COOK v COOK

Annotate this Case
Download PDF
No. 12106 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1972 GAY ANN COOK, Plaintiff and Respondent, -VS - THOMAS NORRIS COOK, Defendant and Appellant. Appeal from: District Court of the Thirteenth Judicial District, Honorable Robert H Wilson, Judge presiding. . Counsel of Record: For Appellant : Moulton, Bellingham, Longo and Mather, Billings, Montana. Ward Swanser argued, Billings, Montana. For Respondent : Kurth, Jones, Davidson, Calton and Bradley, Billings, Montana. Billings, Montana. John R. Da~idson~argued, Submitted: February 16, 1972 Decided : Filed: MAR 2 8 1972 *M Clerk MAR 2 8 1972 The Honorable J a c k D . Shanstrom, D i s t r i c t J u d g e , s i t t i n g i n p l a c e o f M r . J u s t i c e Wesley C a s t l e s , d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion o f t h e C o u r t . T h i s i s an a p p e a l from a d e c r e e of d i v o r c e and p r o p e r t y s e t t l e m e n t g r a n t e d i n f a v o r of t h e p l a i n t i f f w i f e a g a i n s t t h e d e f e n d a n t husband. From t h e p r o p e r t y s e t t l e m e n t p r o v i s i o n s o f t h e d e c r e e , t h e husband a p p e a l s . No i s s u e i s t a k e n t o t h e g r a n t - i n g of t h e divorce. The m a t e r i a l f a c t s are n o t i n s e r i o u s d i s p u t e . The p a r t i e s were m a r r i e d f o r t e n y e a r s p r i o r t o t h e i r s e p a r a t i o n i n J a n u a r y , 1971. respectively. A t that time, t h e y were 31 and 36 y e a r s o l d No c h i l d r e n were born o f t h e m a r r i a g e . Both p a r t i e s were s t e a d i l y employed t h r o u g h o u t most o f t h e marriage. A t t h e t i m e o f t h e d i v o r c e t h e husband w a s e a r n - i n g a p p r o x i m a t e l y $15,000 p e r y e a r as a n automotive p a i n t e r . The w i f e l a s t e a r n e d $450 p e r month as a s e c r e t a r y u n t i l s h e r e s i g n e d from g a i n f u l employment a b o u t one y e a r b e f o r e t h e d i v o r c e . At t h e t i m e o f t h e t r i a l b o t h p a r t i e s were m e n t a l l y and p h y s i c a l l y c a p a b l e o f p r o v i d i n g f o r t h e i r own s u p p o r t . The w i f e ' s e d u c a t i o n c o n s i s t e d of h i g h s c h o o l p l u s one y e a r o f c o l l e g e . The husband's w a s l i m i t e d t o high school only. Over t h e y e a r s , t h e w i f e c o n t r i b u t e d from $80 t o $160 p e r month from h e r e a r n i n g s toward t h e food and h o u s i n g needs of the parties. The husband g e n e r a l l y p a i d t h e remaining l i v i n g expenses n o t covered by t h e w i f e ' s c o n t r i b u t i o n s and saved t h e rest o f h i s income. On t h e d a t e of t h e t r i a l , t h e p a r t i e s i n d i v i d u a l l y o r j o i n t l y owned t h e a s s e t s h e r e i n a f t e r l i s t e d , a l l o f which were acquired during the marriage. The husband correctly argues that approximately 69% of these assets were accumulated through his and not his wife's finances. The properties in dispute on this appeal are as follows: JOINT PROPERTY Investor's Diversified Certificate Equity in Family Home HUSBAND'S INDIVIDUAL PROPERTY Checking account (maintained jointly with his aunt) 1966 automobile 1968 automobile WIFE 'S INDIVIDUAL PROPERTY None TOTAL The judgment of the trial court made no provision for continuing alimony in favor of the wife, but it did in lieu thereof establish a form of property settlement on the following terms. It set aside the 1968 automobile to the wife and ordered the husband to pay her the additional cash sum of $13,317.37. All remaining property was decreed to the husband. The wife's cash settlement figure was arrived at by deducting the value of her automobile from the total assets acquired during the marriage and dividing the remainder by two. In effect, the wife was given the cash value of one-half of the assets acquired during the marriage, including those owned individually by the husband as w e l l a s by t h e p a r t i e s j o i n t l y . The husband was awarded t h e r e s t of t h e p r o p e r t y i n k i n d . The o n l y i s s u e a r g u e d on a p p e a l i s w h e t h e r t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t had t h e a u t h o r i t y t o award t h e w i f e a c a s h sum e q u a l t o o n e - h a l f o f t h e p r o p e r t y owned i n d i v i d u a l l y by t h e husband. a f f i r m t h e judgment o f t h e t r i a l c o u r t . We I n d o i n g s o , and con- t r a r y t o t h e h u s b a n d ' s c o n t e n t i o n , w e d o n o t impose a community p r o p e r t y s t a n d a r d i n Montana. The a u t h o r i t y o f t h e t r i a l c o u r t t o d e a l i n m a t t e r s o f p r o p e r t y s e t t l e m e n t ( a s d i s t i n g u i s h e d from alimony and c h i l d s u p p o r t ) i n d i v o r c e a c t i o n s w a s most r e c e n t l y a f f i r m e d i n L i b r a v . L i b r a , 157 Mont. 252, 484 P.2d 748, 28 S t . Rep. 460 ( 1 9 7 1 ) . In e x e r c i s i n g i t s a u t h o r i t y , w e t h e r e s a i d o f t h e t r i a l c o u r t : " ( a ) d i v o r c e c o u r t i s a c o u r t of e q u i t y and o n c e e q u i t y t a k e s j u r i s d i c t i o n , it w i l l g r a n t complete r e l i e f ; a l s o , t h a t property acquired j o i n t l y during t h e m a r r i a g e may be d i v i d e d by t h e c o u r t whether t h e t i t l e t h e r e t o i s i n e i t h e r o r both of t h e p a r t i e s . * * * " * * * I n t h e s e later cases t h e Court approved t h e a l l o c a t i o n o f t h e p r o p e r t i e s between t h e p a r t i e s on a n e q u i t a b l e b a s i s a c c o r d i n g t o t h e i r c o n t r i b u t i o n e v e n though t h i s r e q u i r e d t h a t t i t l e b e d i v e s t e d from o n e and t r a n s f e r r e d t o t h e o t h e r . " L i b r a f o l l o w e d c l o s e on t h e h e e l s o f Hodgson v . Hodgson, 156 Mont. 469, 482 P.2d 1 4 0 , 28 S t . Rep. 1 9 5 . ( 1 9 7 1 ) w h e r e i n t h e w i f e was awarded by way o f p r o p e r t y s e t t l e m e n t 71% o f t h e m a r i t a l a s s e t s , although h e r f i n a n c i a l c o n t r i b u t i o n s through i n h e r i t a n c e w e r e only 59%. W e a f f i r m e d u n d e r t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s o f t h a t case t h a t t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t d i d n o t a b u s e i t s d i s c r e t i o n , e v e n though i t s o r d e r i n e f f e c t t r a n s f e r r e d t i t l e t o r e a l p r o p e r t y from t h e husband t o t h e w i f e . Libra and Hodgson s h o u l d have l a i d t o rest t h e h u s b a n d ' s argument on a p p e a l h e r e . I t h a s a l r e a d y been a t l e a s t twice d e c i d e d i n t h i s S t a t e t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t may make a n e q u i t a b l e d i v i s i o n of t h e l i t i g a n t s ' p r o p e r t y i n a d i v o r c e a c t i o n r e g a r d l e s s o f t h e s t a t e of t i t l e t o t h a t p r o p e r t y and r e g a r d l e s s of a c t u a l f i n a n c i a l contribution. W e are asked by t h e husband, however, t o r e t r e a t from t h e s e c a s e s f o r t h e s t a t e d r e a s o n t h a t t h e r e i s no s t a t u t o r y a u t h o r i t y f o r t h e p r o p e r t y d i v i s i o n powers t h e r e i n granted t h e t r i a l court. Appellant cites t h e v a r i o u s p r o v i s i o n s c o n t a i n e d i n T i t l e 3 6 , R.C.M. 1947, s e t t i n g f o r t h t h e c o r r e l a t i v e f i n a n c i a l r i g h t s and o b l i g a t i o n s o f husband and w i f e during t h e i r marriage. The s t a t u t e s r e l i e d upon compose what i s commonly c a l l e d t h e Married Women's A c t . The a p p l i c a t i o n o f t h e s e s t a t u t e s t o m a r r i e d c o u p l e s i s u n d e n i a b l e , b u t t h e r e i s no i n t i m a t i o n t h a t t h e y a r e a t a l l cont r o l l i n g upon d i s s o l u t i o n o f t h e m a r r i a g e by d i v o r c e . In the l a t t e r e v e n t , t h e t r i a l c o u r t becomes charged w i t h t h e d u t y of g r a n t i n g "complete r e l i e f " , i n c l u d i n g p r o p e r t y d i v i s i o n , accordi n g t o t h e e q u i t i e s o f each i n d i v i d u a l c a s e . 137 Mont. 11, 349 P.2d 310. Johnson v. Johnson, The d i s t r i c t j u d g e ' s broad powers i n t h i s r e g a r d are e x p r e s s e d i n s e c t i o n 21-139, R.C.M. 1947, where- i n he i s empowered t o make " s u i t a b l e allowance t o t h e w i f e f o r her support during her l i f e , o r f o r a s h o r t e r period, a s t h e c o u r t may deem j u s t , having r e g a r d t o t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s o f t h e parties respectively * * *." (Emphasis added.) A p p e l l a n t a l s o r e f e r s u s t o f o u r Montana d e c i s i o n s ( a l l p r e d a t i n g J o h n s o n , Hodgson and L i b r a ) f o r e a r l y a u t h o r i t y t h a t t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t i n a d i v o r c e a c t i o n does n o t have t h e d i s c r e t i o n t o make p r o p e r t y d i v i s i o n o f m a r i t a l a s s e t s i n l i e u of o r i n a d d i t i o n t o alimony. H e cites: R u f e n a c h v. R u f e n a c h , 120 Mont. 351, 185 P.2d 293; Lewis v . L e w i s , 109 Mont. 4 2 , 94 P.2d 211; Emery v . Emery, 122 Mont. 201, 200 P.2d 251; a n d , L e w i s v . Bowman e t a l . , 1 1 3 Mont. 6 8 , 1 2 1 P.2d 1 6 2 . W e do n o t n e c e s s a r i l y agree t h a t t h e cases last c i t e d s t a n d f o r t h e r e s t r i c t i v e g u i d e l i n e s on t h e power o f t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t a s s e r t e d by a p p e l l a n t , b u t t o e r a s e a l l d o u b t , w e h e r e b y expressly overrule these cases insofar a s they are inconsistent herewith. The t r i a l j u d g e ' s r e s o l u t i o n o f p r o p e r t y d i v i s i o n i s f e t t e r e d o n l y by t h e r a n g e o f r e a s o n and h i s judgment w i l l n o t be d i s t u r b e d i n t h e a b s e n c e o f a n a b u s e o f d i s c r e t i o n . v . B i c k f o r d , 117 Mont. 372, 1 5 8 P.2d 796. Bickford N o such abuse o f d i s - c r e t i o n i s shown u n d e r t h e f a c t s p r e s e n t e d h e r e . A l l property c o n s i d e r e d f o r d i v i s i o n by t h e t r i a l j u d g e w a s a c c u m u l a t e d d u r i n g t h e marriage. T r u e , t h e husband had s c r u p u l o u s l y k e p t t i t l e t o t h i s p r o p e r t y p r i m a r i l y i n h i s own name. H e g e n e r a l l y managed t h e b u s i n e s s a f f a i r s o f t h e c o u p l e , and h e found i t s i m p l e t o manipulate t i t l e t o h i s b e n e f i t . This does not prevent t h e court from d e a l i n g t h e w i f e h e r f a i r s h a r e . H e r e t h e c o u r t chose t o t r a n s f e r a l l t i t l e t o t h e h u s b a n d , b o t h i n d i v i d u a l and j o i n t , r e q u i r i n g a cash s e t t l e m e n t e q u a l t o one-half wife. its value to the T h e r e i s a u t h o r i t y i n Montana f o r p r o p e r t y d i v i s i o n i n those proportions. In Johnson we stated: "And, equal division under normal conditions of property accumulated through joint efforts is not regarded as unreasonable." The district court apparently considered more in this case than mere financial contributions. The law has never confined "joint efforts" to such a narrow meaning. partnership is more than a business relation. The marital The pecuniary and proprietary fruits of the marriage are frequently acquired by joint effort, even though actual financial outlay may be more the contribution of one spouse than the other. This holding does not make Montana a community property state. There is no required percentage of allocation to be applied in all cases. Each case must be looked at by the trial court individually with an eye to its unique circumstances. Under the circumstances here, we are not compelled to state that equal division of the property is an inequitable result. The judgment is affirmed. Jack Shanstrom, district udge, sitting in place of Mr. Justice Wesley Castles. 9 ,As ociate Justices -

Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.

This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.