Robert Morris Glass v. State of Mississippi
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2009-CP-00370-COA
ROBERT MORRIS GLASS
APPELLANT
v.
STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
APPELLEE
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
TRIAL JUDGE:
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED:
02/27/2009
HON. ANDREW K. HOWORTH
MARSHALL COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE:
ROBERT MORRIS GLASS (PRO SE)
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
BY: LISA LYNN BLOUNT
CIVIL - POST-CONVICTION RELIEF
MOTION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF
DENIED
AFFIRMED - 03/09/2010
NATURE OF THE CASE:
TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION:
DISPOSITION:
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
EN BANC.
ROBERTS, J., FOR THE COURT:
¶1.
Robert Glass pled guilty to murder in 1999 in the Circuit Court of Marshall County.
After being sentenced, he filed a petition for post-conviction relief (PCR), which was denied
by the trial court. Glass appealed the denial. However, this Court affirmed the trial court’s
ruling. Glass filed a second petition for PCR on October 1, 2008. His second petition was
also summarily denied by the trial court. Aggrieved by the trial court’s disposition of his
second petition for PCR, Glass appeals. Finding that Glass’s current petition for PCR is
barred as it is a successive writ, we affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
¶2.
Glass was indicted for capital murder on April 29, 1999, in the Circuit Court of
Marshall County. He pled guilty to the reduced charge of murder in violation of Mississippi
Code Annotated section 97-3-19(1)(a) (Rev. 2001) on March 1, 2001, and was sentenced to
life in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections. Glass subsequently filed
a petition for PCR, which was denied by the trial court. He appealed the circuit court’s
denial and alleged that: he received ineffective assistance of counsel; his sentence was
excessive and unconstitutional; and other procedural errors, which were not raised before the
trial court, merit reversal. The trial court’s denial of Glass’s petition for PCR was affirmed
by this Court in Glass v. State, 856 So. 2d 762 (Miss. Ct. App. 2003).
¶3.
Glass filed a second petition for PCR in the Circuit Court of Marshall County on
October 1, 2008, which was again summarily denied. In his appeal of the trial court’s denial,
Glass echoes those claims presented to the trial court. Namely, he argues the following
issues: his sentence was unconstitutional; his guilty plea was not intelligently and voluntarily
entered; the trial court committed plain error when it failed to inform Glass of his proposed
right to a direct appeal of his sentence; his indictment was faulty; he received ineffective
assistance of counsel; and the cumulative errors he has identified warrant reversal of his
conviction. Additionally, he requests an evidentiary hearing to present matters outside the
record, which Glass states would bolster his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.
DISCUSSION
WHETHER GLASS’S PETITION FOR PCR IS BARRED AS A SUCCESSIVE WRIT
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¶4.
PCR.
Glass’s current appeal stems from the trial court’s denial of his second petition for
Mississippi Code Annotated sections 99-39-1 to -29 (Rev. 2007) provide the
mechanism by which convicted felons may petition the bench for post-conviction relief.
However, such requests may not continue ad infinitum. Specifically, a trial court’s grant or
denial of a petition for PCR is a final judgment, and it “shall be a bar to a second or
successive motion under [the Mississippi Uniform Post-Conviction Collateral Relief Act (the
Act)]” unless a named exception applies. Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-23(6) (Supp. 2009).
¶5.
Pursuant to section 99-39-23(6), a convict may only file a successive writ if: it raises
the issue of supervening insanity prior to the execution of a death sentence; there is an
intervening decision of the Mississippi or United States Supreme Courts that adversely
affected the petitioner’s conviction or sentence; the convict has new evidence, which was
“not reasonably discoverable at the time of trial,” that casts such a large shadow over the
conviction or sentence so as to be practically conclusive of an alternate outcome; or the
convict claims that his sentence has expired or right to early release has been revoked in
error. In addition to successfully identifying one of the four statutory exceptions that would
allow the consideration of a successive petition for PCR, a convict seeking to file such a
petition is also obliged to demonstrate that the arguments presented have not previously been
argued and adjudged by the trial court. Retherford v. State, 749 So. 2d 269, 274 (¶ 9) (Miss.
Ct. App. 1999).
¶6.
The only such exception that Glass alleges allows him to file a successive writ is the
existence of an intervening decision. With regard solely to Glass’s proposed unconstitutional
sentence, he argues that Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) and Blakely v.
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Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004) satisfy the “intervening-decision” exception. Glass’s
argument is essentially that his sentence of life is unconstitutional because the trial court and
not a jury decided his punishment. However, neither Apprendi nor Blakely provide any
support for Glass’s claim.
¶7.
In Apprendi, the Supreme Court found unconstitutional a New Jersey hate-crime
statute that allowed a trial judge to increase a defendant’s punishment on his conviction of
a second-degree offense to that which was identical to the punishment imposed for
conviction of the first-degree crime as it removed from the purview of the jury an essential
element of the offense. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 491-92. However, the Supreme Court made
clear that its holding did not interfere with a judge’s ability to sentence a defendant “within
the range prescribed by statute.” Id. at 481. Blakely is similarly unhelpful in overcoming
Glass’s procedural hurdle as its holding also centers around the unconstitutionality of a
sentence enhancement beyond that which was statutorily proscribed and based upon factual
determinations outside those which a jury found. Blakely, 542 U.S. at 301. Additionally, and
as identified by this Court in Glass, “[s]ince the trial court imposed a sentence within the
statutory limitations provided by the Mississippi Legislature, [Glass’s] sentence was
appropriate, and there was no error.” Glass, 856 So. 2d at 764-65 (¶9) (citing Hoops v. State,
681 So. 2d 521, 537 (Miss. 1996)). A sentence of life was the only available sentence given
the crime to which Glass pled guilty to having committed. Miss. Code Ann. § 97-3-21 (Rev.
2006). Therefore, as Glass has failed to successfully argue that any of the issues raised in
his current petition for PCR satisfy any exception enumerated in 99-39-23(6), he is unable
to overcome the procedural bar.
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¶8.
In addition to the procedural bar against a successive writ, Glass’s current petition,
had it been his first plea for review, it would nonetheless still be barred. Mississippi Code
Annotated section 99-39-5(2) (Supp. 2009) states that in the context of a guilty plea, a
petition for PCR must be filed “within three (3) years after entry of the judgment of
conviction” unless a listed exception applies. Glass pled guilty on March 1, 2001. His
current petition for PCR was filed on October 1, 2008, well past the time limit granted to file
for relief under the Act. The supreme court stated:
The fair and orderly administration of justice dictates that a person accused of
a crime be afforded the opportunity to present his claims before a fair and
impartial tribunal. It does not require that he be given multiple opportunities
to “take a bite at the apple.” Likewise, the orderly administration of justice
does not require this Court to “lead a defendant by the hand” through the
criminal justice system. It is this Court's responsibility to provide a
meaningful opportunity for defendant to raise his claims and have them
adjudicated.
Smith v. State, 434 So. 2d 212, 220 (Miss. 1983). Glass was given ample opportunity to have
his grievances surrounding his guilty plea and subsequent sentence addressed. His current
petition for PCR and the appeal of its denial constitute a second bite at the apple and will not
be heard.
¶9.
THE JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT OF MARSHALL COUNTY
DENYING THE MOTION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF IS AFFIRMED. ALL
COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO MARSHALL COUNTY.
KING, C.J., LEE AND MYERS, P.JJ., IRVING, GRIFFIS, BARNES, ISHEE
AND MAXWELL, JJ., CONCUR.
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