Helen L. Rogillio v. David M. Rogillio
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2008-CA-01838-COA
HELEN L. ROGILLIO
APPELLANT
v.
DAVID M. ROGILLIO
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
TRIAL JUDGE:
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE:
NATURE OF THE CASE:
TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION
DISPOSITION:
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
APPELLEE
10/03/2008
HON. MARIE WILSON
WARREN COUNTY CHANCERY COURT
MARK W. PREWITT
R. LOUIS FIELD
CIVIL - DOMESTIC RELATIONS
JUDGMENT OF DIVORCE GRANTED
AFFIRMED – 02/23/2010
BEFORE MYERS, P.J., GRIFFIS AND CARLTON, JJ.
CARLTON, J., FOR THE COURT:
¶1.
Helen Rogillio appeals the judgment of the Warren County Chancery Court granting
an irreconcilable-differences divorce to her and her husband, David Rogillio, and awarding
Helen $15,000 in lump-sum alimony. Helen appeals, arguing that the chancellor erred by
awarding lump-sum alimony instead of permanent periodic alimony. Finding no error in the
chancery court’s judgment, we affirm the chancellor’s award of lump-sum alimony.
FACTS
¶2.
Helen and David were married in September 1997. One child was born to the
marriage, a son, who was approximately six years old at the time of the divorce. Helen and
David separated in March 2007, when David and the couple’s son left the family home and
moved in with David’s parents. Although the chancellor granted the divorce on the grounds
of irreconcilable differences, David contends that he left the marital home because Helen
exhibited bizarre behavior and used illegal drugs.
¶3.
Helen and David agreed that David would have primary custody of their minor child
and that David and the child would reside in the marital home. Helen agreed to move into
a mobile home that she owned prior to the marriage. The mobile home was in need of
numerous repairs. Helen was to receive exclusive use, possession and ownership of the
property, and the sole responsibility for the mortgage on the property. Further, the chancellor
awarded David $436 per month in child support in the form of a social security check the
child received as a result of Helen’s disability. David received the sole use, possession and
ownership of the marital home, and any equity in the home. David was further assigned
responsibility for the first and second mortgages on the marital home.
¶4.
David was also given responsibility for various other marital debts. David received
ownership of a Thrift Savings Plan, his PERS retirement account, and the checking and
savings accounts. The chancellor ordered David to pay Helen $2,038.61 in marital assets,
$4,807 for the debt on her credit cards, and lump-sum alimony in the amount of $15,000.
¶5.
On appeal, Helen contends that the chancellor erred in not awarding her permanent
periodic alimony. Both David and Helen are in their forties. Helen is a registered nurse.
However, she had to stop working in 1998 because she suffers from neurofibromatosis,
which she says causes her constant pain. During the course of her marriage to David, Helen
required more than ten surgeries to remove tumors from various parts of her body as a result
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of her illness. Helen receives $770 per month in Social Security disability benefits, and this
check is Helen’s only source of income.
¶6.
David, on the other hand, is in good health and has secure employment as an engineer
for the Army Corps of Engineers in Vicksburg. David earns approximately $83,372 per year.
Because Helen felt that it was in her son’s best interest to remain with his father, she agreed
to move out of the marital home and into a mobile home she owned prior to the marriage that
she rented out during the course of the marriage.
The mobile home is in need of
approximately $7,725 in repairs. Helen pays $420 per month for the mobile home and
insurance. Further, Helen pays $150 per month in rent for the lot on which the mobile home
sits. However, at the time she filed this appeal, she had fallen sixteen months behind in
making this rental payment.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶7.
“A chancellor’s findings of fact will not be disturbed unless manifestly wrong or
clearly erroneous.” Sanderson v. Sanderson, 824 So. 2d 623, 625 (¶8) (Miss. 2002) (citation
omitted). “This Court will not disturb the findings of a chancellor when supported by
substantial evidence unless the chancellor abused his [or her] discretion, was manifestly
wrong, clearly erroneous or an erroneous legal standard was applied.” Id. at 625-26 (¶8)
(citation omitted).
DISCUSSION
I.
¶8.
Helen’s Award of Lump-Sum Alimony
Helen argues that after the property division, a gross disparity between her needs
and her resources requires that she receive permanent periodic alimony from David. David,
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however, argues that Helen only “claims” to be disabled; she drinks excessively; and she
could work if she chose to do so. To support his contention that Helen perhaps exaggerated
her disability, David notes that Helen sought and received possession and ownership of an
off-road ATV 4-wheeler and scuba-diving equipment in the divorce proceedings. Helen
admitted at the divorce hearing that she frequently rode the ATV on rough terrain and that
she was physically able to scuba dive. However, on re-direct examination, Helen stated that
she was unable to scuba dive due to her disability.
¶9.
The Mississippi Supreme Court has expressed that alimony should be considered only
"[i]f the situation is such that an equitable division of marital property, considered with each
party's nonmarital assets, leaves a deficit for one party." Johnson v. Johnson, 650 So. 2d
1281, 1287 (Miss. 1994). Since the decision to award alimony, and the amount thereof, is
a matter of discretion for the chancellor, we will review the chancellor’s award of lump-sum
alimony for abuse of discretion and will only disturb the ruling if it is found to be against the
overwhelming weight of the evidence or manifestly in error. Pearson v. Pearson, 761 So.
2d 157, 165 (¶25) (Miss. 2000).
¶10.
In the present case, the record reflects that the chancellor utilized the guidelines set
forth in Ferguson v. Ferguson, 639 So. 2d 921, 928 (Miss. 1994) to equitably divide David
and Helen’s marital property. In Ferguson, the Mississippi Supreme Court instructed
chancery courts to equitably divide marital assets by following a nonexclusive list of eight
guidelines and "to support their decisions with findings of fact and conclusions of law for
purposes of appellate review.” Id. The supreme court further outlined the steps for applying
the equitable-distribution factors as listed in Ferguson, stating:
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First, the character of the parties' assets, i.e., marital or nonmarital, must be
determined pursuant to Hemsley. The marital property is then equitably
divided, employing the Ferguson factors as guidelines, in light of each parties'
nonmarital property. Ferguson, 639 So. 2d at 928. If there are sufficient
marital assets which, when equitably divided and considered with each
spouse's nonmarital assets, will adequately provide for both parties, no more
need be done. If the situation is such that an equitable division of marital
property, considered with each party's nonmarital assets, leaves a deficit for
one party, then alimony based on the value of nonmarital assets should be
considered. This process does not require divestiture of inherited or
gift-acquired nonmarital property.
Johnson, 650 So. 2d at 1287.
¶11.
Upon review of the record before us, we find that the chancellor properly classified
the parties’ assets as marital or nonmarital, pursuant to Hemsley v. Hemsley, 639 So. 2d 909
(Miss. 1994). The chancellor then applied the Ferguson factors to the parties’ assets, listing
in the judgment her findings of fact and conclusions of law. Ultimately, the chancellor held
that the marital home should be awarded to David, and the parties’ marital assets divided
equally. The chancellor then divided the parties’ debt, leaving David with $177,934.10 of
the debt and Helen with $67,699.10 of the debt. The chancellor determined:
If we subtract Helen’s marital assets from her marital debts, her remaining
debts total $33,410.39. If we subtract Helen’s mortgage from this debt, her
remaining debts total $10,493.39. Helen has equity in the mobile home valued
at $18,083.00 and remaining marital assets totaling $2,038.61. Thus, her net
value, excluding the mortgage of the mobile home, is $9,628.22.
¶12.
The chancellor, recognizing that the marital assets, after equitable division, would
leave Helen with “certainly an equitable deficit,” determined that alimony should be
considered. The chancellor determined Helen’s monthly income to be $777.1
1
When
Helen receives approximately $9,324 a year ($777 a month) in disability payments
as her only source of income.
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determining whether to award alimony, chancellors are guided by the twelve factors set forth
by the supreme court in Armstrong v. Armstrong, 618 So. 2d 1278, 1280 (Miss. 1993). These
factors include:
(1) the income and expenses of the parties; (2) the health and earning
capacities of the parties; (3) the needs of each party; (4) the obligations and
assets of each party; (5) the length of the marriage; (6) the presence or absence
of minor children in the home, which may require that one or both of the
parties either pay, or personally provide, child care; (7) the age of the parties;
(8) the standard of living of the parties, both during the marriage and at the
time of the support determination; (9) the tax consequences of the spousal
support order; (10) fault or misconduct; (11) wasteful dissipation of assets by
either party; or (12) any other factor deemed by the court to be “just and
equitable” in connection with the setting of spousal support.
Ward v. Ward, 825 So. 2d 713, 718 (Miss. Ct. App. 2002) (citing Armstrong, 618 So. 2d at
1280).
¶13.
After applying the Armstrong factors to the facts before her, the chancellor found that
lump-sum alimony should be considered to resolve Helen’s deficit and allow her a fresh start.
When awarding lump-sum alimony, the supreme court has established certain factors to be
considered by the chancellor:
1) substantial contribution to the accumulation of total wealth of the paying
spouse either by quitting a job to become a housewife, or by assisting in the
paying spouse's business; 2) length of the marriage; 3) separate income of the
recipient spouse as compared to that of the paying spouse; and 4) financial
security of the recipient spouse absent the lump[-]sum payment.
Haney v. Haney, 788 So. 2d 862, 865 (¶10) (Miss. Ct. App. 2001) (citation omitted). We
also note that “the single most important factor is the disparity of the separate estates.” Id.
In the case before us, we find that the chancellor did not abuse her discretion in considering
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the Cheatham 2 factors when determining whether an award of lump sum alimony was
appropriate. The chancellor provided an analysis of her application of the Cheatham factors
in her judgment, finding that:
1. Substantial contribution to accumulation of total wealth of the
payor either by quitting a job to become a housewife, or by assisting in the
spouse’s business: Although Helen did not substantially contribute to David’s
accumulation of wealth, she did work for a couple of years during the
marriage, and contributed the money received from the rent of the mobile
home, as well as her public assistance benefits, to the marriage.
2. A long marriage: An eleven[-]year marriage is long enough to
qualify for an award of lump[-]sum alimony. Creekmore.3
3. Where the recipient spouse has no separate income or the
separate estate is meager in comparison: Helen’s public assistance and
estate is meager in comparison to David’s.
4. Without the lump[-]sum award the receiving spouse would lack
any financial security: Most of the repairs needed to the mobile home must
be made before Helen can move into it. Without a lump[-]sum award, Helen
is unable to pay for the necessary repairs to the mobile home while at the same
time paying the mortgage. In other words, without financial assistance, Helen
cannot obtain financial security.
It appears to the court that, from the information provided, David is able
to pay an award of lump[-]sum alimony and still be able to live a normal life
under a reasonable standard of living. The court believes that an appropriate
amount of lump[-]sum alimony is an amount that would allow Helen a fresh
start. A fresh start would be one in which Helen would not have any debts
other than the mobile home mortgage. Thus, the court awards Helen lump[]sum alimony in the amount of $15,000.00.
In sum, the chancellor’s findings reflect that the alimony awarded eliminated Helen’s
“equitable deficit.”
2
Cheatham v. Cheatham, 537 So. 2d 435, 438 (Miss. 1988).
3
Creekmore v. Creekmore, 651 So. 2d 513, 517 (Miss. 1995).
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¶14.
Helen argues that the chancellor’s Armstrong analysis actually showed that the
majority of the factors favored an award of permanent periodic alimony, and the chancellor
erred in deciding upon an award of lump-sum alimony. Helen cites Monroe v. Monroe, 612
So. 2d 353, 357 (Miss. 1992), where the supreme court upheld an award of permanent
periodic alimony due to Mrs. Monroe’s disability and inability to seek employment, even
where the husband was responsible for raising the two children. However, we note that the
facts in Monroe differ significantly from those before us. This Court found that Mrs. Monroe
supported the couple for the first eleven years of their seventeen-year marriage, enabling Mr.
Monroe to pursue an undergraduate degree and a medical degree. Id. at 358. At one point,
when Mr. Monroe was in medical school, Mrs. Monroe worked three jobs to support the
family. Id. She also withdrew the balance of her pension fund to pay the family’s expenses.
Id. The supreme court thus determined that Mrs. Monroe should be entitled to the benefits
of her eleven years of work as the bread-winner of the family. Id. In contrast, the record in
the present case shows that Helen only worked a couple of years during the marriage, and
she did not substantially contribute to David’s accumulation of wealth. We also note that
Helen receives a monthly disability payment.
¶15.
After reviewing the record before us, we note that the chancellor appropriately utilized
the Ferguson factors, as mandated by the supreme court, to determine the equitable division
of David and Helen’s marital property. The chancellor also determined Helen’s need for
alimony by applying the Armstrong factors, subsequently finding that an award of lump-sum
alimony was proper to resolve Helen’s needs by eliminating her debt, thereby providing
financial security to Helen.
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¶16.
We find that the chancellor conducted a thorough factual analysis of Helen’s need for
alimony after equitable division of marital property by using the factors set forth by the
Mississippi Supreme Court. The chancellor’s analysis and findings are supported by the
record in this case. As stated, we will not disturb a chancellor’s findings regarding the
amount of alimony absent an abuse of discretion. Thus, after careful review, we find that the
record does not reflect that the chancellor abused her discretion in awarding Helen lump-sum
alimony. This issue is without merit.
II.
¶17.
Award of Attorney’s Fees on Appeal
In her appellee brief, Helen requests attorney’s fees for the services rendered in
connection with this appeal.
However, we find that the issue of attorney’s fees is
procedurally barred on appeal because Helen failed to cite any relevant authority to support
her argument. Ruff v. Estate of Ruff, 989 So. 2d 366, 372 (¶24) (Miss. 2008).
¶18. THE JUDGMENT OF THE CHANCERY COURT OF WARREN COUNTY IS
AFFIRMED. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO THE
APPELLANT.
LEE AND MYERS, P.JJ., GRIFFIS, ISHEE, ROBERTS AND MAXWELL, JJ.,
CONCUR. BARNES, J., CONCURS IN PART AND IN THE RESULT WITHOUT
SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION. KING, C.J., CONCURS IN RESULT ONLY
WITHOUT SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION. IRVING, J., DISSENTS WITHOUT
SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION.
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