Ruth Fredericks v. C. Eric Malouf
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2009-IA-01181-SCT
RUTH FREDERICKS, M.D. AND J. MARTIN
TUCKER, M.D.
v.
C. ERIC MALOUF, KRISTINE K. MALOUF
INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF OF
KIMBERLY MALOUF, A MINOR
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
TRIAL JUDGE:
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED:
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANTS:
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES:
NATURE OF THE CASE:
DISPOSITION:
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
07/16/2009
HON. TOMIE T. GREEN
HINDS COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
DIANE V. PRADAT
L. CARL HAGWOOD
WHITMAN B. JOHNSON, III
KRISTI D. KENNEDY
MICHAEL J. MALOUF, JR.
MICHAEL J. MALOUF, SR.
WILLIAM WALKER, JR.
CIVIL - MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
AFFIRMED AND REMANDED - 03/03/2011
BEFORE CARLSON, P.J., LAMAR AND CHANDLER, JJ.
LAMAR, JUSTICE, FOR THE COURT:
¶1.
Kristine Malouf took the drug Depakote to control her seizures both before and during
her pregnancy. While Kristine gave birth to a seemingly healthy child in March 1997, she
and her husband eventually discovered the child had brain damage. They contend that
Kristine’s treating physicians negligently caused this damage and other injuries to their child.
¶2.
In 2002, the Maloufs filed a complaint in Hinds County against Dr. Ruth Fredericks,
a neurologist; and in 2006, they filed an amended complaint adding Dr. J. Martin Tucker, Jr.,
an obstetrician-gynecologist (“Defendants”). After the Maloufs joined Dr. Tucker, the
Defendants moved to transfer venue to Rankin County. The trial court denied the motion to
change venue, finding the Defendants had abandoned it. We granted the Defendants’
interlocutory appeal to determine whether the trial court erred in its ruling on venue. We
agree with the trial court’s finding that the Defendants abandoned their right to contest
venue.
Facts
¶3.
In 1994, Dr. Fredericks began treating Kristine Malouf for seizures with a prescription
for Depakote. In November 1995, Kristine and her husband met with Dr. Fredericks to
discuss the risks and complications associated with pregnancy, epilepsy, and Depakote. Dr.
Fredericks referred Kristine to Dr. Tucker for additional preconception counseling regarding
her seizure disorder and Depokote. The Maloufs first met with Dr. Tucker in December 1995
for this preconception counseling.
¶4.
Kristine discovered she was pregnant on July 28, 1996. Dr. Fredericks remained
Kristine’s neurologist until November 1996, while it appears that Dr. Tucker treated Kristine
throughout her pregnancy. On March 20, 1997, Kristine gave birth to a seemingly healthy
girl, Kimberly Malouf.
But at twenty-two months, Kimberly was diagnosed with
periventricular leukomalacia, a type of brain injury. And in 2005, a geneticist diagnosed
Kimberly with valproate syndrome caused by exposure to Depakote.
2
Procedural History
¶5.
On December 31, 2002, the Maloufs, individually and on behalf of Kimberly, filed
a complaint against Dr. Fredericks in the Circuit Court of the First Judicial District of Hinds
County. They averred that Dr. Fredericks was negligent in prescribing insufficient amounts
of Depakote during pregnancy and as a result, she suffered multiple seizures throughout her
pregnancy that allegedly caused permanent brain damage to Kimberly. With leave of the
court, the Maloufs filed an amended complaint on May 5, 2006. In this complaint, they
named as defendants Dr. Fredericks and Dr. Tucker, and they added an averment that
Kimberly’s brain damage was caused by the Depakote itself. The Maloufs asserted all claims
against both doctors.
¶6.
In response to the amended complaint, Dr. Tucker moved to change venue to Rankin
County, or in the alternative, to sever the claims against him and transfer them to Rankin
County. He argued that the version of Mississippi Code Section 11-11-3 that was effective
at the time of the amended complaint governed, and that all counseling and subsequent
treatment had occurred at his Rankin County office. Dr. Fredericks joined Dr. Tucker’s
motion. The record shows that Dr. Tucker filed a notice of hearing for the motion set for
August 15, 2006.
¶7.
In response to the Defendants’ motion, the Maloufs asserted that venue was proper
at the time they commenced the action, and that the amended venue statute is inapplicable.
They argued that venue is proper in Hinds County because Dr. Fredericks resides in Hinds
County, has an office in Hinds County, and treated the Maloufs in Hinds County. They
3
claimed that venue was proper at the time the action was filed, and it remained proper after
they added Dr. Tucker as a defendant.
¶8.
It was not until February 20, 2009, that Dr. Tucker filed a supplemental joint motion
for change of venue. Dr. Fredericks joined this motion. The trial court denied the requested
relief, finding the Defendants had abandoned their motion to change venue by failing to
renew or pursue the motion until February 20, 2009. The trial court also noted that the
parties had engaged in discovery for three years, and at least three trial dates had been set
before the Defendants renewed the motion. The trial court found that the Defendants failed
to renew the motion until after the deadline set for all motions. Following the circuit court’s
order, the Defendants filed this interlocutory appeal.
Discussion
¶9.
This Court defers to the trial court’s findings regarding waiver and abandonment.1
So we apply an abuse-of-discretion standard to the trial court’s findings.
¶10.
The Defendants argue that the venue statute 2 in effect when the amended complaint
was filed governs this action, and that venue under this statute is nonwaivable. In support
of their argument, the Defendants rely on the statutory language “[A]ny action against a
licensed physician . . . for malpractice . . . shall be brought only in the county in which the
1
See MS Credit Ctr., Inc. v. Horton, 926 So. 2d 167, 181 (Miss. 2006).
2
When the Maloufs filed their amended complaint, Section 11-11-3 had been
amended specifically to address actions filed against physicians: “[A]ny action against a
licensed physician . . .for malpractice, negligence, error, omission, mistake, breach of
standard of care or the unauthorized rendering of professional services shall be brought only
in the county in which the alleged act or omission occurred.” Miss. Code Ann. § 11-11-3(3)
(Rev. 2004) (emphasis added).
4
alleged act or omission occurred.”3 They argue that, under this statute, venue can be only
in Rankin County, as all acts of alleged negligence occurred in that county.
¶11.
However, the venue statute 4 in effect when the Maloufs filed their original complaint
does not contain a subsection specific to malpractice actions. Notably, neither Defendant
argues that venue was improper when the original complaint was filed in Hinds County.
And in fact, Dr. Fredericks concedes venue was proper in Hinds County at the time the
original complaint was filed.
¶12. The language in effect at the time the Maloufs filed their amended complaint does not
support the Defendants’ position that venue cannot be waived. Many of our statutes,
including those governing the statute of limitations, contain similar, mandatory language.
We have never held that such language prevents a litigant from waiving a right.
¶13.
In this case, the parties entered into an agreed scheduling order by which a June 28,
2007, deadline governed all pretrial motions. As the proponent of the motion, the Defendants
had the burden to timely pursue their motion before the June 28, 2007, deadline. We have
ruled:
3
Miss. Code Ann. § 11-11-3(3) (Rev. 2004).
4
This prior version of the venue statute provided that:
Civil actions of which the circuit court has original jurisdiction shall be
commenced in the county in which the defendant or any of them may be found
or in the county where the cause of action may occur or accrue . . . If a civil
action is brought in an improper county, such action may be transferred to the
proper county pursuant to section 11-11-17.
Miss. Code Ann. § 11-11-3 (2002).
5
Our trial judges are afforded considerable discretion in managing the pre-trial
discovery process in their courts, including the entry of scheduling orders
setting out various deadlines to assure orderly pre-trial preparation resulting
in timely disposition of the cases. Our trial judges also have a right to expect
compliance with their orders, and when parties and/or attorneys fail to adhere
to the provisions of these orders, they should be prepared to do so at their own
peril.5
¶14.
Furthermore, the Defendants actively participated in discovery for three years without
pursuing their motion or seeking a ruling from the trial court. Venue is an affirmative right
that generally may be waived or abandoned.6 This Court has ruled that “[w]hat is important
is that venue needs to be settled early on.” 7 Therefore, we cannot say that the trial judge
abused her discretion when she found the Defendants had waived their right to contest venue
by waiting three years to pursue their motion, and in doing so, waiting until two weeks before
the date set for trial.
Conclusion
¶15.
Venue is a right that must be timely asserted and pursued. The trial court did not
abuse its discretion by finding the Defendants had abandoned their motion to contest venue.
We remand this case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
¶16.
AFFIRMED AND REMANDED.
5
Bowie v. Montfort Jones Mem’l Hosp., 861 So. 2d 1037, 1042 (Miss. 2003)
6
Martin v. State, 354 So. 2d 1114, 1119 (Miss. 1978) (finding defendant waived and
abandoned motion for change of venue by failing to obtain ruling from court); see also Miss.
R. Civ. P. 12(h)(1); see generally Flight Line, Inc. v. Tanksley, 608 So. 2d 1149, 1155
(Miss. 1992) (“[W]e regard venue a right as valuable to the defendant as to the plaintiff.”).
7
Tanksley, 608 So. 2d at 1155.
6
CARLSON AND DICKINSON, P.JJ., RANDOLPH, KITCHENS, CHANDLER
AND PIERCE, JJ., CONCUR.
WALLER, C.J., AND KING, J., NOT
PARTICIPATING.
7
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