Terry Wilkins v. State of Mississippi
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2009-CP-01711-COA
TERRY WILKINS
APPELLANT
v.
STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
TRIAL JUDGE:
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE:
NATURE OF THE CASE:
TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION:
DISPOSITION:
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
APPELLEE
07/20/2009
HON. ANDREW K. HOWORTH
LAFAYETTE COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
TERRY WILKINS (PRO SE)
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
BY: LADONNA C. HOLLAND
CIVIL - POST-CONVICTION RELIEF
MOTION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF
DENIED
AFFIRMED: 09/14/2010
BEFORE KING, C.J., GRIFFIS AND ISHEE, JJ.
KING, C.J., FOR THE COURT:
¶1.
Terry Wilkins filed a pro se motion for post-conviction relief on March 12, 2009. On
July 20, 2009, the Lafayette County Circuit Court denied the motion. Wilkins filed a timely
appeal arguing the following issues: (1) he received ineffective assistance of counsel because
his attorney failed to investigate his case and adequately prepare a defense; (2) his sentence
was unconstitutional because his co-defendant received a lesser sentence; (3) his guilty plea
was not entered knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently because he was not informed of the
minimum and maximum sentence; (4) his indictment was defective because it incorrectly
listed the date of one of the offenses used for sentence enhancement; and (5) the State failed
to prove his habitual status. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
FACTS
¶2.
On February 23, 2007, Wilkins was indicted for burglary of a dwelling pursuant to
Mississippi Code Annotated section 97-17-23 (Rev. 2006) and as a habitual offender
pursuant to Mississippi Code Annotated section 99-19-81 (Rev. 2007). On July 2, 2007,
Wilkins entered a guilty plea and was sentenced to serve seventeen and a half years in the
custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections (MDOC). On March 12, 2009,
Wilkins filed a motion for post-conviction relief. On July 20, 2009, the Circuit Court of
Lafayette County denied Wilkins’s motion for post-conviction relief. Wilkins claimed that
his conviction and sentence should be set aside for the following reasons: (1) his counsel
provided him ineffective assistance; (2) the State failed to meet its burden of proof according
to Mississippi Code Annotated section 99-19-81; (3) his guilty plea was not valid because
intervening case law ruled the Uniform Rules of Circuit and County Court 8.04
unconstitutional; and (4) he was denied due process because his sentence was not within the
statutory limits. Wilkins timely filed his appeal on August 12, 2009.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶3.
“When reviewing a lower court’s decision to deny a petition for post-conviction relief,
this Court will not disturb the trial court’s factual findings unless they are found to be clearly
erroneous.” Callins v. State, 975 So. 2d 219, 222 (¶8) (Miss. 2008) (quoting Lambert v.
State, 941 So. 2d 804, 807 (¶14) (Miss. 2006). “However, where questions of law are raised,
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the applicable standard of review is de novo.” Id.
ANALYSIS
I. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
¶4.
Wilkins argues that he received ineffective assistance from his trial counsel.
Specifically, Wilkins contends that: (1) his counsel failed to investigate the facts of the
offense charged; (2) his counsel failed to interview witnesses; (3) his counsel failed to call
witnesses to rebut the State’s witnesses; (4) his counsel failed to adequately prepare a
defense; and (5) his counsel failed to object to the disparity in the sentencing between him
and his co-defendant.
¶5.
The burden of proving ineffective assistance of counsel rests on Wilkins. In order to
establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, Wilkins must prove that counsel’s
performance was deficient and that his defense was prejudiced by his counsel’s deficient
performance. Coleman v. State, 979 So. 2d 731, 735 (¶14) (Miss. Ct. App. 2008) (citing
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)). Under Strickland, there is a strong, but
rebuttable, presumption that counsel’s performance falls within the range of reasonable
professional assistance. Id. (¶14) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689). “To overcome this
presumption, the defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for the
counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id.
(quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694).
¶6.
Wilkins failed to provide any credible proof of his trial counsel’s alleged deficient
performance. Wilkins did claim the existence of an alibi witness, Susan Kesler, that his
defense counsel failed to interview. According to Wilkins, had his counsel interviewed
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Kesler, she would have stated that Wilkins was at her home at the time of the burglary.
Wilkins asserts that Kesler was willing to sign an affidavit and testify regarding Wilkins’s
whereabouts during the crime. Wilkins asserts that he would not have pled guilty andhave
proceeded to trial if he had had an alibi witness and he possibly would have been acquitted
of the charges against him. This Court notes with interest that while Wilkins has suggested
that Kesler was prepared to offer an affidavit and testify regarding his alibi, no affidavit from
Kesler has been presented as a part of this post-conviction-relief proceeding, nor has any
such affidavit been incorporated into the record on appeal. Instead, Wilkins has only
provided his self-serving affidavit. “In cases involving post-conviction collateral relief,
‘where a party offers only his affidavit, then his ineffective assistance of counsel claim is
without merit.’” Cherry v. State, 24 So. 3d 1048, 1051 (¶6) (Miss. Ct. App. 2010) (quoting
Vielee v. State, 653 So. 2d 920, 922 (Miss.1995)).
¶7.
Wilkins maintains that had his counsel investigated the facts of the case and
interviewed witnesses, the outcome of the trial likely would have been different. This Court
has previously held that in order for a failure to investigate claim to rise to ineffective
assistance of counsel, the defendant must state with particularity what the investigation
would have revealed and how it would have altered the outcome. Johnson v. State, 987 So.
2d 501, 504 (¶15) (Miss. Ct. App. 2008). This Court recognizes that defense counsel has a
duty to interview potential witnesses and make an independent investigation of the facts and
circumstances of a case. However, without more, the mere failure to investigate will not give
rise to a viable claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Reed v. State, 918 So. 2d 776, 778
(¶5) (Miss. Ct. App. 2005) (citing Brown v. State, 798 So. 2d 481, 496 (¶21) (Miss. 2001)).
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To establish a viable claim, Wilkins must also demonstrate that the likely outcome of the trial
would have differed if his counsel had, in fact, conducted an investigation. Wilkins claims
that he was at Kesler’s home at the time of the burglary, but the only particulars as to what
counsel would have discovered had he investigated were found in Wilkins’s affidavit. In
addition to Kesler and his co-defendant, David L. Dickey, Wilkins identified one other
individual, Ronnie Winters, who likely would have knowledge of the facts of this case.
However, Wilkins failed to provide the trial court or this Court with an affidavit from either
Kesler, Dickey, or Winters.
¶8.
During the plea colloquy, the State represented to the trial court that it would offer
evidence to prove the following facts in its case against Wilkins:
[T]he State would expect to prove in this case that on or about the 17th day of
October 2006 in Lafayette County, State of Mississippi, within the jurisdiction
of this Court that this defendant, Terry Wilkins, in concert with another
defendant, David L. Dick[ey], did break and enter a structure which is number
207 on a county road in Lafayette County, Mississippi, which was the property
of Dee Mize, which was a dwelling house of Dee Mize; that they entered this
dwelling house, or one of them did, in cooperation with the other; and that they
took certain goods out of that structure; that they sold those goods; that those
goods, some of which were later recovered, most of which were later
recovered; and that that would be what we would prove with respect to the
actual breaking and entering.
With respect to the allegations that the defendant is a habitual offender, we
would expect to prove that in cause number LK-03-294 in this court that the
defendant, Terry Wilkins, was convicted on the 1st day of October 2003 for
the felony crime of receiving stolen property; and he was sentenced to serve
more than a year on [that] occasion; and that also in the cause number LK-03295 in this court the defendant, Terry Wilkins, was convicted on or about the
same day of taking a motor vehicle, taking away a motor vehicle, which is
another felony crime; and that he was sentenced to serve more than a year on
that occasion as well; and that some portion of that time was suspended; but
in each case he received a sentence of 5 years. That’s what we would expect
to prove, and I want to know if the defendant agrees that that’s substantially
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correct.
In response to a question from the trial court, Wilkins acknowledged under oath that the
representations of the State as what the evidence would show were substantially true and
correct.
Included in those representations which Wilkins acknowledged as being
substantially true and correct were: (1) he was guilty of burglary as charged, and (2) he had
two prior felony convictions that would qualify him for habitual status. While Wilkins now
asserts that he was innocent, the trial court is entitled to place great faith in the validity of
sworn statements he made during the plea hearing. See Harris v. State, 822 So. 2d 1129,
1131 (¶4) (Miss. Ct. App. 2002). Therefore, this claim is without merit.
¶9.
Wilkins also asserts that his counsel was ineffective because he failed to object to the
disparity between his sentence and the sentence imposed upon Wilkins’s co-defendant.
Wilkins was sentenced as a habitual offender to seventeen and a half years in the custody of
the MDOC, while his co-defendant, Dickey, who had three prior convictions, was sentenced
on March 9, 2007, as a non-habitual offender to twenty years with fifteen years suspended.
Wilkins contends that his counsel informed him that if he signed the plea petition, then he
would object to the sentence recommended by the State on the basis that Dickey had received
only five years to serve the same offense. Wilkins claims that had he known his counsel was
not going to object to the disparity between the sentences, he would not have pled guilty.
However, this assertion would seem to be belied by the transcript of the plea hearing. In that
hearing, the trial court informed Wilkins that: (1) the plea petition indicated that he was to
plea as a habitual offender; (2) he would have to serve the full sentence imposed without any
entitlement to early release or sentence reduction; (3) the plea petition indicated that the State
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recommended a sentence of seventeen and a half years; and (4) if Wilkins’s guilty plea were
accepted, the trial court would sentence him to seventeen and a half years, “no more, no
less.”
¶10.
The trial court then inquired whether knowing those facts Wilkins still desired to enter
his plea of guilty, to which he responded in the affirmative. Where the trial court has made
clear to a defendant that it intends to impose a sentence which does not deviate from the plea
agreement, and then allows the defendant to determine whether he wishes to complete the
agreement, this Court will not find that counsel was ineffective for not contesting the
agreement. See Gonzales v. State, 915 So. 2d 1108 (¶4) (Miss. Ct. App. 2005).
¶11.
Additionally, during the plea colloquy, it must be noted that Wilkins swore that: (1)
he was satisfied with his attorney’s service, and (2) there was no promise of a lighter
sentence or any other inducement for his guilty plea. This Court is entitled to place greater
weight upon the sworn testimony provided by a defendant in a plea hearing than that
subsequently provided by him in a proceeding for post-conviction relief. See Harris, 822 So.
2d at 1131 (¶4). Wilkins’s sentence was within the statutory sentencing guidelines; thus, it
was not illegal. This claim is without merit.
II. Illegal Sentence
¶12.
Wilkins argues that his sentence is unconstitutional because of the disparity between
his sentence and his co-defendant’s sentence. Wilkins was sentenced to seventeen and a half
years for burglary as a habitual offender pursuant to Mississippi Code Annotated section 9919-81. However, Dickey, who had three prior convictions, was sentenced to twenty years
with fifteen years suspended for burglary, but not as a habitual offender.
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¶13.
This issue is procedurally barred because Wilkins did not present it to the trial court.
See Gilmore v. State, 772 So. 2d 1095, 1098 (¶8) (Miss. Ct. App. 2000). However, were it
not barred, this Court would find it to be without merit. In Mississippi, the law is well-settled
that sentences which are within the statutory limits will generally be upheld. See Addison
v. State, 957 So. 2d 1039, 1041 (¶12) (Miss. Ct. App. 2007). Sentencing is within the trial
court’s discretion and is not subject to appellate review if the sentence is within statutory
limits. Id.; See Tate v. State, 912 So. 2d 919, 933 (¶48) (Miss. 2005).
¶14.
Under Mississippi Code Annotated section 97-17-23, the punishment for burglary of
a dwelling is not less than three (3) nor more than twenty-five years in the MDOC. Wilkins’s
sentence of seventeen and a half years falls within the statutory sentencing guidelines.
Therefore, this issue is procedurally barred and without merit.
III. Voluntariness of Plea
¶15.
According to Uniform Rule of Circuit and County Court, when considering whether
a guilty plea was voluntarily entered, . . .
3. Voluntariness. [T]he trial court must determine that the plea is voluntarily
and intelligently made and that there is a factual basis for the plea. A plea of
guilty is not voluntary if induced by fear, violence, deception, or improper
inducements. A showing that the plea of guilty was voluntarily and
intelligently made must appear in the record.
....
4. Advice to the Defendant. [I]t is [also] the duty of the trial court to address
the defendant personally and to inquire and determine: (a) that the accused is
competent to understand the nature of the charge; (b) that the accused
understands the nature and consequences of the plea, and the maximum and
minimum penalties provided by law; (c) that the accused understands that by
pleading guilty (s)he waives his/her constitutional rights of trial by jury, the
right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses, and the right against
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self-incrimination; if the accused is not represented by an attorney, that (s)he
is aware of his/her right to an attorney at every stage of the proceeding and that
one will be appointed to represent him/her if (s)he is indigent.
¶16.
Wilkins asserts that his guilty plea was not voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently
entered. Wilkins alleges that the trial court did not advise him of the minimum, maximum,
or mandatory sentence that he might suffer if he pled guilty to the offense of burglary of a
dwelling. The record reflects that the trial court did not inform Wilkins of the minimum or
maximum sentence to which a guilty plea might subject him.
However, Wilkins
acknowledged during the plea colloquy that trial counsel had discussed and explained the
plea petition, which he signed on July 2, 2007. The plea petition set forth the minimum and
maximum sentence for the offense of burglary of a dwelling. In addition, during the plea
colloquy, the trial judge informed Wilkins that he was to be sentenced as a habitual offender,
and as such, he would be required to serve day for day any sentence imposed, without the
hope of parole, reduction, or early release. Wilkins affirmatively acknowledged that he
understood this and stated he still wished to plea guilty.
¶17.
When considering whether a guilty plea was voluntarily entered, it must be shown
that:
[T]he defendant’s plea was not induced by fear, violence, deception, or
improper inducements; the plea was voluntarily and intelligently made must
appear in the record; the defendant was competent to understand the nature of
the charge; the defendant understood the nature and consequences of the plea
as well as the maximum and minimum penalties provided by law; the
defendant understood that by pleading guilty he waived his constitutional
rights of trial by jury, the right to confront and cross-examine adverse
witnesses, and the right against self-incrimination; and if the defendant is not
represented by an attorney, he has the right to be appointed an attorney to
represent him if he was indigent, because he had the right to an attorney at
every stage of the proceeding.
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¶18.
We find that Wilkins’s guilty plea was voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently
entered. Thus, this issue is without merit.
IV. Defective Indictment
¶19.
Wilkins claims that the indictment was defective because the date stated as June 30,
1997, which was given as the date of conviction for one of the prior felony convictions used
for enhancement, should have been May 23, 2003. Rule 11.03(1) of the Uniform Rules of
Circuit and County Court states that in cases involving enhanced punishment for subsequent
offenses, “[t]he indictment must allege with particularity the nature or description of the
offense constituting the previous convictions, the state or federal jurisdiction of any previous
conviction, and the date of judgment.”
¶20.
The purpose of an indictment is “to inform the defendant with some measure of
certainty as to the nature of the charges brought against him so that he may have a reasonable
opportunity to prepare an effective defense.” Moses v. State, 795 So. 2d 569, 571 (¶13)
(Miss. Ct. App. 2001). The indictment shall contain “the essential facts constituting the
offenses charged and shall fully notify the defendant of the nature and cause of the
accusation.” URCCC 7.06. Under Rule 7.06 of the Uniform Rules of Circuit and County
Court, the failure to state the correct date in an indictment shall not render the indictment
insufficient. In Benson v. State, 551 So. 2d 188, 196 (Miss. 1989), the Mississippi Supreme
Court held that an indictment’s failure to list any date for a prior conviction was not fatal to
the indictment. The court also noted that:
While it is correct that the date of the judgment is not specifically stated in the
indictment, all of the information that is contained, and specifically the cause
number, afforded the defendant access to the date of the judgment. This Court
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holds that information pertaining to the date of the judgment was substantially
set forth in the indictment and that sufficient information was afforded the
defendant to inform him of the specific prior convictions upon which the State
relied for enhancement punishment to comply with due process.
Id.
¶21.
The indictment stated that Wilkins was convicted on October 1, 2003, in cause
number LK03-294, in the Circuit Court of Lafayette County for receiving stolen property and
sentenced to serve five years in the custody of the MDOC, and he was convicted on June 30,
1997, in cause number LK03-295, in the Circuit Court of Lafayette County for taking away
a motor vehicle and sentenced to five years in the custody of the MDOC. Thus, the date of
June 30, 1997, was merely scrivener’s error in drafting the indictment, which did not render
the indictment defective. Therefore, this issue is without merit.
V. Habitual-Offender Status
¶22.
Wilkins argues that his prior convictions were not proven by competent evidence.
As noted previously, during the plea hearing, the State recited the facts that it anticipated
being able to prove, including that Wilkins had two separate prior felony convictions upon
which he had served at least one year, thereby qualifying him for habitual status. Under oath
Wilkins admitted that the State’s factual representation was correct, and he acknowledged
that he met the definition of a habitual offender.
¶23.
Generally, to sentence a defendant as a habitual offender, the State must prove the
prior offenses by competent evidence, and the defendant must be given a reasonable
opportunity to challenge the prosecution’s proof. Madden v. State, 991 So. 2d 1231, 1236
(¶20) (Miss. Ct. App. 2008); See Keyes v. State, 549 So. 2d 949, 951 (Miss. 1989).
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However, where the defendant enters a plea of guilty and admits those facts which establish
his habitual status, the State has met its burden of proof. See Evans v. State, 988 So. 2d 404,
405-06 (¶10) (Miss. Ct. App. 2008); see also Jefferson v. State, 556 So. 2d 1016, 1019 (Miss.
1989).
¶24. THE JUDGMENT OF THE LAFAYETTE COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
DENYING THE MOTION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF IS AFFIRMED. ALL
COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO LAFAYETTE COUNTY.
LEE AND MYERS, P.JJ., GRIFFIS, BARNES, ISHEE, ROBERTS, CARLTON
AND MAXWELL, JJ., CONCUR. IRVING, J., CONCURS IN RESULT ONLY
WITHOUT SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION.
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