Loretha Pauline Logan Murray v. State of Mississippi
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2008-KA-01039-COA
LORETHA PAULINE LOGAN MURRAY
APPELLANT
v.
STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
APPELLEE
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
TRIAL JUDGE:
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE:
DISTRICT ATTORNEY:
NATURE OF THE CASE:
TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION:
DISPOSITION:
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
06/12/2008
HON. MARCUS D. GORDON
SCOTT COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
EDMUND J. PHILLIPS
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
BY: W. GLENN WATTS
MARK SHELDON DUNCAN
CRIMINAL - FELONY
CONVICTED OF CREDIT CARD FRAUD
AND SENTENCED TO THREE YEARS IN
THE CUSTODY OF THE MISSISSIPPI
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND
TO PAY A $1,000 FINE AND $1,000 IN
RESTITUTION TO THE VICTIM
AFFIRMED - 10/13/2009
BEFORE LEE, P.J., GRIFFIS AND ROBERTS, JJ.
LEE, P.J., FOR THE COURT:
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
¶1.
Loretha Pauline Logan Murray was found guilty by a Scott County Circuit Court jury
of one count of credit card fraud. Murray was sentenced to serve three years in the custody
of the Mississippi Department of Corrections and ordered to pay a $1,000 fine and $1,000
in restitution to the victim. Murray subsequently filed a motion for a new trial, which was
denied. Murray now appeals, asserting four issues that we find appropriate to condense as
follows: (1) the trial court erred in overruling two Batson objections; (2) her confession was
inadmissible; and (3) the verdict is against the overwhelming weight of the evidence.
Finding no error, we affirm.
FACTS
¶2.
Murray, accompanied by her sister, Leslie Lashika Lay, visited the Lackey Hospital
in Forest, Mississippi, to see her podiatrist, Dr. Denver Carter. Dr. Carter’s wife, Amarylis
Carter, was present at the office during Murray’s appointment. Mrs. Carter had placed her
purse in Dr. Carter’s office, which the patients normally did not enter. After Murray’s
appointment ended, Murray stated that Lay said to her, “I ought to get it,” and entered the
office. Once the two women were in Murray’s car, Lay showed Murray the wallet. Murray
called her mother, who lived in Georgia, and informed her that Lay had taken a wallet
containing a credit card. According to Murray, the women were unsure of how to get cash
from the card, and Murray’s mother told them they could wire the money to themselves
through Western Union. Murray called Western Union and was informed that it was possible
to use a credit card to wire money.
¶3.
At this point, Lay was holding the phone and following Western Union’s automated
instructions. Murray stated that the phone was on speaker, and when a Western Union
employee took over the call, Murray helped Lay answer questions. When Lay was prompted
for a dollar amount to wire, Murray stated that she told her, “don’t go crazy.” Lay then said,
“One thousand?,” and Murray nodded her head “yes.”
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¶4.
At some point, Dr. Carter’s wife noticed that her wallet was missing, including a Visa
credit card, and notified the Forest Police Department. Mrs. Carter testified that $1,000 was
removed from her bank account within two hours after her wallet was stolen. Both Dr. and
Mrs. Carter testified that Murray came to their office sometime later and apologized for what
had happened. Murray informed the Carters that she and her sister had disposed of the
wallet.
¶5.
Murray and Lay were arrested. Murray gave a statement to the police admitting guilt.
Both women were indicted for credit card fraud, but Lay was killed in a car accident prior
to trial.
DISCUSSION
I. BATSON ISSUE
¶6.
In her first issue on appeal, Murray argues that the State struck two minority jurors
in violation of Batson, thus denying her a fair trial. In Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 96
(1986), the United States Supreme Court provided the procedure for trial courts to follow
when peremptory challenges are used to remove members of an identified racial group from
jury service based upon nothing more than their race. To successfully assert a Batson
challenge, the following must occur:
First, the defendant must establish a prima facie case of discrimination in the
selection of jury members. The prosecution then has the burden of stating a
racially neutral reason for the challenged strike. If the State gives a racially
neutral explanation, the defendant can rebut the explanation. Finally, the trial
court must make a factual finding to determine if the prosecution engaged in
purposeful discrimination. If the defendant fails to rebut, the trial judge must
base his decision on the reasons given by the State.
Thorson v. State, 721 So. 2d 590, 593 (¶2) (Miss. 1998) (internal citations omitted).
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¶7.
This Court gives “great deference to the trial court’s finding of whether or not a
peremptory challenge was race neutral.” Id. at 593 (¶4). “[W]e will not overrule a trial court
on a Batson ruling unless the record indicates that the ruling was clearly erroneous or against
the overwhelming weight of the evidence.” Id.
¶8.
After the State exercised its peremptory challenges, Murray raised a Batson challenge.
Murray asserted that the State improperly struck two black jurors. The trial court asked the
State to provide race-neutral reasons for striking the two potential jurors, Robert Spivey, a
black male, and Charolotte Stingley, a black female. In regard to Spivey, the State noted that
Spivey was an unemployed twenty-nine-year-old with an unemployed wife and a child. The
trial court found this reason to be race neutral. The supreme court has stated: “[p]ursuant to
Batson, this Court has acknowledged that there are [an] infinite number of grounds upon
which a prosecutor reasonably may peremptorily strike a juror so long as the prosecutor
presents clear and reasonably specific explanations for those reasons . . . . Among the
reasons accepted as race-neutral are . . . unemployment and employment history. . . .” Berry
v. State, 802 So. 2d 1033, 1046 (¶43) (Miss. 2001); see also Tyler v. State, 911 So. 2d 550,
554 (¶13) (Miss. Ct. App. 2005). We find the State’s reason regarding Spivey was race
neutral.
¶9.
In regard to Stingley, the State believed that she was related to a defendant whose trial
was to occur the next week. The trial court found the reason to be race neutral. Murray’s
trial counsel agreed that if Stingley was related, he would not object, but he asked the trial
court to voir dire her. Stingley admitted that she thought she was related to that particular
defendant, but it would not affect her ability to be impartial in Murray’s case. The trial court
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allowed the State’s peremptory challenge to stand. Striking a juror due to a family member’s
criminal conviction or charge is a valid, race-neutral reason. Tanner v. State, 764 So. 2d 385,
394 (¶¶16,18) (Miss. 2000). This issue is without merit.
II. ADMISSIBILITY OF CONFESSION
¶10.
In her second issue on appeal, Murray argues that her confession was involuntary and,
thus, inadmissible. Murray admitted that she signed a statement in the presence of two police
officers during questioning. However, Murray claims that it was a handwritten statement on
a yellow legal pad and not the typewritten confession offered by the State at trial. Murray
did admit that the signature on the typewritten confession, as well as the signature on the
waiver of rights form, looked like her signature. Murray’s chief contention is that the two
officers questioning her told her that “it would be better for [her]” if she gave a statement.
After a suppression hearing, the trial court found that the evidence was sufficient for
determining Murray’s statement was voluntary.
¶11.
For a confession to be admissible it must not have been given as a result of promises,
threats, or inducements. Dancer v. State, 721 So. 2d 583, 587 (¶17) (Miss. 1998). The
prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the confession was made voluntarily,
and it meets this burden by producing “testimony of an officer, or other persons having
knowledge of the facts, that the confession was voluntarily made without any threats,
coercion, or offer of reward.” Morgan v. State, 681 So. 2d 82, 86-87 (Miss. 1996). Our
standard of review regarding the admissibility of confessions is as follows: “So long as the
court applies the correct legal standards, ‘we will not overturn a finding of fact made by a
trial judge unless it be clearly erroneous.’ Where, on conflicting evidence, the court makes
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such findings this Court generally must affirm.” Alexander v. State, 610 So. 2d 320, 326
(Miss. 1992) (internal citations omitted).
¶12.
At the suppression hearing, both officers who questioned Murray testified. Officer
Will Jones testified that he made no threats or promises to Murray. Officer Jones stated that:
he read Murray her Miranda rights; she understood them; he saw her sign the waiver-ofrights form; he typed her statement; he instructed her to read her statement for any changes;
and he watched her sign the statement. Officer Jones further stated that there was no yellow
legal pad in the interview room. Officer Robert Roncali corroborated the testimony of
Officer Jones. Officer Roncali stated that neither he nor Officer Jones made threats or
promises to Murray. Officer Roncali testified that Murray signed the typewritten confession
after being instructed to review and correct it.
¶13.
In denying Murray’s motion to suppress, the trial court found no evidence of promises
made to Murray to solicit her confession. We can find no error with the trial court’s
determination.
III. OVERWHELMING WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE
¶14.
In her last issue on appeal, Murray argues that the verdict is against the overwhelming
weight of the evidence. “When reviewing a denial of a motion for a new trial based on an
objection to the weight of the evidence, we will only disturb a verdict when it is so contrary
to the overwhelming weight of the evidence that to allow it to stand would sanction an
unconscionable injustice.” Bush v. State, 895 So. 2d 836, 844 (¶18) (Miss. 2005). When
reviewing the weight of the evidence, this Court sits as a thirteenth juror. Id.
¶15.
Murray claims that she did not actively participate in the crime with her sister; thus,
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she could not be found guilty. However, the evidence at trial included Murray’s signed
confession, which the trial court concluded had been voluntarily given. Although she did not
explicitly admit her guilt, Murray apologized to the Carters for taking Mrs. Carter’s wallet.
Furthermore, Murray’s statement also indicates she was an active participant as evidenced
by the assistance she provided to Lay in determining how best to get cash from the stolen
credit card. Murray called Western Union, answered questions concerning the withdrawal,
and agreed with Lay on the amount of money to withdraw.
¶16.
Sitting as a thirteenth juror, we find that the verdict is not so contrary to the
overwhelming weight of the evidence that to allow it to stand would sanction an
unconscionable injustice. This issue is without merit.
¶17. THE JUDGMENT OF THE SCOTT COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT OF
CONVICTION OF CREDIT CARD FRAUD AND SENTENCE OF THREE YEARS
IN THE CUSTODY OF THE MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS
AND TO PAY A $1,000 FINE AND $1,000 IN RESTITUTION TO THE VICTIM IS
AFFIRMED. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO SCOTT
COUNTY.
KING, C.J., MYERS, P.J., GRIFFIS, BARNES, ISHEE, ROBERTS, CARLTON
AND MAXWELL, JJ., CONCUR. IRVING, J., CONCURS IN PART AND IN THE
RESULT.
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