Kirk Vincent Mayers v. State of Mississippi
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2008-KA-01722-COA
KIRK VINCENT MAYERS
APPELLANT
v.
STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
TRIAL JUDGE:
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE:
DISTRICT ATTORNEY:
NATURE OF THE CASE:
TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION:
DISPOSITION:
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
APPELLEE
09/11/2008
HON. SAMAC S. RICHARDSON
RANKIN COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
GEORGE T. HOLMES
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
BY: LAURA HOGAN TEDDER
MICHAEL GUEST
CRIMINAL - FELONY
CONVICTED OF COUNT I, AGGRAVATED
ASSAULT UPON A LAW ENFORCEMENT
OFFICER, AND SENTENCED TO THIRTY
YEARS; COUNT II, AGGRAVATED
ASSAULT UPON A LAW ENFORCEMENT
OFFICER, AND SENTENCED TO THIRTY
YEARS; COUNT III, POSSESSION OF A
STOLEN FIREARM, AND SENTENCED TO
FIVE YEARS; COUNT IV, POSSESSION OF
A FIREARM BY A CONVICTED FELON,
AND SENTENCED TO THREE YEARS,
AND SENTENCED TO TEN ADDITIONAL
YEARS EACH FOR COUNTS I AND II,
WITH THE SENTENCES TO RUN
CONSECUTIVELY IN THE CUSTODY OF
THE MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS WITHOUT ELIGIBILITY
FOR PAROLE OR PROBATION
AFFIRMED IN PART; VACATED AND
REMANDED IN PART - 02/23/2010
BEFORE LEE, P.J., CARLTON AND MAXWELL, JJ.
LEE, P.J., FOR THE COURT:
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
¶1.
Kirk Vincent Mayers was convicted in the Circuit Court of Rankin County of Counts
I and II, aggravated assault on law enforcement officers; Count III, possession of a stolen
firearm; and Count IV, possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. Mayers was sentenced
to thirty years each for Counts I and II, five years for Count III, and three years for Count IV.
Mayers was sentenced to two additional ten-year terms for the use of a firearm during the
commission of a felony. All sentences, totaling eighty-eight years, were ordered to run
consecutively in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections without eligibility
for parole or probation. Mayers filed a motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict
or, in the alternative, a new trial, which was denied by the trial court.
¶2.
Mayers now appeals his convictions and sentences, asserting the following issues: (1)
the indictment charged simple rather than aggravated assault; (2) the State failed to prove that
he knowingly assaulted law enforcement officers; (3) the State failed to prove that he
knowingly possessed a stolen firearm; (4) the trial court erroneously refused a self-defense
instruction; (5) he was entitled to a cautionary instruction concerning his prior convictions;
(6) Juror 18 should have been stricken for cause; (7) the State should have been required to
stipulate to his prior convictions under Count IV; (8) the trial court allowed improper opinion
evidence; and (9) his sentence is illegal. Finding that a portion of Mayers’s sentence was in
error, we remand this case for resentencing. Accordingly, we affirm in part and vacate and
2
remand in part.
FACTS
¶3.
Upon being questioned by an investigator with the Simpson County Sheriff’s
Department, Jonathan Shelly confessed to stealing several items, including a television and
firearms. Shelly told authorities that he had traded the stolen items for drugs at the Crestview
Apartment complex in Pearl. On the way to the apartment complex, Shelly pointed out a car
and stated that the stolen items would be found in the vehicle. An officer with the Pearl
Police Department was called to stop and search the car. Stolen goods were found in the car.
¶4.
Warrants were obtained for the two apartments where Shelly allegedly traded the
stolen items for drugs. The apartment doors were adjacent to each other. Two S.W.A.T.
teams were assembled to execute the warrants. The S.W.A.T. teams knocked, announced
their presence, and made forceful entry into the two apartments. The first apartment was
secured quickly. Upon opening the door of the second apartment, gunshots came from
inside. Jake Windham and Philip Arrant, officers with the Pearl Police Department and
members of the Pearl S.W.A.T. team, were injured by the gunshots. Officer Windham was
shot in the left knee, and Officer Arrant was shot in the right hand. Mayers was found inside
lying on the kitchen floor and, subsequently, was arrested. A .22-caliber pistol, which
matched the description of the stolen weapon, was found on the floor near Mayers.
DISCUSSION
I.
¶5.
COUNTS I AND II OF THE INDICTMENT
Mayers argues that his convictions under Counts I and II should be reversed and
3
remanded or, in the alternative, that he should be resentenced on the lesser charge of simple
assault on law enforcement officers because the indictment did not specifically state that
Mayers used a “deadly weapon.” The issue of whether an indictment is fatally defective is
a question of law, which is reviewed de novo. Qualls v. State, 947 So. 2d 365, 369 (¶9)
(Miss. Ct. App. 2007).
¶6.
Count I of the indictment states:
KIRK VINCENT MAYERS . . . did unlawfully, feloniously, purposely and
knowingly, cause or attempt to cause bodily injury to Officer Jake Windham,
a law enforcement officer with the Pearl Police Department, by shooting the
officer in the leg with a gun, knowing the officer was acting within the course
and scope of his official duties in violation of Mississippi Code Annotated §
97-3-7 . . . .
(Emphasis added). Count II of the indictment states:
And, based upon a series of acts connected together and constituting parts of
a common scheme and plan, KIRK VINCENT MAYERS . . . did unlawfully,
feloniously, purposely and knowingly, cause or attempt to cause bodily injury
to Officer Phillip [sic] Arrant, a law enforcement officer with the Pearl Police
Department, by shooting at the officer with a gun, knowing the officer was
acting within the course and scope of his official duties in violation of
Mississippi Code Annotated § 97-3-7 . . . .
(Emphasis added). Mayers argues that the indictment is unclear because the word “gun”
does not necessarily refer to a “handgun.” Mayers argues that a “gun” could refer to a paint
gun, staple gun, toy gun, or grease gun.
¶7.
Uniform Rule of Circuit and County Court 7.06 states the requirements for the
substance of an indictment as follows:
The indictment upon which the defendant is to be tried shall be a plain, concise
and definite written statement of the essential facts constituting the offense
4
charged and shall fully notify the defendant of the nature and cause of the
accusation. Formal and technical words are not necessary in an indictment, if
the offense can be substantially described without them. . . .
¶8.
The heading of Mayers’s indictment states that he is being charged with aggravated
assault on a law enforcement officer. Counts I and II state the statute under which he was
charged. Count I states that Mayers shot Officer Windham “in the leg with a gun,” and
Count II states that Mayers caused or attempted to cause Officer Arrant bodily injury “by
shooting at the officer with a gun.” As Rule 7.06 states: “Formal and technical words are not
necessary in an indictment, if the offense can be substantially described without them.” We
find that it is clear from the indictment that Mayers injured the two police officers with a
deadly weapon. Therefore, we find that this issue is without merit.
II.
¶9.
KNOWING ASSAULT
Mayers argues that the State failed to prove an essential element of aggravated assault
on a law enforcement officer because he did not knowingly shoot the law enforcement
officers. Mayers asserts that he thought someone was breaking into the apartment and fired
a gun toward the door in self-defense.
¶10.
Mississippi Code Annotated section 97-3-7(2) (Supp. 2009) states, in part, that:
A person is guilty of aggravated assault if he . . . (b) attempts to cause or
purposely or knowingly causes bodily injury to another with a deadly weapon
or other means likely to produce death or serious bodily harm . . . .
The statute goes on to provide for an enhanced penalty if aggravated assault is committed
upon a law enforcement officer who is acting within the scope of his duty. Id.
¶11.
In Dotson v. State, 358 So. 2d 1321, 1322 (Miss. 1978), the supreme court addressed
5
the issue of whether it is necessary for the accused to have knowledge that the individual
assaulted was a police officer in order to sustain a conviction for simple assault on a law
enforcement officer. In Dotson, two police officers had a search warrant to search Frederick
Dotson’s vehicle. Id. at 1321. One of the officers approached Dotson’s car while it was
stopped at a red light; walked up to Dotson’s open window; and shouted, “Dotson, freeze
police.” Id. The officer was wearing nothing that would identify him as a police officer, and
he was driving an unmarked car. Id. The officer testified that Dotson pointed a gun at him
and drove off at a high rate of speed. Id. Dotson was found guilty of simple assault on a law
enforcement officer. Id. However, his conviction was reversed on appeal and remanded for
the jury to determine whether he knew that the man who approached his vehicle was a police
officer. Id. at 1323. In its opinion, the supreme court stated:
When there is no doubt of the defendant’s unlawful intention, knowledge of
the official capacity of the victim is invariably unnecessary; the assailant takes
his victim as he finds him. But if the defendant asserts a lack of intention or
wilfulness based upon ignorance of the identity of the victim and ignorance of
the victim’s official privilege to interfere with the defendant’s person or
freedom of movement, the jury must be allowed to consider the defendant’s
evidence tending to show that he was ignorant of the official capacity of the
victim.
Id.
¶12.
Mayers argues that he could not have known the person he shot was a law
enforcement officer because he never saw him. Mayers testified that he and his girlfriend,
Serfina Martin, were asleep and did not hear the officers announce their presence. He
testified that he kept a pistol with him because his girlfriend’s ex-boyfriend was getting out
6
of jail soon and had made threats against Mayers. At approximately 11:51 p.m., he heard a
loud noise at the door. He woke up and retrieved the gun. As he approached the front door,
the door opened from the outside, and Mayers opened fire.
¶13.
We find that the question of whether Mayers committed a knowing assault was for the
jury to decide, and the jury was properly instructed on this issue. Jury instruction number
seven stated that in order to find Mayers guilty, the jury must find from the evidence, beyond
a reasonable doubt that:
1. [Mayers], on or about May 5, 2006, in Rankin County, Mississippi,
2. did unlawfully, purposely and knowingly cause bodily injury to Jake
Windham,
3. by shooting Jake Windham in the leg with a deadly weapon, to-wit: a gun,
4. At a time when [Mayers] knew, or reasonably should have known, that the
said Jake Windham was acting within the course and scope of his duties as a
law enforcement officer for the Pearl Police Department . . . .
Jury instruction number eight was identical except Officer Arrant’s name was substituted for
Officer Windham’s name.
¶14.
Archie Bennett, a narcotics detective with the Pearl Police Department, was present
on the day of the shootings. Detective Bennett testified that the officers knocked on each
apartment door, and the entire S.W.A.T. team repeatedly yelled: “Pearl Police. Search
warrant. Open the door.” Officer Mark Mooney with the Pearl Police Department also
testified that he was present at the scene. Officer Mooney was in charge of breaching the
doorway of the first apartment. He testified that the ten-member team yelled: “Pearl police.
Search warrant. Open the door.” He testified that the first apartment was secured by half of
the team before the other half breached the door of the second apartment. Officer Jerry Adair
7
testified that during the time that he and the other officers were knocking and announcing
their presence, he saw people coming out of other apartments to ask what was happening.
¶15.
Investigator Bernard Gunter, captain of investigations with the Simpson County
Sheriff’s Department, testified that he rode to the scene of the search and was stationed
outside the vehicle, which was approximately seventy-five yards from the doorway of the
apartment. He testified that he could clearly hear the S.W.A.T. team announce “Pearl Police
Department” several times from his location.
¶16.
Officer Arrant testified that all members of the team were announcing their presence
as loudly as they could. Officer Arrant testified that Officer Windham rammed the door four
or five times with a ramming device, but it did not open. Officer Windham then tried to ram
the door with his shoulder several times before trying the ramming device again. He hit the
door with the ramming device one or two more times, and the door opened. Sergeant
Timothy Sarret was present and testified that the team announced their presence by knocking
on the door and repeatedly yelling: “Police. Search warrant.” Sergeant Sarret went on to
testify that as the officers tried to ram the door open, he “could actually see a figure through
. . . the peephole . . . .” He testified that as shots came from inside the doorway, “[t]he
silhouette [was] actually right in front of me[,] and [it was] actually starting to move to my
left.”
¶17.
Officer Arrant testified that he and the other members of the team were wearing
tactical vests with the word “Police” clearly displayed on the front, back, and sleeves. The
officer closest to the door carried a shield which read “Pearl Police Department” on the front.
8
Sergeant Farris Thompson, who was the S.W.A.T. team leader, testified that of the ten men
present, eight were wearing S.W.A.T. flight suits, tactical vests, and helmets; and two were
wearing regular Pearl Police Department uniforms.
¶18.
When reviewing the legal sufficiency of the evidence, “the relevant question is
whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any
rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable
doubt.” Bush v. State, 895 So. 2d 836, 843 (¶16) (Miss. 2005) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia,
443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)). Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, we
find that the jury was presented with sufficient evidence to determine that Mayers knew or
should have known that the men outside his door were police officers. Therefore, we find
that this issue is without merit.
III.
¶19.
SCIENTER
Mayers argues that the State failed to prove that he knew the firearm he used in the
shootings was stolen; therefore, he argues that this Court should reverse and render the jury’s
verdict as to Count III.
¶20.
Mississippi Code Annotated section 97-37-35(1) (Rev. 2006) states: “It is unlawful
for any person knowingly or intentionally to possess, receive, retain, acquire or obtain
possession or dispose of a stolen firearm or attempt to possess, receive, retain, acquire or
obtain possession or dispose of a stolen firearm.” “Guilty knowledge must be both alleged
and proved by the State for a conviction to stand.” Long v. State, 933 So. 2d 1056, 1058 (¶6)
(Miss. Ct. App. 2006). “For the State to prove guilty knowledge, it must prove that [the
9
defendant] received the property under circumstances that would lead a reasonable person
to believe that it was stolen.” Id. (citing Ellett v. State, 364 So. 2d 669, 670 (Miss. 1978)).
¶21.
The jury heard the informant, Shelly, testify that he gave Mayers a .22-caliber pistol
in exchange for crack cocaine. Shelly testified that Mayers knew the pistol was stolen, and
Mayers was trying to sell it quickly because it was a stolen gun. Even though Mayers did
not witness the theft of the gun, we find that the circumstances under which the gun was
obtained would lead a reasonable juror to believe that it was stolen. Therefore, we find that
this issue is without merit.
IV.
¶22.
SELF-DEFENSE JURY INSTRUCTION
Mayers next argues that it was error for the trial court to refuse his proposed jury
instruction on self-defense as a defense to the charge of being a felon in possession of a
firearm.
¶23.
“When a trial court fails to give a jury instruction, this Court must review the jury
instructions as a whole to determine whether reversible error was committed.” Lenard v.
State, 828 So. 2d 232, 236 (¶21) (Miss. Ct. App. 2002). “[T]he court may refuse an
instruction which incorrectly states the law, is covered fairly elsewhere in the instructions,
or is without foundation in the evidence.” Id. (quoting Heidel v. State, 587 So. 2d 835, 842
(Miss. 1991)).
¶24.
Proposed jury instruction D-11 states:
If you find from the evidence in this case beyond a reasonable doubt that:
1. The defendant, Kirk Mayers, has been previously convicted of a felony; and
10
2. The defendant had in his possession a pistol;
3. Not in necessary self-defense;
then you shall find the defendant guilty of possession of a firearm by a
convicted felon.
¶25.
This Court has held that “self-defense is not a viable defense to possession of a
firearm by a convicted felon. Possession of a firearm by a convicted felon is a criminal act
void of a third party to defend against.” Williams v. State, 953 So. 2d 260, 263 (¶8) (Miss.
Ct. App. 2006). However, “necessity is a valid defense to possession of a firearm by a
convicted felon.” Id. at (¶9). “In order to be entitled to a defense of necessity, the defendant
must prove the following: (1) the act charged was done to prevent a significant evil[;] (2)
there was no adequate alternative[;] and (3) the harm caused was not disproportionate to the
harm avoided.” Id. at 263-64 (¶9).
¶26.
We find that the jury instruction, as requested, incorrectly states the law and was
properly refused. We also find that if the requested instruction had been a defense of
necessity, the instruction would have been without foundation in the evidence. Therefore,
we find that this issue is without merit.
V.
¶27.
CAUTIONARY INSTRUCTION
Mayers argues that the trial court erred in failing to grant his requested cautionary jury
instruction regarding possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. Proposed jury instruction
D-8 stated:
The Court instructs the [j]ury that any prior convictions of Kirk Mayers are not
evidence that the defendant committed the crime alleged in the indictment. A
prior conviction is merely one element of the crime charged in the indictment.
11
You only use that evidence, if any, in determining whether the [S]tate has met
their burden of proof that Kirk Mayers is a convicted felon. You should not
consider this element as evidence that Kirk Mayers possessed the firearm in
question.
¶28.
The trial court possesses considerable discretion in determining whether to grant or
deny jury instructions. Bickham v. Grant, 861 So. 2d 299, 301 (¶8) (Miss. 2003). The trial
court refused this instruction, as written, on the grounds that it was confusing and not a
correct statement of the law. We find that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in
making this determination. Instead of simply being a cautionary instruction, instruction D-8
goes on to state that the jury “should not consider this element as evidence that Kirk Mayers
possessed the firearm in question.” Mayers did not deny possession of the firearm; therefore,
this was not an issue for the jury to decide. The supreme court has held that “it would be
error to grant an instruction which is likely to mislead or confuse the jury as to the principles
of law applicable to the facts in evidence.” Id. (quoting Southland Enterprises, Inc. v.
Newton County, 838 So. 2d 286, 289 (¶9) (Miss. 2003)). Since this instruction would have
misled or confused the jury, we find that Mayers’s argument on appeal is without merit.
VI.
¶29.
FOR CAUSE DETERMINATION
Mayers argues that Juror 18, Charles Tucker, should have been stricken for cause
because he said he had work-related matters which would distract him from focusing on
Mayers’s case. Mayers exhausted all of his peremptory challenges, and Tucker was placed
on the jury.
¶30.
“Excusing jurors for cause is in the complete discretion of the trial court.” Berry v.
12
State, 703 So. 2d 269, 292 (¶85) (Miss. 1997). Other than stating that he would have a
difficult time paying attention because of work-related matters, Tucker did not otherwise
indicate any bias or prejudice or any other reason why he should not be on the jury. When
Mayers’s attorney brought Tucker’s statement to the court’s attention, the trial judge replied
that he had asked the potential jurors the same questions the previous day when the grand
jury convened, and Tucker did not respond. The trial judge stated: “He should have told me.
He’s going to have to endure it. He had every opportunity to tell me that Monday.”
¶31.
A presumption exists that the trial court impaneled a fair and impartial jury. Ross v.
State, 954 So. 2d 968, 988 (¶31) (Miss. 2007). “To overcome this presumption, a party must
present evidence indicating that the jury was not fair and impartial and show that prejudice
resulted from the circuit court’s handling of the voir dire.” Id. Mayers has not argued that
any prejudice resulted from the impaneling of Juror 18. Therefore, we find that this issue is
without merit.
VII.
¶32.
PRIOR CONVICTIONS
Mayers argues that any probative value of introducing his prior convictions was
outweighed by the prejudice it caused. Mayers offered to stipulate to the existence of his
prior felony convictions in order to avoid potential prejudice by the jury.
¶33.
Mayers was previously convicted of house burglary and auto burglary. At the time
of the shootings, Mayers was on probation with thirteen years to serve if his probation was
revoked. The State admitted that it would have accepted the stipulation if it was only trying
to prove that Mayers was a felon in possession of a firearm. However, the State argues that
13
the introduction of the prior convictions was necessary to show motive. The State argues that
Mayers shot at the officers because he knew there were stolen goods inside the apartment,
and if the police entered, his probation would be revoked.
¶34.
Mississippi Rule of Evidence 404(b) states:
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the
character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith.
It may, however, be admissible for other purposes such as proof of motive,
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of
mistake or accident.
¶35.
The trial court found it necessary to introduce Mayers’s prior judgment of conviction
and sentencing order because it was part of the State’s theory of the case to show motive for
the aggravated assault on the law enforcement officers. The documents showed the terms
of Mayers’s sentence and the reasons why his probation could be revoked. The trial court
determined that the probative value of the prior convictions outweighed any prejudicial
effect.
¶36.
In Sawyer v. State, 2 So. 3d 655, 656 (¶1) (Miss. Ct. App. 2008), Charlie Sawyer was
charged with armed robbery and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. The State
sought to introduce two prior convictions of armed robbery to establish that Sawyer was a
felon. Id. at 658 (¶13). Sawyer offered to stipulate his status as a convicted felon. Id. The
trial court denied Sawyer’s request and allowed evidence of the prior convictions to be
introduced into evidence. Id. On appeal, this Court reversed and remanded, finding that “the
probative value of Sawyer’s prior armed robbery convictions [was] substantially outweighed
by the danger of unfair prejudice because the jury would use Sawyer’s prior convictions as
14
evidence in considering [the charge of armed robbery].” Id. at 661 (¶28). We found that the
facts of Sawyer were identical to those in Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172 (1997),
where the United States Supreme Court found that the risk of prejudice was too great when
“the prior conviction is for an offense likely to support conviction on some improper ground
. . . .” Id. at 659 (¶20) (quoting Old Chief, 519 U.S. at 191). This Court also noted that a
stipulation would have been sufficient because the State did not offer the prior convictions
as an exception under Rule 404(b). Id. at 660 (¶27).
¶37.
We review the trial court’s “rulings on the admission or exclusion of evidence for
abuse of discretion.” Williams v. State, 960 So. 2d 506, 510 (¶11) (Miss. Ct. App. 2006).
We cannot find that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing evidence of the prior
convictions. First, this case is distinguishable from Sawyer because the prior felonies were
introduced to show the State’s theory of motive. Second, the introduction of the sentencing
report was necessary to show the terms of Mayers’s probation. Finally, we find that the
introduction of Mayers’s prior convictions was not unduly prejudicial because the prior
convictions were not being used to show Mayers’s character or that he acted in conformity
with a previous crime, as the charges of burglary are distinct from the charges of aggravated
assault. This issue is without merit.
VIII. OPINION EVIDENCE
¶38.
Mayers argues that Brian Ellis, an investigator with the Pearl Police Department, was
allowed to give improper opinion evidence regarding the trajectory of the bullets fired by
Mayers’s gun.
15
¶39.
Ellis was not qualified by the trial court as an expert. Ellis testified as to what he
observed when he investigated the crime scene. Ellis testified that he found four shell
casings in the living room. He found a bullet fragment lodged in an entertainment center in
the apartment directly across from the apartment Mayers occupied. Ellis testified that the
doors of the two apartments were directly across from one another. Ellis identified a picture
of the apartment door with a bullet hole in it.
¶40.
Mississippi Rule of Evidence 701 states that a lay person’s testimony is limited to
“opinions or inferences which are (a) rationally based on the perception of the witness, (b)
helpful to the clear understanding of the testimony or the determination of a fact in issue, and
(c) not based on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge within the scope of Rule
702.”
¶41.
Mayers argues that Ellis’s testimony as to the path of the bullets was an area requiring
expert testimony because ballistics investigation is within the scope of Mississippi Rule of
Evidence 702. Ellis’s testimony was nothing more than his opinion based on his personal
observations. We find that Ellis’s testimony was not intended to prove any ballistic evidence
since Mayers admitted to shooting the officers. Therefore, we find that this issue is without
merit.
IX.
¶42.
LEGALITY OF SENTENCE
Mayers argues that his sentence was illegal for five reasons that we will address
separately. Finding that Mayers’s argument regarding the application of Mississippi Code
Annotated section 97-37-37(2) (Supp. 2009) has merit, we will discuss it first. All other
16
issues raised are without merit.
A.
¶43.
Ex Post Facto Application of Section 97-37-37(2)
Mayers argues that his sentence violated the prohibition against ex post facto
application of criminal penalties. Mayers notes that Mississippi Code Annotated section 9737-37(2) became effective on July 1, 2007, and the crime at issue was committed on May 5,
2006.
¶44.
Mayers was sentenced to thirty years on each count of aggravated assault. The trial
court then used section 97-37-37(2) to add an additional ten years to each of the aggravated
assault sentences. Section 97-37-37(2) states:
Except to the extent that a greater minimum sentence is otherwise provided by
any other provision of law, any convicted felon who uses or displays a firearm
during the commission of any felony shall, in addition to the punishment
provided for such felony, be sentenced to an additional term of imprisonment
in the custody of the Department of Corrections of ten (10) years, to run
consecutively, not concurrently, which sentence shall not be reduced or
suspended.
¶45.
We find that Mayers failed to raise a constitutional challenge at trial and, therefore,
waived this issue. Rogers v. State, 928 So. 2d 831, 834 (¶8) (Miss. 2006). Mayers’s attorney
objected to the application of section 97-37-37 on the basis of notice, but no argument is
made regarding its ex post facto application. The supreme court “has consistently held that
constitutional questions not raised at the lower court will not be reviewed on appeal.” Id.
Therefore, we find that Mayers is procedurally barred from raising this issue on appeal.
Porter v. State, 749 So. 2d 250, 259 (¶34) (Miss. Ct. App. 1999).
¶46.
Notwithstanding the procedural bar, we may address this issue under the plain-error
17
doctrine because it affects Mayers’s substantive rights. Id. at 260-61 (¶36). “Article 3,
section 16 of the Mississippi Constitution of 1890 prohibits those laws which retroactively
change the definition of crimes or increase the punishment for criminal offenses.” Id. at 260
(¶35). We agree with Mayers that his substantive rights were violated by the ex post facto
application of section 97-37-37(2). We find this case analogous to Porter. In Porter, Robert
Porter, Jr., was convicted of felony driving under the influence (DUI). Porter, 749 So. 2d
at 252 (¶2). Porter received an enhanced penalty based on the fact that he had two or more
DUI convictions within the past ten years. Id. at 260 (¶34). However, this Court found the
statute that was in effect at the time of the incident only allowed the enhanced penalty to be
applied if two or more DUI offenses occurred within five years of the current offense. Id.
Therefore, Porter’s offense was a misdemeanor rather than a felony. Id. at (¶35). This Court
reversed the case based on the plain-error doctrine and remanded for resentencing pursuant
to the statute that was in effect at the time of Porter’s arrest. Id. at 261 (¶39).
¶47.
We find that the error in Mayers’s sentencing constituted plain error because section
97-37-37(2) did not become effective until after the crime occurred. Instead, Mississippi
Code Annotated section 97-37-37(1) (Supp. 2009), which first became effective on July 1,
2004, was in effect at the time of the crime and was applicable to Mayers’s sentencing.
Section 97-37-37(1) states:
Except to the extent that a greater minimum sentence is otherwise provided by
any other provision of law, any person who uses or displays a firearm during
the commission of any felony shall, in addition to the punishment provided for
such felony, be sentenced to an additional term of imprisonment in the custody
of the Department of Corrections of five (5) years, which sentence shall not be
18
reduced or suspended.
Therefore, because the statute under which Mayers was sentenced was not in effect at the
time his crime was committed, we vacate the two ten-year sentences ordered as sentence
enhancements to the sentences for Counts I and II, and we remand this case for the limited
purpose of resentencing on the sentence enhancements in Counts I and II.
B.
¶48.
Sentence Enhancement
Mayers argues that the statute under which his sentences for aggravated assault were
enhanced does not apply. We will not address this issue as we have found that section 97-3737(2) was not applicable to Mayers’s sentence. However, to the extent that Mayers argues
that the trial court erred in applying the sentence enhancement more than once, we find that
there is no prohibition on multiple applications of this statute. This issue is without merit.
C.
¶49.
Double Jeopardy
Mayers next argues that the application of Mississippi Code Annotated section 97-37-
37 constitutes double jeopardy because it requires proof of the same elements as the
underlying crimes. See Houston v. State, 887 So. 2d 808, 814 (¶23) (Miss. Ct. App. 2004)
(“Double jeopardy allows a defendant to be protected against . . . multiple punishments for
the same offense.”). Mayers argues that the “use” of a firearm element was contained in the
aggravated assault offenses; thus, no additional proof was necessary under section 97-37-37.
We will address this issue even though subsection (2) was incorrectly applied because “use”
or “display” of a firearm is required by both subsections (1) and (2).
¶50.
Mayers admits that sentence enhancements do not typically trigger double jeopardy
19
violations; however, Mayers argues that it is not clear whether the statute creates a new
offense or operates as an enhancement. We find that this argument is procedurally barred
because it was not raised at trial. Notwithstanding the procedural bar, we find that this
argument is without merit. Section 97-37-37, which is entitled: “Enhanced penalty for use
of firearm during commission of felony,” is clearly a sentence enhancement and does not set
out separate elements of the underlying felony. We find that this issue is without merit.
D.
¶51.
Apprendi
Next, Mayers argues that the sentence enhancement was not in the indictment and that
the jury did not make findings as required by Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
Apprendi states that “[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the
penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury,
and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 490. Mayers argues that his case is analogous
to Brown v. State, 995 So. 2d 698 (Miss. 2008), which was decided after he was convicted
and sentenced. In Brown, Jureka Brown’s sentence for the sale of cocaine was doubled
because the offense occurred within 1,500 feet of a church. Id. at 701 (¶6). On appeal, the
supreme court vacated the sentence enhancement because the trial judge, rather than the jury,
decided whether Brown was within 1,500 feet of a church. Id. at 704 (¶27). Citing
Apprendi, the supreme court found that “the Sixth Amendment requires that the issue of
Brown’s sentence enhancement be submitted to a jury.” Id. at 705 (¶29). The supreme court
noted that the testimony was unclear on Brown’s distance from the church or whether the
building was even an operating church. Id. at 704 (¶26).
20
¶52.
Despite making this argument, Mayers does not cite to any specific element of the
statute that was not decided by the jury. Brown is distinguishable from the case at hand
because the jury, rather than the trial judge, decided all the elements of the sentence
enhancement. The jury found beyond a reasonable doubt that Mayers was a convicted felon
and that Mayers used a firearm during the commission of a felony. Each factor of section
97-37-37 is contained in the indictment and was submitted to the jury. No other factors were
required to be determined by section 97-37-37 that had not already been decided by the jury.
Therefore, we find that this issue is without merit.
E.
¶53.
Proportionality of Sentence to Crime
Finally, Mayers argues that his sentence was unconstitutionally disproportionate to
the crimes charged. As a general rule, a sentence that does not exceed the maximum period
allowed by statute will not be disturbed on appeal. Wallace v. State, 607 So. 2d 1184, 1188
(Miss. 1992). However, a sentence that is “grossly disproportionate” to the crime committed
is subject to attack on Eighth Amendment grounds. Id.
¶54.
“[A]s the Mississippi Supreme Court has said on countless occasions, ‘[s]o long as
the sentence imposed is within the statutory limits, sentencing is generally a matter of trial
court discretion.’” Williams v. State, 784 So. 2d 230, 237 (¶19) (Miss. Ct. App. 2000)
(quoting Green v. State, 631 So. 2d 167, 176 (Miss. 1994)). The gravity of the offense in this
case was very high, and we find that the sentence imposed was not unduly harsh. Mayers
states that “the gravity of the offense was moderately high, but the sentence was extreme and
greater than sentences imposed in the same jurisdiction and others.” However, Mayers does
21
not cite to any case law to provide examples of similarly-situated defendants who received
lesser sentences.
¶55.
Since we find that a threshold comparison reveals that Mayers’s sentence was not
grossly disproportionate, no constitutional analysis is necessary under Hoops v. State, 681
So. 2d 521, 538 (Miss. 1996). See also Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 292 (1983) (overruled
in part by Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 965-66 (1991)). Therefore, we find that this
issue is without merit.
CONCLUSION
¶56.
We find that Mayers was erroneously sentenced pursuant to section 97-37-37(2),
which was not in effect at the time his crime was committed. Mayers should have been
sentenced pursuant to section 97-37-37(1), which became effective on July 1, 2004. Section
97-37-37(1) requires a sentence enhancement of five years for each count of aggravated
assault because Mayers used a firearm during the commission of the felonies. The sentence
enhancement under Counts I and II is vacated, and this case is remanded for resentencing
pursuant to the law in effect at the time of Mayers’s crime. We find that all other issues
raised in this appeal are without merit.
¶57. THE JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT OF RANKIN COUNTY OF
CONVICTION OF COUNT I, AGGRAVATED ASSAULT UPON A LAW
ENFORCEMENT OFFICER, AND SENTENCE OF THIRTY YEARS; COUNT II,
AGGRAVATED ASSAULT UPON A LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER, AND
SENTENCE OF THIRTY YEARS; COUNT III, POSSESSION OF A STOLEN
FIREARM, AND SENTENCE OF FIVE YEARS; AND COUNT IV, POSSESSION OF
A FIREARM BY A CONVICTED FELON, AND SENTENCE OF THREE YEARS,
WITH THE SENTENCES TO RUN CONSECUTIVELY IN THE CUSTODY OF THE
MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS WITHOUT ELIGIBILITY FOR
22
PAROLE OR PROBATION, IS AFFIRMED. THE SENTENCE ENHANCEMENTS
FOR COUNTS I AND II ARE VACATED, AND THIS CASE IS REMANDED FOR
THE LIMITED PURPOSE OF RESENTENCING CONSISTENT WITH THIS
OPINION. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO RANKIN
COUNTY.
KING, C.J., MYERS, P.J., GRIFFIS, BARNES, ISHEE, ROBERTS AND
CARLTON, JJ., CONCUR. MAXWELL, J., SPECIALLY CONCURS WITH
SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION JOINED BY BARNES AND ROBERTS, JJ.
IRVING, J., NOT PARTICIPATING.
MAXWELL, J., SPECIALLY CONCURRING:
¶58.
I agree with the result reached by the majority. However, I write separately to address
a matter that has not yet been confronted by Mississippi’s appellate courts – application of
the firearm penalties set forth in Mississippi Code Annotated section 97-37-37 (Supp. 2009).
Section 97-37-37(1) provides:
Except to the extent that a greater minimum sentence is otherwise provided by
any other provision of law, any person who uses or displays a firearm during
the commission of any felony shall, in addition to the punishment provided for
such felony, be sentenced to an additional term of imprisonment in the custody
of the Department of Corrections of five (5) years, which sentence shall not be
reduced or suspended.
If the firearm is used or displayed by a previously convicted felon, a mandatory ten-year
consecutive sentence applies. See Miss. Code Ann. § 97-37-37(2).
¶59.
In Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000), the United States Supreme
Court instructed: “Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty
for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and
proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” In the case before us, the circuit judge increased
Mayers’s sentence “beyond the prescribed statutory maximum” of thirty years’ imprisonment
23
on each of the two aggravated assault counts. Thus, Apprendi’s dictates were clearly
triggered.
¶60.
I agree with the majority that by returning guilty verdicts on the substantive
aggravated-assault and firearm-possession counts, the jury made the necessary factual
findings that Mayers used or displayed a firearm in the commission of another crime as
required by section 97-37-37.
¶61.
Though Mississippi courts have not addressed this specific issue, Florida courts have
held where an indictment alleges “the crime was committed with a firearm and the jury finds
that the defendant committed the crime as charged, the jury has necessarily found use of a
firearm.” Hunter v. State, 828 So. 2d 1038, 1039 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002) (citing State v.
Hargrove, 694 So. 2d 729, 731 (Fla. 1997), abrogated on other grounds by Galindez v. State,
955 So. 2d 517, 522-23 (Fla. 2007)). Other states have similarly reasoned that such findings
satisfy the Apprendi requirement that the element of use of a firearm was charged, submitted
to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. See People v. Rhodes, 281 A.D.2d 225,
227-28 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001); Clark v. State, 621 N.W.2d 576, 581-82 (N.D. 2001); Parker
v. State, 754 N.E.2d 614, 618-19 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001); State v. McLean, 779 A.2d 1128,
1129, 1134-35 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001); State v. Walker, 789 So. 2d 86, 90-91 (La.
Ct. App. 2001).
¶62.
However, situations arise where firearms are employed during the commission of a
felony, but their use or display are not required elements of the charged predicate offense.
For example, if a firearm is employed during a sexual battery, simply proving each element
24
of the sexual-battery charge would not cover the necessary elements of use or display of a
firearm. And in such instances, unless the circuit judge sentences the defendant well below
the statutory maximum, Apprendi would prohibit the additional five and ten-year sentences
provided in section 97-37-37(1) and (2).
¶63.
In situations where the predicate offense does not contain the elements of use or
display of a firearm, there are essentially two ways to trigger the enhanced penalties in
97-37-37(1) and (2). The first method is for prosecutors to charge section 97-37-37 in the
indictment. Indeed, Title 18, Section 924(c)(1)(A) of the United States Code (Supp. 2009)
– the federal firearm counterpart, which Mississippi’s enhanced penalties in section 97-37-37
appear to have been modeled after – has since its inception been charged and presented to
the jury in connection with the underlying predicate felony offense. This approach clearly
complies with Apprendi and creates another arrow in the prosecutor’s quiver to fight felony
crimes during which firearms are used or displayed. This method also provides notice to
criminal defendants that they will be imprisoned for an additional five or ten years if they
proceed to trial and are convicted of using or displaying a firearm.
¶64.
A second approach entails submission of a special verdict form to the jury that
requires deliberation and jury findings beyond a reasonable doubt on the separate elements
of the firearm enhancement. While this second method has been approved by the Florida
Supreme Court, see State v. Iseley, 944 So. 2d 227, 230-31 (Fla. 2006), there are questions
whether it meets the notice requirements set forth in Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227,
243 n.6 (1999) (holding that the Due Process Clause and Sixth Amendment require that any
25
fact other than a prior conviction that increases the maximum penalty for a crime must be
charged in the indictment).
¶65.
In my opinion, the first method of simply charging section 97-37-37 in the indictment
would create the least confusion among the bench and bar and would meet constitutional
notice and due process requirements as well as the dictates of Apprendi.
BARNES AND ROBERTS, JJ., JOIN THIS OPINION.
26
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.