Joseph Davis, Jr. v. Biloxi Public School District
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2007-CP-02155-COA
JOSEPH DAVIS, JR.
APPELLANT
v.
BILOXI PUBLIC SCHOOL DISTRICT; BILOXI
PUBLIC SCHOOL BOARD, BOARD OF TRUSTEES,
AND DR. PAUL A. TISDALE, SUPERINTENDENT;
BILOXI PUBLIC SCHOOL DISTRICT, DR. ROBERT
W. BOWLES, DEPUTY SUPERINTENDENT; BILOXI
PUBLIC SCHOOL DISTRICT, PATTIE GOLDEN,
(PAST SCHOOL BOARD ATTORNEY); BILOXI
PUBLIC SCHOOL DISTRICT, DR. LARRY DRAWDY,
(PAST SUPERINTENDENT); BILOXI SCHOOL
DISTRICT, GERALD BLESSEY, (PAST BILOXI
PUBLIC SCHOOL BOARD ATTORNEY); BILOXI
PUBLIC SCHOOL DISTRICT, DAVID BLAINE, (PAST
VICE PRESIDENT/PRESIDENT); BILOXI PUBLIC
SCHOOL DISTRICT, MAYOR A.J. HOLLOWAY,
CITY OF BILOXI; JUDE MCDONNELL, (PAST
COMPTROLLER/DIRECTOR OF BUSINESS
MANAGEMENT) BILOXI PUBLIC SCHOOL
DISTRICT; BONNIE GRANGER, COMPTROLLER,
AND SHANE SWITZER, COMPTROLLER, BILOXI
PUBLIC SCHOOL DISTRICT; RICHARD F.
STEWART, (PAST PRESIDENT) BILOXI PUBLIC
SCHOOL BOARD; ANDREA PETRO, (PAST
PRINCIPAL POPPS FERRY ELEMENTARY
SCHOOL) PRINCIPAL, LOPEZ ELEMENTARY
SCHOOL, BILOXI PUBLIC SCHOOL DISTRICT; DR.
JANICE WILSON, (PAST ASSISTANT PRINCIPAL)
POPPS FERRY ELEMENTARY SCHOOL; SUSAN
BRAND, PRINCIPAL, BEAUVOIR ELEMENTARY
SCHOOL AND BILOXI PUBLIC SCHOOL DISTRICT,
INDIVIDUALLY
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
TRIAL JUDGE:
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED:
APPELLEES
11/15/2007
HON. ROGER T. CLARK
HARRISON COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT:
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES:
NATURE OF THE CASE:
TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION:
DISPOSITION:
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
JOSEPH DAVIS, JR. (PRO SE)
A.J. HOLLOWAY (PRO SE)
SILAS W. MCCHAREN
EDWARD F. DONOVAN
GERALD BLESSEY (PRO SE)
CITY OF BILOXI, MISSISSIPPI (PRO SE)
ROBERT W. BOWLES (PRO SE)
PAUL A. TISDALE (PRO SE)
PATTIE GOLDEN (PRO SE)
LARRY DRAWDY (PRO SE)
DAVID BLAINE (PRO SE)
JUDE MCDONNELL (PRO SE)
BONNIE GRANGER (PRO SE)
SHANE SWITZER (PRO SE)
RICHARD F. STEWART (PRO SE)
ANDREA PETRO (PRO SE)
JANICE WILSON (PRO SE)
SUSAN BRAND (PRO SE)
BRANDI N. SMITH
CIVIL - TORTS-OTHER THAN PERSONAL
INJURY & PROPERTY DAMAGE
JUDGMENT OF DISMISSAL ENTERED
AFFIRMED: 11/03/2009
BEFORE MYERS, P.J., BARNES AND ISHEE, JJ.
MYERS, P.J., FOR THE COURT:
¶1.
Joseph Davis, Jr., appeals the dismissal of his pro se lawsuit relating to the termination
of his employment as a teacher’s aide with the Biloxi Public School District in September
2003. The Circuit Court of Harrison County dismissed his complaint, finding that any claims
not covered by the doctrines of collateral estoppel or res judicata were barred under the
applicable statute of limitations. Davis now appeals.
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¶2.
In the instant case, Davis alleged causes of action for “wrongful termination,
obstruction of justice, intimidation, retaliation, libel, slander, evincing intentional acts
individually,” as well as a cause of action under 42 U.S.C section 1983 for the deprivation
of his constitutional rights under the First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, Thirteenth,
and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Davis also alleged a violation
of the Civil Rights Act of 1991.
¶3.
As noted by the circuit court, Davis raised many of the same factual and legal issues
in a previous action. This Court entered its opinion in this case in Davis v. Biloxi Pub. Sch.
Dist., 937 So. 2d 459 (Miss. Ct. App. 2005) (“Davis I”). There, Davis appealed his
termination from the decision of the Biloxi School Board. We affirmed the circuit court’s
finding that Davis, as a teacher’s aide, was not entitled to a hearing under the Mississippi
Education Employment Procedures Law. Id. at 461-62 (¶¶7-8). We further held that because
Davis was an at-will employee, he had no property interest in his employment sufficient to
invoke the due process provisions of the United States Constitution. Id. Davis’s motion for
rehearing and a petition for writ of certiorari in his prior appeal were denied, as was his
appeal to the United States Supreme Court.
¶4.
The effect of this prior judgment on Davis’s claims relating to the termination of his
employment is well established. “In short, where a question of fact essential to a judgment
is actually litigated and determined by a valid and final judgment, that determination is
conclusive between the parties in a subsequent suit on a different cause of action.”
Garraway v. Retail Credit Co., 244 Miss. 376, 385, 141 So. 2d 727, 730 (1962).
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¶5.
Four identities are required to establish res judicata: (1) identity of the subject matter;
(2) identity of the cause of action; (3) identity of the parties; and (4) identity of the quality
or character of persons against whom the claim is made. Riley v. Morehead, 537 So. 2d
1348, 1354 (Miss. 1989). In this case, these identities are all present and the doctrine
applicable.
¶6.
On appeal, Davis argues that our prior findings – that he was an at-will employee and
had no constitutional property interest in his previous employment – were in error because
he was fired for being a “whistleblower.” However, under the doctrine of collateral estoppel,
Davis is precluded from relitigating in a second action issues already decided in the prior
action. Howard v. Howard, 968 So. 2d 961, 973 (¶27) (Miss. Ct. App. 2007).
¶7.
The circuit court dismissed Davis’s remaining claims as barred by the statute of
limitations. Davis filed the instant action on February 28, 2007. As the circuit court noted,
this is almost three years and six months after Davis was terminated as a teacher’s aide with
the Biloxi Public School District, on September 4, 2003. As found by the circuit court, any
claims that Davis has should have been raised either within the one-year statute of limitations
of the Mississippi Tort Claims Act, the one-year statute of limitations for intentional torts,
or the general three-year statute of limitations under Mississippi Code Annotated section 151-49 (Rev. 2003).1
1
The statute of limitations for section 1983 claims in Mississippi is three years. Giles
v. Stokes, 988 So. 2d 926, 928 (¶9) (Miss. Ct. App. 2008).
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¶8.
In his pleadings in the circuit court, the only factual basis Davis alleges to support
these causes of action is his allegation that he was “wrongfully and unlawfully terminated”
from his employment at the school district. All of his allegations, to the extent that they are
developed in his pleadings or subsequent filings in the record, appear to relate to his
termination and the events immediately preceding and following it.
¶9.
On appeal, Davis’s only argument relating to the statute of limitations is that the
statute should be tolled because in Davis I, Davis’s appeal from the school board’s decision
to terminate his employment, the circuit court failed to rule on certain “Rule 60 Motions.”
¶10.
This, however, cannot toll the statutes of limitations for Davis’s claims. For authority,
Davis cites to Michael v. Michael, 650 So. 2d 469 (Miss. 1995). The holding there, however,
concerns the tolling of the time to file a notice of appeal; Michael has no application to
statutes of limitation. Accordingly, we find that the circuit court did not err in dismissing
Davis’s remaining claims as barred under the statute of limitations.
¶11.
In their brief, the Biloxi Public School District defendants argue that Davis’s appeal
is frivolous and warrants an award of sanctions under Mississippi Rule of Appellate
Procedure 38. Under Rule 38, we may assess sanctions where an appeal is found to be
frivolous. The question this presents is “whether a reasonable person would have any hope
for success.” Harris v. Harris, 988 So. 2d 376, 380 (¶16) (Miss. 2008). While we find
Davis’s arguments without merit, we do not find them frivolous; accordingly, sanctions are
not appropriate in this case.
¶12.
THE JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT OF HARRISON COUNTY IS
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AFFIRMED. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO THE
APPELLANT.
KING, C.J., LEE, P.J., IRVING, GRIFFIS, BARNES, ISHEE, ROBERTS AND
CARLTON, JJ., CONCUR. MAXWELL, J., NOT PARTICIPATING.
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