STATE EX REL WOODBURY v DIST COU

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No. 12250 I N THE SUPREME C U T O THE STATE O M N A A OR F F OTN 1972 T E STATE O MONTANA ex re1 H F BRIAN EDWARD WOODBURY, Relator, THE DISTRICT C U T O T E THIRTEENTH OR F H JUDICIAL DISTRICT O T E STATE O M N A A F H F OTN, Respondent. ORIGINAL PROCEEDING: Counsel o f Record: For R e l a t o r : John L. Adams argued, B i l l i n g s , Montana. For Respondent : . Hon. Robert L. Waodahl, Attorney General, Helena, Montana David V. Gliko, A s s i s t a n t Attorney General, argued, Hele n a y Montana. Harold I?. Hanser, County Attorney, argued, B i l l i n g s , Montana. Submitted: A p r i l 10, 1972 Decided:AP~ 1 3 1972 M r . J u s t i c e Wesley C a s t l e s d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e Court. This i s a n o r i g i n a 1 proceeding seeking a p o s t - c o n v i c t i o n h e a r i n g under t h e terms of s e c t i o n 95-2601, R.C.M. 1947, by a defendant who claims s e n t e n c e was imposed i n v i o l a t i o n of t h e laws of t h i s s t a t e and seeks c o r r e c t i o n of t h a t s e n t e n c e . Defendant, r e l a t o r h e r e , on March 1, 1972, was convicted i n t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t of t h e t h i r t e e n t h j u d i c i a l d i s t r i c t , county of Yellowstone, of t h e crime of c r i m i n a l s a l e of dangerous d r u g s . Such c o n v i c t i o n a r o s e out of t h e e n t r y of a g u i l t y plea t o t h e charge by t h e defendant. The c o u r t ordered t h e imposition of s e n t e n c e upon defendant be s t a y e d f o r a p e r i o d of two y e a r s upon a c o n d i t i o n t h a t defendant s h a l l s e r v e a term of t h i r t y days i n t h e Yellowstone county j a i l ; t h e j a i l s e n t e n c e t o begin February 21, 1972. Defendant contends t h e c o u r t i s w i t h o u t j u r i s d i c t i o n t o impose t h e c o n d i t i o n of s e r v i c e of time i n t h e Yellowstone county j a i l based on t h e d e c i s i o n of t h i s Court i n S t a t e v. Drew, Mon t . , 490 P.2d 230, 28 St.Rep.930, decided November 3 , 1971. Brian Woodbury, e i g h t e e n y e a r s of a g e , on January 21, 1972 was charged by Information i n t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t of t h e t h i r t e e n t h j u d i c i a l d i s t r i c t , county of Yellowstone, with t h e crime of c r i m i n a l s a l e of dangerous drugs a l l e g e d t o have been committed on January 1 5 , 1972; t h a t he s o l d c e r t a i n dangerous d r u g s , to-wit: L y s e r g i c a c i d diethylamide (LSD). Counsel was appointed f o r defendant and bond s e t a t $500. On January 24, 1972, defendant appeared i n c o u r t w i t h h i s appointed c o u n s e l , Michael J. Whalen, and e n t e r e d a plea of n o t guilty. The bond was continued w i t h t h e r e s t r i c t i o n t h a t i f de- fendant posted bond, he would be s u b j e c t t o c e r t a i n r e s t r i c t i v e scheduling by t h e s c h o o l a u t h o r i t i e s of School D i s t r i c t No. 2. He was r e l e a s e d on bond s u b j e c t t o t h e c o n d i t i o n s which he signed on January 2 8 , 1972. O February 4 , 1972, t h e c a s e was s e t f o r n t r i a l March 7, 1972. On March 1, 1972, defendant appeared i n c o u r t w i t h h i s counsel John L. Adams, J r . , and withdrew h i s plea and e n t e r e d a g u i l t y p l e a , a t which time t h e s e n t e n c e now i n i s s u e was imposed. The f a c t s r e l a t i n g t o t h i s charge a r e : On January 15, 1972, t h e B i l l i n g s P o l i c e Department received telephone c a l l s from two p a r e n t s i n B i l l i n g s t o t h e e f f e c t t h a t they thought t h e i r daughters had on t h e previous n i g h t taken some t y p e of drug. One of t h e g i r l s was placed i n t h e p s y c h i a t r i c ward a t B i l l i n g s Deaconess Hospital. It was subsequently a s c e r t a i n e d t h a t both g i r l s had taken LSD, which had been put i n Kool-Aid. purchased t h e LSD from defendant. They s t a t e d they had O being questioned by t h e n B i l l i n g s P o l i c e Department, defendant admitted t h e s a l e of t h e LSD t o t h e two teen-age g i r l s and a l s o f u r n i s h e d t h e p o l i c e w i t h t h r e e a d d i t i o n a l " h i t s " of LSD t h a t he had cached i n a snowbank n e a r h i s house. This information was a v a i l a b l e t o t h e c o u r t a t t h e time s e n t e n c e was pronounced. This defendant i s p r e s e n t l y under charge of s i x felony counts f o r c r i m i n a l s a l e of dangerous drugs which i n c l u d e s LSD, Marijuana , Crys t a 1-Ma t h and Heroin. This charge a r o s e almost immediately a f t e r t h e c o n v i c t i o n h e r e , t h a t i s , on March 1 7 , 1972, Upon t h e g u i l t y p l e a , t h e c o u r t s t a y e d t h e imposition of s e n t e n c e f o r a period of two y e a r s and i n a d d i t i o n t o seven g e n e r a l c o n d i t i o n s imposed i n t h a t j u r i s d i c t i o n , an a d d i t i o n a l one was added---that t h e defendant would s e r v e a term of t h i r t y days i n t h e Yellowstone county j a i l . The i s s u e h e r e involved i s whether t h e t r i a l c o u r t can impose c o n d i t i o n s on a d e f e r r e d imposition of s e n t e n c e under t h e terms of t h e Montana Dangerous Drug Act; more p a r t i c u l a r l y , whether t h o s e c o n d i t i o n s can i n c l u d e a p e r i o d of time i n a county jail. I n S t a t e v. Drew, Mon t . -9 490 P.2d 230, 28 St.Rep. 930, 932, we s a i d : tt The only remaining i s s u e f o r review i s whether a s i x month imprisonment i s proper under t h e presumpt i o n of e n t i t l e m e n t t o a d e f e r r e d imposition of sent e n c e , d i r e c t e d by s e c t i o n 54-133(c), R.C.M. 1947. W think not. e PI The s t a t e ' s p r i n c i p a l argument i s t h a t s e c t i o n 95-2206, R.C.M. 1947, ~ o n t a n a ' ssentencing s t a t u t e , provides : "'SENTENCE. Whenever any person has been found g u i l t y of a crime o r o f f e n s e upon a v e r d i c t o r plea t h e c o u r t may impose any of t h e following s e n t e n c e s : " ' ( 1 ) Release t h e defendant on p r o b a t i o n ; "' (2) Defer t h e imposition of s e n t e n c e f o r a period n o t t o exceed t h r e e (3) y e a r s ; ' (3) Suspend t h e execution of t h e s e n t e n c e up t o t h e maximum s e n t e n c e allowed f o r t h e p a r t i c u l a r o f f e n s e . However, i f any r e s t r i c t i o n s o r condit i o n s a r e v i o l a t e d , any elapsed time s h a l l n o t be a c r e d i t against t h e sentence, unless t h e court s h a l l otherwise o r d e r . (4) offense; 'I' Impose a f i n e a s provided by law f o r t h e " ' ( 5 ) Commit t h e defendant t o a c o r r e c t i o n a l i n s t i t u t i o n w i t h o r without a f i n e a s provided by law f o r t h e offense; " ' ( 6 ) Impose any combination of t h e above. The c o u r t may a l s o impose any r e s t r i c t i o n s o r c o n d i t i o n s on t h e above s e n t e n c e which i t deems n e c e s s a r y . I "The s t a t e a r g u e s t h a t s e c t i o n 95-2206 read l i t e r a l l y a u t h o r i z e d t h e combination of a d e f e r r e d s e n t e n c e and a ' a i l term. The d e f e c t i n t h i s argument l i e s i n t h e one < a c t which has been overlooked. Here, we a r e c o n s i d e r i n g t h e s e n t e n c i n g mandate of a s p e c i a l s x a t u t e under t h e Dangerous Drug Act, s e c t i o n 54-133 ( c ) , R.C .M. 1947. Under t h i s Act, once t h e presumption provided f o r i n s e c t i o n 54-133 (c) has been found by t h e t r i a l judge n o t t o have been overcome ( S t a t e v. Simtob, 154 Mont. 286, 462 P.2d 873; Campus v. S t a t e , Mont -9 483 P.2d 275, 28 S t . Rep. 339), then t h e c o u r t ' s d i s c r e t i o n i s l i m i t e d by t h i s Act t o d e f e r t h e imposition of s e n t e n c e a s proe vided under s e c t i o n 95-2206(2), R.C.M. 1947. W have o t h e r examples of s p e c i a l p r o v i s i o n s which l i m i t t h e c o u r t ' s s e n t e n c i n g d i s c r e t i o n such a s s e c t i o n 94-2505, R.C.M. 1947, which provides t h e mandatory p e n a l t y f o r murder i n t h e f i r s t degree. However, i n a l l c a s e s when t h e r e a r e no s p e c i a l s e n t e n c i n g p r o v i s i o n s t h e wide d i s c r e t i o n of s e c t i o n 95-2206, R.C.M. 1947, a p p l i e s . - . II The s t a t e f u r t h e r argues w i t h c i t a t i o n s on 'suspended s e n t e n c e s ' , t h a t t h e purpose of I suspended' and ' d e f e r r e d 1 i s n o t d i s s i m i l a r and c o n d i t i o n s of p r o b a t i o n can be a t t a c h e d . This i s t r u e but n o t i n p o i n t w i t h t h e i s s u e presented i n t h i s a p p e a l . "For c l a r i t y : Where t h e defendant i s g r a n t e d a s u s pended s e n t e n c e , s e n t e n c e i s imposed and kxecution of t h e s e n t e n c e i s - s u s p e n d e d i n whole o r i n p a r t up t o t h e maximum time of s e n t e n c e allowed by law and t h e defendant can be r e l e a s e d on probation d u r i n g t h e time i n t e r v a l w i t h t h e c o n d i t i o n s of probation imposed by t h e c o u r t . Where t h e defendant i s granted d e f e r r e d imposition o i s e n t e n c e a s d i r e c t e d by s e c t i o n 54-133(c), R.C.M. 1947, i t contempla tes t h a t t h e v e r d i c t o r plea w i l l be taken and t h e imposition of s e n t e n c e d e f e r r e d , o r i f you p r e f e r , s t a y e d , f o r a period n o t t o exceed t h r e e y e a r s . The c o u r t can impose c o n d i t i o n s o f probation d u r i n g t h i s time o f deferment which a r e n o t i n c o n t r a d i c t i o n t o a s t a y o f s e n t e n c e o r d e f e r r e d s e n t e n c e . This then means defendant w i l l n o t be sentenced,which i n c l u d e s a sent e n c e t o a term i n j a i l . A t t h e t e r m i n a t i o n of t h e time of deferment o r s t a y e d i m p o s i t i o n , s e c t i o n 95-2207, R.C.M. 1947, a u t h o r i z e s t h e c o u r t t o a c c e p t a plea w i t h drawal or t o s t r i k e t h e v e r d i c t of g u i l t y and o r d e r t h e charge dismissed. "The passage of s e c t i o n 95-2207, R.C.M. 1947, demons t r a t e s t h e i n t e n t of t h e l e g i s l a t u r e i n regard t o def e r r e d imposition of sentence. I f s e n t e n c e were imposed o r executed i n any p a r t , then t h e end advantage t o t h e e n t i r e concept o f t h e d e f e r r e d s e n t e n c e c o u l d - n o t be a t t a i n e d and s e c t i o n 95-2207 would become i n o p e r a t i v e . "Accordingly, t h e judgment and sentence o f t h e t r i a l c o u r t i s vacated and t h i s cause remanded t o t h e t r i a l c o u r t w i t h i n s t r u c t i o n s t o e n t e r judgment and deferred sentence not inconsistent with the s t a t u t e s c o n t r o l l i n g o r t h i s opinion. " (Emphasis s u p p l i e d ) Taken l i t e r a l l y , t h e foregoing quote i n t h e underlined p o r t i o n s appears t o be on " a l l fours". However, t h i s Court wishes t o c l a r i f y t h e holding. I n Drew, t h e complete f l e x i b i l i t y of t h e powers of t h e s e n t e n c i n g judge were f i r s t r e f e r r e d t o under s e c t i o n 95-2206, R.C.M. 1947; then t h e Court h e l d t h a t , under t h e proper circum- s t a n c e , a d i s t r i c t judge could n o t e x e r c i s e h i s broad, f l e x i b l e s e n t e n c i n g powers s i n c e he was s t a t u t o r i l y r e s t r i c t e d t o o r d e r i n g a d e f e r r e d imposition of s e n t e n c e f o r a f i r s t o f f e n d e r twenty-one y e a r s o l d o r younger, w i t h no adverse r e c o r d , and c o n v i c t e d under t h e Montana Dangerous Drug Act. Under t h a t r a t i o n a l e , w i t h t h e circumstances of t h e i n s t a n t c a s e , a s e n t e n c i n g judge would be l i m i t e d t o t h e scope of a "deferred imposition of sentence". The q u e s t i o n is: Does t h e concept of a "deferred imposition of sentence" a l l o w a p e r i o d of i n c a r c e r a t i o n i n j a i l t o be ordered a s a condition thereof? - The Drew d e c i s i o n makes t h i s s t a t e m e n t , a s h e r e t o f o r e quoted, tl The c o u r t can impose c o n d i t i o n s of p r o b a t i o n during t h i s time of deferment which a r e n o t i n c o n t r a d i c t i o n t o a s t a y of s e n t e n c e o r d e f e r r e d sentence." So, "conditions of probationrt a r e allowed. Examples o f making a j a i l term a c o n d i t i o n of p r o b a t i o n which a r e n o t considered a p a r t o f a "sentence" can be found i n numerous C a l i f o r n i a c a s e s . Ex p a r t e Webber, 95 Cal.App.2d 183, 212 P.2d 540,541; Ex p a r t e Goetz, 46 Cal.App.2d 848, 117 P.2d 47,49; Ex p a r t e Martin, 82 Cal.App.2d 16, 185 P.2d 645,649. A quotation from a n e a r l y C a l i f o r n i a c a s e , People v. Wallach, 8 Cal.App.2d 129, 47 P.2d 1071, 1072, i s i n p o i n t : "The f a c t t h a t t h e defendant s p e n t t h e f i r s t 30 days of h e r probationary period i n t h e county j a i l does n o t amount t o h e r having served a term of imprisonment i n a penal i n s t i t u t i o n . That period o f d e t e n t i o n was i m posed n o t a s a s e n t e n c e but a s a c o n d i t i o n of p r o b a t i o n , and t h e g r a n t i n g of probation suspended t h e execution of t h e 90-day s e n t e n c e p r e v i o u s l y imposed, It cannot be s a i d t h a t t h e 30 days s p e n t by t h e defendant i n t h e county j a i l was s e r v e d under t h e s e n t e n c e , where t h a t s e n t e n c e had been suspended by t h e p r o b a t i o n o r d e r . " These C a l i f o r n a c a s e s d e a l w i t h a "suspended sentence"; however, t h e purposes of a "suspended sentence1' and a " d e f e r r e d sentence" a r e n o t d i s s i m i l a r . The "suspended sentence'' merely p r e v e n t s a defendant from being exposed t o an i n f l u e n t i a l crimina 1 element by i n c a r c e r a t i o n i n p r i s o n . A "deferred sentence" accomplishes t h e same t h i n g , b u t g r a n t s a defendant t h e a d d i t i o n a l b e n e f i t of l e a v i n g no record o f any c r i m i n a l c o n v i c t i o n . Limited i n c a r c e r a t i o n i n a county j a i l a s a c o n d i t i o n t o a " d e f e r r e d sentence" does n o t d e f e a t t h e purpose of t h i s t y p e o r s e n t e n c i n g power. This Court i n I n r e P e t i t i o n of Williams, 145 Mont. 45, 56,57,58, 399 P,2d 732, d i s c u s s i n g a "suspended imposition of sentence" under o l d s e c t i o n 94-7832, R.C.M.1947, said: "It i s t r u e t h a t t h e o r d e r of August 22 provides t h a t p e t i t i o n e r s h a l l be ' j a i l - b a s e d ' and r e f e r s t o p e t i t i o n e r a s a ' p r i s o n e r 1 . These d e s c r i p t i v e terms a r e , perhaps, an u n f o r t u n a t e c h o i c e of language b u t i n any event t h e s u b s t a n c e of t h e o r d e r , n o t i t s form n o r i t s d e s c r i p t i v e terminology, determines i t s e f f e c t and meaning. And t h e s u b s t a n c e o t t h e o r d e r i s r e a d i l y a p parent---to withhold s e n t e n c e and punishment o r p e t i t i o n e r f o r t h e crime of grand l a r c e n y and t o p l a c e p e t i t i o n e r on p r o b a t i o n s u b j e c t t o terms and c o n d i t i o n s reasonably c a l c u l a t e d t o subserve t h e purpose sought t o be accomplished, namely, t h e r e h a b i l i t a t i o n of a n a l c o h o l i c . , "The f a c t t h a t one of t h e terms of p r o b a t i o n r e q u i r e d p e t i t i o n e r t o be ' j a i l - b a s e d ' i n t h e county j a i l does n o t t r a n s f o r m a p r o b a t i o n a r y r u l e i n t o a term of imprisonment. That i t i s a probationary r u l e i s r e a d i l y determinable by o t h e r p r o v i s i o n s i n t h e o r d e r of August 22 p e r m i t t i n g p e t i t i o n e r t o have employment o u t s i d e t h e county j a i l , a b s o l v i n g t h e s h e r i f f from l i a b i l i t y i n p e r m i t t i n g p e t i t i o n e r t o be a b s e n t from h i s custody without b a i l , and c o n t a i n i n g a r e quirement t h a t p e t i t i o n e r pay h i s own board a t t h e j a i l from h i s e a r n i n g s . The s i m i l a r i t y o f t h e s e p r o v i s i o n s t o some of t h e p r o v i s i o n s contained i n t h e s t a t u t e r e l a t i n g t o convicted misdemeanants s e r v i n g county j a i l s e n t e n c e s (Sec. 94-7835 e t seq. R.C.M. 1947) l i k e w i s e does n o t c o n v e r t a c o n d i t i o n of probation i n t o a term o f i m prisonment. The c o n d i t i o n s of probation h e r e were simply devised and t a i l o r e d t o promote t h e r e h a b i l i t a t i o n of a n a l c o h o l i c a s a n a l t e r n a t i v e t o s e n t e n c i n g him and punishing him r o r t h e crime of grand l a r c e n y . These p r o b a t i o n a r y p r o v i s i o n s f u r n i s h e d him a p l a c e t o e a t and s l e e p r e g u l a r l y whether employed o r unemployed, permitted him t o seek and s e c u r e g a i n f u l employment i f a b l e t o do s o , r e q u i r e d him t o pay f o r h i s own board o u t of any earnings he received from g a i n f u l employment, l i m i t e d h i s spending money from h i s earnings and preserved t h e balance f o r h i s f u t u r e u s e , and provided f o r reasonably c l o s e superv i s i o n over him and h i s a c t i v i t i e s during h i s i d l e hours. "The use of t h e county j a i l a s t h e f a c i l i t y and t h e use of t h e s h e r i f f and h i s d e p u t i e s a s t h e personnel t o promote t h e a l c o h o l i s m r e h a b i l i t a t i o n program a s conceived by t h e Judge does n o t c o n v e r t h i s o r d e r i n t o a s e n t e n c e o r imprisonment nor c o n s t i t u t e imprisonment of p e t i t i o n e r . The Judge simply made use of e x i s t i n g l o c a l f a c i l i t i e s and personnel t h a t met t h e requirements o f h i s r e h a b i l i t a t i o n program f o r a l c o h o l i c s . The County j a i l was n o t used a s a j a i l a t a l l b u t a s a f a c i l i t y f o r t h e s u p e r v i s i o n and c o n t r o l of a n a l c o h o l i c d u r i n g t h e r e h a b i l i t a t i o n process. Expressing t h i s b a s i c d i s t i n c t i o n a r e t h e s e immortal words which, a l t h o u g h spoken under somewhat d i f f e r e n t circumstances and from d i f f e r e n t motives, a r e e q u a l l y a p p r o p r i a t e here--- 'Stone w a l l s do n o t a p r i s o n make, nor i r o n b a r s a c a g e ' . (To Althea from P r i s o n by Richard Lovelace. ) "Under t h e f a c t s and circumstances of t h i s c a s e , t h e c o n d i t i o n s o f p r o b a t i o n contained i n t h e o r d e r of August 22 a r e reasonable c o n d i t i o n s reasonably r e l a t e d t o a l a w f u l purpose and o b j e c t i v e of p r o b a t i o n , i.e . , t h e r e h a b i l i t a t i o n o f a n a l c o h o l i c . A s such they a r e v a l i d and l a w f u l c o n d i t i o n s of p r o b a t i o n . "Neither was t h e r e any f i n a l i t y t o t h e o r d e r o f August 22 which i s an e s s e n t i a l element of a s e n t e n c e . Among o t h e r t h i n g s , t h i s o r d e r provides t h a t I upon t h e completion of one y e a r of s u c c e s s f u l p r o b a t i o n , t h e defendant may a p p l y t o t h i s c o u r t f o r such o t h e r o r d e r h e r e i n a s may be j u s t and e q u i t a b l e ' ; t h e o r d e r a l s o a u t h o r i z e s any peace o f f i c e r t o apprehend p e t i t i o n e r i f he should v i o l a t e h i s p r o b a t i o n , and i f such v i o l a t i o n i s e s t a b l i s h e d a f t e r h e a r i n g , t o s e n t e n c e defendant on t h e o r i g i n a l charge. Thus f u r t h e r proceedings were contemplated i n any event i r r e s p e c t i v e o t whether p e t i t i o n e r subseq u e n t l y adhered t o t h e p r o v i s i o n s of probation o r v i o l a t e d them. " - In Drew, i t would appear t h a t t h e c o u r t sentenced Drew (1) t o a s e n t e n c e of confinement i n t h e county j a i l i n Bozeman f o r one y e a r , and (2) t h a t h e was t o s e r v e s i x months of t h e s e n t e n c e and be allowed t o a t t e n d c l a s s e s a t Montana S t a t e U n i v e r s i t y ; t h a t he s e r v e t h e remainder of t h e s i x months a f t e r s c h o o l , i n t h e county j a i l ; and t h a t he be r e l e a s e d from t h e county j a i l a f t e r s i x months under delayed imposition o t s e n t e n c e w i t h t h e remainder o r h i s one y e a r term. - actually It would appear t h a t t h e d i s t r i c t judge i n Drew imposed a s e n t e n c e and d e f e r r e d t h e imposition of p a r t of t h a t sentence. There i s a v a l i d d i s t i n c t i o n under t h e law i n g r a n t i n g a d e f e r r e d imposition upon c o n d i t i o n s , r a t h e r than imposing a j a i l sentence with conditions. There i s a s u b s t a n t i a l d i f f e r e n c e i n t h e s e n t e n c e s imposed - i n Drew and t h e i n s t a n t c a s e . I f s e r v i c e o f a reasonable time i n t h e county j a i l cannot b e imposed a s a c o n d i t i o n under a d e f e r r e d imposition o f s e n t e n c e i n d e a l i n g w i t h a drug o f f e n s e , t h e n e c e s s a r y q u e s t i o n i s r a i s e d a s t o whether o r n o t any condit i o n s can be imposed under such a d e r e r r e d i m p o s i t i o n of s e n t e n c e . W hold t h a t such c o n d i t i o n s , reasonable i n r e l a t i o n t o a l a w f u l e purpose and o b j e c t i v e of p r o b a t i o n , may be imposed. The funda- mental d i s t i n c t i o n between t h e d e f e r r e d imposition of s e n t e n c e and any o t h e r type of s e n t e n c e imposed by t h e c o u r t i s t h a t a defendant c a n , a t t h e e x p i r a t i o n of t h e d e f e r r e d time, come i n t o c o u r t and move t h e c o u r t t o withdraw h i s plea p r e v i o u s l y e n t e r e d , and i f he has f u l f i l l e d t h e c o n d i t i o n s and o b l i g a t i o n s , have t h e g u i l t y plea withdrawn and t h e record expunged of any c o n v i c t i o n . Drew -i s d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e on i t s f a c t s a s we have shown; and t o t h e e x t e n t t h a t our language t h e r e i n i s i n c o n f l i c t w i t h what i s h e r e i n s t a t e d , i t i s c l a r i f i e d . Accordingly, t h e w r i t a p p l i e d f o r h e r e i n i s denied.

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