LARSON v BURNETT

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No. 12021 I N THE SUPREME C U T O THE STATE O M N A A OR F F OTN 1971 ROBERT LARSON, a / k / a BOB LARSON, P l a i n t i f f and Respondent, GUY P. BURNETT and M R H E. ATA BURNETT, h i s w i f e , Defendants and Appellants. Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court o f t h e Fourth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Honorable E. Gardner Brownlee, Judge p r e s i d i n g . Counsel of Record: For Appellants : G a r l i n g t o n , Lohn and Robinson, Missoula, Montana. Robert E. Sheridan, Jr. argued, Missoula, Montana. Sherman V. Lohn appeared, Missoula, Montana. For Respondent : Tipp, Haven and B r a u l t , Missoula, Montana. Raymond P. Tipp argued, Missoula, Montana. Submitted : December 3 , 1971 Decided : ~ ~ l 1972 2 1 M r . J u s t i c e Frank I. Haswell d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e C o u r t . T h i s i s a n a p p e a l by d e f e n d a n t s , Guy P. B u r n e t t and Martha E. B u r n e t t , h i s w i f e , from a f i n a l judgment o f t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t of Missoula County f o l l o w i n g t h a t c o u r t ' s d e n i a l of d e f e n d a n t s ' e x c e p t i o n s and motion t o amend t h e f i n d i n g s o f f a c t and c o n c l u s i o n s o f law. The c a s e was t r i e d by t h e c o u r t w i t h o u t a j u r y . Judgment was e n t e r e d wherein t h e c o u r t found t h a t t h e p l a i n t i f f , Robert L a r s o n , had a c q u i r e d a n o n e x c l u s i v e easement f o r road purposes o v e r c e r t a i n land owned by d e f e n d a n t s . Further, the court o r d e r e d t h a t p l a i n t i f f f o r a p e r i o d of one y e a r should b e e n t i t l e d t o t h e c o n t i n u e d u s e of a c e r t a i n e x i s t i n g roadway a c r o s s p o r t i o n s o f d e f e n d a n t s ' land and a l s o p l a i n t i f f s h o u l d have a p e r i o d o f one y e a r t o complete t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n o f t h e roadway on h i s easement. The sequence o f e v e n t s l e a d i n g up t o t h i s a c t i o n can b e summarized i n t h i s manner: I n 1966 p l a i n t i f f purchased p r o p e r t y l o c a t e d i n Missoula County, Montana, s i t u a t e d d i r e c t l y n o r t h and a d j o i n i n g two p i e c e s o f p r o p e r t y owned by d e f e n d a n t s ; p l a i n t i f f ' s p r o p e r t y a b u t s t h e B i t t e r r o o t R i v e r on t h e s o u t h . I t was s t i p u l a t e d by c o u n s e l f o r both p a r t i e s t h a t t h e r e was no w r i t t e n g r a n t o f any i n t e r e s t o r easement i n t h e 1966 conveyance t o p l a i n t i f f . A f t e r purchasing the property, p l a i n t i f f i n order t o gain access t o h i s property made s e v e r a l a t t e m p t s t o p r o c u r e a n easement over a d j o i n i n g p r o p e r t i e s owned by o t h e r s . When d e f e n d a n t s o r i g i n a l l y purchased t h e i r two a d j o i n i n g p i e c e s o f p r o p e r t y i n 1962, road a c c e s s t o p l a i n t i f f ' s p r o p e r t y was accomplished by u s e of a road running i n a n o r t h - s o u t h d i r e c t i o n through t h e w e s t e r l y t r a c t owned by defendants. This road w i l l b e r e f e r r e d t o a s t h e " o l d road". From t h e o u t s e t defendants had advised p l a i n t i f f he d i d n o t have a c c e s s t o h i s p r o p e r t y by way of t h e "old road" through t h e i r property. The record i s r e p l e t e w i t h testimony of defendants f l a t l y t e l l i n g p l a i n t i f f he could n o t a v a i l himself o f a c c e s s t o h i s p r o p e r t y by way of t h e i r s . In a d d i t i o n , "No res spas sing" s i g n s were placed every few f e e t and a lock was placed on t h e g a t e where t h e "old road" e n t e r e d d e f e n d a n t s ' w e s t e r l y t r a c t . It was a t t h i s p o i n t t h a t d i f f i c u l t i e s began. c u t t h e lock and went on d e f e n d a n t s ' p r o p e r t y . The Plaintiff "NO Tres- passing" s i g n s were e i t h e r broken o r t o r n down by p l a i n t i f f o r h i s son. A t about t h i s time, defendants e n t e r e d i n t o n e g o t i a t i o n s w i t h a t h i r d . p a r t y , one K o e s s l e r , t o s e l l t h e i r w e s t e r l y t r a c t over which t h e "old road" r u n s . Deiendants, i n o r d e r t o g a i n a c c e s s t o t h e i r remaining e a s t e r l y t r a c t , then b u i l t a road running i n a n o r t h - s o u t h d i r e c t i o n a c r o s s t h e lower o n e - t h i r d p o r t i o n of t h e i r remaining e a s t e r l y t r a c t , s o t h a t i t would n o t be necessary t o use t h e road on t h e w e s t e r l y t r a c t being s o l d . I n t h e meantime t h e d i s p u t e between p l a i n t i f f and defendants i n t e n s i f i e d u n t i l on May 1, 1968, t h e p a r t i e s f i n a l l y e n t e r e d i n t o a w r i t t e n agreement, t h e f u l l t e x t of which follows: "I Guy P . B u r n e t t , a g r e e t o l e t Bob Larson go thru road July from m p r o p e r t y i f h i g h water i s on h i s e n t r a n c e y and he cannot g e t t h r u . This agreement e x p i r e s 1, 1968. A f t e r t h a t permission must be obtained new owners t o pass t h r u p r o p e r t y . "/s/ Bob Larson Bob Larson " / s / Emanuel Rohrbach Witness " / s / Guy P. Burnett Guy P . B u r n e t t " / s / Emanuel Rohrbach witness" The d i s t r i c t c o u r t , i n a d j u d i c a t i n g t h i s m a t t e r , was unable t o f i n d s u f f i c i e n t evidence t o warrant the establishment o f a n easement by a d v e r s e u s e . Nevertheless, the d i s t r i c t court d i d g r a n t p l a i n t i f f a "non-exclusive" easement upon t h e "new road" over and a c r o s s t h e lower p o r t i o n o f d e f e n d a n t s ' e a s t e r l y t r a c t . The judgment f u r t h e r g r a n t s p l a i n t i f f a p e r i o d of one y e a r t o complete c o n s t r u c t i o n of a road which would r u n a l o n g t h e upper two-thirds of defendants e a s t e r l y t r a c t , n o road i n t h a t l o c a t i o n p r e s e n t l y being i n e x i s t e n c e . The r e c o r d a l s o i n d i c a t e s t h a t a t t h e t i m e p l a i n t i f f purchased h i s p r o p e r t y , no road was i n e x i s t e n c e a l o n g t h e upper t w o - t h i r d s o f d e f e n d a n t s ' e a s t e r l y t r a c t . On a p p e a l d e f e n d a n t s r a i s e t h e f o l l o w i n g i s s u e s f o r review: 1. Does a d v e r s e u s e f o r l e s s t h a n t h e f u l l s t a t u t o r y p e r i o d c o n f e r any i n t e r e s t upon t h e p l a i n t i f f ? 2. Did t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t e r r i n a d m i t t i n g o r a l t e s t i - mony t o modify t h e w r i t t e n agreement d a t e d May 1, 1968? 3. Did t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t e r r i n f i n d i n g t h a t t h e w r i t t e n agreement d a t e d May 1, 1968, g r a n t e d a n easement f o r roadway purposes t o p l a i n t i f f ? p l a i n t i f f ' s p o s i t i o n i s simply tha t t h e e v i d e n c e s u b m i t t e d a t t h e t r i a l c l e a r l y s u p p o r t s t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t ' s f i n d i n g s and judgment. P l a i n t i f f contends d e f e n d a n t s b a r g a i n e d w i t h him t o r e l o c a t e t h e easement and r o a d . He r e l i e d on t h e b a r g a i n , changed h i s p o s i t i o n , and gave v a l u a b l e c o n s i d e r a t i o n . Plaintiff further contends t h a t he i s t h e r e f o r e e n t i t l e d t o t h e r e l o c a t e d easement and r o a d , and t o deny him s u c h r e l o c a t e d easement and r o a d , which he b a r g a i n e d f o r , would p e r m i t a g r o s s i n j u s t i c e and wrong a t t h e hands of d e f e n d a n t s who t o b e g i n w i t h c r e a t e d t h e c o n d i t i o n . This Court has many times s t a t e d i t s f u n c t i o n on a p p e a l i n a nonjury c a s e i s t o determine whether t h e r e i s s u b s t a n t i a l evidence t o s u p p o r t t h e f i n d i n g s of f a c t o f t h e t r i a l c o u r t , and we w i l l n o t r e v e r s e such f i n d i n g s of f a c t u n l e s s t h e r e i s a c l e a r preponderance of evidence a g a i n s t such f i n d i n g s . Spencer v . Robertson, 151 Mont. 507, 445 P.2d 48, and c a s e s t h e r e i n c i t e d ; Smith v. K r u t a r , 153 Mont. 325, 457 P.2d 459. A g e n e r a l p i c t u r e of t h e a p p l i c a b l e l e g a l precedents t o t h i s c o n t r o v e r s y appears d e s i r a b l e . It i s w e l l e s t a b l i s h e d law i n Montana t h a t a p a r t y claiming t o have a c q u i r e d any easement o r -. i n t e r e s t by p r e s c r i p t i o n must show open, n o t o r i o u s , e x c l u s i v e , a d v e r s e , continuous, and u n i n t e r r u p t e d use of t h e easement claimed f o r the f u l l s t a t u t o r y period. S c o t t v . J a r d i n e Gold Min. & M i l l . Co., 79 Mont. 485, 257 P. 406; Cope v. Cope, , P.2d Mon t . 2- 28 St.Rep. 1120. An "exclusive'' use means t h a t t h e c l a i m a n t ' s r i g h t t o use t h e right-of-way another. i s independent of a l i k e right-of-way i n S c o t t v. Weinheimer, 140 Mont. 534, 374 P.2d 91. F u r t h e r , any use which i s permissive i n i t s i n c e p t i o n cannot r i p e n i n t o a t h e r e has been a d i s t i n c t and p o s i t i v e prescriptive right, a s s e r t i o n by t h e c l a i m a n t owner o i a r i g h t h o s t i l e t o t h e owner of t h e s e r v i e n t l a n d s . 232. Drew v. Burggraf, 141 Mont. 403, 378 P.2d F i n a l l y , t h e presence of g a t e s t h a t must be opened by t h e u s e r i s g e n e r a l l y considered t o be s t r o n g evidence of a mere personal l i c e n s e t o pass over t h e right-of-way. Peasley v. Trosper, 103 Mont. 401., 64 P.2d 109. I n Montana, i t i s e q u a l l y a s c l e a r t h a t any a d v e r s e use f o r l e s s than t h e f u l l s t a t u t o r y period o f f i v e y e a r s can i n no way c o n f e r any r i g h t s o r i n t e r e s t whatsoever upon t h e person a t t e m p t i n g t o e s t a b l i s h such a d v e r s e use. S e c t i o n 93-2507, R.C.M. 1947. T h i s Court i n S c o t t v. Weinheimer, 140 Mont. 534, 560, 374 P.2d 91, s t a t e d : "To e s t a b l i s h t h e e x i s t e n c e o f a n easement by p r e s c r i p t i o n , t h e p a r t y s o c l a i m i n g must show open, n o t o r i o u s , e x c l u s i v e , a d v e r s e , c o n t i n u o u s and u n i n t e r r u p t e d u s e o f t h e easement f o r t h e By ' c o n t i n u o u s and unf u l l s t a t u t o r y period. i n t e r r u p t e d ' u s e i s meant u s e n o t i n t e r r u p t e d by t h e a c t of t h e owner o f t h e land o r by v o l u n t a r y abandonment by t h e p a r t y c l a i m i n g t h e r i g h t . I I (Emphasis s u p p l i e d ) *** Applying t h e f o r e g o i n g g e n e r a l p r i n c i p l e s t o t h e r e l e v a n t f a c t s h e r e , t h e r e i s no e v i d e n c e i n t h e r e c o r d t o s u p p o r t t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t ' s d e t e r m i n a t i o n t h a t p l a i n t i f f d i d have such i n t e r e s t s o a s t o constitute valid consideration for the alleged t r a n s f e r t h e r e o f t o t h e upper t w o - t h i r d s of d e f e n d a n t s ' e a s t e r l y tract. The d i s t r i c t c o u r t was u n a b l e t o f i n d t h a t p l a i n t i f f had i n f a c t o b t a i n e d a n easement by a d v e r s e u s e . L o g i c a l l y i t would t h e n f o l l o w t h a t p l a i n t i f f a c q u i r e d no r i g h t t o a t r a n s f e r o f a roadway easement when h e had n o t h i n g t o b e g i n w i t h . To h o l d o t h e r w i s e would c o n f e r upon a t r e s p a s s e r r i g h t s and i n t e r e s t s which would p l a c e t h e owner a t a s e r i o u s d i s a d v a n t a g e and i n f r i n g e upon t h e l e g i t i m a t e r i g h t s a c c r u i n g t o land ownership. Indeed, t h e r e a s o n i n g behind p l a i n t i f t ' s argument would e l e v a t e a t r e s p a s s e r on land t o t h e u n f a i r p o s i t i o n of b e i n g a b l e t o demand compensation i n r e t u r n f o r a r e l i n q u i s h m e n t o f " i n t e r e s t " t h e t r e s p a s s e r had o b t a i n e d by " p a r t i a l a d v e r s e use1', when t h e u s e had been f o r a period considerably s h o r t e r than t h e f i v e year required period p r e s c r i b e d by s t a t u t e . W a r e c e r t a i n t h e l e g i s l a t u r e never ine tended s u c h r e s u l t , when e n a c t i n g o u r a d v e r s e p o s s e s s i o n s t a t u t e . Our examination o f t h e r e c o r d c l e a r l y r e v e a l s t h e p e r m i s s i v e n a t u r e o f p l a i n t i f f ' s r i g h t t o go a c r o s s d e f e n d a n t s ' l a n d . A t t h e o u t s e t when p l a i n t i f f purchased h i s p r o p e r t y , he was i n n o way t o l d by a d j o i n i n g landowners o r by defendants t h a t he had a right-of-way over d e f e n d a n t s ' land; i n f a c t , i t was only a f t e r p l a i n t i f f had been unsuccessful i n t r y i n g t o e s t a b l i s h a r i g h t - o f way a c r o s s t h e lands o i o t h e r a d j o i n i n g owners t h a t he began h i s a t t e m p t s t o g e t a n easement upon d e f e n d a n t s ' land. F i n a l l y , we hold t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t e r r e d i n a d m i t t i n g o r a l testimony modifying t h e w r i t t e n agreement dated May 1, 1968, between t h e p a r t i e s . A t t h e t r i a l p l a i n t i f f was allowed t o e x p l a i n t o t h e c o u r t t h a t t h i s w r i t t e n agreement was intended t o g i v e him a c c e s s over t h e e a s t e r l y t r a c t of d e f e n d a n t s ' property i n r e t u r n f o r a t e r m i n a t i o n of p l a i n t i f f ' s a c c e s s over t h e w e s t e r l y t r a c t , formerly owned by defendants. It i s w e l l e s t a b l i s h e d law i n Montana t h a t , s u b j e c t t o c e r t a i n exceptions n o t p e r t i n e n t h e r e , w r i t t e n c o n t r a c t s cannot be v a r i e d , c o n t r a d i c t e d , nor a l t e r e d by p a r o l o r e x t r i n s i c e v i dence. P r i t c h e t t v. J e n k i n s , 52 Mont. 81, 155 P. 974; Leigland v. McGaffick, 135 Mont. 188, 338 P.2d 1037; S e c t i o n 13-907, R.C.M. 1947. Our reading of t h e w r i t t e n agreement between t h e p a r t i e s c l e a r l y i n d i c a t e s t h e r e was no mistake, impe r f e c t i o n , o r ambiguity which would i n any way r e q u i r e p a r o l testimony t o e x p l a i n . The i n t e n t of t h e p a r t i e s i s c l e a r w i t h i n t h e words of t h e agreement. Defendants were w i l l i n g t o permit p l a i n t i f f t o use t h e i r e a s t e r l y t r a c t Tor two months. A f t e r t h a t period of time, p l a i n t i f f no longer hdd a c c e s s t o t h e d e f e n d a n t s ' p r o p e r t y . A t best, plaintiff was g r a n t e d a temporary permissive easement trom May 1, 1968 u n t i l J u l y 1, 1968. I n a d d i t i o n , i n conjunction w i t h t h e q u e s t i o n of t h e i n a d m i s s i b i l i t y of par01 testimony t o vary t h e terms o t t h e p a r t i e s w r i t t e n agreement, we hold t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t e r r e d i n f i n d i n g t h a t t h e terms o f t h e agreement could be i n t e r p r e t e d t o g r a n t an easement t o p l a i n t i f f . The d i s t r i c t c o u r t i n i t s f i n d i n g s s t a t e s , i n e r f e c t , t h a t t h e w r i t t e n agreement t o t e r m i n a t e t h e use of roads a p p l i e d only t o t h a t p i e c e of p r o p e r t y which defendants were s e l l i n g , i . e . t h e w e s t e r l y t r a c t , and n o t t o t h e road l o c a t e d on t h e e a s t e r l y t r a c t , s t i l l owned by defendants. Our review of t h e evidence i n d i c a t e s otherwise. The words "my propertyf' contained i n t h e agreement can have b u t one r e a s o n a b l e meaning. A t t h e time of t h e execution o r t h e agreement, defendants had a l r e a d y s o l d t h e i r w e s t e r l y t r a c t on c o n t r a c t , and they remained only t h e owners of t h e e a s t e r l y t r a c t . phrase 11 The m property" p l a i n l y and simply means t h a t p r o p e r t y r e y maining i n t h e defendants ' hands, s p e c i f i c a l l y t h e i r e a s t e r l y t r a c t . F u r t h e r , t h e terms of t h e agreement unequivocally s t a t e t h e a g r e e ment e x p i r e s on J u l y 1, 1968. For t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t t o have found t h a t p l a i n t i f f had any r i g h t s a f t e r J u l y 1, 1968, i g n o r e s t h e express language of t h e agreement. Accordingly, we f i n d p l a i n t i i f ' s use t o be permissive i n n a t u r e and, s i n c e no easement was e s t a b l i s h e d by p r e s c r i p t i o n , he had no r i g h t t o t r a n s f e r any easement upon any a r e a o f defendanti ' property. Judgment i s r e v e r s e d . Associate ~ u s t i c e I \ \ U M r . J u s t i c e Wesley C a s t l e s , deeming himself d i s q u a l i f i e d , o p a r t i n t h i s Opinion.

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