GODFREY v PILON
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No. 12681 I N THE SUPREME C U T O T E STATE O M N A A OR F H F OTN 1974 LEE GODFREY and VEGA GODFREY, husband and w i f e ; MARINER B. BALLARD and GWEN 0. BALLARD, husband and w i f e ; and D I C K NEWTON, P l a i n t i f f s and Respondents, GENE H. PILON and THAIS PILON, Defendants and A p p e l l a n t s . Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e F i f t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Honorable Frank E. B l a i r , Judge p r e s i d i n g . Counsel of Record: For Appellants : Schulz and Davis, D i l l o n , Montana C a r l M. Davis argued and John Warren appeared, D i l l o n , Montana For Respondents : Frank M. Davis argued, D i l l o n , Montana Submitted: Decided Filed : November 21, 1974 :DEC13 974 DEC 2 3 1974 Clerk Mr. J u s t i c e Wesley C a s t l e s d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e C o u r t . T h i s i s a n a p p e a l by d e f e n d a n t s , Gene and T h a i s P i l o n , from a judgment o f t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t , County of Beaverhead, which q u i e t e d t i t l e t o a n easement r u n n i n g a c r o s s t h e l a n d of d e f e n d a n t s , i n t h e p l a i n t i f f s , Lee and Vega Godfrey; Mariner and Gwen B a l l a r d ; and Dick Newton. On J u l y 1 8 , 1972, p l a i n t i f f s f i l e d t h e i r c o m p l a i n t a l l e g i n g t h a t d e f e n d a n t s had d e n i e d p l a i n t i f f s ' u s e of a r o a d across defendants' property. P l a i n t i f f s r e q u e s t e d and r e c e i v e d from t h e c o u r t an i n j u n c t i o n pendente l i t e o r d e r i n g t h e P i l o n s t o remove a f e n c e from t h e r o a d and n o t t o i n t e r f e r e w i t h p l a i n t i f f s ' u s e t h e r e o f , pending a h e a r i n g . P i l o n s immediately com- p l i e d w i t h t h e o r d e r and f i l e d a motion t o d i s s o l v e i n j u n c t i o n which was d e n i e d by t h e c o u r t . i n effect. The i n j u n c t i o n h a s s i n c e remained Following a n o n j u r y t r i a l , t h e c o u r t made and e n t e r e d f i n d i n g s o f f a c t s and c o n c l u s i o n s of law i n f a v o r of p l a i n t i f f s and a g a i n s t P i l o n s . E x c e p t i o n s t o t h e f i n d i n g s and c o n c l u s i o n s were d u l y f i l e d by P i l o n s , b u t r e f u s e d by t h e c o u r t . Judgment i n f a v o r of p l a i n t i f f s was e n t e r e d , from which P i l o n s now a p p e a l . The p a r t i e s t o t h i s a c t i o n own t r a c t s of l a n d i n S e c t i o n 5 , T . 5 S . , R. 1 2 W., M.P.M., n e a r Elkhorn Hot S p r i n g s and t h e Rainy Mountain S k i H i l l i n Beaverhead County, a p p r o x i m a t e l y 3 4 m i l e s west of D i l l o n . T i t l e t o e a c h t r a c t came from a common g r a n t o r , John M i l l e r , who, i n 1962, commenced a program of subd i v i d i n g and s e l l i n g t r a c t s o f h i s l a n d . None of t h e conveyances i n v o l v e d i n t h i s l a w s u i t c o n t a i n any g r a n t o r r e s e r v a t i o n of a n easement o r r i g h t of way. On May 25, 1962, M i l l e r s o l d a t r a c t of l a n d 100 f e e t wide by 150 f e e t d e e p t o H . J . Howard. T h i s t r a c t , which w i l l be r e f e r r e d t o h e r e a s t h e Howard t r a c t , was bounded on t h e w e s t by t h e N a t i o n a l F o r e s t and o n t h e n o r t h by a f o r e s t s e r v i c e r o a d . On J u n e 6 , 1962, t h e P i l o n s , d e f e n d a n t s i n t h i s a c t i o n , purc h a s e d by w a r r a n t y deed t h e f e e s i m p l e t i t l e t o a t r a c t o f l a n d 1 0 0 f e e t wide by 150 f e e t d e e p f r o n t i n g on t h e f o r e s t s e r v i c e road. P i l o n s ' t r a c t was e a s t of and c o n t i g u o u s t o t h e Howard tract. A t t h e t i m e of deed t o t h e P i l o n s , M i l l e r owned o t h e r l a n d f r o n t i n g on t h e f o r e s t s e r v i c e r o a d a s w e l l a s o t h e r l a n d s o u t h of t h e t r a c t s conveyed. Over a y e a r l a t e r , on August 2 7 , 1963, M i l l e r s o l d a t h i r d t r a c t of l a n d t o D r . McLaren ( h e r e i n a f t e r r e f e r r e d t o a s t h e McLaren t r a c t ) . The McLaren t r a c t was a l s o bounded on t h e n o r t h by t h e f o r e s t s e r v i c e r o a d . t o the Pilon tract. I t w a s e a s t of and c o n t i g u o u s An e x a m i n a t i o n of t h e P i l o n deed and t h e McLaren deed c o n f i r m s t h e f a c t t h a t t h e P i l o n s ' e a s t l i n e w a s used a s t h e p o i n t of b e g i n n i n g f o r t h e w e s t l i n e i n t h e McLaren deed. These b o u n d a r i e s a r e i d e n t i c a l . The McLaren deed merely r e t r a c e s t h e metes and bounds of t h e P i l o n deed i n o r d e r t o a r r i v e a t a p o i n t of b e g i n n i n g f o r t h e McLaren t r a c t . It then proceeds w i t h t h e mates and bounds of t h e McLaren t r a c t , r u n n i n g s o u t h a l o n g t h e l i n e p r e v i o u s l y e s t a b l i s h e d a s t h e e a s t boundary of the Pilon t r a c t . Miller, a layman w i t h r e g a r d t o c i v i l e n g i n e e r i n g matters, p r e p a r e d t h e metes and bounds d e s c r i p t i o n s t o t h e v a r i o u s t r a c t s s o l d , and d e l i v e r e d t h e d e s c r i p t i o n s t o h i s a t t o r n e y f o r t h e p r e p a r a t i o n of t h e d e e d s . I n J u l y 1968, Miller s o l d a d d i t i o n a l t r a c t s o f l a n d t o t h e Godfreys. These t r a c t s were s o u t h of t h e t h r e e t r a c t s p r e - viously sold. I n t h e summer o f 1968, M i l l e r c a u s e d a r o a d t o be constructed over t h e land he had s o l d t h e P i l o n s i n 1962 i n o r d e r t o p r o v i d e a c c e s s t o t h e l a n d s he wished t o s e l l t h e Godfreys. This road, t h e s u b j e c t of t h i s lawsuit, runs generally i n a norths o u t h d i r e c t i o n o v e r t h e e a s t edge of t h e P i l o n t r a c t . Prior t o 1 9 6 8 , t h e r e was no r o a d , t r a i l , p a t h o r o t h e r way a c r o s s P i l o n s t land. The r o a d was gouged o u t of a v i r g i n t i m b e r e d h i l l s i d e by a b u l l d o z e r o p e r a t e d by one Wayne S t o c k s a t M i l l e r ' s d i r e c t i o n and w i t h o u t t h e P i l o n s l knowledge o r c o n s e n t . Godfreys t e s t i f i e d they w e r e l e d t o b e l i e v e t h a t a c c e s s t o t h e l a n d s they purchased was by a r o a d o v e r a s t r i p of l a n d Miller had r e s e r v e d between t h e McLaren and P i l o n t r a c t s . Godfreys acknowledged t h a t t h e i r d e e d s c o n t a i n e d no g r a n t o f r i g h t of way o r e a s e m e n t s . They a l s o acknowledged t h a t t h e y had n o t checked t h e b o u n d a r i e s n o r o b t a i n ed any p l a t o r s u r v e y of t h e p r o p e r t y p u r c h a s e d from M i l l e r , n o r had any s u r v e y made t o d e t e r m i n e t h e l o c a t i o n of t h e r o a d u n t i l a f t e r t h e f i l i n g of t h i s s u i t . There i s no c l a i m o r f i n d i n g o f a n easement by a d v e r s e u s e h e r e , a s t h e f i v e y e a r r e q u i r e m e n t of s e c t i o n 93-2513, 1947, h a s n o t been met. R.C.M. The g r e a t e s t p e r i o d of u s e p l a i n t i f f s c o u l d c l a i m would be from J u l y 1968 t o J u l y 1 7 , 1972, when P i l o n s f e n c e d t h e r o a d , o r a p e r i o d of f o u r y e a r s . A f t e r i t s i n i t i a l c o n s t r u c t i o n , t h e r o a d was widened by Godfrey t o i t s p r e s e n t d i m e n s i o n s of 150 f e e t i n l e n g t h by 1 0 t o 12 f e e t i n width, again without informing t h e P i l o n s o r o b t a i n ing t h e i r consent. cabin. The r o a d i s w i t h i n 2 0 t o 25 f e e t of t h e P i l o n s ' P l a i n t i f f s have used t h e r o a d t o d r i v e heavy equipment t o t h e i r p r o p e r t i e s , t o o p e r a t e snowmobiles and t o d r i v e t r a i l b i k e s and p i c k u p t r u c k s . A l l of t h e p a r t i e s have c a b i n s on t h e i r t r a c t s which t h e y u s e a s second homes. Sometime p r i o r t o t h e i n s t i t u t i o n of t h i s s u i t , Gene P i l o n a d v i s e d t h e Godfreys t h a t t h e r o a d was on P i l o n ' s l a n d ; Godfreys, however, c l a i m e d t h a t t h e y had p u r c h a s e d a r i g h t of way between t h e P i l o n and McLaren t r a c t s from M i l l e r . F e a r i n g con- t i n u e d u s e of t h e r o a d might r i p e n i n t o a r i g h t by a d v e r s e u s e , P i l o n s o b t a i n e d a s u r v e y of t h e p r o p e r t y which e s t a b l i s h e d t h a t t h e r o a d was on t h e i r l a n d and t h e r e was, i n f a c t , no s p a c e between t h e McLaren and P i l o n t r a c t s . Gene P i l o n t e s t i f i e d t h a t , p r i o r t o o b t a i n i n g t h e s u r v e y , he t h o u g h t it was o n l y p a r t i a l l y on h i s l a n d . Originally, P i l o n d i d not o b j e c t t o t h e road. o n l y a p p e a r e d concerned w i t h i t s w i d t h . He H e waited almost a year, u n t i l a f t e r t h e Godfrey home was b u i l t , b e f o r e even m e n t i o n i n g it t o h i s neighbor. P i l o n s t h e r e a f t e r p r e s e n t e d t h e Godfreys w i t h a copy o f t h e s u r v e y and a l i c e n s e agreement t o u s e t h e r o a d , r e v o c a b l e on 90 d a y s n o t i c e . Godfreys r e f u s e d t o e x e c u t e t h e l i c e n s e , m a i n t a i n i n g t h e y owned t h e r o a d . After t h i s , Pilons e r e c t e d a f e n c e a c r o s s t h e d i s p u t e d roadway s o a s t o p h y s i c a l l y b a r i t s u s e by p l a i n t i f f s . T h i s a c t i o n ensued. The t r i a l judge, i n company w i t h c o u n s e l , viewed t h e property. The c o u r t concluded: " * * * From t h a t i n s p e c t i o n i t i s q u i t e c l e a r t h a t t h e r e was no o t h e r p r a c t i c a l a c c e s s t o t h e p r o p e r t i e s h e l d i n r e s e r v e by t h e common l a n d owner a t t h e t i m e he e x e c u t e d d e f e n d a n t s 1 deed * * *. T h e r e b e i n g no o t h e r a c c e s s upon which a n e n t r a n c e c o u l d be b u i l t t o p r o v i d e e n t r a n c e t o t h e l a n d h e l d i n r e s e r v e by M r . Miller, ' n e c e s s i t y ' c l e a r l y appears, "The most i m p r e s s i v e e v i d e n c e was a p p a r e n t on t h e C o u r t ' s v i s i t t o t h e p r o p e r t i e s o u t of which t h i s l a w s u i t a r o s e . A mountain s i d e , h e a v i l y t i m b e r e d , is t h e s e t t i n g f o r t h e controversy. N other access o seems r e a s o n a b l y p o s s i b l e t o p l a i n t i f f s t l a n d . " The d i s t r i c t c o u r t , i n a t t e m p t i n g t o r e s o l v e t h i s d i s p u t e , found t h a t John M i l l e r r e s e r v e d a n easement o f r i g h t o f way o v e r and upon t h e P i l o n p r o p e r t y . The c o u r t f u r t h e r concluded t h a t even i f John Miller d i d n o t i n f a c t r e s e r v e t h e r i g h t of way easement i n q u e s t i o n , t h a t p l a i n t i f f s a r e e n t i t l e d t o t h e r i g h t of way "on t h e e q u i t a b l e p r i n c i p l e s of n e c e s s i t y , e s t o p p e l and easement by i m p l i c a t i o n " . On a p p e a l t h r e e i s s u e s a r e p r e s e n t e d : (1) Whether t h e evidence supports t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t ' s holding t h a t M i l l e r d i d i n f a c t r e s e r v e a n easement o v e r t h e P i l o n p r o p e r t y f o r a c c e s s to the remainder of the property he owned? (2) Whether the evidence supports the district court's holding that there was an implied reserved easement of necessity over the Pilon property for access to the remainder of the property Miller owned? (3) Whether plaintiffs are entitled to an easement on the equitable principle of estoppel? We find there is a total lack of evidence to support the district court's holding that Miller did in fact reserve an easement over the Pilon property when he sold it to them in 1962. To support this holding, plaintiffs rely on this finding of the district court: " * * * that at about the time Miller conveyed the parcels to Pilon and McLaren, he placed a marker, an MJB Coffee Can, at a point marked '2' on the attached plat, hpproximately 15 feet west of the Pilons' east boundary line, on the edge of the Forest Service Road], and the Court finds that the grantor Miller intended for this marker to indicate a reserved right of way over and upon which he thereafter constructed the road for access to the property he had reserved. That this MJB Coffee Can marker was in place from the date of the Miller conveyance to defendants Pilon, was seen and acknowledged by all parties to this action but which disappeared on (Bracketed material or about July 12, 1972 added) . ." There is absolutely no evidence of the coffee can or any other marker at the time Miller sold to either McLaren or Pilon. Mrs. Godfrey testified it had "been there ever since the first time we were ever up there" and that ''Jack always told us that this was the end of the Pilon property and that was where the road would go in when we bought it, that's where he showed us the road would go in that way." The evidence does not show that the coffee can was on the Pilons' land any earlier than 1968. This certain- ly does not support the intention to reserve a right of way across ground sold to the Pilons in 1962. The only other evidence having any bearing whatsoever on whether Miller reserved an easement across Pilons' land was the testimony plaintiffs to the effect that "Jack [Miller] said there was no problem because he had reserved a space between McLaren and Pilon for the road" and, it was their "impression" or "understanding" that they had a right of way into their land. Plaintiffs entire argument on the subject of an express reserved easement appears to be that Miller must have reserved an easement since his failure to do so would have forever deprived him of access to his retained property. The conclusion does not neces- sarily follow. Neither do we find any evidence to support the district court's holding that there was an implied reserved easement of necessity over the Pilon property for access to the remainder of the property Miller owned. In Pioneer Min. Co. v. Bannack Gold Min. Co., 60 Mont. 254, 263, 264, 198 P. 748, this Court said: " * * * The parties are presumed to contract with reference to the condition of the property at the time of the sale, provided the marks are open and visible. [Citing cases]. "'In a sense no easement or quasi easement can well be absolutely necessary to any possible enjoyment of property. The most that can be required is that it be, in addition to being apparent and continuous, essential to use and enjoyment of the premises as permanently improved at the time of the conveyance of the servient estate. And this appears to be what is meant by the term "strict necessity," in defining easement reserved by implication.' (19 C.J. 920, note 75, Div.A.) "An easement is apparent when it may be discovered upon reasonable inspection." (Emphasis supplied). Although there may have been "necessity" for the easement, in the sense that Miller may have been effectively landlocked from the land which he retained (a point which we will discuss later), there is absolutely no evidence in the record that there was any apparent easement, path, "roadway of sorts", trail or "primative road" over the land sold to the Pilons until the sale to the Godfreys in 1968, more than six years after Pilons purchased their tract. All of the land was unimproved, timbered hillside and the witnesses all agreed and testified that the first visible sign of a roadway over the area of the claimed easement was in the summer of 1968. The trial court stated in its opinion: "There was a roadway of sorts, on the easement ground described in the Court's findings, at the time the Pilon family purchased the same." The only conceivable support for this statement would be the trial judge's view of the properties. However, if this was the case, we are unable to accept the district court's flat assertion without some explanation of how he was able to observe this "roadway of sorts" or "primative road" after a road 10 to 12 feet wide had been gouged out of the hillside by a bulldozer in The requirement that the implied reserved easement of necessity must be open and visible at the time of the conveyance is further supported by Montan's statute, section 67-1607, R.C.M. "A transfer of real property passes all easements attached thereto, and creates in favor thereof an easement to use other real property of the person whose estate is transferred in the same manner and to the same extent as such property was obviously and permanently used by the person whose estate is transferred, for the benefit thereof, at the time when the transfer was agreed upon or completed." (Emphasis supplied). In Spaeth v. Emmett, 142 Mont. 231,237, 383 P.2d 812, we applied the rules of that section to a situation where the servient tenement was conveyed creating an implied easement by reservation. See also 28 C.J.S., Easements, 5 33(b), p. 693. Plaintiffs testified repeatedly that the road in question was "the only access" and "the only possible way" into plaintiffs' properties. The t r i a l judge viewed t h e l a n d and s t a t e d i n h i s opinion : "From t h a t i n s p e c t i o n it i s q u i t e c l e a r t h a t t h e r e was no o t h e r p r a c t i c a l a c c e s s t o t h e p r o p e r t i e s h e l d i n r e s e r v e by t h e common l a n d owner a t t h e t i m e he e x e c u t e d d e f e n d a n t s ' d e e d " . W e would be w i l l i n g t o a c c e p t t h a t f i n d i n g o f " n e c e s s i t y " ( i n t h e s e n s e t h a t M i l l e r may have been e f f e c t i v e l y l a n d l o c k e d from t h e l a n d which he r e t a i n e d ) e x c e p t f o r t h i s : A t the t i m e M i l l e r conveyed t h e P i l o n t r a c t t o t h e P i l o n s , he r e t a i n e d t h e l a n d t o t h e e a s t which l a t e r became t h e McLaren t r a c t . s t a t e d , q u o t i n g from P i o n e e r Min. Co., A s we previously t h e " n e c e s s i t y " must a p p e a r " a t t h e t i m e of t h e conveyance of t h e s e r v i e n t e s t a t e " . The e a s t boundary of t h e P i l o n t r a c t i s i d e n t i c a l w i t h t h e w e s t boundary of what l a t e r became t h e McLaren t r a c t . The r o a d i n q u e s t i o n i s l o c a t e d a d j a c e n t t o t h e boundary, on t h e P i l o n s i d e of t h e l i n e . There i s n o t h i n g i n t h e t r a n s c r i p t o r i n t h e j u d g e ' s r e p o r t i n g of h i s view t o i n d i c a t e why i t would be ' h e c e s s a r y " a t t h e t i m e of t h e conveyance t o P i l o n , t o p u t t h e r o a d on t h e P i l o n s i d e of t h e l i n e r a t h e r t h a n 1 0 t o 1 2 f e e t e a s t on t h e o t h e r s i d e o f t h e boundary. From t h e p h o t o g r a p h s i n t r o d u c e d , t h e t e r r a i n 1 0 t o 1 2 f e e t e a s t a p p e a r s s i m i l a r t o t h e t e r r a i n upon which t h e road i s b u i l t . Because p l a i n t i f f s c o n t e n d and t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t found t h a t a n easement had been c r e a t e d by e s t o p p e l , we have a t t e m p t e d t o s e t f o r t h a s many of t h e r e l e v a n t f a c t s b e a r i n g on t h i s i n c i dent a s possible. S u f f i c e i t t o s a y t h a t we d o n o t f i n d any evidence t o support t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t ' s holding t h a t p l a i n t i f f s a r e e n t i t l e d t o an easement on t h e e q u i t a b l e grounds of e s t o p p e l . The r o a d w a s o r i g i n a l l y c o n s t r u c t e d and s u b s e q u e n t l y e n l a r g e d a l l w i t h o u t t h e knowledge o r c o n s e n t of t h e P i l o n s . The most t h a t a n be s a i d a g a i n s t t h e P ' l o n s i s t h tof four years, thinking &fiey passively acquiesced t o r a p e r l o $ o n l y t h a t t h e r o a d m i g h t be on t h e i r l a n d , u n t i l t h e y d i s c o v e r e d t h e i r r i g h t s and a c t e d t o p r e v e n t a n easement by p r e s c r i p t i o n from a r i s i n g . There was no m i s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n by t h e P i l o n s t o t h e p l a i n t i f f s , n o r any d e t r i m e n t a l r e l i a n c e on t h e p a r t of t h e p l a i n t i f f s , which a r e n e c e s s a r y f o r a f i n d i n g o f e s t o p p e l . blom v. Employers' L i a b i l i t y Assurance Corp., P. Lind- 88 Mont. 488, 295 1007. I n t h e i r complaint, p l a i n t i f f s requested, i n t h e alter- n a t i v e , r e l i e f under t h e p r o v i s i o n s of s e c t i o n s 93-9923 and 321401, R.C.M. 1947, f o r t h e p r i v a t e condemnation of a r i g h t of way by n e c e s s i t y . The d i s t r i c t c o u r t i n d i c a t e d a t t h e h e a r i n g on t h e i n j u n c t i o n p e n d e n t e l i t e t h a t i f h e h e l d i n f a v o r of t h e p l a i n t i f f s a s t o t h e i r ownership o f t h e easement, t h e r e would be no need t o make a r u l i n g on t h e condemnation c a u s e of a c t i o n . A s a r e s u l t , no r u l i n g was made by t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t i n t h i s regard. Nothing w e have s a i d h e r e p r e c l u d e s p l a i n t i f f s from p r o c e e d i n g w i t h a p r i v a t e condemnation a c t i o n . P i l o n s ' answer i n c l u d e d a c o u n t e r c l a i m t o q u i e t t i t l e t o t h e access r o a d i n t h e m s e l v e s . Finding p l a i n t i f f s ' claims t o t h e a c c e s s r o a d t o be w i t h o u t m e r i t , t i t l e t o t h e a c c e s s r o a d i s quieted i n the Pilons. P i l o n s a r e n o t e n t i t l e d t o damages s i n c e t h e i r p r a y e r f o r damages o n l y had r e l a t i o n t o t h e condemnation a c t i o n and s u c h i s s u e h a s n o t been r e s o l v e d . P i l o n s have asked f o r and a r e e n t i t l e d t o c o s t s and a t t o r n e y f e e s p u r s u a n t t o s e c t i o n 93-4213, R.C.M. 1947, and o u r d e c i s i o n i n E l e c t r i c Co-op., I n c . v. Ferguson, 124 Mont. 543, 551, 227 P.2d 597. The judgment of t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t i s r e v e r s e d and t h e m a t t e r i s r e t u r n e d t o t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t f o r t h e f i x i n g of r e a s o n - able attorney fees. V Justice , - -. Wei concur: Chief Justice
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