DEVERNIERO v EBY
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No. 12046 I N THE SUPREME COURT O THE STATE O M N A A F F OTN 1972 M R A E A. DeVERNIERO and AG RT JAMES V. DeVERNIERO, P l a i n t i f f s and A p p e l l a n t s , MARK ALLEN EBY, Defendant and Respondent. Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e T h i r t e e n t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Honorable C. B. Sande, Judge p r e s i d i n g . Counsel o f Record: For A p p e l l a n t s : Hutton, S c h i l t z and Sheehy, B i l l i n g s , Montana. John C. Sheehy argued, B i l l i n g s , Montana. For Respondent: Crowley, Kilbourne, Haughey, Hanson and G a l l a g h e r , B i l l i n g s , Montana. George C. Dalthorp and J a c k S. Ramirez argued, B i l l i n g s , Montana. Submitted : January 10, 1972 Filed : APR 19 I9P M r . J u s t i c e Gene B. Daly d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e Court. This i s a n e g l i g e n c e a c t i o n brought by p l a i n t i f f s Margaret A . DeVerniero and James V. DeVerniero, husband and w i f e , a r i s i n g out o f an automobile a c c i d e n t i n B i l l i n g s , Montana, involving p l a i n t i f f Margaret A . DeVerniero and defendant Mark A l l e n Eby, r e p r e s e n t e d by h i s f a t h e r , Allen H. Eby, appointed guardian ad litem. The c a s e was t r i e d t o t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t s i t t i n g w i t h a j u r y , i n t h e t h i r t e e n j u d i c i a l d i s t r i c t , county of Yellowstone. Margaret A . DeVerniero and James V. DeVerniero a r e joined a s p l a i n t i f f s i n t h i s a c t i o n t o recover damages f o r p h y s i c a l i n j u r i e s s u s t a i n e d by t h e w i f e ; and f o r t h e l o s s of t h e w i f e ' s s e r v i c e s , companionship, and s o c i e t y s u s t a i n e d by t h e husband; a l l a l l e g e d t o have been t h e r e s u l t of t h e automob i l e accident. From a judgment e n t e r e d on a v e r d i c t f o r defendant, p l a i n t i f f s appeal, The a c c i d e n t h e r e involved occurred a t 2:00 p.m., January 22, 1968, a t t h e i n t e r s e c t i o n of Alderson Avenue and Third S t r e e t West i n t h e c i t y of B i l l i n g s . A t t h e time of t h e a c c i d e n t , t h e s t r e e t s were d e s c r i b e d a s having snow, i c e , and water on them, w i t h temperatures warm enough s o t h a t t h e snow and i c e were melting and water running. Plaintiff.3 d i d n o t maintain t h a t t h e presence of s l u s h o r i c e on t h e s t r e e t s had any e f f e c t on t h e accident. Defendant Mark Eby was d r i v i n g a 1963 Pontiac s t a t i o n wagon i n a n o r t h e r l y d i r e c t i o n on Third S t r e e t West toward t h e i n t e r s e c t i o n a t a speed of approximately 2 5 miles per hour. P l a i n t i f f Eiargaret DeVerniero was d r i v i n g a 1966 Dodge Monaco i n a w e s t e r l y d i r e c t i o n on A l d e r s o n Avenue toward t h e i n t e r s e c t i o n a t a speed o f between 20 t o 25 m i l e s p e r hour. Although t e s t i m o n y a s t o t h e s p e e d o f b o t h a u t o m o b i l e s ranged from 15 t o 25 m i l e s p e r h o u r , t h e o n l y i n d e p e n d e n t e y e w i t n e s s , B e v e r l y Runkle, t e s t i f i e d t h e v e h i c l e s were a p p r o a c h i n g t h e i n t e r s e c t i o n a t a p p r o x i m a t e l y t h e same s p e e d . Neither a u t o m o b i l e was e x c e e d i n g t h e speed l i m i t o f 25 m i l e s p e r h o u r . The i n t e r s e c t i n g s t r e e t s were of e q u a l s t a t u s and were n o t marked w i t h s t o p s i g n s , s t o p l i g h t s , o r warning a p p r o a c h signals. Neither p a r t y contested t h e f a c t t h a t t h e presence of s u f f i c i e n t a f t e r n o o n d a y l i g h t and t h e a b s e n c e of o b s t r u c t i o n s i n t h e l i n e o f s i g h t of b o t h d r i v e r s g a v e e a c h d r i v e r a n unobs t r u c t e d view f o r t h e s a f e o p e r a t i o n o f h i s a u t o m o b i l e a t t h e unmarked i n t e r s e c t i o n . It i s uncontested t h a t i n such a s i t u a t i o n a s e x i s t e d here---where two v e h i c l e s , a r e e n t e r i n g o r approaching a n i n t e r - s e c t i o n from d i f f e r e n t highways a t a p p r o x i m a t e l y t h e same t i m e , t h a t under Montana s t a t u t e s e c t i o n 32-2170, R.C.M. 1947, and s e c t i o n s 21-145 and 21-170, B i l l i n g s T r a f f i c Code, t h e d r i v e r o f t h e v e h i c l e on t h e l e f t i s r e q u i r e d t o y i e l d t h e r i g h t o f way t o t h e v e h i c l e on t h e r i g h t . Here, d e f e n d a n t was on t h e l e f t and p l a i n t i f f was on t h e r i g h t , t h e r e f o r e p l a i n t i f f was t h e favored d r i v e r . A t t r i a l , Margaret DeVerniero t e s t i f i e d t h a t a s s h e approached t h e i n t e r s e c t i o n s h e slowed down t o a b o u t 1 5 m i l e s p e r hour and looked "again and a g a i n b o t h ways"; t h a t she did n o t "remember s e e i n g anything"; and t h e f i r s t s h e saw of t h e o t h e r v e h i c l e was ' ' J u s t b e f o r e t h e impact." Thus a t t r i a l , Mrs. DeVerniero was completely unable t o remember s e e i n g t h e o t h e r automobile approaching, although s h e d i d remember looking both ways a s she approached t h e i n t e r s e c t i o n . Plaintiffs ' Exhibit 10, the investigation report f i l e d by P o l i c e O f f i c e r John C o l t e r , contained t h i s i n t e r v i e w w i t h Mrs. DeVerniero immediately following t h e a c c i d e n t : "That s h e was going W. on Alderson a t approx. 20 MPH a s she approached t h e i n t e r s e c t i o n of Alderson and 3 r d St.W. s h e observed a n o t h e r veh. going No. on 3 r d S t . She thought t h e o t h e r c a r would s t o p and g r a n t t h e r i g h t of way and when s h e r e a l i z e d t h a t i t wasn't going t o s h e a p p l i e d h e r brakes and i t was t o o l a t e t o avoid t h e a c c . 1I The same a c c i d e n t r e p o r t a l s o contained a s i m i l a r i n t e r view with t h e defendant, Mark Eby, d r i v e r of t h e o t h e r v e h i c l e : 1' That he was going No. on 3rd St.W. a t approx. 25 He d i d n o t s e e t h e o t h e r veh. u n t i l he was j u s t e n t e r i n g t h e i n t e r s e c t i o n he a p p l i e d h i s brakes but could n o t avoid t h e a c c . " MPH. A t t r i a l , defendant Mark Eby supplemented t h i s r e p o r t w i t h h i s testimony, r e p e a t i n g t h a t he d i d n o t s e e p l a i n t i f f ' s v e h i c l e u n t i l he had e n t e r e d t h e i n t e r s e c t i o n , and "I a c c e l e r a t e d because I thought I could g e t out of t h e way i n time." A t t h e p o i n t ox impact p l a i n t i f f ' s automobile s t r u c k t h e right r e a r door of d e f e n d a n t ' s automobile and came t o r e s t i n t h e i n t e r s e c t i o n , w h i l e d e f e n d a n t ' s automobile continued down Alderson Avenue, spun around, and s t r u c k two parked automobiles. Defendant and h i s passenger, Mark Longo, were unhurt. was knocked momentarily unconscious s t e e r i n g wheel of h e r automobile. Plaintiff when h e r head s t r u c k t h e Shortly thereafter Officer C o l t e r of t h e B i l l i n g s P o l i c e Department a r r i v e d a t t h e s c e n e , made measurements, and t a l k e d t o both p a r t i e s . The measurements taken by O f f i c e r C o l t e r r e v e a l e d t h e p o i n t of impact was approximately 12 f e e t i n t o t h e i n t e r s e c t i o n from t h e e a s t e r l y boundary of Third S t r e e t West and 16 f e e t from t h e n o r t h e r l y boundary of Alderson Avenue. The nor th-south dimensions of t h e i n t e r s e c t i o n a r e 32 f e e t and t h e east-west dimensions a r e 30 f e e t . For t h e purposes of t h i s a p p e a l , t h e medical h i s t o r y of p l a i n t i f f Margaret DeVernierots i n j u r i e s i s n o t r e c i t e d , a l t h o u g h i t was thoroughly explored a t t r i a l . It i s s u f f i c i e n t t o s t a t e t h a t i n t h e i n t e r v e n i n g period of time from t h e a c c i d e n t t o t h e d a t e o f t r i a l , s h e a l l e g e d s p i n a l i n j u r i e s which n e c e s s i t a t e d a s p i n a l f u s ion, c o n t i n u i n g migraine headaches, and a r e s u l t i n g " t h o r a c i c o u t l e t syndrome" which n e c e s s i t a t e d a s e p a r a t e operat i o n t o remove a r i b . Complaint was f i l e d on January 26, 1970, r e c i t i n g two claims f o r r e l i e f and j o i n i n g Margaret and James DeVerniero a s p l a i n t i f f s . Margaret DeVerniero i n h e r amended prayer a t t r i a l r e c i t e d $7,500 s p e c i a l damages and $150,000 g e n e r a l damages. James DeVerniero s i m i l a r l y amended h i s prayer t o r e c i t e $82,500 damages. T r i a l commenced on December 1, 1970, and r e s u l t e d i n a j u r y v e r d i c t i n favor of defendant, Mark Eby. During t r i a l s e v e r a l motions and o b j e c t i o n s were made by counsel f o r p l a i n t i f f s which a r e t h e b a s i s of t h i s a p p e a l . Plaintiffs i s s u e s presented f o r review a r e : I s s u e 1. P l a i n t i f f , Margaret DeVerniero, a s a m a t t e r o f law, was n o t g u i l t y of c o n t r i b u t o r y negligence; t h e i s s u e should n o t have been submitted t o t h e j u r y . I s s u e 2. The c o u r t o r d e r of December 4 , 1970, allowing defendant ' s counsel t o i n s p e c t a l l medical records of p l a i n t i f f i n two h o s p i t a l s , i r r e s p e c t i v e of t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p t o p l a i n t i f f ' s p h y s i c a l c o n d i t i o n from t h e a c c i d e n t , was a n abuse of Rule 35, M.R.Civ.P. The o r d e r became p r e j u d i c i a l t o t h e p l a i n t i f f and t h e c o u r t e r r e d t o p l a i n t i f f ' s p r e j u d i c e when i t allowed e v i dence o f h o s p i t a l records n o t r e l a t e d t o t h e a c c i d e n t under t h e g u i s e of impeachment. I s s u e s 4 and 5 concern i n s t r u c t i o n s t h a t were given o r r e f u s e d by t h e t r i a l c o u r t . Conceding h i s own n e g l i g e n c e , defendant argues t h a t t h e p l a i n t i f f i n approaching and e n t e r i n g a n u n c o n t r o l l e d i n t e r s e c t i o n without observing t h e v e h i c l e t o h e r l e f t and c o l l i d i n g w i t h d e f e n d a n t ' s v e h i c l e which had passed i n f r o n t of h e r , i s n o t f r e e from c o n t r i b u t o r y neglgence and such f a c t u a l i s s u e should have been placed b e f o r e the j u r y f o r i t s d e t e r m i n a t i o n upon t h e facts. Here, i t i s important t o n o t e t h a t a t t h e c l o s e of evidence a t t r i a l t h e c o u r t i n s t r u c t e d t h e j u r y defendant was n e g l i g e n t a s a m a t t e r of law, f o r f a i l u r e t o y i e l d t h e r i g h t o f way. P l a i n t i f f s a p p e a l on t h e b a s i s of t h e d e n i a l o f t h e i r motion f o r d i r e c t e d v e r d i c t on l i a b i l i t y and t h e g i v i n g of j u r y i n s t r u c t i o n s on c o n t r i b u t o r y n e g l i g e n c e . The duty of d r i v e r s approaching and e n t e r i n g a n uncont r o l l e d i n t e r s e c t i o n i s contained i n s e c t i o n 32-2170, R.C.M. 1947: "Vehicle approaching o r e n t e r i n g i n t e r s e c t i o n . ( a ) When two (2) v e h i c l e s e n t e r o r approach a n i n t e r s e c t i o n from d i f f e r e n t highways a t approximately t h e same time, t h e d r i v e r of t h e v e h i c l e on t h e l e f t s h a l l y i e l d t h e r i g h t of way t o t h e v e h i c l e on t h e r i g h t . -k * *" The r e c o r d d i s c l o s e s t h e p r o v i s i o n s of s e c t i o n 32-2170, R.C.M. 1947, were s t i p u l a t e d t o by counsel. C i t y ordinance No. 3069, t h e B i l l i n g s T r a f f i c Code, i n s e c t i o n 21-170 provides t h e i d e n t i c a l wording a s s e c t i o n 32-2170, R.C.M. 1947. Defendant's f a i l u r e t o y i e l d t h e r i g h t of way c o n s t i t u t e d both s t a t u t o r i l y recognized duty and breach of t h a t d u t y . It i s c l e a r t h a t by s t a t u t o r y d i r e c t i v e automobiles approaching o r e n t e r i n g a n i n t e r s e c t i o n a r e accorded t h e s t a t u s of favored and d i s f a v o r e d d r i v e r s t o f a c i l i t a t e t h e o r d e r l y movement of automobiles. Defendant, conceding h i s f a i l u r e t o y i e l d t h e r i g h t of way, n e v e r t h e l e s s argues p l a i n t i f f was g u i l t y of c o n t r i b u t o r y n e g l i g e n c e i n h e r f a i l u r e t o keep a lookout and t o c o n t r o l h e r automobile. Defendant a r g u e s t h a t p l a i n t i f f ' s duty a s s h e approached t h e i n t e r s e c t i o n was t o : (1) look ahead and l a t e r - a l l y ahead, (2) o p e r a t e h e r c a r a t a speed no g r e a t e r than was reasonably proper under t h e circumstances then e x i s t i n g , and (3) keep h e r c a r under c o n t r o l . For a u t h o r i t y dekendant r e l i e s on Autio v. M i l l e r , 92 Mont. 150, 165, 1 P.2d 1039, which h e l d : 1 "The d r i v e r must look 'not only s t r a i g h t ahead, but l a t e r a l l y ahead.' [ C i t i n g c a s e s ] 1 Moreover, a person i s presumed t o s e e t h a t which he could s e e by looking. H e w i l l n o t be permitted t o s a y t h a t he d i d n o t s e e what he must have s e e n , *'The duty t o keep a lookout had he looked, ' includes t h e duty t o s e e t h a t which i s i n p l a i n s i g h t . I II *** ** This c o n t e n t i o n has m e r i t i n t h e l i m i t e d a r e a t o which it applies --- negligence, but s t a n d i n g a l o n e does n o t demon- s t r a t e c o n t r i b u t o r y n e g l i g e n c e i n a s much a s no c o n s i d e r a t i o n has been given t o proximate cause. C o n t r i b u t o r y n e g l i g e n c e by d e f i n i t i o n i n Montana i n c l u d e s "proximate cause", and t h i s s t r i c t formula does n o t t o l e r a t e any l e s s o r remote " c o n t r i b u t i o n " by the p l a i n t i f f , p l a i n t i f f ' s conduct must n o t only " c o n t r i b u t e " t o t h e i n j u r y but must c o n t r i b u t e a s a "proximate cause". This i s demonstrated i n Montana J u r y I n s t r u c t ion Guides, No. 11.00 : II C o n t r i b u t o r y negligence i s n e g l i g e n c e on t h e p a r t a f a claimant which c o n t r i b u t e d a s a proximate cause t o h i s i n j u r y . f 1 Also s e e : Wolf v. ~ ' ~ e a r y n c . , 132 Mont. 468, 318 P.2d 582. I, Proximate cause i s a twofold l e g a l concept which may l i m i t l i a b i l i t y depending upon t h e e x i s t e n c e of (1) an i n t e r - vening a c t and (2) t h e u n f o r s e e a b i l i t y of t h a t i n t e r v e n i n g a c t . This Court s t a t e d i n Sztaba v . Great Northern Ry., 147 Mont. 11 Causation i s a f a c t . It i s important t o d e t e r mine c a u s a t i o n f i r s t t o avoid i t s confusion w i t h t h e i s s u e s t o follow. This i s n o t a r e l a t i o n s h i p between negligence and i n j u r y , but r a t h e r a c a u s a l r e l a t i o n between conduct and h u r t , both of which a r e f a c t u a l concepts. It i s only a f t e r t h e c a u s a l r e l a t i o n s h i p , d u t y , and i t s scope a r e found t h a t t h e negligence i s s u e i s reached. 6 1 Co1.L.R. 1401. "The t e s t most g e n e r a l l y employed i n determining c a u s a t i o n i s t h e ' b u t f o r ' t e s t . Montana has adopted t h i s t e s t i n numerous c a s e s . "Proximate c a u s e i s one 1 which i n a n a t u r a l and continuous sequence, unbroken by any new, independent c a u s e , produces t h e i n j u r y , and without which t h e i n j u r y would n o t have o c c u r r e d . ' Stroud v. Chicago, M.St.P. & P.Ry. Co., 75 Mont. 384, 393, 243 P. 1089, 1092," (Emphasis s u p p l i e d ) O t h e p o i n t of proximate c a u s e , defendant seems t o h i n t n t h e "but f o r " d o c t r i n e can be a p p l i e d i n a manner t h a t approaches l1 l a s t c l e a r chance", which of course i s n o t our c a s e , by t h e a s s e r t i o n t h a t t h e a c c i d e n t could have been e a s i l y avoided by t h e s l i g h t e s t decelezation on t h e p a r t of p l a i n t i f f had s h e been keeping a proper lookout. This i s a m i s a p p l i c a t i o n of t h e r u l e under t h e f a c t s of t h i s c a s e . There i s nothing i n t h e r e c o r d t o i n d i c a t e t h a t p l a i n t i f f would have been a l e r t e d t o any danger had s h e seen d e f e n d a n t ' s v e h i c l e a t a p o i n t when s h e could have stopped. Defendant gave no i n d i c a t i o n he was n o t going t o y i e l d t h e r i g h t of way, by t r a v e l i n g t o o t a s t , o r by being inattentive. Remembering,also, t h a t i t i s d e f e n d a n t ' s duty t o y i e l d , t h e r e i s no 1.aw t h a t would hold p l a i n t i f f r e s p o n s i b l e f o r f a i l u r e t o a n t i c i p a t e t h a t defendant would a c c e l e r a t e t o pass i n f r o n t of p l a i n t i f f a t t h e l a s t i n s t a n t , when t h e r e was no chance f o r p l a i n t i f f t o s t o p . Rather, when a l l appeared normal, p l a i n t i f f had every r i g h t t o assume defendant would y i e l d , a s t h e law r e q u i r e s . Defendant argues a t l e n g t h t h a t p l a i n t i f f has no r i g h t t o i g n o r e "obvious danger" i n a b l i n d uncompromising r e l i a n c e upon t h e r i g h t of way. Support f o r t h i s p o s i t i o n has been c i t e d a t l e n g t h and defendant r e l i e s on c a s e s such as Flynn v . Helena Cab & Bus Co., 94 Mont. 204, 21 P.2d 1105, which c i t e s Autio. Flynn i s a well-reasoned and c o r r e c t l y decided c a s e , but f a c t u a l l y e a s i l y d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e from t h e i n s t a n t c a s e . Here, t h e r e i s no s i m i l a r f a c t o r any f a c t s t o be cons i d e r e d concerning proceeding i n t h e f a c e of obvious danger. This was a n a b s o l u t e l y normal appearing s i t u a t i o n , u n t i l t h e defendant a c c e l e r a t e d through t h e i n t e r s e c t i o n and whatever h i s s t a t e d reasons f o r s o doing w i l l n o t s h i f t t h e proximate c a u s e t o the plaintiff. I f t h i s r a t i o n a l e could be a p p l i e d t o t h e f a c t s i t u a t i o n , i t would by i m p l i c a t i o n render meaningless t h e r i g h t of way r e g u l a ' t i o n s designed t o a v o i d , i n any c a s e , a r a c e for the intersection. Additionally, f a i l u r e t o accept defendant's argument does n o t a b r o g a t e t h e duty t o keep a lookout by a l l p a r t i e s , a s defendant seems t o i n d i c a t e . The d i s t i n c t i o n pointed out h e r e i s s t a t e d i n very c o n c i s e language by t h e Utah Supreme Court i n Bates v. Burns, 3 Utah 2d 180, 281 P.2d 209, 213: "Had p l a i n t i f f looked j u s t p r i o r t o , o r a t t h e time o f , c r o s s i n g t h e c e n t e r l i n e , d e f e n d a n t ' s p o s i t i o n would n o t have a l e r t e d p l a i n t i f f t o any danger--then defendant would have been f u r t h e r away from t h e i n t e r s e c t i o n than a t t h e time he d i d look. Had p l a i n t i f f looked i t would n o t have a f f e c t e d d e f e n d a n t ' s d r i v i n g o r speed. Defendant t e s t i f i e d t h a t h e never saw p l a i n t i f f till defendant was w i t h i n 100 f e e t of t h e i n t e r s e c t i o n . Unless p l a i n t i f f had been a b l e t o c a s t some hypnotic s p e l l over defendant h i s looking e a r l i e r would have had no e f f e c t on t h e c o l l i s i o n . " The f a i l u r e of t h e record t o demonstrate any negligence of t h e p l a i n t i f f t h a t c o n t r i b u t e d a s a proximate c a u s e t o h e r i n j u r i e s compels t h e f i n d i n g t h a t p l a i n t i f f was n o t c o n t r i b u t o r i l y n e g l i g e n t , a s a m a t t e r of law. P l a i n t i f f s ' I s s u e 2 , a l t h o u g h grounded on an o r d e r of t h e t r i a l c o u r t given under Rules 34 and 35, M.R.Civ.P., concerns i t s e l f i n t h e main w i t h impeachment based on t h e f a c t s of t h i s c a s e and does n o t b r i n g t h e r u l e s themselves s q u a r e l y b e f o r e t h i s Court i n a manner t h a t would r e q u i r e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o r clarification. I n view o f o u r h o l d i n g h e r e i n , t h e remaining i s s u e s as need n o t be d i s c u s s e d / t h e y r e l a t e o n l y t o m a t t e r s withini~dzhe f a c t s o f t h i s c a u s e and s h o u l d n o t a p p e a r a t r e t r i a l . The judgment o f t h e t r i a l c o u r t i s r e v e r s e d and a new t r i a l i s o r d e r e d on t h e i s s u e of damages. d-+ Associate J u s t i c e I Chief J u s t i c e \ Associate J u s t i c e M r . J u s t i c e Wesley C a s t l e s d i s s e n t i n g : I dissent. The f a c t s of t h i s c a s e show t h e c o l l i s i o n t o have taken p l a c e when t h e f r o n t of p l a i n t i f f ' s automobile was but 12 f e e t i n t o t h e i n t e r s e c t i o n , t h e r e a r of h e r c a r had n o t e n t e r e d the intersection. ~ e f e n d a n's automobile was about t o e x i t t from t h e i n t e r s e c t i o n when t h e c o l l i s i o n occurred. It i s c l e a r t h a t i f p l a i n t i f f had maintained a lookout a s s h e was r e q u i r e d t o do, and which s h e d i d n o t do, s h e would have seen d e f e n d a n t ' s c a r c r o s s i n g t h e i n t e r s e c t i o n i n h e r p a t h i n time t o avoid t h e c o l l i s i o n . Here, b l i n d and uncompromising r e l i a n c e upon a r i g h t of way i s h e l d by t h e m a j o r i t y opinion a s t o n o t r a i s e a j u r y q u e s t i o n a s t o whether t h a t i s negligence. I wonder i f t h e Court would apply t h a t s t r i n g e n t a r u l e t o a p e d e s t r i a n . This Court i n Autio v. M i l l e r , 92 Mont. 150, 166, 11 P.2d 1039, d i d n o t and s a i d "* * * But t h i s does n o t r e l i e v e him [ t h e d r i v e r w i t h t h e r i g h t of way] from e x e r c i s i n g due c a r e under t h e circumstances.It In Autio i t was an e i g h t y e a r o l d boy. I n J e s s e n v. O'Daniel, 136 Mont. 513, 349 P.2d 107, t h i s Court a f f i r m e d a p l a i n t i f f ' s judgment f o r t h e d i s f a v o r e d d r i v e r . Also i n Flynn v. Helena Cab & B u s Co., 94 Mont. 204, 2 1 P.2d 1105, t h e cab d r i v e r who had t h e r i g h t of way was found n o t e n t i t l e d t o r e l y b l i n d l y upon h i s r i g h t of way. The m a j o r i t y opinion recognizes t h e s e cases a s t h e c o r r e c t law but by some "mysticr' of a d i s c u s s i o n of proximate cause does n o t f i n d them a p p l i c a b l e h e r e . Additionally, t h e majority o p i n i o n , seemingly in a n e f f o r t t o j u s t i f y i t s h o l d i n g , s t a t e s i n r e f e r r i n g t o f a c t s d i s t i n g u i s h i n g t h i s c a s e from Flynn, t h a t "* * * This was an a b s o l u t e l y normal appearing s i t u a t i o n u n t i l t h e defendant a c c e l e r a t e d through t h e i n t e r section * * *." This simply i s n o t t h e record u n l e s s one t a k e s completely o u t of c o n t e x t t h e testimony of defendant. I would a f f i r m t h e judgment and v e r d i c t of t h e j u r y . A S S ~ & e~ J u s t i c e . t
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