J.E.W. v. T.G.S.
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2004-CA-02458-SCT
J. E. W.
v.
T. G. S.
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
TRIAL JUDGE:
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT:
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
NATURE OF THE CASE:
DISPOSITION:
12/01/2004
HON. VICKI R. BARNES
WARREN COUNTY CHANCERY COURT
PATRICIA PETERSON SMITH
LEE DAVIS THAMES, JR.
J. MACK VARNER
CIVIL - CUSTODY
AFFIRMED IN PART AND DISMISSED IN
PART - 06/29/2006
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
EN BANC.
CARLSON, JUSTICE, FOR THE COURT:
¶1.
Today’s appeal involves a request by a minor child’s mother that we refuse to give full faith
and credit to two ex parte orders entered by a South Carolina trial court concerning child custody
issues litigated by her and the child’s father in both the South Carolina and Mississippi courts. The
Warren County Chancery Court entered an order on a petition for writ of habeas corpus affording
full faith and credit to the South Carolina court orders. The mother asserts that she was denied due
process, and that the execution of the Mississippi chancery court order should have been stayed
pending appeal, pursuant to our rules of appellate procedure. We find that the mother’s request for
a stay of execution of the chancery court order is without merit. Additionally, because the County
Court of Warren County has awarded custody of the minor child to the father in separate
proceedings, and that judgment is final, the issue of child custody is moot. Thus, as to the issues
raised, we affirm in part, and dismiss in part.
FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS IN THE TRIAL COURT
¶2.
T. G. S. (Tom) and J. E. W. (Jan) are the natural parents of B. A. S. (Bob), born out of
wedlock on June 5, 2003, in Vicksburg, where Tom and Jan were then living.1 On January 31, 2004,
Tom, Jan, and Bob moved to Atlanta, Georgia. Within weeks, because of continuing difficulties in
their relationship, Jan and Tom parted ways, and Jan, who was essentially a life-long resident of
Warren County, returned to Vicksburg with Bob. However, Jan and Tom, without court
intervention, quickly agreed to an alternating schedule of shared custody whereby each parent had
separate custody of Bob every other month. When Tom took custody of Bob in August, 2004, he
returned with Bob, not to Atlanta, but instead, to his home state of South Carolina. Likewise, instead
of returning Bob to Jan’s custody pursuant to this informal agreement, Tom, in November, 2004,
filed a petition for child custody and support and restraining order in the Family Court of the Fourth
Judicial Circuit of Darlington County, South Carolina. The South Carolina family court promptly
entered an ex parte temporary injunction, enjoining both Tom and Jan from removing Bob from the
state of South Carolina, pending a temporary hearing on the issues of child custody and child support
and other related issues.
¶3.
Within days of the entry of this ex parte restraining order, Jan and her sister, without
knowledge of the South Carolina court action, traveled to South Carolina to retrieve Bob pursuant
1
Since a minor child is involved, fictitious names are used for the parties to maintain
confidentiality.
2
to a pre-arranged agreement between Jan and Tom. Although the method of notice is disputed, it
is undisputed that by the time Jan and her sister left South Carolina with Bob, Jan was aware of the
South Carolina family court temporary restraining order prohibiting Bob from being removed from
the state of South Carolina. After returning to Mississippi, Jan, on November 16, 2004, filed a
petition for child custody in the County Court of Warren County. Upon learning that Jan had
removed Bob from the state of South Carolina, in violation of its previously entered order, the South
Carolina family court, by way of a second ex parte order entered on November 22, 2004, awarded
Tom custody of Bob pending a hearing, and directed “all law enforcement officers” to assist Tom
in retrieving Bob.
¶4.
On November 29, 2004, Tom filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Chancery
Court of Warren County requesting, inter alia, that full faith and credit be given to the previously
entered South Carolina temporary injunction and custody order. On November 30, 2004, a hearing
was conducted before Chancellor Vicki R. Barnes, and both Tom and Jan were personally present,
and each was represented by Mississippi counsel. The chancellor received testimony from Tom and
Jan as well as S. C. (Sally), Jan’s sister, and B. W. (Betty), Jan’s mother. Exhibits were also
received into evidence, including certified copies of the relevant South Carolina state court
documents, and the petition for child custody which Jan had filed in the County Court of Warren
County. After hearing closing arguments from the attorneys in this two-day hearing, the chancellor
immediately thereafter rendered her bench ruling, which stated in pertinent part:
The Court notes that ... a copy of a Temporary Injunction, which was certified by
South Carolina was filed as Exhibit B. That the Temporary Injunction was entered
on November 12th, 2004, by the Family Court of the Fourth Judicial Circuit County
of Darlington, South Carolina. That this was an ex parte order without notice to the
Respondent, [J. E. W.]. That also as part of this file is a certified copy of an ex parte
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custody order entered on November the 22nd of 2004, by the same Court, granting
ex parte custody to the Petitioner, [T. G. S.]. The Court also notes that a hearing has
been scheduled in South Carolina for January 21st of 2005, at 9:45 a.m., where that
is set to determine the custody matter and other issues.
The Court has also been advised as part of the testimony that the Respondent has a
hearing scheduled for January 14th of 2005, on the Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss
or the Alternate Relief Contesting the Jurisdiction of the South Carolina Court.
The Court has also been advised through testimony that the Respondent has filed a
custody action in the Warren County Court.
This Court realizes that this dispute involves the issues of custody and proper service
of process.
The Court finds that today the only issue before this Court is that of whether or not
the South Carolina Order should be afforded full faith and credit, that this is not a
custody hearing to be determined by this Court at this time.
The Court finds that the issue regarding the service of process has to be brought
before the Darlington County, South Carolina Family Court and that Court would
have to make a determination. That both parties are represented by attorneys in South
Carolina.
The Court finds after considering all of these facts and the evidence presented as well
as the applicable law, that the Petition for Habeas Corpus should be granted and the
Court has no choice but to return the minor child to the father until there is a hearing
by the Family Court of Darlington, South Carolina. Therefore, the Court must, at this
time, give full faith and credit to the Darlington, South Carolina Court Order.
¶5.
After the bench ruling from the chancery court, but prior to entry of the written judgment
consistent with the bench ruling, Jan, through counsel, filed a motion for a stay of execution of the
chancery court judgment pending appeal at 2:38 p.m., on December 1, 2004, the same day as the
bench ruling. It was not until 3:23 p.m., on December 1, 2004, that the chancery court judgment was
entered. This judgment stated, inter alia, that the South Carolina temporary injunction and custody
order would be afforded full faith and credit and that Tom would receive immediate custody of Bob.
At 3:25 p.m., on December 1, 2004, Jan filed her notice of appeal with the trial court. On December
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2, 2004, the chancellor entered an order denying Jan’s motion for stay of execution of the judgment
and directing Jan to deliver Bob “immediately to the Petitioner, T. G. S., in accordance with the
Judgment entered in this cause on December 1, 2004.” Likewise on December 2, 2004, Jan, through
counsel, filed with this Court an Emergency Petition for Extraordinary Relief or in the Alternative
Emergency Petition for Stay Pending Appeal, and by a single-justice order entered on December 3,
2004, Tom and the Warren County Chancery Court were given the opportunity to respond to Jan’s
emergency petition. See M.R.A.P. 21. After receiving a response from Chancellor Barnes and Jan’s
reply to that response, a three-justice panel of this Court, by order dated December 31, 2004, and
entered on January 5, 2005, denied Jan’s Emergency Petition for Extraordinary Relief or in the
Alternative Emergency Petition for Stay Pending Appeal.
¶6.
After the filing of the notice of appeal, but prior to this Court’s receipt of the trial court
record in the chancery court proceedings, the County Court of Warren County conducted a two-day
hearing on Jan’s petition for child custody, and on March 16, 2005, the county court granted “the
permanent care, custody and control” of Bob to Tom, and all remaining issues, “including but not
limited to, visitation and child support [were] deferred until a future hearing” to be scheduled by the
County Court of Warren County. Thereafter, Jan appealed the county court’s order directly to this
Court. On July 26, 2005, a three-justice panel of this Court granted Tom’s motion to dismiss Jan’s
appeal of the county court order. The panel order of July 26, 2005, stated, inter alia, that Jan should
have appealed the county court order to the Chancery Court of Warren County, and that this Court
thus lacked jurisdiction to consider Jan’s appeal of the custody order entered by the County Court
of Warren County. Accordingly, Jan’s appeal of the county court custody order was dismissed,
without prejudice, and the mandate issued from this Court on August 16, 2005. Jan then filed a
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motion with the county court for an out-of-time appeal of the county court custody order to the
chancery court. The county court denied the motion for an out-of-time appeal. Finally, Jan filed a
motion with the county court requesting the court to reconsider the denial of an out-of-time appeal,
or in the alternative to grant relief under Miss. R. Civ. P. 60(b). The record is silent as to the
disposition of this motion to reconsider by the County Court of Warren County.
¶7.
In today’s appeal, Jan asserts that the chancery court erred in granting full faith and credit to
the South Carolina ex parte orders, and in denying the automatic stay of execution of the chancery
court judgment pursuant to the provisions of M.R.A.P. 8. However, Jan filed her notice of appeal
on December 1, 2004, before the automatic stay became an issue on the following day at the hearing
on her motion to stay the execution of the judgment. Jan’s notice of appeal makes no mention of the
automatic stay, as it had not yet arisen as an issue, and instead only makes reference to the order of
December 1, 2004. Finding that Jan is entitled to no relief on appeal, we affirm the Warren County
Chancery Court’s denial of Jan’s request for an automatic stay of execution of the chancery court
judgment pending appeal, pursuant to M. R. A. P. 8(b)(5), and we dismiss as moot Jan’s appeal from
the chancery court order affording full faith and credit to the South Carolina family court orders.
DISCUSSION
¶8.
Jan raises two issues on appeal: (1) whether the Warren County chancellor erred in granting
full faith and credit to the ex parte orders from South Carolina; and, (2) whether the chancellor erred
in denying the automatic stay under M.R.A.P. 8. We will restate and reorder these issues for clarity
in discussion.
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I.
¶9.
WHETHER THE CHANCERY COURT ERRED BY DENYING JAN
AN AUTOMATIC STAY UNDER M. R. A. P. 8(b)(5)
Jan asks this Court to determine whether the trial court erroneously failed to grant an
automatic 10-day stay of enforcement of the judgment pending appeal under Rule 8 of the
Mississippi Rules of Appellate Procedure. Jan filed her notice of appeal in this case on December
1, 2004, and the chancery court denial of the automatic stay did not occur until the next day,
December 2, 2004. Rule 3(c) requires that the notice of appeal “shall specify the party or parties
taking the appeal and the party or parties against whom the appeal is taken, and shall designate as
a whole or in part the judgment or order appealed from.” M.R.A.P. 3(c) (emphasis added). Jan is
attempting to do the impossible – pursue on appeal an issue arising from events that had not yet
taken place at the time she filed her notice of appeal. M.R.A.P. 3(c) also states that an appeal “shall
not be dismissed for informality of form or title of the notice of appeal.” However, Jan fails to
comply with the Rule 3 requirements no matter how flexible the text regarding form. The event
leading to her appeal had not yet occurred at the time she filed her notice of appeal, and thus this
issue is not properly before this Court. Notwithstanding this finding, we will address this issue on
its merits.
¶10.
Jan argues she was due an automatic ten-day stay under M.R.A.P. 8(b)(5), which states:
If a hearing is necessary for issues arising under subpart (b), the judgment shall be
stayed during such hearing and for ten days following the trial court’s ruling. The
ruling of the trial court on motions filed under this subpart (b) shall be reviewable by
the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals.
Therefore, in order for this rule to apply, a hearing must be “necessary for issues arising under
subpart (b),” such as “[a]pplication for a stay of the judgment or the order of a trial court pending
appeal or for approval or disapproval of a contested supersedeas bond or for an order suspending,
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modifying, restoring, or granting an injunction during the pendency of an appeal.” M.R.A.P. 8(b)(1).
Assuming, arguendo, that M.R.A.P. 8 is applicable in this case, Jan is entitled to no relief under this
rule. Immediately after the trial court denied a stay of judgment, she petitioned this Court for relief.
A three-justice panel of this Court ultimately denied Jan’s request for a stay pending appeal. From
the record before us, we again find the trial court committed no error in denying Jan’s request for
an automatic stay of execution of the chancery court order. This issue is without merit.
II.
¶11.
WHETHER THE FULL FAITH AND CREDIT ISSUE CONCERNING
THE SOUTH CAROLINA EX PARTE ORDERS IS NOW MOOT
When presented with issues of law, we employ a de novo standard of review; and, when
confronted with the issue of whether a sister state’s judgment should be given full faith and credit
by our courts, we are indeed considering an issue of law. Tel-Com Management, Inc. v. Waveland
Resort Inns, Inc., 782 So.2d 149, 151 (Miss. 2001) (citing Ellis v. Anderson Tully Co., 727 So.2d
716, 718 (Miss. 1998)).
¶12.
The authority for a court to give full faith and credit to a foreign court’s judgment is found
in Article IV of the United States Constitution. “Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State
to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may
by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved,
and the Effect thereof.” U.S. CONST . art. IV, § 1. This Court has made it clear that we will first look
to the requirements of that clause when determining when a judicial proceeding from another state
is due full faith and credit. “Our decision must comport with Article IV., § 1 of the United States
Constitution requiring us to give full faith and credit to the judicial proceedings of a sister state.”
Owens ex rel. Mosley v. Huffman, 481 So.2d 231, 238 (Miss. 1985).
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¶13.
Jan makes various arguments, stating first that the enforcement of a foreign judgment is
subject to various limitations, including proper jurisdiction of the rendering state court, due process
provided to the defendant, and finality of the judgment on its merits. See Tennessee Properties, Inc.
v. Southern Pilot Ins. Co., 766 So.2d 44 (Miss. 2000). Jan argues in part that because Bob had not
met the residency requirements, South Carolina did not have jurisdiction. Jan also argues that, in
entering the order giving full faith and credit to the foreign ex parte orders, the Warren County
Chancery Court erroneously failed to find (1) that the South Carolina trial court had no subject
matter or personal jurisdiction; (2) that Jan was not afforded the opportunity to defend herself under
her due process rights because of lack of proper service and the ex parte nature of the orders; and,
(3) that the orders were not final judgments on the merits deserving of full faith and credit. Jan
contends that because these requirements were not met, the ex parte orders were in no way deserving
of full faith and credit in Mississippi; and, that, therefore, the chancery court erred in entering its
judgment. Tom, on the other hand, argues that the issue is now moot because the County Court of
Warren County has already awarded him custody in the separate action initiated by Jan’s filing of
her petition for custody and child support.
¶14.
This Court has stated: “[c]ases in which an actual controversy existed at trial but the
controversy has expired at the time of review, become moot. We have held that the review
procedure should not be allowed for the purpose of settling abstract or academic questions, and that
we have no power to issue advisory opinions.” Monaghan v. Blue Bell, Inc., 393 So.2d 466, 466-67
(Miss. 1980) (internal citations omitted). In Monaghan, this Court was called on to decide the
validity of a trial court’s order enjoining a party for one year from working for his former employer’s
competitor. However, by the time the case was submitted to this Court on briefs and oral argument,
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the one-year period of injunction had expired, thus, the issue was moot. We will not adjudicate moot
questions. Id.; City of Madison v. Bryan, 763 So.2d 162, 166 (Miss. 2000).
¶15.
This principle of mootness applies in child custody cases as well. In an earlier child custody
appeal which this Court dismissed as moot, the trial court had initially entered an order giving
custody of the child in a divorce proceeding to the father, but then later entered a decree modifying
that order, awarding a two-month period of custody to the mother, who was to redeliver the child to
the father at the end of that time. Campbell v. Lovgren, 171 Miss. 385, 157 So. 901 (1934). This
Court was presented with the issue of whether the later decree modifying the first order should stand,
but never directly addressed that issue because the two-month period had ended. “The period of time
during which the custody of the child was changed by the decree appealed from having expired, the
questions presented by the record have become purely academic, and therefore no actual controversy
is presented for the decision of this court, from which it follows that the appeal should be
dismissed.” Id. at 901 (citations omitted). In Savell v. Savell, 206 Miss. 55, 56-57, 39 So.2d 532,
533 (1949), the trial court had directed that the children, who were in custody of their mother
following a divorce, be placed in certain boarding schools during that scholastic year, and that the
father pay five times per month the amount the mother was to pay. The children were to then be
returned to the mother for six weeks, and then transferred to the custody of the father for six weeks.
Id. The husband appealed, and this Court relied on Campbell to dismiss the appeal as moot, as the
appeal took place after both the school year and the two six-week periods of custody had ended. Id.
¶16.
Tom argues that he sought a writ of habeas corpus based on the applicable statute, Miss.
Code Ann. § 11-43-1, which reads, “[t]he writ of habeas corpus shall extend to all cases of illegal
confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful
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custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto, except in cases expressly
excepted.” Tom cites several Mississippi cases where habeas corpus proceedings have ultimately
been rendered moot. See Bradley v. State, 355 So.2d 675 (Miss. 1978); McGarrh v. State, 243
Miss. 234, 138 So.2d 284 (1962); Serton v. Sollic, 829 So.2d 730 (Miss. Ct. App. 2002). Jan, on
the other hand, asserts that the original orders from the South Carolina trial court were not due full
faith and credit. See, e.g., Morrison v. Mississippi Dep’t of Human Services, 863 So.2d 948 (Miss.
2004) (a judgment in a child support proceeding was found void because of lack of jurisdiction and
due process violations when one party and his counsel were not present at the hearing as a result of
flawed service of process). However, in considering the arguments of both Tom and Jan, we find
that Jan’s argument cannot overcome the fact that both proceedings concerning the custody of Bob
have come to an end, and neither proceeding resulted in Jan’s obtaining custody of Bob. Jan simply
cannot legitimately argue that she was not afforded the opportunity to answer and defend herself in
South Carolina when she did in fact do exactly that. She hired an attorney and, only one week after
Tom filed his complaint in South Carolina, Jan filed both a motion to dismiss based on lack of
jurisdiction and the notice of a hearing on the motion in the South Carolina trial court. Tom points
out that the South Carolina trial court ultimately granted the motion in Jan’s favor the following
month. The South Carolina custody orders were only temporary, pending a hearing. It appears now
that the hearing has taken place, and the case has been dismissed because of lack of jurisdiction.
More damaging to Jan’s case is the March 16, 2005, order by the County Court of Warren County,
awarding Tom the permanent care, custody, and control of Bob in a proceeding Jan herself initiated.
Therefore, a court which Jan admits did have proper jurisdiction has now also heard the matter and
entered its final judgment awarding “the permanent care, custody and control” of Bob to Tom.
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Based on the actions of the South Carolina and Mississippi courts, we find that this controversy has
now expired at the time of review, making this appeal moot. See Monaghan, 393 So.2d at 466. As
noted, we have made it clear that we will not adjudicate moot questions. City of Madison, 763
So.2d at 166.
¶17.
However, relying on Allred v. Webb, 641 So.2d 1218, 1220 (Miss. 1994), Jan attempts to
argue, just as the Allred appellant did, that this case should not be dismissed as moot because it is
a matter of public interest and therefore an exception to the rule applies. Jan raises the “capable of
repetition but evading review” doctrine employed by the United States Supreme Court in Weinstein
v. Bradford, 423 U.S. 147, 96 S.Ct. 347, 46 L.Ed.2d 350 (1975). This Court in Strong v. Bostick,
420 So.2d 1356, 1359 (Miss. 1982), adopted the two-part Weinstein rule that the question of
mootness is not applied to matters of public interest, determined by a two-part test, reiterated in
Allred. “To utilize the ‘capable of repetition but evading review’ doctrine, these two elements must
be combined: (1) The challenged action was in its duration too short to be fully litigated prior to its
cessation or expiration, and (2) there was a reasonable expectation that the same complaining party
would be subject to the same action again.” Allred, 641 So.2d at 1220. In Strong, this Court found
that the Weinstein factors were present and that the question was not moot. 420 So.2d at 1359. In
today’s case, we cannot find that both prongs are met as there is no reasonable expectation that Jan
will be subject to the same action again; thus, the exception does not apply.
¶18.
Jan next cites the pre-Weinstein case of Sartin v. Barlow, 196 Miss. 159, 16 So.2d 372, 376
(1944), relied on by Strong, which applied the public interest exception because that case dealt with
election proceedings, no doubt a matter of public interest. Another case relied on by Jan, Board of
Trustees of Pascagoula Mun. Separate School Dist. v. Doe, 508 So.2d 1081, 1084 (Miss. 1987),
12
is also inapplicable here because the Court in that case dealt with a matter of public concern,
Mississippi’s compliance with the Education for all Handicapped Children Act. Jan likewise cites
Allred because in that case, the two elements were not both met but the Court nonetheless proceeded
to publish an opinion concerning the district attorney, relying on Sartin. However, the Court in
Allred distinguished that particular case by holding, “[t]his situation is clearly not a mere private
dispute between two parties since future district attorneys inevitably will find themselves in the same
quandary as Allred found himself in 1991.” Allred, 641 So.2d at 1220. The same is not true here,
however. This case is a private dispute between two parties and does not involve matters of such
public interest present in Allred, Doe, and Sartin such that we are compelled to do anything except
dismiss the case as moot. To do otherwise would be to issue an advisory opinion impermissibly, or
to attempt to settle abstract or academic questions. See Monaghan, 393 So.2d at 466-67.
¶19.
This Court in Allred also reiterated the Monaghan rule that we are normally not to delve into
what are essentially advisory opinions. 641 So.2d at 1220. The Monaghan warning against
advisory opinions is not a new rule, but reaches as far back as 1934. “Though earnestly requested
by counsel to depart from this rule and to say whether or not the decree of the court below should
have been rendered, in order that the court may be guided thereby should another petition be filed
for the modification of the decree rendered in the divorce proceeding, we do not feel at liberty to do
so. Such an opinion would be merely advisory, and the rendering of opinions of that character are
not within the province of this Court. Moreover, whether or not that decree should be modified will
depend on facts and circumstances that may exist when a petition for that purpose is heard by the
court.” Campbell, 157 So. at 901.
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¶20.
We thus find in today’s case that the facts and circumstances involving child custody are too
case-specific and sensitive for the Court to lay down a blanket rule when the controversy before us
has terminated. The question Jan presents to this Court is now moot. We therefore dismiss the
appeal as to this issue.
CONCLUSION
¶21.
The chancery court did not err in refusing to grant Jan an automatic ten-day stay under
M.R.A.P. 8(b)(5). As to the chancery court affording full faith and credit to the South Carolina
orders, there is simply no remaining issue that is anything other than academic in this case. The
South Carolina proceedings have been dismissed, and the County Court of Warren County has
entered a final judgment awarding the custody of Bob to his natural father in a proceeding that the
natural mother herself began. The natural mother’s question now presented to this Court on appeal
is thus moot.
¶22.
For these reasons, the judgment of the Chancery Court of Warren County is affirmed in part
and dismissed as moot in part.
¶23.
AFFIRMED IN PART AND DISMISSED IN PART.
SMITH, C.J., WALLER, P.J., DIAZ, EASLEY, GRAVES, DICKINSON AND
RANDOLPH, JJ., CONCUR. COBB, P.J., NOT PARTICIPATING.
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