LaCarlos Moss v. State of Mississippi
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2009-CP-02027-COA
LACARLOS MOSS
APPELLANT
v.
STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
TRIAL JUDGE:
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE:
NATURE OF THE CASE:
TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION:
DISPOSITION:
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
APPELLEE
11/19/2009
HON. LESTER F. WILLIAMSON JR.
LAUDERDALE COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
LACARLOS MOSS (PRO SE)
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
BY: BILLY L. GORE
CIVIL - POST-CONVICTION RELIEF
PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION
COLLATERAL RELIEF DISMISSED
AFFIRMED: 10/05/2010
BEFORE MYERS, P.J., GRIFFIS AND BARNES, JJ.
GRIFFIS, J., FOR THE COURT:
¶1.
LaCarlos Moss filed a petition for post-conviction collateral relief in the Circuit Court
of Lauderdale County. The circuit court dismissed Moss's petition as time-barred under
Mississippi Code Annotated section 99-39-5(2) (Rev. 2007). We find no error and affirm.
FACTS
¶2.
On January 23, 1998, Moss pleaded guilty to attempted armed robbery. He was
sentenced to sixteen years in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections.
¶3.
On November 6, 2009, Moss filed a petition for post-conviction collateral relief. The
circuit court dismissed the petition as time-barred under section 99-39-5(2). Moss appeals
the dismissal.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶4.
A circuit court's dismissal of a petition for post-conviction collateral relief will not be
reversed on appeal absent a finding that the trial court's decision was clearly erroneous.
Williams v. State, 872 So. 2d 711, 712 (¶2) (Miss. Ct. App. 2004). However, when
reviewing issues of law, this Court's proper standard of review is de novo. Brown v. State,
731 So. 2d 595, 598 (¶6) (Miss. 1999).
ANALYSIS
¶5.
The Mississippi Uniform Post-Conviction Collateral Relief Act provides an exclusive
procedure for collateral review of convictions and sentences in Mississippi state courts.
Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-3(1) (Rev. 2007). The Act provides grounds for relief, and it
establishes time frames within which petitions for relief must be brought. Miss. Code Ann.
§ 99-39-5(1)-(2) (Supp. 2009). In cases where the petitioner pleaded guilty, the petition must
be brought within three years from the entry of judgment of conviction. Miss. Code Ann.
§ 99-39-5(2).
¶6.
In this case, Moss pleaded guilty, and his judgment of conviction was entered on
January 23, 1998. Moss filed his petition for post-conviction collateral relief more than
eleven years later, on November 6, 2009. This was well outside the three-year statute of
limitations.
¶7.
The statute provides certain exceptions to the time bar, none of which are applicable
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to this case. Id. However, there is a recognized exception to the time bar that is not
mentioned in the statute. Where the petitioner asserts a “fundamental right,” procedural bars
will not prevent a court from hearing the petition. Davis v. State, 958 So. 2d 252, 254 (¶6)
(Miss. Ct. App. 2007) (citing Luckett v. State, 582 So. 2d 428, 430 (Miss. 1991) (overruled
on other grounds)).
¶8.
Moss argues the fundamental-rights exception applies here. He asserts that the State
violated his fundamental right – “not to be tried for a felony without being sufficiently
indicted as required by the Mississippi Constitution.” Moss argues that the circuit court did
not have jurisdiction to convict and sentence him because the criminal information, which
was substituted in place of an indictment after Moss had waived his right to indictment, was
not stamped and signed by the circuit clerk.
¶9.
Moss also argues that the criminal information was fatally defective because it omitted
some language from the armed-robbery statute. The information stated that Moss, “did
wilfully, unlawfully and knowingly take or attempt to take the personal property of [another],
from his person or presence and against his will by the exhibition of a deadly weapon, a
handgun; in violation of Mississippi Code Annotated section (97-3-79) (1972).” While this
substantially tracks the language of the armed-robbery statute, the information omitted the
words, “by violence to his person or by putting such person in fear of immediate injury to his
person”; in the statute, those words precede “by the exhibition of a deadly weapon.” Miss.
Code Ann. § 97-3-79 (Rev. 1994).
¶10.
We find these claims are insufficient to invoke the fundamental-rights exception to
the statute’s time bar. This Court has held previously that post-conviction-relief claims based
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on allegedly defective indictments are subject to the time bar. Davis, 958 So. 2d at 254 (¶6)
(citing Luckett, 582 So. 2d at 430). The fact that Moss untimely filed his petition requires
that we affirm the circuit court’s dismissal.
¶11.
Furthermore, we find that his claims fail for additional reasons. The absence of the
circuit clerk's stamp and signature on the information was a non-jurisdictional defect in the
information that was waived when Moss failed to raise the issue at trial and pleaded guilty.
Jones v. State, 356 So. 2d 1182, 1183 (Miss. 1978). Also, we find that failing to recite
verbatim the armed-robbery statute did not make the information fatally defective. See
Caston v. State, 949 So. 2d 852, 855-59 (¶¶6-14) (Miss. Ct. App. 2007) (holding that failure
to include the word "serious" as a modifier to "bodily injury" in an indictment for aggravated
assault did not render the indictment fatally defective).
¶12.
Finding no error, we affirm the circuit court’s judgment dismissing the petition for
post-conviction collateral relief.
¶13. THE JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT OF LAUDERDALE COUNTY
DISMISSING THE PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION COLLATERAL RELIEF
IS AFFIRMED. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO
LAUDERDALE COUNTY.
KING, C.J., LEE AND MYERS, P.JJ., IRVING, BARNES, ISHEE, ROBERTS,
CARLTON AND MAXWELL, JJ., CONCUR.
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