STATE v TURCOTTE
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No. 12662 I N T E SUPREME C U T O THE STATE O M N A A H OR F F OTN 1974 THE STATE O MONTANA, F P l a i n t i f f and Respondent, -vs - WILLIAM TURCOTTE , Defendant and Appellant. Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Twelfth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Honorable B. W. Thomas, Judge p r e s i d i n g . Counsel of Record: For Appellant : Morrison, E t t i e n & Barron, Havre, Montana Robert D. Morrison argued, Havre, Montana For Respondent : Hon. Robert L. Woodahl, Attorney General, Helena, Montana Thomas J. Beers, A s s i s t a n t Attorney General, argued, He lena , Montana Ronald W. Smith, County Attorney, Havre, Montana David G. Rice, Deputy County Attorney, argued, Havre, Montana Submitted: Decided : Filed: mL 1 6 1974 May 23, 1974 J'& 16 1974 Clerk Mr. Justice Gene B. Daly delivered the Opinion of the Court. This is an appeal from an order of the district court of the twelfth judicial district, county of Hill, denying defendant's motion to suppress evidence in a drug case. Appeal was brought after defendant had plead guilty to the charge contained in the information and final judgment of the court had been entered. The facts relevant to the appeal are: A police officer of the city of Havre obtained a search warrant January 24, 1973 to search defendant's residence. which led The search produced evidence to the charge against defendant of possession of dangerous drugs in violation of section 54-133, R.C.M. 1947, on January 26, 1973. On March 7, 1973, defendant filed a motion to controvert search warrant and suppress evidence which was heard by the district court on March 30, 1973. The matter was taken under advisement by the court and denied on April 25, 1973. On July 30, 1973 defendant applied to this Court for a writ of supervisory control, Cause No. 12566, State of Montana ex rel. William Turcotte v. District Court of the 12th Judicial District 3f the State of Montana. The application was heard ex parte on July 30, 1973 and the writ denied on procedural grounds the same day. Trial of the cause was set in the district court for November 1, 1973. On that day defendant plead guilty to the charge after first advising the court that he was preserving his constitutional and statutory right to appeal the adverse ruling denying the motion to suppress, heretofore discussed. His rationale being to petition the district court to withdraw the guilty plea in the event this Court rendered a decision favorable to defendant. The district court judge very carefully questioned defendant on all aspects of a guilty plea and demonstrated in the record t h a t d e f e n d a n t was making a n i n t e l l i g e n t v o l u n t a r y p l e a and w a s f u l l y s a t i s f i e d with t h e a s s i s t a n c e of h i s counsel. Thereafter on November 29, 1973, t h e c o u r t gave d e f e n d a n t a d e f e r r e d imposit i o n of s e n t e n c e and d e f e n d a n t was p l a c e d on p r o b a t i o n . T h i s a p p e a l d o e s n o t c o n c e r n t h e g u i l t y p l e a o r judgment, b u t p r e s e n t s two i s s u e s f o r r e v i e w h a v i n g t o do w i t h t h e s e a r c h of d e f e n d a n t ' s r e s i d e n c e and t h e f a i l u r e t o make a r e t u r n t o t h e issuing magistrate. The d i s p o s i t i v e q u e s t i o n b e f o r e t h i s Court i s whether a v o l u n t a r y p l e a of g u i l t y t o t h e c r i m e of p o s s e s s i o n of d a n g e r o u s d r u g s f o r e c l o s e s d e f e n d a n t from s e e k i n g r e v i e w of p r o c e d u r e s p r i o r t o t h e e n t r y of t h e g u i l t y p l e a . The g e n e r a l r u l e i s t h a t a p l e a of g u i l t y v o l u n t a r i l y and u n d e r s t a n d i n g l y made c o n s t i t u t e s a w a i v e r of n o n j u r i s d i c t i o n a l d e f e c t s and d e f e n s e s , i n c l u d i n g c l a i m s o f v i o l a t i o n s o f c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t s prior t o the plea. The r e a s o n i n g i s t h a t a p e r s o n p l e a d i n g g u i l t y i s c o n v i c t e d and s e n t e n c e d on h i s p l e a , n o t on t h e evidence. United S t a t e s v . C l a r k , c e r t . d e n . 409 U.S. (1972 CA 8 Mo.) 459 F.2d 977, 880, 34 L ed 2d 135, 93 S.Ct. I n T o l l e t t v. Henderson, 4 1 1 U.S. 93 S.Ct. 209. 258, 36 L ed 2d 235, 243, 1602, t h e United S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t h e l d : "We t h u s r e a f f i r m t h e p r i n c i p l e r e c o g n i z e d i n t h e Brady t r i l o g y : a g u i l t y p l e a r e p r e s e n t s a b r e a k i n t h e c h a i n o f e v e n t s which h a s preceded it i n t h e c r i m i n a l p r o c e s s . When a c r i m i n a l def e n d a n t h a s solemnly a d m i t t e d i n open c o u r t t h a t h e i s i n f a c t g u i l t y of t h e o f f e n s e w i t h which he i s c h a r g e d , he may n o t t h e r e a f t e r r a i s e i n dependent c l a i m s r e l a t i n g t o t h e d e p r i v a t i o n of constitutional rights that occurred-prior t o the entry of the g u i l t y p l e a . H e m a y o n l y attack t h e v o l u n t a r y and i n t e l l i g e n t c h a r a c t e r of t h e g u i l t y p l e a by showing t h a t t h e a d v i c e he r e c e i v e d from counsel w a s n o t within t h e standards set f o r t h i n McMann." I n P e t i t i o n of Harold E b e l i n g , 143 Mont. 298, 299, 387 P.2d 302, t h e d e f e n d a n t a f t e r waiving h i s r i g h t t o c o u n s e l , p l e a d g u i l t y t o t h r e e c o u n t s of b u r g l a r y i n t h e f i r s t d e g r e e . H e later b r o u g h t a p e t i t i o n f o r w r i t of e r r o r coram n o b i s i n a n a t t e m p t t o withdraw h i s g u i l t y p l e a and f o r t h e e n t r y of a p l e a of n o t g u i l t y and f o r t h e a p p o i n t m e n t of c o u n s e l t o r e p r e s e n t him. De- f e n d a n t c l a i m e d t h a t an i l l e g a l s e a r c h had been made o f h i s h o t e l room. T h i s Court s t a t e d : " * * * While p e t i t i o n e r makes much of t h e contended i l l e g a l s e a r c h , t h e s e m a t t e r s were known t o him bef o r e h e made any c o n f e s s i o n s i n c e he w a s p r e s e n t and knew what was b e i n g done. H i s p l e a of g u i l t y waives t h e n e c e s s i t y of proof on t h e p a r t of t h e s t a t e and we f a i l t o s e e where any c a u s e e x i s t s f o r t h e i s s u a n c e o f any w r i t h e r e i n . " I n S t a t e v. Lowery, 148 Mont. 7 5 , 80, 4 1 7 P.2d 1 1 3 , t h e d e f e n d a n t p l e a d g u i l t y b u t l a t e r c h a l l e n g e d t h e competency o f h i s c o u n s e l and c o e r c i o n o f a c o n f e s s i o n which was n o t used a g a i n s t him. T h i s C o u r t h e l d t h a t by e n t e r i n g a p l e a o f g u i l t y t h e de- f e n d a n t a d m i t t e d t h a t t h e murder c h a r g e was w e l l p l e a d and i n s o d o i n g waived a l l o t h e r d e f e n s e s o t h e r t h a n t h a t t h e I n f o r m a t i o n c h a r g e s no o f f e n s e . W e d o n o t d i s a g r e e w i t h d e f e n d a n t ' s argument and a u t h o r - i t y a s i t c o n c e r n s t h e w i t h d r a w a l of a g u i l t y p l e a b e f o r e t h e d i s t r i c t court. I n f a c t under t h e p r e s e n t d e f e r r e d i m p o s i t i o n of s e n t e n c e d e f e n d a n t w i l l be a l l o w e d t o do p r e c i s e l y t h a t . Defendant seems t o r e a s o n t h a t T o l l e t t i s n o t a u t h o r i t y f o r t h e f a c t s presented here, because defendant h e r e preserved h i s constitutional r i g h t s before t h e plea. F i r s t , a conditional plea i s n o t a l l o w e d i n Montana, s e c t i o n 9 5 - 1 6 0 6 ( e ) , R.C.M. 1947. Second, d e f e n d a n t had a f u l l h e a r i n g on t h e a l l e g e d c o n s t i t u t i o n a l v i o l a t i o n o f h i s r i g h t s and t h e t r i a l c o u r t r u l e d a d v e r s e l y t o him. Third, t h e p l e a o f g u i l t y was p r o p e r l y e n t e r e d , a s d i s c u s s e d above, w i t h a t y p e o f p l e a b a r g a i n t o withdraw t h e p l e a i f t h e r e was a p r o p e r a p p e a l t o t h i s Court from t h e motion t o s u p p r e s s e v i d e n c e , which e v i d e n c e was n o t used a t t r i a l t o c o n v i c t , and i f t h i s C o u r t r u l e d favorably t o defendant. F o u r t h , t h e r e i s no s t a t u t o r y a u t h o r i t y i n Montana for a procedure of this type. 1947. Section 95-2404, R.C.M. Fifth, and finally, the case law both federal and state makes these issues matters of defense at trial and upon a judgment of final conviction when the evidence is used against defendant the constitutionality of obtaining the evidence becomes an issue on appeal. In Alden v. State of Montana, 234 F.Supp. 661, 664, where a plea of guilty had been voluntarily entered, Judge Murray held: "'Complaints in regard to arrest and search are matters for defense * * *. One who pleads guilty waives these defenses and is not in a position to successfully move for a writ of habeas corpus on claims of alleged illegal arrest, search and seizure. Cf. United States v. Zavada, 291 F.2d 189 (6th Cir. 1961); United States v. Salzano, 241 F.2d 849 (2nd Cir. 1957).' United States ex rel. Hazen v. Maroney, 217 F.Supp. 328 (D.C. 1963)." (Emphasis supplied.) For the foregoing reasons, the appeal is dismissed. /" We concur: Justice 4
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