Charles Anderson v. State of Mississippi
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2009-KA-00968-COA
CHARLES ANDERSON
APPELLANT
v.
STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
APPELLEE
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
TRIAL JUDGE:
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE:
DISTRICT ATTORNEY:
NATURE OF THE CASE:
TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION:
DISPOSITION:
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
5/12/2009
HON. R.I. PRICHARD III
LAMAR COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
HUNTER NOLAN AIKENS
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
BY: DEIRDRE MCCRORY
HALDON J. KITTRELL
CRIMINAL - FELONY
CONVICTED OF COUNT II, ARSON, AND
SENTENCED TO TWENTY YEARS, WITH
THE SENTENCE TO RUN
CONSECUTIVELY TO A PREVIOUSLY
IMPOSED SENTENCE, IN THE CUSTODY
OF THE MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS, AND TO PAY
RESTITUTION OF $136,391
AFFIRMED - 12/7/2010
BEFORE MYERS, P.J., GRIFFIS AND BARNES, JJ.
BARNES, J., FOR THE COURT:
¶1.
A Lamar County grand jury returned a two-count indictment against Charles
Anderson for murder and arson.
During his first trial, Anderson was convicted of
manslaughter, but the jury was unable to reach a verdict on the arson charge. Anderson was
retried on the arson charge, and the jury found him guilty. The trial court sentenced him to
twenty years in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections, to be served
consecutively with the sentence previously imposed for the manslaughter conviction.
Anderson was also ordered to pay restitution.
¶2.
Anderson now appeals his conviction for arson, challenging the weight and
sufficiency of the evidence, as well as claiming ineffective assistance of counsel and the
denial of his fundamental right to a fair trial. Finding no error, we affirm.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
¶3.
On the evening of April 19, 2003, at approximately 9:30 p.m., law enforcement was
called to Anderson’s residence in Lamar County, Mississippi, to investigate a fire and a
shooting. When they arrived on the scene, law enforcement found Anderson’s home ablaze
and Shelton Smith shot dead on the carport.
¶4.
It was discovered Anderson was having an affair with Shelton’s wife, Cathy.
Anderson, who was divorced from Ann Stockstill, lived in a house that was jointly owned
with his ex-wife, which was located on her family’s property. Ann’s brother, Owen
Stockstill, lived on this property as well, in a separate house, with his wife Debra and
daughter Megan. The weekend before the incident, Owen stated that Shelton had stopped
by his house and told Owen that he was “having problems with his wife, that she had left and
he was done with her this time.”
¶5.
On the night of April 19, it was discovered Anderson had invited Shelton to his house
in order to sell him tapes proving his wife’s infidelity. It was not known whether, at that
time, Shelton knew Anderson was having sexual relations with his wife. The State’s theory
2
of the case was that Anderson killed his paramour’s husband and then committed arson to
be rid of the jointly owned house with his ex-wife. Conversely, the defense’s theory of the
case was that Shelton had a motive to burn Anderson to death, as Shelton was going through
a divorce and was seeking retribution against Anderson for having an affair with his wife.
¶6.
Approximately four or five days before the incident, Shelton had contacted W.F.
Steele, Chief Investigator of the Lamar County Sheriff’s Office, because Shelton had
received several phone messages from a person trying to sell him video tapes for $10,000 of
his wife and another man having an affair. Deputy Steele’s investigation identified Anderson
as the person who had left the messages on Shelton’s phone. Shelton went to Anderson’s
house the night of April 19 to purchase these tapes twice: the first time he did not purchase
the tapes, but he returned the second time because Anderson had offered him the tapes for
the discounted price of $500.
¶7.
Arriving on the scene on April 19, Deputy Steele put crime-scene tape around
Anderson’s residence, then photographed and collected evidence. Early on the morning of
April 20, Anderson gave a statement at the sheriff’s office to Deputy Steele. After receiving
his Miranda warnings and signing a waiver-of-rights form, Anderson gave his version of the
events, which was read to the jury and entered into evidence:
Somewhere around 8:30 . . . I went to bed, hadn’t been asleep very long and
the dogs were barking. I got up to go to make my dogs be quiet. When I
opened my bedroom door I saw Shelton Smith standing in the hallway and
then the next thing I saw was a small flame and then the whole hallway was
on fire. I immediately went back in my bedroom. I don’t remember if I shut
my door or not, but I think I did. The windows in my bedroom were already
open and I pushed the screen out, went out the window, took my 12-gauge
shotgun that was beside the window. He went running behind his truck and
I immediately went up on the carport . . . .
3
Reiterating where he saw Shelton, Anderson continued:
I opened the door from my bedroom and went to step into the hall and I saw
him standing at the other end of the hallway. . . . I didn’t say a word, but
whenever I opened the door and stepped out there he said, hollered something
like “die you son-of-a-bitch, die” or something and lit a match or cigarette
lighter or something then the whole hall was afire. . . . I could smell gasoline
when I opened the door. It had to of been gas . . . nothing come[s] that fast. .
. . I broke and went back to my bedroom, went out the window and went out
there and ran from around a blue car and he was on the end of the carport. . .
.
Anderson added that he did not remember “stepping in any” gasoline.
¶8.
Deputy Steele testified that there were several gas cans under Anderson’s carport.
One of the gasoline cans was “away from the others” with a loose cap and only half a gallon
of gas in it. No fingerprints were found on the can. Deputy Steele also observed the burn
pattern in the house, which indicated an accelerant substance “was poured from the carport
door all the way through the living room area and back to the end of the hallway” (where
Anderson’s bedroom was located). A shotgun, devoid of burn or soot marks, was recovered
from the carport. Deputy Steele did not know if, at the time of his death, Shelton was aware
that Anderson was having an affair with his wife.
¶9.
Telephone records showed that between April 1 and 19, 2003, Anderson had made
forty-five telephone calls to Shelton’s wife, Cathy, and she had made sixty-four calls to
Anderson. Moreover, on the date of April 19, 2003, eight telephone calls were made
between Anderson and Cathy, with seven of those calls made between 4:00 p.m. and the time
of the fire. Initially, Anderson denied he was having a sexual relationship with Cathy, but
Cathy admitted the affair to law enforcement on the night of the fire.
¶10.
Preston Burkhalter, with the Lamar County Sheriff’s Department, testified that on
4
April 19, 2003, he was dispatched to the scene where he found smoke coming from
Anderson’s house and Shelton’s body lying next to his pickup truck in the carport. Law
enforcement decided to move Shelton’s truck so that firefighters could put out the fire, and
they retrieved the keys from Shelton’s pocket. Deputy Burkhalter then found the shotgun
under the carport and secured it in the backseat of his patrol car. There were no burn marks
on the gun.
¶11.
Owen testified that he, his wife, and daughter lived approximately 100 to 150 yards
down the road from his ex-brother-in-law, Anderson. At approximately 8:45 p.m. on April
19, Owen stated that he, his wife Debra, his daughter Megan, and his daughter’s boyfriend
were at home “watching TV when the dogs started barking and [Anderson] came running up
on the porch and run into the door and fell back out on the porch. We went out and helped
him up, brought him inside and put him on the couch. And I asked him what happened and
he said that Shelton was trying to burn his house down and that he shot [Shelton].” Anderson
was barefoot and wearing pajamas.
¶12.
Debra then called 911, while Owen, Megan, and Megan’s boyfriend got into Owen’s
truck and went to Anderson’s home. They were the first people to arrive on the scene. As
he pulled into the carport, Owen saw Shelton’s body lying next to his truck. It was
determined that Shelton was deceased. Owen stated: “The house was just billowing black
smoke . . . around all the windows, the vents, the doors, but I could not see a flame at all.”
Owen noticed a shotgun lying on the carport in front of Anderson’s vehicle.
¶13.
Megan testified that she, her mother, her father, and her boyfriend all “heard some
shots go off” but thought little of it as there are many hunters in the area. Shortly thereafter,
5
Anderson “came running up” to the house, “ran on the porch and collapsed” at the front door.
She corroborated her father’s testimony about the ensuing events. Additionally, Megan
testified that later that evening, she noticed the smell of gasoline on the armrest of the couch
upon which Anderson had been sitting. Debra corroborated the testimony of her daughter
and husband. She also testified that she smelled gasoline on Anderson after they put him on
the couch.
¶14.
William Courtney, a paramedic who was dispatched to the scene, explained that he
found “two patients” – “[o]ne having chest pains and one that was deceased.” Courtney
related that Anderson stated his dogs woke him up, “at which time he went outside into the
hallway of his bedroom, found Mr. Shelton in his hallway. Some expletives from Mr.
Shelton. And then he ignited a fire in the house.” Anderson told Courtney he went to his
bedroom to escape and went around the other side of the house.
“At that point he
encountered Mr. Shelton and it went from there.” When Anderson, who was on a stretcher,
was being unloaded from the ambulance at the hospital, Courtney noticed the smell of
gasoline on Anderson’s lower extremities.
¶15.
Joe Crawford of the State Fire Marshal’s Office was accepted by the trial court as an
expert in the field of causation, origin, and properties of fire. Crawford explained when he
arrived at the scene, the house was still burning; so, he only examined the perimeter of the
structure that night. He returned approximately two days later to commence his initial
investigation of the house’s interior. There were indications of accelerant, like gasoline, on
the flooring before it burned. The most extensive part of the fire was inside the hallway.
Crawford determined the “burn pattern existed from the carport door, [past the living room
6
area and a wrap-around couch] all the way down near the bedroom of Mr. Anderson.”
Crawford was of the opinion the fire was incendiary; it was not an act of God, and it was not
electrical. He was also of the opinion that the fire was ignited near Anderson’s bedroom.
¶16.
During Crawford’s direct examination, the State sought to refer to a statement by
Anderson where he indicated Shelton was in the hallway. Defense counsel asked to
approach the bench, stating to the judge he objected to a statement Crawford had received
from Anderson without being Mirandized. The trial court overruled the defense’s objection
and allowed the State to refer to Anderson’s statement that was already in evidence, which
was taken at the same time that Anderson had signed a Miranda warning and waiver-ofrights form. Crawford proceeded with his testimony, stating in his opinion, if Shelton had
been where Anderson claimed he was, Shelton would have been “badly burned. . . . [b]ecause
when fire burns, it burns up and it burns out. And when you have accelerant that’s used in
a fire, then the fire itself burns more intensely. So . . . he would have been totally engulfed
in fire if he had been there.”
¶17.
Importantly, the autopsy of Shelton’s body showed no evidence of burns; nor were
his clothes burned. Law enforcement officers were unable to recover Shelton’s clothes for
testing of accelerant, but his shoes and body were tested, as were Anderson’s pajamas. No
accelerant was found on any of these items. Shelton had approximately $1,200 in cash on
his person. Found in Shelton’s shirt pocket were a memo book and a cigarette lighter. Found
inside Shelton’s pickup truck, which was locked, were an icepick, a screwdriver, a pistol, and
a box of matches. Deputy Steele testified that Emma Shelton had given Shelton the matches
that day for burning some trash on her place.
7
¶18.
During Crawford’s cross-examination, defense counsel had him read his case
summary to the jury, and it was entered into evidence. The summary related his investigation
of the incident. After his initial visit to the scene, Crawford explained he went to the Lamar
County Jail to gather information from Anderson about the fire. Crawford said Anderson
told him that when the fire was set, Shelton was standing in the hallway near “the living
room area of the home behind the couch looking toward his bedroom.” At trial, it was
Crawford’s personal opinion that the fire had started approximately three-quarters of the way
down the hallway near Anderson’s bedroom. This opinion was in conflict with Crawford’s
earlier report, dated May 29, 2003, which stated that the fire had started near the kitchen area
“near the [carport] door where there was a rug.” Crawford apparently changed his mind
about this matter, but it is unclear from the record why. In the report, Crawford maintained
“[t]here was nothing that indicated that the fire was accidental. . . . The only way this fire
could have started is by human hands coming into contact with an ignitable liquid and an
open flame to start this fire.” His report also stated “something [was] poured throughout the
length of the hallway and ignited.” On redirect examination, Crawford reiterated that
regardless of where the fire was ignited, Shelton would have been burned if he had been
standing where Anderson said he had been standing.
¶19.
Sharron Jones, a forensic scientist with the Mississippi Crime Laboratory, was
accepted by the trial court as an expert in the field of analysis of fire debris and ignitable
liquids. Out of six material submissions taken by Crawford at the scene, gasoline was
identified on three: two samples from a rug near the carport door, and one sample from a
carpet pad from beside the couch on the edge of the hallway and living room. Jones also
8
testified that while a test of Anderson’s pajamas did not show ignitable liquids, it would not
surprise her if gasoline was smelled on him, because the nose is better at picking up that
smell than testing instruments.
¶20.
Gary Jones, a senior fire investigator with Crawford Investigation Services 1 at the time
of the fire, was accepted as an expert in the field of causation and origins of fire. Jones was
sent by Nationwide Insurance to investigate the fire. It was his opinion that the fire was
incendiary. During his investigation of the scene on April 25, 2003, he could smell gasoline
near the couch in the living room. He testified that the “irregular burn pattern extended
southward down the hallway into the living room and terminated at the rug at the back door.
. . . It is a continuous pattern” from the back door down the hallway. It was also Jones’s
opinion that Anderson’s version of the events was not supported by the physical evidence.
Jones testified that if a person were standing in the pour pattern of the gasoline, he was going
to be burned, because “that liquid pattern is going to support that flame from one end of that
space to the other. An individual that’s standing in the middle of it, near it, is going to
receive burn exposure effects from it.” Jones’s report of the fire was entered into evidence.
It also referenced a previous fire loss by Anderson to a residence he had owned.
¶21.
Prior to the trial, Anderson filed a motion in limine, which the trial court granted, to
exclude any evidence or reference to this previous fire loss reported by Anderson. During
deliberations, the jury asked if they could use the information in Jones’s report that
referenced this previous fire loss by Anderson. The trial court responded: “It was determined
that this evidence has no evidentiary value and is not for consideration in this matter.” The
1
The company has no relation to Crawford with the State Fire Marshal’s office.
9
jury found Anderson guilty of arson. The trial court denied Anderson’s post-trial motion for
a judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) or, in the alternative, a new trial. Anderson
timely appeals his conviction and sentence.
ANALYSIS OF THE ISSUES
1.
¶22.
Sufficiency and Weight of the Evidence
Anderson claims that the jury verdict was against the sufficiency and weight of the
evidence. A motion for a directed verdict and a JNOV challenges the sufficiency of the
evidence. Bush v. State, 895 So. 2d 836, 843 (¶16) (Miss. 2005). “[T]he relevant question
is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any
rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable
doubt.” Id. (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 315 (1979)). The evidence will be
deemed sufficient if “reasonable fair-minded men in the exercise of impartial judgment might
reach different conclusions on every element of the offense.” Id. (quoting Edwards v. State,
469 So. 2d 68, 70 (Miss. 1985)). However, if the evidence “point[s] in favor of the defendant
on any element of the offense with sufficient force that reasonable men could not have found
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was guilty,” this Court must reverse and render.
Id. All credible evidence supporting the defendant’s guilt will be accepted as true, and the
evidence will be considered in the light most favorable to the State. McClain v. State, 625
So. 2d 774, 778 (Miss. 1993).
¶23.
On the other hand, a motion for a new trial challenges the weight of the evidence.
Bush, 895 So. 2d at 844 (¶18). A trial court’s denial of a motion for a new trial is reviewed
for an abuse of discretion. Id. The reviewing court will disturb a verdict only “when it is so
10
contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence that to allow it to stand would sanction
an unconscionable injustice.” Id. All “evidence consistent with the defendant’s guilt is
accepted as true together with any reasonable inferences that may be drawn from that
evidence.” Young v. State, 891 So. 2d 813, 821 (¶21) (Miss. 2005) (citing Heidel v. State,
587 So. 2d 835, 838 (Miss. 1991)). Finally, “[a]ny factual disputes are properly resolved by
the jury and do not mandate a new trial.” Moore v. State, 859 So. 2d 379, 385 (¶26) (Miss.
2003) (quoting McNeal v. State, 617 So. 2d 999, 1009 (Miss. 1993)).
¶24.
In reviewing the record and analyzing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
State, we find sufficient evidence was presented to the jury to convict Anderson of arson.
The jury was instructed on the elements of arson of a dwelling: that Anderson willfully and
maliciously set fire to or caused his dwelling house to be burned.
Additionally, a
circumstantial-evidence instruction was given to the jury: that the evidence must be so
strong as to exclude every other reasonable hypothesis other than of guilt.
¶25.
The fact arson was committed was undisputed; the only question was who did it –
Anderson or Shelton. The State provided sufficient proof to convict Anderson. Gas was not
detected on Shelton, but three people – Megan, Debra, and Courtney – smelled it on
Anderson. The State’s expert witnesses all testified that the fire could not have been started
as Anderson stated, and Shelton would have been badly burned, but he was not. Anderson,
in his brief, re-analyzes the evidence and speculates as to where Shelton could have been
standing and not been burned while starting the fire, offering a “reasonable hypothesis” as
to Shelton’s possible motive for arson. However, it is ultimately the jury that resolves these
matters and any conflicts in the evidence. Anderson had a motive for arson as well, and the
11
evidence showed he lured Shelton to his home in order to purchase tapes of his wife having
an affair.
¶26.
Further, we do not find the trial court abused its discretion in denying Anderson’s
motion for a new trial. The jury chose not to believe Anderson’s version of the events. The
weight of the evidence is not so contrary to the verdict that allowing this judgment to stand
would sanction an unconscionable injustice. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in
denying Anderson’s motion for a JNOV or, alternatively, a new trial.
2.
¶27.
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Anderson argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for several reasons. First,
Anderson claims that at trial, his counsel was deficient for failing to renew his objection or
make a motion to strike certain parts of Crawford’s testimony on direct examination about
where the fire was ignited and where Anderson said Shelton was standing. Anderson
contends Crawford improperly referenced a prejudicial un-Mirandized statement made by
Anderson to Crawford. Second, in a related contention, Anderson argues that his trial
counsel was ineffective for having Crawford read his case summary to the jury, which made
a brief reference to this allegedly un-Mirandized statement by Anderson. Third, Anderson
states that trial counsel was ineffective for stipulating to the admission of Jones’s
investigative report, which referenced a previous residential fire loss by Anderson.
¶28.
The Mississippi Supreme Court has held that we may determine the merits of an
ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim on direct appeal even if it was not raised before the
trial court. Read v. State, 430 So. 2d 832, 841 (Miss. 1983). Usually, because the record on
direct appeal is insufficient to support a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel, it is best
12
that these claims be brought in post-conviction-relief proceedings. Id. at 837. However, the
reviewing court “may address an ineffectiveness claim on direct appeal if the presented
issues are based on facts fully apparent from the record.” Archer v. State, 986 So. 2d 951,
955 (¶16) (Miss. 2008) (citing M.R.A.P. 22(b)). We find such a situation here. Due to the
Anderson’s specific claims of ineffectiveness, we are able to discern from the record whether
defendant’s trial counsel was constitutionally effective without reference to materials outside
of the record which would necessitate the issue be more appropriately taken up in postconviction-relief proceedings.
¶29.
To succeed on an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim, the defendant must prove:
(1) counsel’s performance was deficient, and (2) the deficiency prejudiced the defense.
Liddell v. State, 7 So. 3d 217, 219 (¶6) (Miss. 2009) (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 668, 687 (1984)). Counsel’s errors must be deemed so serious as to deprive the
defendant of a fair trial. Id. “[A]n appellate court must strongly presume that counsel’s
conduct falls within a wide range of reasonable professional assistance, and the challenged
act or omission might be considered sound trial strategy. In other words, defense counsel is
presumed competent.” Id. at 219-220 (¶6) (quoting Bennett v. State, 990 So. 2d 155, 158
(¶9) (Miss. 2008)). In assessing attorney conduct, every effort must be made “to eliminate
the distorting effects of hindsight . . . and to evaluate the conduct from counsel’s perspective
at the time.” In order to reach ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal, the record
must show that counsel’s performance was so deficient “that the trial judge had a duty to
declare a mistrial in order to prevent a mockery of justice.” Colenburg v. State, 735 So. 2d
1099, 1102 (¶8) (Miss. Ct. App. 1999) (citing Parham v. State, 229 So. 2d 582, 583 (Miss.
13
1969)).
A.
¶30.
Crawford’s Case Summary
Regarding Anderson’s first claim of ineffective counsel, Crawford testified that,
according to the burn patterns, the fire was ignited near Anderson’s bedroom. The State then
asked Crawford if Anderson had indicated in his statement that Shelton was standing in the
hallway. Defense counsel promptly objected to any reference to a statement Crawford took
from Anderson without being Mirandized. Anderson did admit, in his statement to Deputy
Steele after he was Mirandized and which was admitted into evidence, that he saw Shelton
standing “at the other end of the hallway.” The trial judge ruled that Crawford could refer
to Anderson’s statement to Deputy Steele that was already in evidence. Crawford proceeded
to testify that Shelton would have been burned badly if he had been standing in the hallway
and lit the fire. Crawford then testified that, based on his diagram of the house, where
Anderson reported that Shelton had been standing, and the position of the burn pattern,
Shelton would have been “right around the center down the hallway.”
¶31.
Anderson, however, maintains that Crawford is referencing and basing his opinion not
on Anderson’s Mirandized statement to Deputy Steele, but on a supposedly un-Mirandized
statement that Crawford refers to in his case summary, which was entered into evidence later
in the trial during Crawford’s cross-examination. In the summary, Crawford states he
returned to the Lamar County Jail on April 20 to get information from Anderson about the
fire. Crawford asked Anderson where Shelton was standing when the fire was set, and he
stated that Shelton was standing “in the living room area of the home behind the couch
looking toward the bedroom,” which would not have been at the “end of the hallway,” but
14
in the middle of the hallway.
¶32.
Anderson’s argument on this point lacks merit. It is not at all clear from the record,
as Anderson maintains, that Crawford was referencing Anderson’s statement in the case
summary, or that all of the State’s experts based their opinion on this statement, and not
Anderson’s statement to Deputy Steele. Both statements make reference to Shelton standing
in the hall. Moreover, the decision to “‘make certain objections fall[s] within the ambit of
trial strategy’ and cannot give rise to an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.” Jackson
v. State, 815 So. 2d 1196, 1200 (¶8) (Miss. 2002) (quoting Cole v. State, 666 So. 2d 767, 777
(Miss. 1995)). Trial counsel did promptly object when he thought the State was going to
refer to the un-Mirandized statement that had not been recorded. His performance was not
deficient in this regard.
¶33.
Nor can we say that the statement Crawford references was taken in violation of
Anderson’s Miranda rights. Anderson relatedly complains that his trial counsel should not
have entered the case summary into evidence during his cross-examination of Crawford
because “[t]he statement was clearly taken in violation of Anderson’s Miranda rights.”
¶34.
Anderson acknowledged that he had received his Miranda warning and signed a
waiver-of-rights form on April 20, 2003, at 1:30 a.m. His statement to Deputy Steele was
taken at this time. It is unclear from Crawford’s case summary exactly what time Crawford
took this unrecorded statement while Anderson was in custody, but it was sometime on April
20, the same day Anderson waived his Miranda rights for the statement to Deputy Steele, and
no more than twenty-four hours after he had waived his rights. Crawford admits that he did
not re-issue Miranda warnings to Anderson during his questioning April 20.
15
Also,
Crawford’s case summary notes Anderson had an attorney on April 21, who had advised him
not to sign anything further. There is no indication in the record that Anderson had invoked
his right to remain silent or requested an attorney until April 21.
¶35.
Regarding Miranda warnings and a waiver of those rights:
There is no mechanical rule for measuring the longest possible interval
between the last warning and the accused’s statement. . . . An accused need
not be continually reminded of his or her rights once the accused has
knowingly waived them, except where necessary to assure that a continuation
of the waiver constitutes a knowing and intelligent abandonment of rights. . .
. The accused need not invariably receive new warnings simply because there
is . . . a resumption of interrogation, [or] an interrogation by a different officer.
. . . Once the mandate of Miranda is complied with at the threshold of the
interrogation by law enforcement officers, the warning need not be repeated
at the beginning of each successive interview.
23 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 1264 (2006). See also United States v. Anthony, 474 F.2d 770, 773
(5th Cir. 1973) (holding that repeated warnings are not necessary to a finding that a
defendant, with full knowledge of his rights, knowingly and intelligently waived them).
¶36.
Generally, a warning given many hours before the making of incriminating statements
is not considered “stale” when the subject has been in continuous custody up to the time of
the statement, and most courts allow the use of statements taken many hours or even days
after the giving of Miranda warnings. William E. Ringel, Searches and Seizures Arrests and
Confessions, § 26:6 (2d ed. 2003). See Biddy v. Diamond, 516 F.2d 118, 122 (5th Cir. 1975)
(found to have still waived rights even after twelve days passed between initial Miranda
rights and later questioning where suspect was asked if she remembered her rights); Maguire
v. United States, 396 F.2d 327, 331 (9th Cir. 1968) (could not claim a lack of apprisal of
Miranda rights when questioned by another officer three days after the initial Miranda
16
warnings and questioning). Accordingly, we cannot say from the record before us that
Anderson’s statement that Crawford references in the case summary is un-Mirandized. It
was taken within at least one day of Anderson’s acknowledgment and waiver of his rights.
¶37.
On cross-examination, defense counsel also requested Crawford’s entire case
summary be read to the jury and entered into evidence. Anderson contends this was
constitutionally ineffective as well, for the statement contained other prejudicial and
inadmissible hearsay statements, but he does not offer any further specifics. We find no
merit to these contentions. Crawford’s case summary merely relates Crawford’s actions from
his arrival at the scene on April 20 to his investigation on April 21 and his subsequent
opinion about the fire, which, in his opinion, was incendiary. Crawford recounts whom he
spoke with and what he observed inside the house after the fire. It is quite plausible
Anderson’s trial counsel entered the case summary into evidence in order to show that
Shelton lit the fire. This Court has stated “only under exceptional circumstances will we
second guess counsel on matters of trial strategy.” Jones v. State, 40 So. 3d 665, 668 (¶11)
(Miss. Ct. App. 2010) (citing Shorter v. State, 946 So. 2d 815, 819 (¶15) (Miss. Ct. App.
2007)). We shall not do so here.
B.
¶38.
Jones’s Report
Anderson also argues that his trial counsel was deficient for stipulating to the
admission of fire investigator Jones’s report, which contained language about a previous
residential fire loss by Anderson. In a pretrial-motion hearing, several motions in limine
were presented. The trial court granted Anderson’s motion in limine to exclude inferences
to any previous fire losses by Anderson. The parties also reached an agreement as to which
17
exhibits from the first trial would be used, any new exhibits, and supposedly eliminated any
exhibits precluded by the motion in limine. Of 163 exhibits from Anderson’s murder trial,
approximately seventy-six were used in the arson trial.
Jones’s report for Crawford
Investigation Services, dated May 2003, was nine-written pages, with twenty-three pages
containing forty-five photographs of Anderson’s burned residence. The language at issue
occurred on page three, and it stated: “Deputy Joe Crawford also advised that Charles
Anderson had a previous fire loss while he resided in Columbia. He could not recall the
particulars but was going to check with the fire chief about securing a copy of that incident.”
¶39.
During deliberations, the jury did pass a question to the trial judge concerning this
evidence, and it asked: “can we use information in the Crawford Investigative Report that
refers to a previous fire loss by Charles Anderson in Columbia . . . ?” The trial court
responded, stating: “It was determined that this evidence has no evidentiary value and is not
for consideration in this matter.”
¶40.
Anderson argues that this evidence is inadmissible under Mississippi Rules of
Evidence 403 and 404(b). Under Rule 403, he claims the prejudicial effect outweighs any
probative value. Under Rule 404(b), Anderson states this evidence is inadmissible as a
previous crime, wrong, or act “to prove the character of a person in order to show that he
acted in conformity therewith.”
We do not find Jones’s report in its entirety was
inadmissible evidence.
¶41.
Neither do we find Anderson’s trial counsel was constitutionally deficient for failing
to redact these two sentences in Jones’s report. Even though the jury asked about this
information, they were properly instructed by the trial judge to disregard the previous fire
18
loss. We cannot say that the jury was so impressed with this evidence, as Anderson argues,
that it caused his conviction. This issue is without merit.
¶42.
We conclude that the record does not indicate that Anderson’s trial counsel was
constitutionally ineffective at any point in the proceedings.
3.
¶43.
Prosecutorial Misconduct and Right to a Fair Trial
Lastly, Anderson argues that he was denied his fundamental rights to due process and
a fair trial because of prosecutorial misconduct.
Anderson claims the State’s use of
prejudicial evidence that had been previously ruled inadmissible evinces a purposeful trial
tactic to inflame the jury. Specifically, he refers to the previously discussed incidents of
Crawford’s reference to Anderson’s allegedly un-Mirandized statement, as well as the report
which mentioned Anderson’s previous fire loss. When presented with an allegation of
prosecutorial misconduct, this Court will only reverse if such conduct “endangers the fairness
of a trial and the impartial administration of justice.” Jackson v. State, 1 So. 3d 921, 928
(¶19) (Miss. Ct. App. 2008) (quoting Goodin v. State, 787 So. 2d 639, 653 (¶41) (Miss.
2001)).
¶44.
We find no such instances here. Defense counsel objected to the prosecution’s
possible attempt to reference Anderson’s comment in Crawford’s statement, and the trial
judge ruled Crawford could refer to Anderson’s statement, which was already in evidence.
We find no evidence that the prosecutor purposefully elicited testimony from Crawford in
disregard of this ruling. Moreover, both parties stipulated to the admission of Jones’s report
into evidence. While the lengthy report did include two sentences about a previous fire loss
of Anderson’s, which was to have been excluded from the evidence, we find no indication
19
the State agreed to its admission to inflame the jury. When the jury asked about the previous
fire loss during deliberations, the trial judge instructed the jury to disregard it. Jurors are
presumed to follow the instructions given by the court. Harris v. State, 37 So. 3d 1237, 1247
(¶37) (Miss. Ct. App. 2010) (citing Payne v. State, 462 So. 2d 902, 904 (Miss. 1984)). We
find this issue without merit.
CONCLUSION
¶45.
Anderson’s conviction for arson was not against the sufficiency and weight of the
evidence. Nor is there any proof in the record that defense counsel was constitutionally
ineffective. Any allegations of prosecutorial misconduct are unfounded. Accordingly, we
affirm Anderson’s conviction and sentence.
¶46. THE JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT OF LAMAR COUNTY OF
CONVICTION OF COUNT II, ARSON, AND SENTENCE OF TWENTY YEARS,
WITH THE SENTENCE TO RUN CONSECUTIVELY TO A PREVIOUSLY
IMPOSED SENTENCE, IN THE CUSTODY OF THE MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT
OF CORRECTIONS, AND TO PAY RESTITUTION OF $136,391, IS AFFIRMED.
ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO LAMAR COUNTY.
KING, C.J., LEE AND MYERS, P.JJ., IRVING, GRIFFIS, ISHEE, ROBERTS,
CARLTON AND MAXWELL, JJ., CONCUR.
20
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
