FITZPATRICK v CRIST

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No. 12746 I N THE S P E E COURT O THE STATE O M N A A URM F F OTN 1974 BERNARD JAMES FITZPATRICK , Petitioner, ROGER W. CRIST, WARDEN MONTANA STATE PRISON, Respondent. Counsel of Record: For P e t i t i o n e r : David J. Patterson, argued, Missoula, Montana For Respondent : Hon. Robert L. Woodahl, Attorney General, Helena, Montana Thomas A. Budewitz, A s s i s t a n t Attorney General, argued, Helena, Montana Submitted : November 12, 1974 M r . Chief J u s t i c e James T. Harrison d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion o f t h e Court. T h i s i s a n o r i g i n a l proceeding i n t h i s Court. On A p r i l 15, 1972, p e t i t i o n e r Bernard F i t z p a t r i c k and on A p r i l 1 7 , 1972, one Gus Gardner were a r r e s t e d f o r t h e murder o f a f e l l o w inmate a t t h e Montana S t a t e P r i s o n i n Deer Lodge, Montana. During t h e t r i a l on February 28, 1973, Gardner was granted a directed v e r d i c t of not g u i l t y , but p e t i t i o n e r w a s convicted of second degree murder and sentenced t o a term o f twenty y e a r s , t o be served c o n s e c u t i v e l y w i t h t h e f i v e y e a r term he w a s s e r v i n g a t t h e time of h i s a r r e s t . Petitioner unsuccessfully challenged c e r t a i n e v i d e n t i a r y m a t t e r s upon a p p e a l t o t h i s Court, which a f f i r m e d h i s c o n v i c t i o n on December 4 , 1973. Fitzpatrick, Mont . , 516 S t a t e v. P.2d 605, 30 St.Rep. 1052. On A p r i l 22, 1974, p e t i t i o n e r f i l e d pro se a " P e t i t i o n f o r W r i t of Habeas corpus" w i t h t h i s Court. Among o t h e r t h i n g s , he a l l e g e d t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t p r e j u d i c e d h i s r i g h t s by f a i l i n g t o make t i m e l y appointment of counsel; t o a r r a i g n him i n t h e manner r e q u i r e d by law; o r t o g r a n t him a speedy ttial as demanded. On t h e same day t h i s Court i s s u e d ail o r d e r r e f e r r i n g t h e p e t i t i o n t o t h e Montana Defender P r o j e c t i n o r d e r t h a t i t a s c e r t a i n t h e v a l i d i t y o f p e t i t i o n e r ' s a l l e g a t i o n s and t a k e a p p r o p r i a t e action. The Montana Defender P r o j e c t i s a c l i n i c a l l e g a l a i d program supervised by t h e U n i v e r s i t y o f Montana Law School and s t a f f e d by s e n i o r law s t u d e n t s . P r o f e s s o r David J. P a t t e r s o n and s t u d e n t Ken Green s p e n t s e v e r a l months i n v e s t i g a t i n g p e t i t i o n e r ' s c l a i m s and from p r i s o n r e c o r d s , l e t t e r s , and t h e l i k e , were a b l e t o c o n s t r u c t a f a c t u a l framework s a t i s f a c t o r y t o t h i s Court f o r t h e purpose of a c t i n g upon t h e p e t i t i o n . F i n a l l y , i t was agreed among a l l concerned t h a t i n o r d e r t o e x p e d i t e matters t h i s proceeding would be considered a p o s t - c o n v i c t i o n h e a r i n g , (See Chapter 26, T i t l e 95, R.C.M. 1947, S e c t i o n s 95-2601-2608), rather t h a n an a p p l i c a t i o n f o r habeas corpus under t h e Montana Rules of Criminal Procedure. The b r i e f s w i t h a t t a c h e d e x h i b i t s submitted i n p e t i t i o n e r ' s lehalf by t h e Montana Defender P r o j e c t b r i n g t o l i g h t t h e s e events: A f t e r h i s " a r r e s t " on A p r i l 15, 1972, p e t i t i o n e r w a s taken t o a s e g r e g a t i o n c e l l w i t h i n t h e main w a l l s of t h e p r i s o n . Three days l a t e r a complaint c h a r g i n g murder was i s s u e d and an i n i t i a l h e a r i n g was h e l d i n t h e deputy warden's o f f i c e . P e t i t i o n e r and Gardner were informed of t h e i r r i g h t s , i n c l u d i n g t h e r i g h t t o appointed counsel. P e t i t i o n e r r e q u e s t e d appointed counsel a t t h a t t i m e . On A p r i l 26, 1972, p e t i t i o n e r was t r a n s f e r r e d from h i s s e g r e - g a t i o n c e l l t o a maximum s e c u r i t y c e l l (one used f o r d i s c i p l i n a r y purposes) where he s t a y e d u n t i l J u l y 19, 1972. On May 4 , 1972, p e t i t i o n e r s e n t a l e t t e r t o t h e Honorable Sid S t e w a r t , t h e n d i s t r i c t judge of t h e t h i r d j u d i c i a l d i s t r i c t , r e q u e s t i n g a c o u r t appointed a t t o r n e y . While a w a i t i n g word on t h i s r e q u e s t , p e t i t i o n e r had h i s w i f e c o n t a c t t h e l a w f i r m of S a n d a l l , Moses 6 Cavan of B i l l i n g s , Montana, about t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f r e p r e s e n t i n g him and Gardner. Esq., S h o r t l y t h e r e a f t e r , D. Frank Kampfe, of t h a t f i r m , made an appointment t o v i s i t p e t i t i o n e r t o d i s c u s s t h e c a s e and make f e e arrangements. On May 1 8 , 1972, William Taylor, Esq., p e t i t i o n e r a t the prison. o f Deer Lodge v i s i t e d Apparently Taylor was s e n t by Judge Stewart i n response t o p e t i t i o n e r ' s l e t t e r of May 4. After dis- c u s s i n g t h e c a s e w i t h p e t i t i o n e r , Taylor a d v i s e d p e t i t i o n e r he would n o t r e p r e s e n t him. Kampfe v i s i t e d p e t i t i o n e r and Gardner a t t h e p r i s o n on May 30, 1972. Gardner paid Kampfe $800 a s a r e t a i n e r and informed him t h a t he (Gardner) might be a b l e t o r a i s e t h e money needed t o r e p r e s e n t b o t h defendants. P e t i t i o n e r claimed an i n a b i l i t y t o pay anything. On J u l y 5 , 1972, Kampfe withdrew from t h e c a s e because of a c o n f l i c t of i n t e r e s t w i t h i n h i s law firm. He r e t u r n e d $700 t o Gardner, keeping t h e o t h e r $100 f o r t i m e and expenses i n c u r r e d i n making t h e v i s i t t o t h e p r i s o n . Kampfe a l s o advised t h e Montana Defender P r o j e c t of t h e c a s e and asked t h a t defendants b e c o n t a c t e d a s soon a s p o s s i b l e . On July 12, 1972, t h e Montana Defender P r o j e c t n o t i f i e d pep titioner t h a t t h e Defender P r o j e c t d i d n o t r e p r e s e n t anyone a t the trial level. P r o f e s s o r P a t t e r s o n , however, o f f e r e d t o keep p e t i t i o n e r a d v i s e d of t h e proceedings a g a i n s t him and informed him of h i s r i g h t t o c o u r t appointed counsel. On J u l y 1 5 , 1972, t h r e e months a f t e r h i s a r r e s t , p e t i t i o n e r was s t i l l i n maximum s e c u r i t y and without t h e a i d of counsel. On t h i s d a t e , i n a l e t t e r t o t h e Montana Defender P r o j e c t , p e t i t i o n e r expressed h i s disappointment w i t h t h e p r o j e c t ' s i n a b i l i t y t o r e p r e s e n t him and mentioned h i s d i f f i c u l i t i e s i n g e t t i n g l e g a l a s s i s t a n c e ; h i s confinement i n maximum s e c u r i t y s i n c e A p r i l ; and, h i s ignorance of t h e s i t u a t i o n . 1I He c l o s e d w i t h a p l e a t o have someone from t h e ~ e f e n d e r ' sP r o j e c t come down and t a l k t o u s and l e t u s know j u s t what i s going on. II On J u l y 25, 1972, p e t i t i o n e r s e n t t h e s e papers t o t h e d i s t r i c t court : I. A motion t o f i l e and proceed i n forma p a u p e r i s ; 2. A motion f o r appointment of c o u n s e l ; 3. A demand f o r s p e e e t r i a l ; and 4. A motion t o d i s m i s s . A l l of t h e s e papers were r e c e i v e d and f i l e d i n t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t on J u l y 27, 1972. On August 22, 1972, over f o u r months (126 days) a f t e r t h e i n i t i a l appearance, p e t i t i o n e r ' s p r e l i m i n a r y h e a r i n g began. Peti- t i o n e r t e s t i f i e d h e w a s i n d i g e n t and r e q u e s t e d appointed counsel. The h e a r i n g t h e r e f o r e w a s continued f o r a week t o a l l o w appointment o f counsel. The s t a t e , however, d i d t a k e d e p o s i t i o n s of f o u r major witnesses then present. On August 24, 1972, Judge Stewart appointed James J. Masar, Esq., o f Deer Lodge t o r e p r e s e n t p e t i t i o n e r . From t h e i n i t i a l h e a r i n g , where p e t i t i o n e r f i r s t r e q u e s t e d appointment of c o u n s e l , t o t h e a c t u a l appointment t h e r e was a d e l a y of over f o u r months (128 d a y s ) . On August 28, 1972, t h e p r e l i m i n a r y h e a r i n g was completed. The o r d e r b i n d i n g p e t i t i o n e r and Gardner over t o t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t f o r t r i a l was issued on October 4 , 1972, and t h e Information a g a i n s t them was f i l e d on October 12, 1972. The t r i a l of both defendants began on February 26, 1973, and l a s t e d two days. From t h e d a t e of t h e demand f o r speedy t r i a l t o t h e d a t e of t h e t r i a l over seven months (216 days) had elapsed. I n l i g h t of t h e above f a c t s , p e t i t i o n e r contends: 1. The f o u r month delay between t h e i n i t i a l hearing and t h e preliminary hearing v i o l a t e d s e c t i o n 95-902, R.C.M. 2. 1947. The four month delay i n t h e appointment of counsel de- prived p e t i t i o n e r of h i s r i g h t t o e f f e c t i v e counsel. 3. The seven month delay between t h e demand f o r speedy t r i a l and t h e t r i a l deprived p e t i t i o n e r of h i s r i g h t t o a speedy t r i a l . A t t h e o u t s e t i t should be observed t h a t we a r e proceeding on t h e assumption p e t i t i o n e r has n o t waived these i s s u e s , d e s p i t e h i s f a i l u r e t o r a i s e them e a r l i e r . W do n o t r e j e c t t h e general e proposition t h a t such questions should be interposed a s promptly a s p o s s i b l e , but only say t h a t t h e unusual f a c t s of t h i s c a s e make a c l e a r c u t determination of waiver d i f f i c u l t . Unless t h e r e i s s u b s t a n t i a l evidence of waiver, c o n s t i t u t i o n a l claims must be heard on t h e i r m e r i t s . The b a s i c r i g h t t o counsel i s f i r m l y e s t a b l i s h e d by t h e United S t a t e s and Montana C o n s t i t u t i o n s and t h e Montana Code of Criminal Procedure. The narrow i s s u e here i n when t h i s r i g h t a t t a c h e s and whether a four month delay i n t h e appointment of counsel, while t h e defendant i s confined i n maximum s e c u r i t y , renders counsel i n effective. W e a r e convinced t h a t under both f e d e r a l and Montana law p e t i t i o n e r ' s r i g h t t o appointed counsel attached no l a t e r than h i s i n i t i a l hearing; t h a t p e t i t i o n e r d i d n o t waive h i s r i g h t t o appointed counsel; and t h a t t h e delay i n t h e appointment o f counsel was p r e j u d i c i a l t o p e t i t i o n e r ' s case. Our law provides t h a t any a r r e s t e d person must be brought without unnecessary delay before a judge f o r an i n i t i a l appearance, and t h a t i t i s t h e duty of t h a t judge t o advise defendant of h i s r i g h t t o counsel, and of h i s r i g h t t o have counsel assigned by a c o u r t of record. Sections 95-901 and 95-902, R.C.M. 1947. Obviously the court's duty cannot end with a mere reading of his rights to defendant; if defendant requests counsel to be appointed the court without unnecessary delay must determine indigency and appoint counsel accordingly. How can this duty be fulfilled by delaying the appointment of counsel for four months while the state prepares its case and the defendant lingers in a prison or a jail? The length of the delay here, coupled with petitioner's plight during the interim, shocks one's concept of fundamental fairness and due process. See: Federal cases compel the same result. Escobedo v, Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 84 S,Ct. 1758, 12 L ed 2d977; United States v Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 87 S.Ct. 1926, 18 . L ed 2d 1149. Our holding on the issue of delay in appointing counsel for petitioner is buttressed by a showing of actual prejudice. defense petitioner raised at trial was that of alibi. One The delay saw a release from the state prison of many potential alibi witnesses and caused a loss of memory in those who remained, On April 15, 1972, the date of petitioner's arrest, the section of the prison to which petitioner was assigned contained 112 inmates, By August 24, 1972, the date counsel was appointed, 65 of these inmates had been released. This turnover of inmates seriously undermined counsel's ability to conduct interviews to see who could verify petitioner's alibi. Another defense concerned the interchange and labeling of prisoner clothing. Introduced in evidence at trial were three articles of blood stained clothing. Only one of these articles-a pair of prison issued levis--bore petitioner's name. Petitioner contends that on the day of his arrest he could account for all the lev* issued to him, but the *l$y in appointing counsel made it impossible for his attorney to investigate and prove such a contention. Unquestionably, the deprivation of counsel for four months rendered these defenses virtually meaningless. W a l s o b e l i e v e t h e seven month delay between t h e demand f o r e speedy t r i a l and t h e t r i a l i t s e l f v i o l a t e d p e t i t i o n e r ' s r i g h t t o a speedy t r i a l . The United Sta t e s and t h e Montana C o n s t i t u t i o n s guarantee an accused t h e r i g h t t o a speedy t r i a l . The United S t a t e s Supreme Court and t h i s Court have adopted e s s e n t i a l l y t h e same t e s t t o determine whether a t r i a l i s 407 U.S. 514, 530, 532, 92 S.Ct. It speedy". Compare Barker v. Wingo, 2182, 33 L ed 2d 101, w i t h S t a t e v. Lagerquist, 152 Mont. 21, 445 P.2d 910. Barker d e s c r i b e s t h i s t e s t a s a balancing t e s t "in which t h e conduct of both t h e prosecution and t h e defendant a r e weighed." It i d e n t i f i e s t h e f a c t o r s involved a s : 1. Length of delay; 2. Reason f o r delay; 3. ~ e f e n d a n t ' sa s s e r t i o n of t h e r i g h t ; and 4. Prejudice t o defendant. Applying t h i s t e s t t o t h e i n s t a n t c a s e , w e f i n d : Length of delay: Seven months. W e emphasize t h i s delay i s - n o t considered a per s e v i o l a t i o n of p e t i t i o n e r ' s r i g h t t o a speedy t r i a l , but under t h e circumstances h e r e i t i s thought long enough t o s h i f t t o t h e s t a t e t h e burden of explaining t h e reason f o r t h e delay and showing absence of prejudice t o p e t i t i o n e r . Reason f o r delay: The s t a t e ' s contention t h a t it took much t i m e t o g a t h e r and analyze t h e evidence used a g a i n s t p e t i t i o n e r a t h i s t r i a l i s u n s a t i s f a c t o r y because t h e record h e r e e x p l a i n s t h i s caused no more than two and one-half months of t h e delay. Moreover, t h e evidence gathering process s t a r t e d before p e t i t i o n e r demanded a speedy t r i a l . It i s n o t s e r i o u s l y contended t h a t p e t i t i o n e r o r h i s counsel c o n t r i b u t e d t o t h e delay. ~ e f e n d a n t ' sa s s e r t i o n of t h e r i g h t : petitioner's written demand f o r speedy t r i a l seven months before h i s t r i a l began i s a matter of record. Prejudice t o defendant: of t h i s f o u r t h f a c t o r : Barker explained what l a y a t t h e h e a r t "* * * Prejudice, of course, should be assessed in the light of the interests of defendants which the speedy trial right was designed to protect. This Court has identified three such interests: (i) to prevent oppressive pretrial incarceration; (ii) to minimize anxiety and concern of the accused; and (iii) to limit the possibility that the defense will be impaired. Of these, the most serious is the last, because the inability of a defendant adequately to prepare his case skews the fairness of the entire system. If witnesses die or disappearduring a delay, the pre'udice is obvious. There is also prejudice ii defense iitnesses are unable to recall accurately events of the distant past. Loss of memory, however, is not always retlected in the record because what has been forgotten can rarely be shown. " (Emphasis added). To the same effect is State v Mielke, 148 Mont. 320, 322, 420 . P.2d 155, citing United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116, 86 S.Ct. 773, 15 L ed 2d 627. We think petitioner was clearly prejudiced with respect to all three interests discussed in Barker. First, when petitioner was arrested he was serving a sentence at the "honor farm" of the state prison, but thereafter he was placed in maximum security for over three months. Without more, the state merely asserts such con- finement was lawful and necessary. This is hardly sufficient to carry the state's burden. Second, petitioner's predicament maximized, rather than minimized, his anxiety and concern. This is amply demonstrated by his letter of July 15, 1972, to the Montana Defender Project and by his motion for speedy trial of July 27, 1972, wherein he alleged physical and mental anguish of such a nature as to inhibit him from assisting in his own defense. The state's position that any man accused of a serious crime will suffer some anxiety and concern and that minimization of these emotions is largely subject to individual quirks of personality utterly fails to come to grips with the stark realities here. Third, what has already been said about the delay in appointment of counsel impairing petitioner's alibi defense applies even more strongly to the problem of speedy trial, since petitioner's trial was delayed another six months after counsel was finally appointed. From the foregoing, it is plain the state by its unexcused inaction deprived petitioner of effective representation by counsel and a speedy trial. Since we have decided the case on these issues, it becomes unnecessary to consider whether section 95-902, R.C.M. 1947, was violated. The judgment of conviction of February 28, 1973, is-set aside and the sentence vacated, with prejudice. ..................................... Chief Justice We Concur: Justices.

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