Mississippi United Methodist Conference v. Telaya Brown
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2005-M-02092
MISSISSIPPI UNITED METHODIST CONFERENCE
v.
TELAYA BROWN
ON PETITION FOR DISQUALIFICATION
OF TRIAL JUDGE AND FOR STAY
TRIAL JUDGE:
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED:
ATTORNEYS FOR PETITIONER:
ATTORNEYS FOR RESPONDENT:
DISPOSITION:
TOMIE T. GREEN
HINDS COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
JOSEPH E. LOTTERHOS
CHARLES F. BARBOUR
STEVE MARK WANN
MARJORIE S. BUSCHING
TARA A. HARRISON
PETITION GRANTED - 03/09/2006
EN BANC.
SMITH, CHIEF JUSTICE, FOR THE COURT:
¶1.
This interlocutory appeal stems from a lawsuit filed by Telaya Brown against the
Mississippi United Methodist Conference (Conference), which is currently pending before
the Hinds County Circuit Court. In this suit, the Conference filed a motion seeking recusal of
Circuit Judge Tomie T. Green.
Judge Green subsequently signed an order denying the motion.
Pursuant to M.R.A.P. 48B, the Conference now petitions this Court for disqualification of
Judge Green and a stay of the proceedings.
FACTS
¶2.
This Court has considered this case in a previous interlocutory appeal, wherein we
stated the facts of this case in detail.
Finding no need to restate these facts we direct the
reader to Mississippi United Methodist Conference v. Brown, 911 So. 2d 478, 480-82 (Miss.
2005).
During the first interlocutory appeal we considered the Conference’s claim that Judge
Tomie Green should have been recused due to bias.
However, regarding the issue of Judge
Green’s recusal, we found the Conference did not follow the applicable procedure for
requesting recusal in that it was not first submitted to Judge Green.
Thus, we declined to
consider the issue of recusal because it was not ripe for review. Id. at 482.
¶3.
In the present interlocutory appeal, the Conference initially requested Judge Green to
recuse herself from the matter.
Judge Green considered the Conference’s motion and
subsequently refused to recuse herself.
Therefore, in accordance with M.R.A.P. 48B the
Conference seeks review of Judge Green’s action.
This issue of recusal is now ripe for our
consideration.
ANALYSIS
¶4.
We have previously decreed we “will not order recusal unless the decision of the trial
judge is found to be an abuse of discretion.” Hathcock v. Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins.,
912 So. 2d 844, 847 (Miss. 2005) (citation omitted).
Thus, we will only reverse the trial
court’s ruling regarding recusal if the trial court has abused its discretion in overruling such
motion. See Bredemeier v. Jackson, 689 So. 2d 770, 774 (Miss. 1997).
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¶5.
The Conference argues Judge Green has repeatedly demonstrated an appearance of bias
in this matter, and if allowed to preside in these proceedings prejudice will result.
Thus the
Conference submits Judge Green has abused her discretion and should be disqualified from
presiding in the case at bar.
¶6.
Our opinion In re Blake, 912 So. 2d 907 (Miss. 2005), provides invaluable insight, and
a generous source of pertinent law for application in our analysis of present appeal. 1 We stated
“[t]he oath of office taken by all trial judges, including Judge Green, requires that judges
‘administer justice without respect to persons,’ and that they ‘faithfully and impartially execute
and perform’ all of their duties.” Id. at 917. Furthermore, in In re Blake we adopted a sister
state’s approach and stated “in viewing all circumstances, recusal is required only where the
judge’s conduct would lead a reasonable person, knowing all the circumstances, to conclude
that the ‘prejudice is of such a degree that it adversely affects the client.’” Id. (citing Town
Centre of Islamorada v. Overby, 592 So. 2d 774, 775 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992)). Therefore,
the question this Court must now ask is:
would a reasonable person, knowing all the
circumstances, conclude that Judge Green cannot conduct herself in an impartial manner?
¶7.
The Conference contends Judge Green cannot be impartial as evinced by the biased
commentary found in her order regarding an in camera inspection of documents, her order
denying recusal,
and
her response to the
1
Conference’s petition during the
This Court in In re Blake, considered motions for recusal of the trial judge in
seven pending cases. As is the case today, the presiding trial judge in all of those cases was
Judge Green.
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previous
interlocutory appeal.
Judge Green maintains she is not biased and can be fair to the
Conference.
In Camera Order
¶8.
In her in camera order Judge Green comes to the conclusion that “[t]he case before the
[trial] court is a civil case, wherein the victim of a crime perpetrated by the pastor of a church,
seeks damages for physical and emotional injury resulting for [sic] that sexual assault.” Judge
Green states “[t]he documents appear to establish that Defendants [the Conference] and
Anderson, were put on notice of allegations of Defendant Stallworth’s sexual misconduct as
far back as 1989.” Further, subsequent to the in camera inspection of certain documents Judge
Green opined “that some of the documents should be produced to Plaintiff, under protective
order, due to their sensitive nature, as it involves persons who may be the victims of Defendant
Stallworth [sic] misconduct.” In addition, as we discussed in the previous interlocutory appeal,
Judge Green provided the plaintiff with a copy of her in camera order and copies of the
sensitive documents in an ex parte appearance. Brown, 911 So. 2d at 481. Thus, the plaintiff
was provided copies of the documents in question at least four hours before the Conference
had notice of Judge Green’s order.
The Conference had insufficient time to object or appeal.
Response to the Previous Interlocutory Petition
¶9.
In Judge Green’s response to the Conference’s former petition she added several
troubling remarks, which appear to undermine her contention that she can sit as an impartial
judge in this matter. In the response Judge Green stated:
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Nonetheless, the court will respond, as best it can, to the misrepresentations,
mischaracterization and allegations advanced by [the Conference] in an attempt
to inflame this Honorable Court. Such callous misrepresentation [sic], without
just cause, are an unwarranted challenge of the integrity of the undersigned
judge.
While attorneys may not agree with undersigned’s rulings, false
accusations are inexcusable and should not be sanctioned by this Honorable
Court.
¶10.
Judge Green mentions the discovery history of the case and remarks that “[d]epositions
of a number of witnesses introduced as a part of other motions heard by the court appear to
confirm Stallworth’s propensities.”
Moreover, regarding her in camera review of the sensitive
documents, Judge Green avers:
Many pages in the document [sic] indicated prior incidents, complaints and/or
allegations of sexual misconduct by Stallworth that had been reported to [the
Conference] as early as 1989. The documents produced also contained [the
Conference’s] actions and/or inactions in dealing with Stallworth previously, and
attested to [the Conference’s] removal of Stallworth, after the sexual assault
against Plaintiff.
Judge Green also stated that “the court responds that allegations of ex parte communication
between Plaintiff and the court is [sic] patently false. For Defendant [the Conference] to infer
such is both reckless, intentional and a patent disregard for the truth about how the court ruled
on the issue in this matter.”
¶11.
In addition to the above comments, the final sentence in Judge Green’s response is the
most troubling. Judge Green effectively tips the scales in favor of the plaintiff by stating that
“[s]hould the Supreme Court decide to conceal the documents on the bases of priest penitent
or medical privilege, then such precedent would permanently preclude an injured party from
ever prosecuting an action against a church Defendant, such as [the Conference].”
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Such
statement standing alone, removed all doubt about whether Judge Green has already decided
this issue prematurely.
Order Denying Recusal
¶12.
In Judge Green’s order denying the Conference’s motion for judicial recusal, Judge
Green expressly states that “[d]efendants have been sued for damages resulting from an
undisputed sexual assault by Stallworth against Plaintiff Telaya Brown (“Brown”).”
Judge
Green also states
First, the court’s statements regarding Defense counsel’s representation to the
Supreme Court were accurate. Defense Counsel inferred that the court had an
ex parte meeting with the Plaintiff after the in camera inspection. This was
indeed a misrepresentation to the Supreme Court. Additionally, Defendant’s
outline of the events that led to the production of the document [sic] to the
parties at a different time was not accurate and seemed to cast a shadow on the
Court’s integrity. The Court was duty bound to make accurate statements to the
Supreme Court when a response was requested by the Supreme Court. Thus,
there was no personal bias in setting the record straight. Defendant has no bases
for a request for recusal in this regard. Neither should Defendant be allowed to
use the order of the court to attempt to create an unreasonable appearance of
impartiality or bias where none exist.
¶13.
Judge Green filed a brief response to the Conference’s present petition for her recusal.
In that response Judge Green categorically denied the Conference’s allegations of bias,
prejudice, or impartiality.
Judge Green asserts the Conference has failed to present sufficient
facts or law to overcome the presumption of fairness and impartiality to which she as a judge
is entitled. See Turner v. State, 573 So. 2d 657, 678 (Miss. 1990).
We have previously
determined that “[i]mpartiality is viewed under the totality of the circumstances analysis using
an objective reasonable person, not a lawyer or judge, standard.” Hathcock, 912 So. 2d at 849
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(citing Dodson v. Singing River Hosp. Sys., 839 So. 2d 530, 534 (Miss. 2003); Collins v.
Joshi, 611 So.2d 898, 903 (Miss. 1992) (Banks, J. concurring)) (emphasis in original).
¶14.
It is apparent to this Court Judge Green feels slighted by the Conference’s contentions
in this matter, and Judge Green opines in the aforementioned commentary that the Conference
was untruthful and has misrepresented the facts to this Court. Also, Judge Green’s statements
indicate she has already determined that fault lies with the defendants.
Finally, by her own
language Judge Green clearly appears to have assumed the position of advocate for the
plaintiff.
Therefore, after a collective view of Judge Green’s in camera order, her response
to the Conference’s previous petition, and her order denying recusal, we find that a reasonable
person, knowing all of the circumstances, would conclude that Judge Green could not sit as an
impartial administer of justice.2
Thus, we hold that Judge Green abused her discretion in
denying the Conference’s motion to recuse.
CONCLUSION
¶15.
Judge Green’s comments and actions demonstrate that she cannot remain impartial in
the case at bar. Therefore the Conference’s petition for disqualification is hereby granted, and
all proceedings in the circuit court shall be stayed pending random reassignment to another
circuit judge.
2
See Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 3E(1), “Judges should disqualify themselves
in proceedings in which their impartiality might be questioned by a reasonable person
knowing all the circumstances . . . .”
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¶16.
PETITION GRANTED.
WALLER AND COBB, P.JJ., CARLSON, DICKINSON AND RANDOLPH, JJ.,
CONCUR. EASLEY, J., DISSENTS WITHOUT SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION. DIAZ
AND GRAVES, JJ., NOT PARTICIPATING.
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