Mansfield Langston v. Ethel Williams
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2008-CA-01090-COA
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF
PATRICIA MCDANIEL LANGSTON,
DECEASED: MANSFIELD LANGSTON
APPELLANT
v.
ETHEL WILLIAMS
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
TRIAL JUDGE:
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE:
NATURE OF THE CASE:
TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION:
DISPOSITION:
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
APPELLEE
06/16/2008
HON. JANACE H. GOREE
SUNFLOWER COUNTY CHANCERY
COURT
LINDSEY C. MEADOR
ALSEE MCDANIEL
CIVIL - WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES
FOUND CLEAR AND CONVINCING
EVIDENCE OF UNDUE INFLUENCE AND
SET ASIDE INTER VIVOS TRANSFERS
REVERSED AND RENDERED: 03/30/2010
EN BANC.
GRIFFIS, J., FOR THE COURT:
¶1.
Mansfield Langston appeals the chancellor’s judgment setting aside the creation of
certain joint tenancies with his wife, Patricia McDaniel Langston. He claims that the
chancellor: (1) erred as a matter of law in finding that a confidential relationship existed
between Mansfield and Patricia and (2) made certain findings of fact that are not supported
by substantial credible evidence. We find that the chancellor applied the incorrect standard
of law to the particular facts of this case; therefore, the judgment of the chancery court is
reversed and rendered.
FACTS
¶2.
Mansfield and Patricia were married on May 29, 1994. At the time of marriage,
Mansfield was forty-four years old, and Patricia was forty years old. This was the second
marriage for both parties, and they both had children from previous marriages. Patricia
suffered from several chronic health problems throughout the marriage including heart and
kidney problems. In 2001, she was a class-action plaintiff and received a settlement
following litigation involving the diet drug Phen-Phen.
¶3.
From August 23, 1997, until March 11, 2002, the couple owned their marital home
on Kentwood Lane, in Indianola, Mississippi, as joint tenants with the right of survivorship.
On March 11, 2002, Patricia quitclaimed the marital home to Mansfield because Patricia had
purchased a home on French Road, also in Indianola.
¶4.
On March 15, 2002, Patricia executed a will naming Mansfield as executor. The will
divided Patricia’s entire estate equally among her three adult children and one of her sisters.
A clause in the will expressly stated that: “MANSFIELD LANGSTON, my husband, has his
own estate in his name, therefore no provision for him is made in this will.” At the time this
will was executed, Patricia owned the French Road home solely in her name.
¶5.
On May 9, 2002, three deeds were prepared by the Langstons’ attorney, Richard
Noble. The first deed was executed by Patricia and created a joint tenancy with the right of
survivorship in the French Road home, which then became the couple’s marital home. The
second deed conveyed the home on Kentwood Lane to Patricia’s mother, Ethel Williams.
2
Mansfield testified that the home was sold to Williams at a discounted price. In the third
deed, Williams sold and conveyed her home in Indianola.
¶6.
On June 11, 2002, Patricia executed a second will that was identical to her first will
except it named Patricia’s mother as executor instead of Mansfield. On September 4, 2003,
Mansfield and Patricia executed a $200,000 certificate of deposit as joint tenants with the
right of survivorship.
¶7.
On May 11, 2005, Patricia died due to a sudden illness.1 Patricia’s estate was opened
by her mother. The estate sought to set aside the joint tenancies in the marital home and the
certificate of deposit in order to bring those assets into the estate for distribution to the will
beneficiaries – Patricia’s adult children and Patricia’s sister.
¶8.
Following the trial, the chancellor found that a confidential relationship existed
between Mansfield and Patricia. Therefore, the chancellor ruled that the burden shifted to
Mansfield to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the creation of the joint tenancies
was not the result of undue influence. The chancellor held that Mansfield did not meet this
burden, and both joint tenancies were set aside and brought into Patricia’s estate.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶9.
“This Court will not disturb a chancellor's findings of fact in a will contest unless the
findings are clearly erroneous, manifestly wrong, or the chancellor applied an incorrect legal
standard.” In re Estate of Thornton v. Thornton, 922 So. 2d 850, 852 (¶6) (Miss. Ct. App.
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There were no medical records or testimony introduced at trial concerning Patricia’s
cause of death. Despite this fact, the chancellor ultimately concluded that Patricia’s chronic
health problems “eventually culminated in her death.”
3
2006). “Questions of law, however, are reviewed de novo.” Id.
ANALYSIS
Whether the chancellor erred as a matter of law in finding that a confidential
relationship existed between Mansfield and Patricia.
¶10.
Mansfield claims that the chancellor erred as a matter of law in finding that Mansfield
and Patricia were in a confidential relationship for the purpose of raising the presumption of
undue influence. Specifically, Mansfield contends that the factors used by the chancellor to
find a confidential relationship are factors that would be found in any trusting, healthy
relationship between a husband and wife. Williams responds that the relationship between
Mansfield and Patricia clearly met all of the factors which constitute a confidential
relationship. Thus, Williams claims that the presumption of undue influence automatically
applies to the two inter vivos transfers.
¶11.
The supreme court defines a confidential relationship as:
Whenever there is a relation between two people in which one person is in a
position to exercise a dominant influence upon the other because of the latter's
dependency upon the former, arising either from weakness of mind or body,
or through trust, the law does not hesitate to characterize such relationship as
fiduciary in character.
Madden v. Rhodes, 626 So. 2d 608, 617 (Miss. 1993) (citation omitted). “[T]he relationship
must reflect ‘a dominant, overmastering influence [which] controls over a dependent person
or trust justifiably reposed.’” Taylor v. Welch, 609 So. 2d 1225, 1231-32 (Miss. 1992)
(quoting Mullins v. Ratcliff, 515 So. 2d 1183, 1191-92 (Miss. 1987)). The factors to be
considered in determining whether a confidential relationship exists between the parties are:
(1) whether one person has to be taken care of by others,
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(2) whether one person maintains a close relationship with another,
(3) whether one person is provided transportation and has their medical care
provided for by another,
(4) whether one person maintains joint accounts with another,
(5) whether one is physically or mentally weak,
(6) whether one is of advanced age or poor health, and
(7) whether there exists a power of attorney between the one and another.
Thornton, 922 So. 2d at 852-53 (¶7).
¶12.
The chancellor examined each of these factors and made the following findings.
Patricia suffered from a variety of health problems including chronic heart disease, kidney
problems, asthma, gout, high blood pressure, and swelling of the feet. Mansfield helped
Patricia get her medication and drove her to various doctors’ appointments. Mansfield
testified that he and Patricia had a close relationship. The couple shared joint bank accounts
during their marriage. The chancellor found that Patricia’s chronic health problems made
her physically and mentally 2 weak, and although she was not of an advanced age, she did
have poor health. Finally, both Mansfield and Patricia granted each other power of attorney.
¶13.
The chancellor concluded that a confidential relationship existed between Mansfield
and Patricia. We find substantial evidence to support the chancellor’s conclusion; however,
our review does not end there. We must determine whether the chancellor correctly applied
2
We note that the chancellor’s finding that Patricia was mentally weak was contrary
to the testimony of Williams and two of the estate beneficiaries – Patricia’s son, Keith
White, and Patricia’s sister, April Frierson. Their testimony established that Patricia had no
mental problems, was strong willed and strong minded, and that Patricia’s physical health
problems did not affect her mental state.
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the presumption of undue influence as it relates to Mansfield and Patricia as husband and
wife.
¶14.
As the supreme court discussed in Madden, 626 So. 2d at 618, the presumption of
undue influence operates differently depending on whether a transfer occurs during the
grantor’s lifetime or occurs through operation of the grantor’s will. The supreme court
stated:
[T]he rules of law are different regarding gifts testamentary and gifts inter
vivos where a confidential relationship exists between the testator/grantor and
the beneficiary/grantee. The prior holdings of this Court indicate a
presumption of undue influence only arises in the context of gifts by will when
there has been some abuse of the confidential relationship, such as some
involvement in the preparation or execution of the will. On the other hand,
with a gift inter vivos, there is an automatic presumption of undue influence
even without abuse of the confidential relationship. Such gifts are
presumptively invalid.
Id.
¶15.
Thus, a party claiming that an inter vivos transfer is void because of undue influence
must show by clear and convincing evidence that a confidential relationship existed between
the grantor and grantee/beneficiary. Estate of Hawkins v. Shiyou, 737 So. 2d 432, 434 (¶9)
(Miss. Ct. App. 1999). When such a relationship exists, the presumption of undue influence
arises automatically. Lancaster v. Boyd, 803 So. 2d 1285, 1289 (¶9) (Miss. Ct. App. 2002);
Shiyou, 737 So. 2d at 434 (¶9).
¶16.
Once the presumption is established, the burden shifts to the grantee to rebut the
presumption by clear and convincing evidence. Id. In order to overcome the presumption,
the grantee must show that: (1) he or she exhibited good faith in the fiduciary relationship
with the grantor; (2) the grantor had full knowledge and deliberation when he executed the
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deed; and (3) the grantor exhibited independent consent and action. Lancaster, 803 So. 2d
at 1289 (¶9).
¶17.
Here, the transfers at issue were inter vivos transfers. Therefore, once the chancellor
found a confidential relationship, the presumption of undue influence automatically arose.
No actual showing of undue influence on the part of Mansfield was required.
¶18.
While we recognize that our supreme court has set forth such automatic presumption
for inter vivos transfers, we also find that the supreme court has found it necessary to
distinguish confidential relationships between spouses in a long-term marriage. In Genna
v. Harrington, 254 So. 2d 525, 528-29 (Miss. 1971), the supreme court held that:
It is undoubtedly true that a husband or a wife may exercise undue influence
upon the other spouse, but the mere fact that there is a close relationship
between the parties in a marriage does not mean that one's influence upon
another is undue influence.
....
In order to set a will aside upon the grounds of undue influence on the part of
a spouse, it must be shown that the devisee spouse used undue methods for the
purpose of overcoming the free and unrestrained will of the testator so as to
control his acts and to prevent him from being a free agent.
¶19.
Because it is clear that a husband and wife naturally influence each other as part of
their marital relationship, there must be something more to show that such influence was
undue. To presume undue influence here, solely based on the existence of a confidential
relationship, would discourage certain benefits that are quite common and encouraged among
spouses – assistance with health problems, transportation to doctors’ visits, joint accounts,
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reciprocal powers of attorney, and the most obvious factor – a close relationship.3
Accordingly, we find that the legal standard used by the chancellor in this case was improper
due to the long-term marriage of Patricia and Mansfield.
¶20.
Our finding is supported by a brief examination of how the facts of this case relate to
recent cases in which this Court addressed the issue of a confidential relationship between
a husband and wife. First, in Spencer v. Hudspeth, 950 So. 2d 238, 243 (¶17) (Miss. Ct. App.
2007), this Court reversed the chancery court’s denial of a motion to set aside a deed on the
ground of undue influence. Ethel Hudspeth executed a deed to forty acres of land to her
husband, Montie Hudspeth. Id. at 240 (¶6). We found a confidential relationship existed
between Ethel and Montie because Ethel was physically and mentally weak. Id. at 241-42
(¶12). She had suffered a stroke, a heart attack, and a broken hip. She was bedridden,
disoriented, and very weak. Id. at 240 (¶4). Ethel’s signature on the deed was misspelled,
and Ethel had been in a nursing home for a year before the deed was signed. Id. at (¶6). The
motion to set aside the deed was filed by Ethel’s niece after both Ethel and Montie were
deceased.
¶21.
The facts of Spencer are distinguishable from the facts in this case. Ethel’s signature,
which was made while she was physically and mentally weak and a resident of a nursing
home, was highly suspect. In the instant case, there is no question that Patricia executed the
deed and the certificate of deposit. Both Noble, the attorney who prepared the deed, and Paul
3
Our conclusion is emphasized by the chancellor’s finding under the factor of
whether one person maintains a close relationship with another: “Mansfield and Patricia
shared a close relationship, as the testimony of Mansfield indicated. The Court accepted
Mansfield’s version inasmuch as it is a statement against interest.”
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Townsend, the banker who prepared the certificate of deposit, testified that Patricia was
competent, knowledgeable, and did not exhibit any mental weakness.
¶22.
Next, in In re Estate of Chapman v. Chapman, 966 So. 2d 1262, 1263 (¶¶1-2) (Miss.
Ct. App. 2007), this Court affirmed the chancellor’s ruling that no confidential relationship
existed between husband and wife, Leslie and Betty Chapman. Gary Chapman, Leslie’s son
who was disinherited by Leslie’s will, claimed that a confidential relationship existed
between Leslie and Betty. Id. This Court noted that a close relationship was to be expected
as an inherent part of a long-term marriage. Furthermore, the testimony revealed that Leslie
was a very strong-willed man. Id. at 1264-65 (¶16). There was no evidence that Betty
prevented Leslie from being a free agent in the signing of his will. Id. at (¶17).
¶23.
Similarly, here, a close relationship is to be expected as part of Patricia and
Mansfield’s long-term marriage. The two were married for eleven years, and the transfers
at issue were not executed until eight years into the marriage. There was no evidence that
Mansfield prevented Patricia from freely signing the deed or the certificate of deposit. In
fact, Townsend testified that Patricia dominated the conversation regarding the certificate of
deposit. There was ample testimony that Patricia was a strong-willed person.
¶24.
Finally, in In re Estate of Pope v. White, 5 So. 3d 427, 433 (¶13) (Miss. Ct. App.
2008), we found substantial evidence to support the chancellor’s finding that a confidential
relationship existed between husband and wife, Earsel and Juanita Pope. Earsel was a
seventy-three-year-old, terminally-ill man suffering from several ailments including
Alzheimer’s and dementia. Id. at 430 (¶3). Juanita became Earsel’s caregiver, and the two
married after a very brief courtship. Within days of the marriage, Juanita set up an
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appointment with an attorney and drove Earsel to the appointment. Juanita met with Earsel
and the attorney, and a will was prepared disinheriting Earsel’s children. The will left
Earsel’s entire estate to Juanita. Id. at 431 (¶6).
¶25.
The present case is clearly distinguishable from Pope because Patricia and
Mansfield’s marriage was not contrived. While Patricia suffered from physical problems,
the evidence established that she was a strong-willed person and mentally capable of making
her own decisions. Pope is a clear example of a circumstance where the factors used to find
a confidential relationship properly lead to the automatic presumption of undue influence
between a husband and wife. Such is not the case here.
¶26.
We further note that the chancellor found that Mansfield failed to rebut the
presumption of undue influence by clear and convincing evidence. Again, the factors used
against Mansfield are inherent to the relationship between a husband and wife in a long-term
marriage. For example, the fact that the attorney who prepared the deeds had also done other
legal work for Mansfield was used against Mansfield. Also, the fact that Mansfield was a
customer at the bank that held the certificate of deposit was used to prevent Mansfield from
showing a lack of undue influence.4
The chancellor found that Mansfield gave no
consideration for the deeds. Further, Patricia only discussed the transfers with Mansfield and
not her mother or sister. Each of these factors – using the same attorney or bank, lack of
consideration, confidence in each other – are to be expected as part of a relationship between
4
There was undisputed testimony from an employee of Guaranty Bank, the holder
of the certificate of deposit, that Patricia did not want to purchase the certificate of deposit
from her regular bank because one of her relatives was employed at that particular bank.
10
a husband and wife of eleven years.
¶27.
The chancellor also found that Patricia did not understand the consequences that the
inter vivos transfers would have on the distribution of her estate by will. However, had
Mansfield predeceased Patricia, Patricia would have become the sole owner of the property.
The property would have then been distributed to her children and sister via her will. Thus,
Williams’s argument that the transfers were contrary to Patricia’s specific intent and made
Patricia’s will null and void is incorrect. Moreover, the will does not bequeath specific
property to the beneficiaries; instead, it gives all of Patricia’s “estate, real and personal,
wheresoever situate, of which I may die, seized and possessed.”
¶28.
We find that the chancellor’s application of the automatic presumption of undue
influence based solely on the existence of a confidential relationship was improper based on
the specific facts of this case. Mansfield and Patricia were married for eleven years. As part
of that marriage, they assisted each other with business, their health needs, and personal
matters. The two shared a close relationship. Under these circumstances, their relationship
alone is insufficient to void the joint tenancies created in their marital home and the
certificate of deposit. Accordingly, the judgment of the chancellor holding such joint
tenancies null and void is reversed and rendered.
¶29. THE JUDGMENT OF THE SUNFLOWER COUNTY CHANCERY COURT
IS REVERSED AND RENDERED. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED
TO THE APPELLEE.
BARNES, ISHEE, ROBERTS AND MAXWELL, JJ., CONCUR. IRVING, J.,
DISSENTS WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION JOINED BY KING, C.J., LEE
AND MYERS, P.JJ.
IRVING, J., DISSENTING:
11
¶30.
The majority concludes that the chancellor improperly applied the presumption of
undue influence because Patricia McDaniel Langston and Mansfield Langston were a
married couple. The majority then decides that the proper remedy is to reverse and render,
rather than remand for a consideration of the facts utilizing the proper standard. Based on
my review of the record, I find that the chancellor utilized the proper standard, but even if
she did not, the proper remedy is not to reverse and render. Therefore, I dissent.
¶31.
The record reflects that the chancellor’s findings of fact and conclusions of law make
up sixteen pages. In her extensive findings of fact and conclusions of law, the chancellor
made specific findings regarding Mansfield’s domination of Patricia. In her judgment, the
chancellor noted:
The evidence showed that Mansfield engaged in a pattern of systematically
alienating Patricia from her family and friends. April Frierson testified that
Patricia would not come inside of her home because Mansfield had accused
Patricia of having an affair with April’s husband. Prior to the marriage of
Patricia to Mansfield, Linda Myles-Williams testified that she and Patricia
were long[-]time friends, who talked frequently by phone and visited often in
each other[’]s home. After her marriage to Mansfield, the calls and visitation
virtually ceased. Historically, Patricia talked to her mother and sister about her
business and personal affairs. Ethel Williams testified she was not aware that
Patricia executed the warranty deed and CD in question. Only Mansfield and
those who were connected with him were aware of these inter vivos
transactions.
¶32.
The chancellor made specific findings of fact which support her decision that the two
inter vivos transactions by Patricia were a nullity because Mansfield exercised undue
influence over Patricia in the procurement and execution of the warranty deed and the
certificate of deposit. For the reasons stated, I would affirm the chancellor’s judgment.
¶33.
However, even if I agreed with the majority’s conclusion that the chancellor applied
12
an incorrect legal standard, I would still find that this case should be reversed and remanded,
rather than reversed and rendered. Mississippi appellate courts generally reverse and remand
a chancellor’s judgment when an incorrect legal standard has been applied. See In Interest
of R.D. v. Linda D., 658 So. 2d 1378, 1389 (Miss. 1995); Schonewitz v. Pack, 913 So. 2d
416, 418 (¶6) (Miss. Ct. App. 2005); In re Guardianship of Brown v. Wiley, 902 So. 2d 604,
606 (¶2) (Miss. Ct. App. 2004); Johnson v. Johnson, 877 So. 2d 485, 495-96 (¶45) (Miss. Ct.
App. 2003). Therefore, if I agreed with the majority’s finding that the chancellor applied an
incorrect legal standard, I would reverse and remand this case to the chancellor with
instructions to apply the proper legal standard, because I believe that, when applying the
standard that the majority believes should be applied, the facts of this case would still compel
the result that was reached by the chancellor.
KING, C.J., AND LEE AND MYERS, P.JJ., JOIN THIS OPINION.
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