l l answer i t i n t h e same way. "JURY F RM N OE A : W have i t i n w r i t i n g . e "THE COURT: Very w e l l , M r . B a i l i f f , w i l l you submit t h e w r i t t e n question t o t h e Court? (Thereupon t h e B a i l i f f submitted t h e w r i t t e n questions t o t h e Court, s a i d questions being a s follows : " o "1. D each of t h e conditions of w i l l f u l , d e l i b e r a t e and premeditated have t o be proven by t h e S t a t e ? "2. Does d e l i b e r a t e have anything t o do with premeditate? "3. Does d e l i b e r a t e mean t h e defendant has given thought t o more than deciding t o perform o r n o t perform t h e a c t i o n ? " 4 . Does d e l i b e r a t i o n mean considering t h e consequences of t h e crime before committing i t ? " The c o u r t excused t h e j u r y u n t i l 9:00 a.m., t h e following day and immediately met with counsel i n chambers. The c o u r t ' s f i r s t impression, s t a t e d i n t h e record, was t h a t i f counsel agreed t h e c o u r t would i n s t r u c t t h e j u r y t h a t t h e words w e r e a l r e a d y defined i n t h e i n s t r u c t i o n s and he could n o t i n s t r u c t f u r t h e r on d e f i n i t i o n . F u r t h e r , t h e c o u r t suggested t h a t i f both counsel could agree on any f u r t h e r d e f i n i t i o n t h a t would answer t h e j u r y ' s q u e s t i o n s , t h e c o u r t would a l s o consider t h a t a s well. Counsel could n o t agree t o a d d i t i o n a l i n s t r u c t i o n . Counsel r e p r e s e n t i n g t h e s t a t e requested t h a t no f u r t h e r i n s t r u c t i o n be given t h e j u r y t o prevent any f u r t h e r confusion. defendant requested Counsel f o r t h a t question number 1 be answered, b u t t h a t numbers 2 , 3, and 4 not be answered. Counsel f o r t h e s t a t e objected t o t h e answering of question 1, and s t a t e d t h a t i f number 1 was answered, then numbers 2 , 3 and 4 should a l s o be answered. In o t h e r words, counsel disagreed about which of t h e q u e s t i o n s , i f any, should be answered and d i d n o t make any e f f o r t t o propose f u r t h e r d e f i n i t i o n a s suggested by t h e c o u r t , except i n t h i s suggestion by defense counsel t o c a l l f u r t h e r a t t e n t i o n t o c o u r t ' s I n s t r u c t i o n No. 1; "MR. KAMPFE: "THE COURT: The f i r s t question b o t h e r s m e , Judge. But i t should be c l e a r l y defined. "MR. BRADLEY: Every m a t e r i a l a l l e g a t i o n of t h e Information h a s t o be proved and t h e s e a r e t h e m a t e r i a l a l l e g a t i o n s . The word w i l l f u l , premeditated and d e l i b e r a t e a r e a l l defined. KAMPFE: W e l l , t h e f i r s t question bothers m e because . t h a t i s very p l a i n i n t h e I n s t r u c t i o n s . "MR. - "THE COURT: I t ' s i n t h e f i r s t i n s t r u c t i o n . I t h i n k t h e f i r s t two i n s t r u c t i o n s cover t h a t , t h e f a c t t h a t they must prove a l l of t h e m a t e r i a l a l l e g a t i o n s a r e i n about t h r e e o r four i n s t r u c t i o n s a l t o g e t h e r , b u t i t i s s p e c i f i c a l l y set out what t h e s p e c i f i c a l l e g a t i o n s a r e and you can def i n e w i l l f u l and premeditation. '?MR. KAMPFE: It would be m suggestion t o t h e Court y t h a t t h e f i r s t question should be answered by e i t h e r r e f e r r i n g t o a s p e c i f i c Court i n s t r u c t i o n and an example of t h a t would be see Court's I n s t r u c t i o n such and such, o r i n t h e a l t e r n a t i v e , which would be answered by saying, yes, before a conviction of f i r s t degree murder can be rendered you must b e l i e v e beyond a reasonable doubt t h a t each of t h e s e s e p a r a t e elements have been proven by the S t a t e , and I make t h e a d d i t i o n a l suggestion t h a t t h e t h r e e remaining questions should not be answered. *.I1 (Emphasis supplied.) ** The s t a t e , a s s t a t e d h e r e t o f o r e , objected and t h e c o u r t submitted t h e following answer t o t h e j u r y : II The answers t o your i n s t r u c t i o n s given. on t h e s e m a t t e r s and written instructions jury room. 1I questions a r e contained i n t h e I cannot f u r t h e r i n s t r u c t you suggest t h a t you r e f e r t o t h e on t h e law which you have i n t h e The record does n o t i n d i c a t e any o b j e c t i o n by counsel t o t h e method t h e judge adopted t o solve t h e problem of t h e j u r y ' s questions. Appellant contends t h a t t h e c o u r t ' s r e f u s a l t o answer t h e j u r y ' s questions i s an abnegation by t h e t r i a l judge of h i s s p e c i f i c and h i s s i n g l e most important duty: i m p a r t i a l t r i a l f o r t h e accused. t o i n s u r e a f a i r and That without an answer t o t h e j u r y ' s question number 1, submitted t o t h e c o u r t , a p p e l l a n t maint a i n s t h e j u r y was s t i l l confused a s t o who had t h e burden of proof a s t o t h e m a t e r i a l a l l e g a t i o n s of w i l l f u l , d e l i b e r a t e and preHe contends he was thereby denied h i s r i g h t t o a f a i r meditated. jury t r i a l . It i s , however, a l s o arguable t h a t t h e r e p l y of t h e t r i a l judge t o t h e j u r y s u f f i c i e n t l y c l e a r e d up t h e confusion on t h e p a r t of t h e j u r y s o t h a t i t f u l l y comprehended who had t h e burden of proof i n proving t h e m a t e r i a l a l l e g a t i o n s . Section 95-1913(d), R.C.M. ** 1947, provides i n p e r t i n e n t p a r t : *** 'I* After t h e j u r y has r e t i r e d f o r d e l i b e r a t i o n i f they d e s i r e t o be informed on any point of law a r i s i n g i n t h e cause, they must r e q u i r e t h e o f f i c e r t o conduct them i n t o c o u r t . Upon being brought i n t o c o u r t , t h e i n m formation requested may given i n t h e d i s c r e t i o n o court &.I1 (Emphasis added.) ** n It is therefore, in the discretion of the court whether or not to give additional instructions to the jury. The district judge did not abuse his discretion. If the judge is of the opinion the instructions already given are adequate, correctly state the law, and fully advise the jury on the procedures it is to follow in its deliberation, his refusal to answer a question already answered in the instructions is not error. Tellis v. State, 84 Nev. 587, 445 P.2d 938; State v. Vaughn, 200 Ore. 275, 265 P.2d 249; State v Flett, 234 Ore. 124, 380 P.2d 634; . State v. Weinandt, 84 S.D. 322, 171 ~ . ~ . 2 73. d This is particularly true when defense has argued that the instructions as a whole are adequate and the answer to the jury's question number 1 "is very plain in the instruction" given. This takes defendant's argument away from judicial discretion and into the area of personal opinion and conjecture as to confusion, i.e., the five instructions presented as primarily responsible; which questions caused confusion and if one or all should or should not be answered, and if any confusion existed after the court's instruction to reread the instructions already given. Defendant relies on State v. Jackson, 88 Mont. 420, 293 P. 309, for support. However, a close reading of Jackson will demonstrate that these are not our facts and hence easily distinguishable from the instant case. Jackson arose from the withdrawal of an in- struction felt necessary by the Supreme Court, which in fact was instructing the jury further and orally at that, when told by the trial court to disregard the w i t h d m instruction. The judgment of the district Justice i' We Concur: .- - - - - - - Chief Justice
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
