Harvey Williams, Jr. v. State of Mississippi
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2008-CT-00844-SCT
HARVEY WILLIAMS, JR. a/k/a SMOKIE
v.
STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
TRIAL JUDGE:
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED:
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE:
DISTRICT ATTORNEY:
NATURE OF THE CASE:
DISPOSITION:
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
04/06/2007
HON. L. BRELAND HILBURN
HINDS COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
MERRIDA COXWELL
CHARLES RICHARD MULLINS
JANE E. TUCKER
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
BY: LADONNA C. HOLLAND
ROBERT SHULER SMITH
CRIMINAL - FELONY
REVERSED AND REMANDED - 02/03/2011
EN BANC.
PIERCE, JUSTICE, FOR THE COURT:
¶1.
Harvey “Smokie” Williams, Jr., shot and killed Calvin Younger in the parking lot at
Jay’s Lounge in Jackson, allegedly in self-defense. At trial, he called a bouncer, Anthony
Herrington, to testify that Younger had possessed a firearm earlier that night. That testimony
was excluded because it was not disclosed in discovery. Williams was convicted, and the
Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction. Because no evidence indicates that this discovery
violation was willful, the evidence should not have been excluded. Thus, the conviction is
reversed, and the case is remanded for a new trial.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
¶2.
Early in the morning of June 22, 2003, Williams parked his vehicle in the turn lane
in the middle of Medgar Evers Drive in front of Jay’s Lounge, a nightclub in Jackson.
According to his testimony at trial he exited his car saw Younger pull a gun from behind his
back. Williams fired off five shots and fled the scene. Williams produced no other witnesses
who would testify that Younger had pulled a gun on Williams. He did, however, produce
Anthony Herrington, a bouncer at the club, who would have testified that he personally had
denied entry to Calvin Younger earlier that night because Younger had a gun on his person.
¶3.
While Herrington was allowed to testify that he had heard Younger cursing at
Williams before the shooting and that he had seen Younger reach toward his back before
Williams fired, he was not allowed to testify that Younger had possessed a gun earlier
because the defense’s discovery responses had not mentioned this fact.
¶4.
On the second day of the trial, Williams’s attorney told the judge that Herrington’s
story about the gun had been discovered by the defense only that day. Nevertheless, the
evidence was excluded, and Williams was convicted. His appeal was heard by the Court of
Appeals, which affirmed the conviction.1 We granted certiorari.
ANALYSIS
1
Williams v. State, _ So. 3d _, 2010 WL 161495, *16 (Miss. Ct. App., January 19,
2010).
2
¶5.
Pursuant to Mississippi Rule of Appellate Procedure 17(h), we limit our review to
whether the trial court should have excluded portions of Anthony Herrington’s testimony.
The standard of review for the admission or exclusion of evidence is abuse of discretion.2
The trial court's decision will stand unless the reviewing court concludes that the decision
was arbitrary and clearly erroneous, amounting to an abuse of discretion.3 Here, evidence
was excluded based on an alleged discovery violation. We must determine (1) whether such
a violation occurred and, if so, (2) whether the exclusion of this evidence was an appropriate
remedy.
I.
¶6.
WHETHER THERE WAS A VIOLATION OF DISCOVERY
PROCEDURES.
The process by which a defendant complies with discovery requirements is outlined
in Uniform Rule of Circuit and County Court Practice 9.04:
C. . . . the defendant shall, subject to constitutional limitations, promptly
disclose to the prosecutor . . . the following information and material which
corresponds to that which the defendant sought and which is in the possession,
custody, or control of the defendant or the defendant’s attorney, or the
existence of which is known, or by the exercise of due diligence may become
known, to the defendant or defendant’s counsel:
1. Names and addresses of all witnesses in chief which the
defendant may offer at trial, together with a copy of the contents
of any statement, written, recorded or otherwise preserved of
each such witness and the substance of any oral statements made
by any such witness. . . .4
2
Miss. Transp. Comm'n v. McLemore, 863 So. 2d 31, 34 (¶ 4) (Miss. 2003).
3
Id.
4
URCCC 9.04(C) (emphasis added).
3
If after complying with the rules, a party discovers new evidence, it must be promptly
disclosed.
Here, Williams complied with pretrial discovery requirements, disclosing
Herrington’s name and a summary of his testimony, but purportedly discovered new
information from Herrington during the trial. The trial court allowed Herrington to testify,
but excluded the statements purportedly discovered recently by the defense and not included
in the discovery provided to the State.
¶7.
Either side may use newly discovered information subject to the requirements of Rule
9.04. The plain language of the rule requires only disclosure of information and materials
known or that would have become known by the exercise of due diligence and prompt
disclosure of newly discovered information. The trial court did not specifically find that the
information regarding Younger’s possession of a gun actually was known by the defense,
that it would have been known by due diligence, or that it was not promptly disclosed to the
State once it was known. If none of these elements was present, then there was no discovery
violation at all.
¶8.
However, the trial court did have information at its disposal to determine within its
discretion that due diligence may not have been exercised in discovery. Williams’s attorney
admitted that he did not begin preparing for the case until March 3, 2007, when the April 3,
2007, trial date was set, after having been appointed to take on the case more than a year
before. And it appears that Herrington was not interviewed at all by the defense until the
week before the trial.
¶9.
In Morris v. State, we found that a trial court did not abuse discretion when it
determined that a discovery violation was “willful and motivated by a desire to obtain a
4
tactical advantage,” even though the judge gave no specific reason for the ruling.5
Considering our holding in Morris, we would exhibit a lack of deference to the trial court if
we found that it had erred in determining that a discovery violation had occurred. However,
even though that determination stands, we must settle whether the exclusion of important
testimony was the appropriate remedy.
II.
¶10.
WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION
IN EXCLUDING HERRINGTON’S TESTIMONY BASED ON
THE FINDING OF A DISCOVERY VIOLATION.
In the context of discovery violations, exclusion of evidence is a radical sanction that
should rarely be used.6 If a trial court is made aware of a party’s failure to comply with
discovery requirements, it may admit the evidence, grant a continuance, or “enter such an
order as it deems just under the circumstances.” 7 However, the general rule is that the
evidence cannot be excluded.8 In Darby v. State, we carved out an exception to this rule:
If the trial court determines that the defendant's discovery violation is “willful and motivated
by a desire to obtain a tactical advantage,” the newly discovered evidence or witnesses may
be excluded.9
5
Morris v. State, 927 So. 2d 744, 747 (Miss. 2006).
6
Houston v. State, 531 So. 2d 598, 612 (Miss. 1988).
7
Morris v. State, 927 So. 2d 744, 747 (Miss. 2006).
8
Morris, 927 So. 2d at 747.
9
Darby v. State, 538 So. 2d 1168, 1176 (Miss. 1989).
5
¶11.
In Morris, we affirmed a finding that a discovery violation was willful where the
defendant gave the State a list of witnesses the morning that the trial began.10 On the other
hand, in Skaggs v. State, we reversed where the trial court struck the testimony of a defense
witness who offered additional details that were not in reciprocal discovery.11 There, the
defense counsel admitted to the court that he had learned of the additional testimony only that
morning and had not even notified the State that the witness’s testimony might be different.12
¶12.
In this case, similarly to Skaggs and in contrast to Morris, the defense provided
discovery to the State, including summaries of witness testimony. The defense attorney told
the judge that Herrington later had provided him with an additional fact, which was quickly
disclosed to the State, and nothing in the record indicates otherwise. The Court of Appeals
reasoned that failure to disclose the entire substance of Herrington’s testimony was, per se,
reason to find that the same failure was wilful.13 We disagree.
¶13.
While avoiding unfair surprise to either the defense or prosecution is a fundamental
policy of criminal procedure, nothing is more fundamental than an accused's right to present
witnesses in his own defense.14 It would be a mistake to adopt a posture in which we assume
that recently discovered evidence is part of some scheme to defraud justice and require the
10
Morris, 927 So. 2d at 747.
11
Skaggs v. State, 676 So. 2d 897, 903-04 (Miss. 1996).
12
Skaggs, 676 So. 2d at 902.
13
See Williams v. State, __ So. 3d __, 2010 WL 161495, *5 (¶ 8) (Miss. Ct. App.,
January 19, 2010)
14
Ray v. State, 503 So. 2d 222, 225 (Miss. 1986).
6
defendant to prove otherwise. Here, the only indication in the record that the discovery
violation was willful or motivated by a desire to obtain a tactical advantage is that the
evidence was recently discovered. Coupled with the fact that the defense had disclosed the
identity of the witness, had provided a partial summary of his testimony, and had disclosed
the new information to the State before the witness took the stand, we do not think that the
suspicious timing is enough. Further, exclusion was especially sharp considering the
importance of this testimony to Williams’s case. Therefore, a sanction less harsh than
exclusion of defense testimony, if any, should have been imposed.
¶14.
Finally, contrary to the reasoning of the Court of Appeals, we do not think that this
error was harmless.15 The admission or exclusion of evidence constitutes reversible error
only where a party can show prejudice or harm.16 Herrington would have corroborated
Williams’s testimony by verifying that Younger had possessed a gun shortly before the
shooting. From the excluded testimony, the jury might have inferred that Younger, who had
approached Williams, still had possessed the gun when Williams shot him. Without
Herrington’s testimony, the evidence overwhelmingly indicates that Younger was unarmed.
¶15.
Therefore, we find that the trial court’s exclusion of the full testimony of Anthony
Herrington was an abuse of discretion, as the error seriously prejudiced the defendant. The
opinion of the Court of Appeals and the conviction by the Hinds County Circuit Court are
reversed, and the case is remanded to the trial court for a new trial.
¶16.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
15
Williams, 2010 WL 161495, at *5.
16
Ross v. State, 954 So. 2d 968, 1001 (Miss. 2007).
7
WALLER, C.J., CARLSON AND GRAVES, P.JJ., DICKINSON, RANDOLPH,
KITCHENS AND CHANDLER, JJ., CONCUR. LAMAR, J., CONCURS IN RESULT ONLY.
8
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