Albert Joiner, Jr. v. State of Mississippi
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2009-CA-00222-COA
ALBERT JOINER, JR.
APPELLANT
v.
STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
APPELLEE
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
TRIAL JUDGE:
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE:
NATURE OF THE CASE:
TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION:
DISPOSITION:
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
01/15/2009
HON. ANDREW K. HOWORTH
LAFAYETTE COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
JAMES D. MINOR
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
BY: LISA LYNN BLOUNT
CIVIL - POST-CONVICTION RELIEF
MOTION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF
DENIED
AFFIRMED - 04/20/2010
BEFORE LEE, P.J., IRVING AND ISHEE, JJ.
LEE, P.J., FOR THE COURT:
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
¶1.
Albert Joiner, Jr., pleaded guilty in the Lafayette County Circuit Court to felony
fleeing from a law enforcement officer and strong armed robbery. He was sentenced as a
habitual offender pursuant to Mississippi Code Annotated section 99-19-81 (Rev. 2007) to
four years for felony fleeing and fifteen years for strong armed robbery. The sentences were
ordered to be served consecutively in the custody of the Mississippi Department of
Corrections. Joiner filed a motion for post-conviction relief, which was denied by the trial
court.
¶2.
Joiner now appeals the denial of his motion for post-conviction relief, asserting the
following issues: (1) he was improperly charged as a habitual offender; (2) he was
improperly sentenced as a habitual offender; and (3) he was denied effective assistance of
counsel. For judicial economy, issues one and two will be discussed together. Finding no
error, we affirm the denial of Joiner’s motion for post-conviction relief.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶3.
A trial court’s denial of a motion for post-conviction relief will not be reversed absent
a finding that the trial court’s decision was clearly erroneous. Smith v. State, 806 So. 2d
1148, 1150 (¶3) (Miss. Ct. App. 2002). However, when issues of law are raised, the proper
standard of review is de novo. Brown v. State, 731 So. 2d 595, 598 (¶6) (Miss. 1999).
DISCUSSION
I. HABITUAL-OFFENDER STATUS
¶4.
Joiner argues that the indictment failed to notify him that he was being charged as a
habitual offender. As part of Joiner’s plea bargain, Count II of the indictment, possession
of a weapon by a convicted felon, was dismissed. Count II lists five felonies with which
Joiner had been previously convicted. Joiner asserts that since Count II was dismissed, the
indictment no longer contained the necessary information to charge him as a habitual
offender pursuant to Mississippi Code Annotated section 99-19-81.
¶5.
Section 99-19-81 states:
Every person convicted in this state of a felony who shall have been convicted
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twice previously of any felony or federal crime upon charges separately
brought and arising out of separate incidents at different times and who shall
have been sentenced to separate terms of one (1) year or more in any state
and/or federal penal institution, whether in this state or elsewhere, shall be
sentenced to the maximum term of imprisonment prescribed for such felony,
and such sentence shall not be reduced or suspended nor shall such person be
eligible for parole or probation.
¶6.
Joiner is correct that the plea petition does not list his prior felony convictions.
However, Joiner voluntarily pleaded guilty to a reduced charge of “felony fleeing lesser
habitual.”
He was originally charged as a habitual offender under Mississippi Code
Annotated section 99-19-83 (Rev. 2007). During the plea colloquy, the trial judge explained
to Joiner that he would be sentenced as a lesser-habitual offender, which meant that Joiner
would serve his nineteen-year sentence “day-for-day” without eligibility for parole or
probation rather than life without eligibility for parole or probation under section 99-19-83.
Joiner does not deny that he has five prior felonies. Because the reduced sentence was part
of Joiner’s plea bargain, we find that the record shows that Joiner was aware of his eligibility
for sentencing as a habitual offender. This issue is without merit.
II. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
¶7.
Joiner argues his counsel was ineffective for allowing him to enter his guilty pleas as
a habitual offender without supporting proof of his prior felony convictions.
¶8.
To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, Joiner must prove that his
counsel’s performance was deficient, and the deficient performance prejudiced his defense.
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). Joiner stated in his plea colloquy that
his attorney had properly advised him of the charges and sentences, and he was satisfied with
his attorney’s representation. While the supreme court has repeatedly stated that “[t]he best
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evidence of a conviction is a certified copy of the judgment of conviction[,] . . . the
defendant’s in-court admission of prior felony convictions has been found sufficient to
permit a finding of habitual[-]offender status.” Short v. State, 929 So. 2d 420, 426 (¶16)
(Miss. Ct. App. 2006). Therefore, no additional proof of Joiner’s prior felonies was needed.
¶9.
Also, we note that Joiner was originally indicted for felony fleeing, armed robbery,
and possession of a deadly weapon by a felon; and he faced a possible life sentence as a
habitual offender. His attorney negotiated a deal wherein the armed-robbery charge was
reduced to strong armed robbery, and the charge of felon in possession of a deadly weapon
was dismissed. His attorney also negotiated a reduced sentence of nineteen years as a
habitual offender under section 99-19-81 rather than a life sentence as a habitual offender
under section 99-19-83. We find this issue is without merit.
¶10. THE JUDGMENT OF THE LAFAYETTE COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
DENYING THE MOTION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF IS AFFIRMED. ALL
COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO LAFAYETTE COUNTY.
KING, C.J., MYERS, P.J., IRVING, GRIFFIS, BARNES, ISHEE, ROBERTS
AND MAXWELL, JJ., CONCUR.
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