STATE EX REL WOODAHL v DISTRICT C
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No. 12240 I N THE SUPREME C U T O T E STATE O MONTANA OR F H F THE STATE O M N A A on t h e r e l a t i o n of F OTN ROBERT L. W O A L Attorney General of O D H, t h e S t a t e of Montana, Rela t o r , THE DISTRICT COURT O THE FIRST JUDICIAL F DISTRICT O THE STATE O M N A A i n and f o r F F OTN t h e County o f Lewis and C l a r k and HONORABLE N T A ALLEN, t h e Acting Judge t h e r e o f , Respondents, Counsel of Recordc For Rela t o r : Hon. Robert L. Woodahl, Attorney General, Helena, Montana. John P. Connor, Jr., A s s i s t a n t Attorney General, appeared, Helena, Montana. Poore, McKenzie and Roth, B u t t e , Montana. Robert Poore argued, S p e c i a l Deputy Attorney General, B u t t e , Montana. Donald Robinson appeared, B u t t e , Montana. For Respondents: S a n d a l l , Moses and Cavan, B i l l i n g s , Montana. Charles F. Moses argued, B i l l i n g s , Montana. AMICUS CURIAE H a James Oleson, argued, County Attorney, K a l i s p e l l , Montana. Submitted: March 28, 1972 4 Decided : MAR 8 1 1972 Mr. J u s t i c e Frank I . H a s w e l l d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e C o u r t . The a t t o r n e y g e n e r a l ' s a p p l i c a t i o n t o t h i s C o u r t f o r supervisory control o r other appropriate r e l i e f presents but a single legal issue: whether t h e a t t o r n e y g e n e r a l , under t h e f a c t s and c i r c u m s t a n c e s o f t h i s c a s e , h a s t h e power t o i n i t i a t e a c r i m i n a l felony prosecution i n t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t independent of t h e county a t t o r n e y . The d i s t r i c t c o u r t h e l d t h e a t t o r n e y g e n e r a l h a s no such l e g a l power. W e agree. The f a c t s o f t h i s c a s e a r e n o t complex. The a t t o r n e y g e n e r a l a p p l i e d t o t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t o f L e w i s and C l a r k County, t h e Hon. N a t A l l e n , d i s t r i c t judge p r e s i d i n g , f o r l e a v e t o f i l e a d i r e c t i n f o r m a t i o n c h a r g i n g one George McGaffick w i t h e i g h t f e l o n y c o u n t s i n v o l v i n g t h e p r e s e n t a t i o n of f r a u d u l e n t b i l l s o r c l a i m s t o t h e s t a t e f o r a l l o w a n c e and payment. The a p p l i c a t i o n w a s s i g n e d by John P . Connor, J r . , a s s i s t a n t c h i e f d e p u t y a t t o r n e y g e n e r a l of t h e s t a t e o f Montana. The c o u n t y a t t o r n e y of L e w i s and C l a r k County w a s n o t c o n s u l t e d and d i d n o t s i g n t h e a p p l i c a t i o n f o r leave t o f i l e t h e charges nor d i d he s i g n t h e i n f o r mation tendered t o t h e c o u r t with t h e a p p l i c a t i o n . On March 3 , 1972, Judge A l l e n h e l d a h e a r i n g on t h e a p p l i cation of the attorney general. Judge A l l e n h e a r d d e t a i l e d proof o f p r o b a b l e c a u s e f o r f i l i n g t h e i n f o r m a t i o n d i r e c t and made an e x p r e s s f i n d i n g t h a t p r o b a b l e c a u s e e x i s t e d and had been proven. However Judge A l l e n d e n i e d t h e a p p l i c a t i o n on t h e s o l e ground t h a t t h e a t t o r n e y g e n e r a l d i d n o t have a u t h o r i t y t o f i l e t h e i n f o r m a t i o n h i m s e l f i n d e p e n d e n t of t h e c o u n t y a t t o r n e y ' s p a r t i c i p a t i o n and s i g n a t u r e . Following t h i s d e n i a l by t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t , t h e a t t o r n e y general applied to t h i s Court f o r supervisory c o n t r o l o r o t h e r a p p r o p r i a t e r e l i e f t o r e v i e w t h i s d e t e r m i n a t i o n by t h e d i s t r i c t court. W e i s s u e d a n o r d e r t o show c a u s e and t h e r e a f t e r b r i e f s w e r e f i l e d and o r a l argument h e a r d on b e h a l f o f t h e a t t o r n e y g e n e r a l , t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t , and t h e Montana County A t t o r n e y s ' A s s o c i a t i o n a s amicus c u r i a e . A d d i t i o n a l l y a motion t o q u a s h was f i l e d by t h e Montana County A t t o r n e y s ' A s s o c i a t i o n , A t t h e o u t s e t we hold t h a t t h e w r i t of supervisory c o n t r o l i s a v a i l a b l e a s a remedy t o t e s t t h e power o f t h e a t t o r n e y g e n e r a l i n t h i s regard. The a t t o r n e y g e n e r a l h a s no remedy i n t h e o r d i n - a r y c o u r s e o f law by a p p e a l from t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t ' s o r d e r , It w i l l n o t d o t o s a y t h a t h e h a s an a v a i l a b l e remedy by d i r e c t i n g t h e c o u n t y a t t o r n e y t o s i g n t h e i n f o r m a t i o n and f i l e i t , f o r t o d o s o would amount t o an a b d i c a t i o n o f t h e l e g a l power c l a i m e d by t h e a t t o r n e y g e n e r a l and would f u r n i s h no answer t o t h e l e g a l i s s u e he seeks t o r a i s e . P r o c e e d i n g t o t h e merits, t h e b a s i c p o s i t i o n o f t h e a t t o r n e y g e n e r a l i s t h a t he h a s power t o f i l e t h e s e c r i m i n a l c h a r g e s and i n i t i a t e t h i s p r o s e c u t i o n i n d e p e n d e n t o f t h e c o u n t y a t t o r n e y ' s power t o d o so; t h a t t h e a t t o r n e y g e n e r a l ' s power i n t h i s r e g a r d i s d e r i v e d from t h e common law which h a s n o t been a b r o g a t e d by constitution or statute. On t h e o t h e r hand, r e s p o n d e n t ' s p o s i t i o n i s s i m p l y t h a t t h e a t t o r n e y g e n e r a l ' s common law power t o i n i t i a t e a c r i m i n a l p r o s e c u t i o n i n d e p e n d e n t l y o f t h e c o u n t y a t t o r n e y h a s been s u p e r s e d e d by s t a t u t e i n Montana. The common law power o f t h e a t t o r n e y g e n e r a l t o f i l e c r i m i n a l c h a r g e s and i n i t i a t e c r i m i n a l p r o s e c t u i o n s i s t a c i t l y conceded. Nor c a n t h e r e b e any real i s s u e i n t h i s r e g a r d . t i o n 12-103, R.C.M. Sec- 1947 p r o v i d e s : "The common law o f E n g l a n d , so f a r a s i t i s n o t repu.gnant t o o r i n c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n o f t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s , or the constitution o r l a w s of t h i s s t a t e , o r o f t h e c o d e s , i s t h e r u l e of d e c i s i o n i n a l l t h e c o u r t s of t h i s s t a t e . " The Montana Supreme C o u r t , i n S t a t e e x r e l . F o r d v. Young, 54 Mont. 401, 170 P . 9 4 7 , had t h i s t o s a y c o n c e r n i n g t h e n a t u r e and o r i g i n o f t h e powers o f t h e a t t o r n e y g e n e r a l : "The o f f i c e o f a t t o r n e y g e n e r a l i s o f a n c i e n t o r i g i n . The powers and d u t i e s a p p e r t a i n i n g t o i t were r e c o g n i z e d by t h e common l a w , and t h e common law h a s b e e n a p a r t o f o u r s y s t e m o f j u r i s p r u d e n c e from t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n of Montana t e r r i t o r y t o t h e p r e s e n t day. (Bannack S t a t u t e s , p. 356; Comp. S t a t s . p . 647; Rev. Codes, sec, 3 5 5 2 ) . In t h i s state the o f f i c e of attorney general i s c r e a t e d b y o u r s t a t e C o n s t i t u t i o n (sec. 1, A r t . V I I I ) , which a l s o p r o v i d e s t h a t t h e incumbent o f t h e o f f i c e ' s h a l l p e r f o r m s u c h d u t i e s a s a r e prescribed i n t h i s Constit u t i o n and by t h e l a w s o f t h i s s t a t e . ' The C o n s t i t u t i o n e n u m e r a t e s c e r t a i n d u t i e s , and s e c t i o n 1 9 3 , R e v i s e d Codes,(now s e c t i o n 82401-11, R.C.M. 1 9 4 7 ) c e r t a i n o t h e r s , and t h e n c o n c l u d e s by i m p o s i n g upon t h e a t t o r n e y g e n e r a l ' o t h e r d u t i e s p r e s c r i b e d by l a w . ' I t i s t h e g e n e r a l consensus of opinion t h a t i n p r a c t i c a l l y e v e r y s t a t e of t h i s Union whose b a s i s o f j u r i s p r u d e n c e i s t h e common l a w , t h e o f f i c e o f a t t o r n e y g e n e r a l , a s it e x i s t e d i n E n g l a n d , was a d o p t e d a s a p a r t of t h e g o v e r n m e n t a l m a c h i n e r y , and t h a t i n t h e a b s e n c e of e x p r e s s r e s t r i c t i o n s , t h e common-law d u t i e s a t t a c h t h e m s e l v e s t o t h e o f f i c e so f a r as t h e y a r e a p p l i c a b l e a n d i n harmony w i t h o u r s y s t e m o f g o v e r n m e n t . " (Emphasis s u p p l i e d .) To t h e same e f f e c t see S t a t e v . P u b l i c S e r v i c e Comm., 129 Mont. 1 0 6 , 283 P.2d 594. The u n d e r l y i n g i s s u e h e r e i s w h e t h e r o r n o t t h e a t t o r n e y g e n e r a l ' s common l a w power i n t h i s r e s p e c t h a s b e e n a b r o g a t e d by statute. A t t h e o u t s e t i n a c r i m i n a l case w e n o t e a c o m p l e t e a b s e n c e o f a n y c o n s t i t u t i o n a l or s t a t u t o r y power v e s t e d i n t h e a t t o r n e y g e n e r a l t o f i l e an information or i n i t i a t e a prosecution independent of t h e county a t t o r n e y . On t h e o t h e r h a n d , t h e r e are numerous s t a t u t e s r e q u i r i n g t h e c o u n t y a t t o r n e y t o f i l e c r i m i n a l charges and i n s t i t u t e c r i m i n a l p r o s e c u t i o n s . R.C.M. S e c t i o n 16-3101, 1 9 4 7 , l i s t s t h e powers of t h e c o u n t y a t t o r n e y and t h i s s e c t i o n reads i n p e r t i n e n t p a r t a s follows: "16-3101. D u t i e s o f c o u n t y a t t o r n e y . The county a t t o r n e y i s t h e p u b l i c p r o s e c u t o r , and must: "1. A t t e n d t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t and c o n d u c t , on b e h a l f o f t h e s t a t e , a l l p r o s e c u t i o n s f o r p u b l i c o f f e n s e s and r e p r e s e n t t h e s t a t e i n a l l m a t t e r s and p r o c e e d i n g s t o which it i s a p a r t y , o r i n which i t may b e b e n e f i c i a l l y i n t e r e s t e d , a t a l l t i m e s and i n a l l p l a c e s w i t h i n ' t h e l i m i t s of h i s county; * * * "3. Draw a l l * * * i n f o r m a t i o n s * * * "9. When o r d e r e d o r d i r e c t e d b y t h e a t t o r n e y g e n e r a l so t o d o , t o p r o m p t l y i n s t i t u t e and d i l i g e n t l y p r o s e c u t e i n t h e p r o p e r c o u r t , and i n t h e name o f t h e s t a t e o f Montana, a n y c r i m i n a l or c i v i l a c t i o n o r s p e c i a l proceeding, i t being h e r e b y d e c l a r e d t h a t t h e s u p e r v i s o r y powers g r a n t e d t o t h e a t t o r n e y g e n e r a l by s e c t i o n 824 0 1 ( 5 ) , i n c l u d e t h e power t o o r d e r a n d d i r e c t s a i d county a t t o r n e y s i n a l l m a t t e r s p e r t a i n i n g to t h e duties of t h e i r office." (Emphasis supplied. ) - S e c t i o n 95-1302, a s follows: R.C.M. 1947, provides i n p e r t i n e n t p a r t " * * * a f t e r l e a v e o f c o u r t h a s been g r a n t e d * * * t h e c o u n t y a t t o r n e y must f i l e , w i t h i n t h i r t y (30) days, i n t h e proper d i s t r i c t c o u r t an information charging t h e defendant with t h e o f f e n s e f o r which h e i s h e l d t o a n s w e r , o r any o t h e r o f f e n s e d i s c l o s e d by t h e e v i d e n c e . * * * " ( ~ m p h a s i ss u p p l i e d . ) S e c t i o n 95-1503[53 ( e ) p r o v i d e s i n p e r t i n e n t p a r t : " I f t h e c h a r g e i s by c o m p l a i n t i t s h a l l be s i g n e d on o a t h by a p e r s o n h a v i n g knowledge o f t h e f a c t s o r by t h e c o u n t y a t t o r n e y ; i f by i n f o r m a t i o n , it s h a l l be s i g n e d by t h e county a t t o r n e y o r by h i s d e p u t y * * *." (Emphasis s u p p l i e d . ) F i n a l l y , s e c t i o n 95-101 g o v e r n s t h e s c o p e o f t h e new Code of C r i m i n a l P r o c e d u r e and p r o v i d e s a s f o l l o w s : "95-101. Scope. These p r o v i s i o n s s h a l l g o v e r n t h e p r o c e d u r e i n t h e c o u r t s of Montana i n a l l c r i m i n a l p r o c e e d i n g s e x c e p t where p r o v i s i o n f o r a d i f f e r e n t procedure i s s p e c i f i c a l l y provided by law." W e hold t h a t t h e foregoing s t a t u t e s expressly supersede and a b r o g a t e t h e common l a w powers o f t h e a t t o r n e y g e n e r a l t o f i l e i n f o r m a t i o n s i n h i s own name and i n s t i t u t e c r i m i n a l proceedi n g s i n d e p e n d e n t of t h e c o u n t y a t t o r n e y . T h i s o p i n i o n i s n o t t o be c o n s t r u e d as any l i m i t a t i o n on t h e s u p e r v i s o r y powers and c o n t r o l o f t h e a t t o r n e y g e n e r a l o v e r t h e c o u n t y a t t o r n e y s o f t h i s s t a t e a s p r o v i d e d by law. This o p i n i o n s i m p l y h o l d s t h a t under t h e f a c t s and c i r c u m s t a n c e s h e r e , t h e a t t o r n e y g e n e r a l h a s no l e g a l power t o + f i l e an i n f o r m a t i o n s i g n e d o n l y by h i m s e l f o r t o i n s t i t u t e a c r i m i n a l f e l o n y p r o s e c u t i o n i n t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t i n d e p e n d e n t of t h e c o u n t y a t t o r n e y . T h i s p r o c e e d i n g h a s a l r e a d y d e l a y e d t h e i n s t i t u t i o n and p r o s e c u t i o n of c h a r g e s a g a i n s t George McGaffick s i n c e March 3 . As probable cause for the prosecution has already been found by the district court, the prosecution of the case should not be delayed further. Accordingly, the attorney general should immediately direct the county attorney of Lewis and Clark County to sign and file the necessary information and proceed with prosecution of the case. Associate ~Zstice M r . J u s t i c e Wesley C a s t l e s S p e c i a l l y Concurring: I concur i n J u s t i c e asw well's view of t h e law t h a t T i t l e 9 5 , R.C.M. 1947, supersedes t h e common law i n c r i m i n a l procedure. I , however, would n o t a c c e p t j u r i s d i c t i o n of t h i s proceeding because no j u s t i c i a b l e i s s u e appears because t h e Attorney General has an adeq u a t e r o u t e by using t h e r e g u l a r processes o . law. f Thus, I concur i n t h e r e s u l t . ~ s s o c N . t e ustice J M r . Chief J u s t i c e James T. Harrison Dissenting: I am n o t , under t h e record b e f o r e us h e r e , prepared t o q u a l i f y , r e s t r i c t o r l e s s e n what I b e l i e v e t o be t h e powers of t h e Attorney General of Montana. This Court has d i s c u s s e d t h e s e powers of t h e Attorney General a s g r a n t e d by our C o n s t i t u t i o n , under t h e s t a t u t o r y law and under t h e common law and I do n o t i n t e n d t o f u r t h e r d i s c u s s them but Z do wish t o p o i n t o u t t h i s wording from t h e opinion i n S t a t e ex r e l . Nolan v. D i s t r i c t C o u r t , 22 Mont. 25, 29, 55 P. 916, to-wit: "The Attorney General i s t h e p r i n c i p a l law o f f i c e r of t h e S t a t e . H i s d u t i e s a r e g e n e r a l ; h i s a u t h o r i t y i s co-extensive w i t h p u b l i c l e g a l a f f a i r s of t h e whole community. H i s a d v i c e o f t e n a f f e c t s t h e r i g h t s of a l l persons w i t h i n t h e S t a t e , and, excepting judgments and . o r d e r s of c o u r t , h i s opinions c o n t r o l p u b l i c i n t e r e s t s more l a r g e l y than do t h e a c t s of any o t h e r o f f i c i a l of t h e S t a t e . R e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s of s o h i g h a c h a r a c t e r a r e u s u a l l y put upon a lawyer of a b i l i t y , experience and c h a r a c t e r , and, presuming t h e Attorney General t o be such, t h e s t a t u t e has g i v e n him t h e s i g n i f i c a n t , y e t e x t e n s i v e , powers r e f e r r e d t o . Again, e x i g e n t times o c c a s i o n a l l y a r i s e i n t h e a f f a i r s of a s t a t e , where l o c a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n s render i t i m p o l i t i c t o i n t r u s t a county a t t o r n e y w i t h t h e d i s charge of h i s duty unaided by learned counsel r e p r e s e n t i n g t h e supreme a u t h o r i t y of t h e S t a t e . " I n t h e i n s t a n t c a s e t h e Attorney General s t a t e s t h a t i n h i s opinion i t i s i m p o l i t i c t o i n t r u s t t h e m a t t e r w i t h t h e County Attorney, and w h i l e I may n o t a g r e e w i t h t h e Attorney G e n e r a l ' s reasoning i n t h i s p a r t i c u l a r , I do f e e l t h a t such a d e c i s i o n i s w i t h i n h i s d i s c r e t i o n and one of h i s p r e r o g a t i v e s . The same l i n e of reasoning a s quoted i n Nolan seems t o me t o be repeated i n S t a t e ex r e l . Ford v. Young, 54 Mont. 401, 170 P. 947, a s w e l l a s i n S t a t e ex r e l . Olsen v . P u b l i c S e r v i c e Commission, 129 Mont. 106, 283 P.2d 594. M dissent y
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