Jimmy Collins v. City of Gautier, Mississippi
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2008-CA-01929-COA
JIMMY COLLINS AND FELICIA COLLINS
APPELLANTS
v.
MAYOR AND COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF
GAUTIER, MISSISSIPPI
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
TRIAL JUDGE:
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANTS:
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES:
NATURE OF THE CASE:
TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION:
DISPOSITION:
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
APPELLEES
11/03/2008
HON. KATHY KING JACKSON
JACKSON COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
JOHN PAUL BARBER
AMY LASSITTER ST. PE’
ROBERT G. RAMSAY
ROBERT W. WILKINSON
CIVIL - OTHER
AFFIRMED CITY’S REZONING OF
PROPERTY
REVERSED AND RENDERED - 06/29/2010
EN BANC.
BARNES, J., FOR THE COURT:
¶1.
This appeal arises from a decision of the Mayor and the City Council of Gautier,
Mississippi (collectively, the City or city council) to rezone a 13.5-acre lot from R-1, singlefamily residential, to R-2, multi-family residential, at the developer’s request. Silver Girl,
LLC, the owner and developer, wishes to construct condominiums on the subject property.
Jimmy and Felicia Collins, owners of property adjacent to the subject property, opposed the
rezoning and filed an appeal with the circuit court. The circuit court affirmed the City’s
decision, and the Collinses now appeal to this Court, arguing that the city council’s decision
was arbitrary and capricious. Finding that there was not substantial evidence to support the
rezoning and that the rezoning constituted illegal “spot zoning,” we reverse and render.
SUMMARY OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
¶2.
The subject property is located to the south of Roy’s Road in Gautier, near the
intersection of Roy’s Road and Martin Bluff Road, the major corridor in the area. Roy’s
Road lies to the north of the subject property, while Martin Bluff Road lies to the west.
Several single-family residences lie between the subject property and the aforementioned
roads, abutting both, but on its eastern side the subject property has frontage along Roy’s
Road. The subject property and its immediate surroundings were zoned R-1 by Jackson
County prior to annexation by the City in February 2002. The City retained the County’s R1 zoning after annexation.
¶3.
The City uses a two-tiered process for changing its zoning ordinances. First, a
planning commission reviews re-zoning requests and makes recommendations to the city
council.
Afterwards, the city council accepts or rejects the planning commission’s
recommendations. On January 14, 2008, Silver Girl, LLC filed an application seeking to
rezone the subject property from R-1 single-family residential to R-2 multi-family residential.
Documents submitted in support of the application show a proposal to construct a 120-unit
condominium development to be called “Frenchman’s Ridge.” The development would
consist of eight four-story buildings and 309 parking spaces.
Prior to the planning
commission’s hearing, the director of the City’s community services department issued a
2
written report regarding the rezoning request. The report recommended that the application
be denied, citing concerns that the subject property would be an “island” surrounded by land
zoned R-1. The report ultimately concluded, however, that an argument could be made for
or against rezoning.
¶4.
On February 7, 2008, the planning commission conducted a public hearing on the
rezoning request. After hearing testimony and arguments, the commission denied the
request, finding that the developer had not shown that the character of the neighborhood had
changed. The developer appealed the commission’s decision to the city council, which held
a public hearing on the matter on March 18, 2008. At the hearing, the developer offered
additional arguments and evidence, including a document that it had prepared detailing what
it asserted were seven changes in the neighborhood that supported its rezoning request.
Several citizens appeared at the hearing and offered arguments and evidence against the
rezoning request. The opponents also presented a petition signed by fifty-one residents
opposing the rezoning.
¶5.
Ultimately, the city council unanimously passed an ordinance granting the rezoning
request. The ordinance specifically found a substantial change in the neighborhood and a
public need for rezoning. The Collinses appealed the city council’s decision to the circuit
court. Finding that the city council’s decision was supported by substantial evidence, the
circuit court affirmed the decision. Aggrieved by that decision, the Collinses appeal arguing:
(1) there was not substantial evidence in the record of a change in the character of the
neighborhood or a public need sufficient to justify rezoning; (2) the rezoning ordinance
3
constituted illegal “spot zoning”; and (3) the rezoning ordinance was illegal because it was
not enacted in accordance with a comprehensive plan. Finding that there was not substantial
evidence to support the rezoning and that the rezoning resulted in illegal “spot zoning,” we
reverse and render the judgment of the circuit court.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶6.
The Mississippi Supreme Court has stated:
The classification of property for zoning purposes is a legislative rather than
a judicial matter. The order of the governing body may not be set aside unless
it is clearly shown to be arbitrary, capricious, discriminatory, or is illegal, or
without a substantial evidentiary basis. The action of the Board of Supervisors
in enacting or amending an ordinance, or its action of rezoning, carries a
presumption of validity, casting the burden of proof upon the individual or
other entity asserting its invalidity. On appeal we cannot substitute our
judgment as to the wisdom or soundness of the Board’s action. We have stated
that where the point in controversy is “fairly debatable,” we have no authority
to disturb the action of the zoning authority.
Childs v. Hancock County Bd. of Supervisors, 1 So. 3d 855, 859 (¶12) (Miss. 2009) (quoting
Faircloth v. Lyles, 592 So. 2d 941, 943 (Miss. 1991)). “Judicial review is limited to
determining whether there was a substantial evidentiary basis for the [local government’s]
decision. It is not the role of the judiciary to reweigh the evidence, but rather to verify if
substantial evidence exists.” Id. at 861 (¶19).
¶7.
However, “a clear distinction exists between the burden an individual must meet when
requesting that a parcel of property be rezoned and the burden which is required on appeal
to overturn the presumptively valid zoning decision of a local governing body.” Id. at 859
(¶13). “When contesting a rezoning classification, the burden of proof is on the individual
4
or other entity asserting its invalidity.” Id. at 861 (¶20) (internal quotations omitted). Our
task on appeal is “to determine whether the circuit court erred in its judicial review of
whether the [local authority’s] decision to rezone was arbitrary and capricious and
unsupported by substantial evidence.” Id. at 860 (¶18).
Whether there was substantial evidence to support rezoning.
¶8.
“The courts presume that comprehensive zoning ordinances adopted by municipal
authorities are well planned and designed to be permanent.” Town of Florence v. Sea Lands,
Ltd., 759 So. 2d 1221, 1224 (¶11) (Miss. 2000) (quoting Cloverleaf Mall, Ltd. v. Conerly,
387 So. 2d 736, 740 (Miss. 1980)). Therefore, “[b]efore property is reclassified, an applicant
seeking rezoning must prove by clear and convincing evidence either that[:] (1) there was a
mistake in the original zoning, or (2) the character of the neighborhood has changed to such
an extent as to justify rezoning and that a public need exists for rezoning.” Childs, 1 So. 3d
at 859-60 (¶13) (quoting Bridge v. Mayor and Bd. of Aldermen of Oxford, 995 So. 2d 81, 83
(¶6) (Miss. 2008)).
¶9.
No mistake in the original zoning has been alleged. In its ordinance, the city council
approved the rezoning as it expressly found a change in the character of the neighborhood
and the existence of a public need for rezoning the subject property to R-2. However, the city
council did not make detailed or specific findings of fact regarding the change in the
character of the neighborhood or the public need for rezoning; it stated only that its finding
was “based on the evidence presented.” The supreme court has acknowledged that specific
findings are not required, so long as the record contains substantial evidence to support the
5
required findings. In Faircloth, 592 So. 2d at 945, the supreme court stated:
Absent a record showing sufficient evidence to support the findings, it is
inevitable that reversal will follow. On the other hand, while recognizing the
desirability of specific findings by the zoning authority on each considered
issue, we will not reverse for a lack of such specificity where a factual basis
for the action is disclosed.
Furthermore, “informality attends rezoning proceedings . . . .” City of Clinton v. Conerly,
509 So. 2d 877, 885 (Miss. 1987). The city council was entitled to rely upon the entire
record before it – information obtained at the hearings, hearsay evidence, and the council’s
“own common knowledge and the familiarity with the ordinance area” are all valid bases for
its findings. Childs, 1 So. 3d at 860 (¶¶14-16). On appeal, the City points to the record and
hearings before the city council and the planning commission, as well as the documents that
were submitted in support of the developer’s application for rezoning.
¶10.
The Collinses’ primary argument against the City’s evidence is that much of it is
irrelevant as it focuses on changes in the area surrounding Martin Bluff Road, rather than
Roy’s Road, which the subject property fronts. The Collinses argue that the neighborhood
at issue is the Roy’s Fish Camp Community, consisting of Martin Bluff Elementary School,
single-family properties located along Roy’s Road, several single-family residential streets
for which Roy’s Road is the only means of entrance and egress, and several small
commercial operations at the eastern end of Roy’s Road. Citing Kuluz v. City of D’Iberville,
890 So. 2d 938, 941-42 (¶¶6-7) (Miss. Ct. App. 2004), the City responds that what
constitutes the “neighborhood” relevant to this analysis should be determined by the local
authority, and its decision should not be disturbed so long as sufficient evidence renders the
6
issue “fairly debatable.” We agree this is the applicable rule, and we likewise agree with the
City’s contention that the large size of the property in question and its proximity to Martin
Bluff Road are sufficient to support the finding of a broader “neighborhood,”
notwithstanding that the property fronts Roy’s Road. In fact, this issue and these arguments
were specifically raised at the hearing before the city council. We can find no basis in the
record to say that its decision finding a broader definition of “neighborhood,” in this instance,
was arbitrary and capricious.
¶11.
Even so, we find no change in the character of the neighborhood. We recognize that
this Court affords deference to a zoning decision of a local governing board and presumes
that its decision is valid. See Mayor and Bd. of Aldermen v. Estate of Lewis, 963 So. 2d
1210, 1214 (¶9) (Miss. Ct. App. 2007). However, “[i]t is clearly within the judicial
discretion on review to reverse a rezoning ordinance adopted on insufficient proof.” City of
Oxford v. Inman, 405 So. 2d 111, 114 (Miss. 1981). “The Mississippi Supreme Court has
not hesitated to reverse . . . decisions regarding rezoning when substantial evidence of change
in the character of the area is not met.” Cockrell v. Panola County Bd. of Supervisors, 950
So. 2d 1086, 1092 (¶14) (Miss. Ct. App. 2007). We find that the evidence presented was
insufficient to support the change in zoning. The principal evidence presented to justify the
rezoning was summarized in a document prepared by the developer for the city council
hearing. It states in pertinent part:
1.
Martin Bluff [R]oad is a two lane road. Construction is supposed to
start soon making it a four lane road.
7
2.
River Bend apartments to the southwest of this parcel recently
converted to condominium ownership. This is in the R-2 zone that is
less than an eighth of a mile from the Frenchman Ridge property.
3.
There is a new and very large apartment complex in the R-2 zone
southwest of Frenchman’s Ridge, less than a quarter of a mile away.
4.
Recently a conditional use was granted to build a private school in the
R-1 zone north of the Santa Maria mobile home park. We estimate this
conditional use parcel to be about a quarter of a mile from Frenchman’s
Ridge.
5.
The Santa Maria mobile home park is growing very fast, at least partly,
we believe, because of the shortage of housing in the area.
6.
Until the storm, Roy[’s] [R]oad had several businesses on the east end.
Because of storm damage, only the boat launch is still in operation. We
believe this is a neighborhood change that will reduce traffic.
7.
In February of 2007, approval was granted for Farragut Lake
condominiums which we estimate to be a mile or less to the north of
Frenchman’s Ridge, north of the interstate.
The Collinses submit in their brief that these developments “are built on land zoned for such
uses and are consistent with existing uses on Martin[] Bluff Road,” and the City has not
refuted this claim. Thus, each of these “changes,” with the exception of the private school,
were in accordance with the original zoning plan. We must agree with the Collinses, finding
that the record reflects that the areas in which the condominiums and new apartment complex
were being built were already zoned R-2 or C-2.1
1
While the zoning maps contained in the record do not sufficiently depict the zoning
for land north of the interstate, the owners of the subject property represented to the planning
commission that the one-mile section of Martin Bluff Road north of the interstate has
continuous C-2 zoning. Further, at the hearing before the planning commission, the owners
represented that “[t]he C-2 [area] that is currently on Martin Bluff Road has traditional two8
¶12.
The Mississippi Supreme Court has held that “the use of property in accordance with
an original zoning plan is not a material change of conditions which authorizes rezoning.”
Cloverleaf Mall, Ltd. v. Conerly, 387 So. 2d 736, 740 (Miss. 1980); see also Cockrell, 950
So. 2d at 1092 (¶14). We find Inman instructive. In that case, the City of Oxford approved
a zoning change for 8.33 acres from A-1 (agricultural) to R-C (multi-family residential). The
proponents cited changes in the nearby area such as the building of a low-rent housing
project across the street from the property, the building of a 25,000-foot recreational center
at the junction of Price Street and Molly Barr Road, and the construction of a major street
across the subject property. The supreme court held that “the building of the C.B. Webb lowrent housing and recreational facility as well as road expansion were changes in accordance
with the original zoning plan”; thus, they did not constitute a material change that would
warrant rezoning. Inman, 405 So. 2d at 114. The supreme court in that case affirmed the
circuit court’s reversal of the zoning reclassification. Here, as the circuit court affirmed the
approval of the zoning change, we reverse the circuit court’s judgment and render the zoning
change invalid as there was not substantial evidence to support a finding of a change in the
character of the neighborhood.
¶13.
In a related issue, the Collinses assert that the City’s decision represents a prime
example of “spot zoning” Again, we agree. The supreme court has defined “spot zoning”
story condo-apartment projects.” Therefore, based upon these descriptions given in the
record, this C-2 area north of the interstate would include the new condominium complex
cited.
9
as a zoning amendment “reclassifying one or more tracts or lots for a use prohibited by the
original zoning ordinance and out of harmony therewith.” McWaters v. City of Biloxi, 591
So. 2d 824, 828 (Miss. 1991). A zoning ordinance is illegal “spot zoning” where it is “not
in harmony with the comprehensive or well-considered land use plan of a municipality” and
is “designed to favor someone.”
Id.
(citations omitted).
Zoning ordinances and
amendments are presumptively valid. Childs, 1 So. 3d at 859 (¶12). The burden of proof
falls on the party asserting the ordinance’s invalidity. Id. The supreme court has defined
“spot zoning” as “a small island of relatively intense use surrounded by a sea of less intense
use.” Modak-Truran v. Johnson, 18 So. 3d 206, 209-10 (¶16) (Miss. 2009) (quoting 2 E.C.
Yokley, Zoning Law and Practice §13-2 (4th ed. 2000)). There is no question that this
reclassification would create an “island” of R-2 zoned property in the midst of R-1 zoned
property. Both before and after the re-zoning, the property does not abut any area zoned R-2.
The proponents for the zoning change admitted as much during their presentation to the
planning commission, stating:
Mrs. Johnson:
And there’s no R-2 that touches you.
Mr. Scott:
We do not touch R-2.
Mrs. Johnson:
You are sitting right in the middle of R-1?
Mr. Scott:
That’s correct.
Mr. Wishtischin:
By 50 feet.2
2
This proximity estimate appears to refer to the distance from the subject property
to Martin Bluff Road. At the planning commission hearing, the owners of the subject
10
Mrs. Johnson:
You are R-1.
Mr. Scott:
Yes.
The supreme court further held in Modak-Truran that:
Spot zoning has been held to be invalid “when it is primarily for the private
interest of the owner of the property affected, and not related to the general
plan for the community as a whole.” 2 Yokley, supra §13-3. In other words,
a zoning amendment which favors a particular landowner over adjacent
landowners will be viewed as an arbitrary and discriminatory use of zoning
authority unless there is “substantial evidence of change in the neighborhood
in order to justify the rezoning of a small tract as an amendment in keeping
with the comprehensive plan.” Id. at §13-4.
Id. at (¶17) (emphasis added). We have already found that no “substantial evidence of a
change in the neighborhood” was presented which justified the rezoning. Further, this
reclassification clearly favored the developer over the adjacent landowners; accordingly, we
find that it constituted invalid “spot zoning.”
CONCLUSION
¶14.
We agree with the findings of the planning commission that the proponents for
reclassification of the property at issue failed to present sufficient evidence to prove a
substantial change in the neighborhood. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the circuit
court and render the zoning reclassification invalid.
¶15. THE JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT OF JACKSON COUNTY IS
REVERSED AND RENDERED. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED
property discussed the possibility of purchasing the small piece of land that would give them
an egress directly on Martin Bluff Road. However, the record reflects that the property
across the street from this point on Martin Bluff Road is forest area that appears to be largely
undeveloped and zoned R-1.
11
TO THE APPELLEES.
IRVING, GRIFFIS, ROBERTS AND MAXWELL, JJ., CONCUR. MYERS,
P.J., DISSENTS WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION JOINED BY KING, C.J.,
AND LEE, P.J. ISHEE AND CARLTON, JJ., NOT PARTICIPATING.
MYERS, P.J., DISSENTING:
¶16.
The majority concludes that the Circuit Court erred in affirming the City of Gautier’s
decision to rezone the subject property.
The City found a substantial change in the
neighborhood and a public need for rezoning the subject property to multifamily residential.
The majority finds that the changes cited by the City were “in accordance with the original
zoning plan” and therefore not legitimate factors for its consideration. I dissent because I
find the majority’s conclusions unsupported by the record and the City’s decision beyond our
authority to disturb on appeal.
¶17.
In Childs v. Hancock County Board of Supervisors, 1 So. 3d 855, 861 (¶19) (Miss.
2009), the supreme court succinctly laid out our standard of review for such decisions:
Judicial review is limited to determining whether there was a substantial
evidentiary basis for the Board's decision. It is not the role of the judiciary to
reweigh the evidence, but rather to verify if substantial evidence exists.
Neither the circuit court nor the Supreme Court has the power to tamper with
municipal zoning unless the zoning decision is shown to be arbitrary,
capricious, discriminatory, illegal, or without substantial evidentiary basis.
(Citation and internal quotations omitted.) Moreover, the supreme court reaffirmed its prior
holdings that the actions of the local authority are presumptively valid. “The action of the
[local authority] in enacting or amending an ordinance, or its action of rezoning, carries a
presumption of validity, casting the burden of proof upon the individual or other entity
12
asserting its invalidity.” Id. at 859 (¶12) (quoting Faircloth v. Lyles, 592 So. 2d 941, 943
(Miss.1991)). “The classification of property for zoning purposes is a legislative rather than
a judicial matter. The order of a governing body may not be set aside unless it is shown to
be arbitrary, capricious, discriminatory, or is illegal, or without a substantial evidentiary
basis.” Id. at 860-61 (¶18) (quoting Fondren N. Renaissance v. Mayor of Jackson, 749 So.
2d 974, 977 (¶7) (Miss. 1999)) (emphasis added).
¶18.
A comprehensive zoning plan is defined by Mississippi Code Annotated section 17-1-
1(c) (Supp. 2009), which states:
“Comprehensive plan” means a statement of public policy for the physical
development of the entire municipality or county adopted by resolution of the
governing body, consisting of the following elements at a minimum:
(i) Goals and objectives for the long-range (twenty (20) to
twenty-five (25) years) development of the county or
municipality. Required goals and objectives shall address, at a
minimum, residential, commercial and industrial development;
parks, open space and recreation; street or road improvements;
[and] public schools and community facilities.
(ii) A land use plan which designates in map or policy form the
proposed general distribution and extent of the uses of land for
residences, commerce, industry, recreation and open space,
public/quasi-public facilities and lands.
Background
information shall be provided concerning the specific meaning
of land use categories depicted in the plan in terms of the
following: residential densities; intensity of commercial uses;
industrial and public/quasi-public uses; and any other
information needed to adequately define the meaning of such
land use codes. Projections of population and economic growth
for the area encompassed by the plan may be the basis for
quantitative recommendations for each land use category.
(iii) A transportation plan depicting in map form the proposed
13
functional classifications for all existing and proposed streets,
roads and highways for the area encompassed by the land use
plan and for the same time period as that covered by the land use
plan. Functional classifications shall consist of arterial, collector
and local streets, roads and highways, and these classifications
shall be defined on the plan as to minimum right-of-way and
surface width requirements; these requirements shall be based
upon traffic projections. All other forms of transportation
pertinent to the local jurisdiction shall be addressed as
appropriate. The transportation plan shall be a basis for a capital
improvements program.
(iv) A community facilities plan as a basis for a capital
improvements program including, but not limited to, the
following: housing; schools; parks and recreation; public
buildings and facilities; and utilities and drainage.
¶19.
The Collinses have argued that the changes cited by the City were “in accordance with
the original zoning plan,” but they have failed to substantiate this allegation with evidence
in the record – it contains no zoning plan for this court to review. In fact, the Collinses’
principal argument on appeal is that the City does not even have a comprehensive plan.3
Neither of these arguments were raised before the city council or the planning commission;
they have been made for the first time on appeal.
¶20.
The only evidence in the record concerning the contents of the City’s comprehensive
plan was offered by the developer: it includes what purports to be a zoning map showing the
subject property and its immediate surrounding area, to a radius of approximately one mile,4
3
It appears undisputed from the record that the City has zoning ordinances, but they
have not been made a part of the record for this Court to evaluate.
4
A larger zoning map purporting to show the entire municipality was made part of
the record in documents submitted by the developer, but it is undated and reproduced in the
14
and generalized descriptions of the land use categories assigned to nearby parcels – i.e., R-1
is “single-family residential,” R-2 is “multi-family residential,” and C-2 is “commercial.”
No complete definitions have been offered. In fact, there is no record regarding the contents
of the plan sufficient to satisfy any of the four requirements for a comprehensive plan
enumerated in section 17-1-1(c) – no twenty or twenty-five year development plan, no
comprehensive land-use map with specific zoning definitions, no transportation plan, and no
community facilities plan.
¶21.
Because of the state of the record, I cannot dismiss the changes in the neighborhood
cited by the City as developments in accordance with its comprehensive plan. To do so
without examining the City’s zoning ordinances would violate this Court’s standard of
review on appeal; zoning amendments are presumptively valid and the burden of proving
them invalid falls upon party asserting their invalidity. Childs, 1 So. 3d at 859 (¶12). The
majority turns this presumption on its head, finding for the Collinses because “the City has
not refuted this claim.”
¶22.
In reviewing the record, there is good reason to believe that many of the changes cited
by the City were not, in fact, in accordance with the original zoning plan – even if some of
those uses were permitted by the present zoning. At the time of the original zoning, the
“Santa Maria Park” to the north of the subject property along Martin Bluff Road was either
a water park or an RV park; at the time of rezoning, it was alternatively called either a “trailer
record as a reduced size, black-and-white photocopy of what was apparently a color-coded
original.
15
park” or a “FEMA park.” Nor has it been shown that the increased density of multi-family
housing in the R-2 and C-2 zones to the south was in accordance with the original plan.
Moreover, nothing in the record indicates that the planned expansion of Martin Bluff Road
to four lanes was contemplated in the original zoning. It is likewise unclear from the record
where the Farragut Lake Apartments are located or what the zoning classification was at the
time of the original zoning ordinance.5 And, although the majority is technically correct in
stating that the rezoning renders the subject property an “island” of R-2, surrounded by R-1,
it is a relatively large island at 13.5 acres. It would not be the only such island along Martin
Bluff Road – both the C-2 zone to the north and the R-2/C-2 zone to the south are of
comparable size, are entirely surrounded by R-1, and contain dense multi-family housing.
¶23.
On this record, I cannot say that any of the neighborhood changes cited by the City
were immaterial. The Collinses have not met their burden to show that the changes were in
accordance with the City’s comprehensive plan. I would instead find that the City’s rezoning
decision is supported by substantial evidence, and, therefore, is a legislative decision beyond
this Court’s authority to disturb on appeal. I respectfully dissent.
KING, C.J., AND LEE, P.J., JOIN THIS OPINION.
5
The record only states that this new development was located north of Interstate 10
and east of Martin Bluff Road; the precise location is not given. As the majority notes, there
is a letter from the developer in the record which states that the land “along” Martin Bluff
Road north of the interstate highway is continuously zoned C-2; however the distance of the
development from Martin Bluff Road is not stated. The majority’s assumption that this
development was “along” Martin Bluff Road and therefore on land zoned C-2 is in my
judgment unfounded.
16
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.