Teresa Darlene Jones v. George Herbert Mayo, III
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2009-CA-01131-COA
TERESA DARLENE JONES
APPELLANT
v.
GEORGE HERBERT MAYO, III
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
TRIAL JUDGE:
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED:
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE:
NATURE OF THE CASE:
TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION:
DISPOSITION:
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
APPELLEE
6/1/2009
HON. FRANKLIN C. MCKENZIE JR.
LAUDERDALE COUNTY CHANCERY
COURT
HENRY PALMER
ROBERT JAMES BRESNAHAN
ROBERT R. MARSHALL
CIVIL - DOMESTIC RELATIONS
ORDERED, UNDER RULE 60(a), THAT
EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION AWARD
MAY BE SATISFIED USING QUALIFIED
DOMESTIC-RELATIONS ORDER
AFFIRMED- 2/08/2011
BEFORE MYERS, P.J., ISHEE AND MAXWELL, JJ.
MAXWELL, J., FOR THE COURT:
¶1.
Teresa Darlene Jones (Darlene) appeals the chancery court’s post-trial determination
that her ex-husband, George Herbert Mayo III (Herbert), could satisfy Darlene’s equitable
distribution award of $36,488.50 with a portion of his retirement, using a qualified domesticrelations order (QDRO), instead of paying cash. She also appeals the denial of her request
for interest on her 2005 award.
¶2.
At the hearing on Herbert’s motion to reconsider, the chancery court found the
omission of a reference to a QDRO in the 2005 divorce judgment was an oversight. The
intent of the equitable distribution award was for both Darlene and Herbert to receive an
equal share of the martial assets. The marital estate had no cash, and if Herbert were to
withdraw $36,488.50 in cash from his retirement, he would lose more than $15,000 in taxes
and penalties. Because there were to be no foreseeable tax consequences of the distribution,
Herbert’s using a QDRO to transfer $36,488.50 from his retirement to a separate account for
Darlene was the only way to achieve the award’s purpose. The chancery court also found,
because Herbert had tried to satisfy the award using a QDRO shortly after the divorce
judgment was entered, Darlene was not entitled to interest.
¶3.
Because the chancery court had the authority under Rule 60(a) of the Mississippi
Rules of Civil Procedure to clarify its previous divorce judgment and correct any oversight,
we find no error and affirm.
FACTS
¶4.
Darlene and Herbert divorced on January 24, 2005. While they agreed who should
keep most of their marital property, they left the issue of equitable distribution to the
chancery court. The majority of the marital property was in retirement accounts. Darlene
had a state pension worth $23,000, and Herbert had two ERISA-qualifying accounts, worth
$82,449 total. All the assets combined totaled $139,637.1
1
The rest of the assets were equity in personal vehicles, jewelry, and other personal
property, including furniture and household items. The sale of the marital home and division
of its equity was not included in the equitable distribution.
2
¶5.
Special Chancellor Charles D. Thomas proposed “[d]ividing this amount equally [so]
each party should receive $69,818.50.” He reasoned that “[d]educting $33,330.00 in assets
[Darlene] is to receive from the agreed value of the personal property already divided would
leave her with a deficit of $36,488.50.” Applying the Ferguson factors, he found there were
no foreseeable tax consequences of the proposed distribution. The corresponding divorce
order awarded Darlene $36,488.50 as a final judgment, bearing interest at a rate of six
percent.
¶6.
To satisfy the judgment against him, in February 2005, Herbert sought to transfer
$36,488.50 from one of his retirement accounts to a separate account for Darlene through a
QDRO. Darlene refused to execute the QDRO documents, demanding Herbert pay the
judgment in cash.
¶7.
Unable to resolve their dispute, Herbert filed a motion for relief under Rule 60 on May
16, 2005. He sought court authority to satisfy the judgment through his retirement funds,
using a QDRO. The motion hearing did not occur until May 2009. In the interim, a new
special chancellor, Chancellor Franklin C. McKenzie, had been appointed.2
¶8.
At the May 1 hearing, Chancellor McKenzie determined the 2005 divorce judgment
required clarification. Chancellor Thomas, in the January 2005 divorce judgment, had found:
(1) there were no foreseeable tax consequences of the distribution; (2) there were no cash
assets to divide; (3) Herbert’s only assets available for transfer were his two retirement
accounts; and (4) the parties should each take an equal $69,818.50 share of the marital assets.
2
In June 2007, Herbert had requested the chancellors in Lauderdale County’s judicial
district (District 12) recuse themselves. Herbert based his motion on Darlene’s employment
at the Lauderdale County Justice Court and her subsequent marriage to a local attorney.
3
But the order omitted a finding that Herbert’s accounts were ERISA-qualifying, only
transferrable through a QDRO to avoid immediate tax liability. At the May 2009 hearing,
expert testimony revealed Herbert would lose more than $15,000 in taxes and penalties if he
transferred $36,488.50 in cash instead of using a QDRO.3
¶9.
Because the intent of the equitable distribution award was for both spouses to take an
equal share and avoid immediate tax consequences, the chancellor ordered that Herbert could
satisfy the remaining balance of Darlene’s award 4 by transferring money from his retirement
to a separate account for Darlene, using a QDRO. Because Herbert had already attempted
to satisfy fully the January 2005 judgment using a QDRO in February 2005, Chancellor
McKenzie denied Darlene’s request for interest on the balance. Darlene timely appealed
Chancellor McKenzie’s June 8, 2009 order.
DISCUSSION
A.
¶10.
Rule 60 Relief
Darlene claims the chancellor erred in allowing Herbert’s Rule 60 motion to be treated
as a Rule 59 motion. Because Herbert sought to have the judgment altered or amended, she
argues his only remedy was to file a motion under Rule 59(e), which must be filed within ten
days of the entry of the judgment. M.R.C.P. 59(e). And because Herbert waited four months
to file his motion, she reasons, it should have been dismissed as untimely.
3
The expert also testified if Darlene received $36,488.50 through a QDRO, should
she withdraw the money early, the taxes and penalties would leave her with $20,799 cash.
4
The hearing also revealed Herbert had allowed Darlene to keep $12,300.88, the
amount of equity he was entitled to after selling the marital home. Chancellor McKenzie
credited Herbert this amount, leaving $24,187.62 to be transferred.
4
¶11.
But the chancery court did not alter or amend its 2005 divorce judgment. Instead,
under authority provided in Rule 60(a), it clarified an oversight or omission in the 2005
judgment. Rule 60(a) provides that “errors therein arising from oversight or omission may
be corrected by the court at any time on its own initiative or on the motion of any party[.]”
M.R.C.P. 60(a). Chancellor McKenzie reasoned that oversight led to the original order
omitting the use of a QDRO because a QDRO was the only way to effect the chancellor’s
clear intent in the original decision—to avoid tax consequences in the equal distribution of
the assets. Although “Rule 60(a) cannot be used to reflect a change in mind by the judge,”
it can be used “to correct an order that failed accurately to reflect the judge’s original
decision.” Seymour v. Seymour, 869 So. 2d 1035, 1036 (¶4) (Miss. Ct. App. 2004) (citing
Edwards v. Roberts, 771 So. 2d 378, 386 (¶27) (Miss. Ct. App. 2000) (finding chancellor’s
clarification of “what his decision in the divorce decree was” fell within scope of Rule 60(a)).
¶12.
In Seymour, a chancellor, upon hearing the husband’s motion to reconsider the amount
of the lump-sum-alimony award, determined his previous award required clarification that
the award of “lump sum alimony” was for support, not property distribution. Seymour, 869
So. 2d at 1036-37 (¶5). Because “Rule 60(a) may be used on the judge’s own motion as a
source of authority,” this court found “the chancellor also had the right in responding to Mr.
Seymour’s motion, to state that the lump sum alimony was for support.” Id. at 1037 (¶6).
And because the chancellor stated he was not changing his previous award, this court found
the chancellor had the discretion under Rule 60(a) to make that clarification. Id.
¶13.
Here, upon hearing the parties’ dispute over how the award must be satisfied (by cash
or QDRO), the chancellor stated he was not changing the previous order. Instead, he was
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effecting the intent of the previous award—that the parties share equally without tax
consequences—by ordering Herbert to transfer from his retirement account the balance on
the judgment using a QDRO. Like the chancellor in Seymour, we find Chancellor McKenzie
had the right to correct the oversight in the 2005 award that had led to Darlene and Herbert’s
dispute.
¶14.
Further, we do not find that Chancellor McKenzie’s appointment in 2007 to take over
as chancellor in this matter alters Seymour’s application. Darlene argues the law-of-the-case
doctrine prevented Chancellor McKenzie, as the subsequently appointed chancellor, from
granting Herbert’s post-trial motion. We disagree.
¶15.
“Under the law of the case doctrine and general principles of comity, a successor
judge has the same discretion to reconsider an order as would the first judge, but should not
overrule the earlier judge’s order or judgment merely because the later judge might have
decided matters differently.” In re Ford Motor Co., 591 F.3d 406, 411 (5th Cir. 2009)
(citations omitted). At the motion-for-reconsideration hearing, Chancellor McKenzie did not
substitute his own judgment but rather found Chancellor Thomas’s award contained an
oversight, requiring clarification to effect its intent.
¶16.
Rule 63(b) authorizes post-trial appointment of judges to perform the duties of a
previous judge. M.R.C.P. 63(b). Because Chancellor Thomas, prior to recusal, had the
authority under Rule 60(a) to clarify his judgment, Chancellor McKenzie had the same
authority.
B.
¶17.
Interest and Attorney’s Fees
Darlene also argues Chancellor McKenzie erroneously denied her request for interest
6
on the outstanding balance of her award. The 2005 divorce judgment expressly stated the
award of $36,488.50 was a final judgment, accruing interest at the rate of 6% annually until
fully satisfied. We note Herbert’s filing of a Rule 60(b) motion, in itself, did not operate as
a stay of the judgment or prevent the accumulation of interest. M.R.C.P. 60(b) & cmt.5 But
the pending motion was not the reason for denying interest.
¶18.
Instead, the chancellor based his decision not to award interest on the $24,187.62
balance of the judgment because (1) Darlene could have received $36,488.50 in retirement
through a QDRO within months of the judgment, and (2) Darlene did not have to share any
of the investment loss Herbert has experienced in his retirement accounts since 2005. At the
2009 hearing, Chancellor McKenzie found the evidence proved Herbert had offered to
transfer $36,488.50 through a QDRO shortly after the 2005 judgment was entered, but
Darlene refused to accept it.
¶19.
Because Herbert attempted to fully satisfy the judgment soon after its entry but was
prevented by Darlene, we find the chancellor did not abuse his discretion in refusing to award
Darlene’s request for interest on the balance of her judgment. Cf. Holmes v. Bates, 218 Miss.
233, 236, 67 So. 2d 273, 274 (1953) (Attempted tender of full payment by debtor, which was
prevented by creditor, stops the running of interest.).
¶20.
Darlene further argues it was error for the chancellor (1) not to cite Herbert in
contempt for failing to timely satisfy the judgment and (2) not to award Darlene attorney’s
5
In general, to prevent the running of interest while a Rule 60(b) motion is pending,
a separate motion under Rule 62(b) must be filed. M.R.C.P. 62(b); see Franklin v. BSL, Inc.,
987 So. 2d 1050, 1052 (¶11) (Miss. Ct. App. 2008) (Motion for relief did not stay running
of deadlines for payment in consent judgment.).
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fees. Although she requested and was denied attorney’s fees at the 2005 divorce hearing, she
did not revive this request at the 2009 reconsideration hearing. We find her argument is not
proper for appeal because Darlene neither moved for a citation of contempt nor notified
Herbert she was seeking attorney’s fees. See Vincent v. Griffin, 872 So. 2d 676, 678 (¶6)
(Miss. 2004) (Due process requires one receive adequate notice of contempt charge and a
meaningful opportunity to defend oneself before being ordered to pay attorney’s fees.).
¶21.
Even were her claims for contempt and attorney’s fees proper, they would fail. We
review civil-contempt decisions for manifest error. Dennis v. Dennis, 824 So. 2d 604, 608
(¶¶7-8) (Miss. 2002) (Contempt is civil when the primary purpose is to enforce the rights of
private parties or compliance with a court order.). We review the denial of attorney’s fees
for abuse of discretion. Woodell v. Parker, 860 So. 2d 781, 790 (¶33) (Miss. 2003) (citations
omitted) (reviewing award of attorney’s fees in domestic cases for abuse of discretion);
Seghini v. Seghini, 42 So. 3d 635, 643 (¶31) (Miss. Ct. App. 2010) (reviewing award of
attorney’s fees based on finding of contempt for abuse of discretion ); see also Day v. Day,
28 So. 3d 672, 677 (¶¶22-23) (Miss. Ct. App. 2010) (finding no abuse of discretion in
denying party’s request for attorney’s fees, even when other party was found in contempt).
Because the chancellor found Herbert attempted to satisfy the judgment in 2005, he did not
commit manifest error by failing on his own initiative to cite Herbert for contempt for failing
to comply with the order. And because the chancellor found Darlene’s refusal to execute a
QDRO prevented her judgment from being satisfied, we find he did not abuse his discretion
in denying Darlene’s request for attorney’s fees.
CONCLUSION
8
¶22.
The chancery court had the discretion, under Rule 60(a), to clarify that Herbert may
satisfy the judgment through his retirement funds using a QDRO. Therefore, we affirm the
grant of Herbert’s Rule 60 motion ordering Herbert to pay the balance of the judgment,
$24,187.62, without interest and attorney’s fees, using a QDRO.
¶23. THE JUDGMENT OF THE LAUDERDALE COUNTY CHANCERY COURT
IS AFFIRMED. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO THE
APPELLANT.
KING, C.J., LEE AND MYERS, P.JJ., IRVING, BARNES AND ISHEE, JJ.,
CONCUR. CARLTON, J., CONCURS IN RESULT ONLY WITHOUT SEPARATE
WRITTEN OPINION. GRIFFIS AND ROBERTS, JJ., NOT PARTICIPATING.
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