Torsha A. Brown v. Harrah's Entertainment, Inc.
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2008-CP-01430-COA
TORSHA A. BROWN
APPELLANT
v.
HARRAH’S ENTERTAINMENT, INC. D/B/A
HORSESHOE CASINO-TUNICA
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
TRIAL JUDGE:
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT:
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
NATURE OF THE CASE:
TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION:
DISPOSITION:
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
APPELLEE
07/23/2008
HON. ALBERT B. SMITH III
TUNICA COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
TORSHA A. BROWN (PRO SE)
ROBERT LEWIS MOORE
RUSSELL B. JORDAN
CIVIL - TORTS-OTHER THAN PERSONAL
INJURY & PROPERTY DAMAGE
SUMMARY JUDGMENT GRANTED FOR
DEFENDANT
AFFIRMED - 08/11/2009
BEFORE LEE, P.J., ISHEE AND ROBERTS, JJ.
LEE, P.J., FOR THE COURT:
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
¶1.
On September 27, 2005, security personnel at the Horseshoe Casino in Tunica County,
Mississippi detained Torsha A. Brown for failing to provide identification. Brown engaged
in a physical struggle with security officers while she was being detained, and the Tunica
County Sheriff’s Department was notified. Brown was ultimately charged with trespassing
and disturbing the peace. Brown’s trespassing charge stemmed from an earlier incident at
the same casino, which resulted in Brown’s permanent eviction from the Horseshoe Casino.
¶2.
Brown pleaded not guilty in the Tunica County Justice Court to both charges.
Brown’s trespassing charge was dismissed, but she was found guilty of disturbing the peace.
Brown appealed her conviction to the Tunica County Circuit Court. The circuit court
reversed Brown’s conviction for disturbing the peace.
¶3.
On September 21, 2007, Brown filed a complaint against Harrah’s Entertainment,
Inc., d/b/a Horseshoe Casino – Tunica (the Casino) alleging false arrest. The Casino
ultimately filed a motion for summary judgment, and after a hearing on the matter, the trial
court granted the Casino’s motion. The trial court found that there were no genuine issues
of material fact and that Brown’s false arrest claim was barred by the one-year statute of
limitations for intentional torts. Brown now appeals, asserting the following issues: (1) the
trial court failed to consider her claims of negligence; (2) the trial court applied an incorrect
standard of law; (3) the trial court abused its discretion by allowing the Casino to withhold
or destroy surveillance evidence; (4) the trial court allowed the Casino to violate a court
order; (5) the trial court abused its discretion in handling the arguments during the motion
hearing; and (6) the trial court erred in hearing different motions simultaneously. Finding
that summary judgment was proper, we decline to review Brown’s remaining issues.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶4.
In reviewing a trial court’s grant of summary judgment, this Court employs a de novo
standard of review. Anglado v. Leaf River Forest Prods., 716 So. 2d 543, 547 (¶13) (Miss.
1998). Summary judgment “shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions,
answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show
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that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to
a judgment as a matter of law.” M.R.C.P. 56(c). All of the evidence before the trial court
must be examined in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Palmer v. Anderson
Infirmary Benevolent Ass’n, 656 So. 2d 790, 794 (Miss. 1995). The party opposing the
motion “may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleadings, but his response,
by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that
there is a genuine issue for trial.” M.R.C.P. 56(e). The entry of summary judgment is
mandated if the non-movant “fails to make a showing sufficient to establish an essential
element of the claim or defense, then all other facts are immaterial, and the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Galloway v. Travelers Ins. Co., 515 So. 2d 678, 684
(Miss. 1987).
DISCUSSION
¶5.
Brown first contends that summary judgment was inappropriate because both
negligence and intentional torts were committed against her. Brown does concede, however,
that her claim of false arrest is an intentional tort and is subject to a one-year statute of
limitations. See Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-35 (Rev. 2003); see also City of Mound Bayou v.
Johnson, 562 So. 2d 1212, 1218 (Miss. 1990) (no difference between intentional tort of
malicious arrest, as enumerated in section 15-1-35, and false arrest). Brown’s claim for false
arrest arose on September 27, 2005, and her complaint was filed on September 21, 2007, well
outside the one-year statute of limitations.
¶6.
Brown also contends that the Casino employees acted negligently while arresting her.
During the hearing on the motion for summary judgment, the trial court noted that all of
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Brown’s instances of alleged negligence were part of her false arrest claim; thus, the one-year
statute of limitations applied. Regardless, Brown has failed to set forth specific facts to
establish the existence of each element of negligence – duty, breach of that duty, proximate
causation, and damages. See Green v. Dalewood Prop. Owners’ Ass’n, 919 So. 2d 1000,
1005 (¶10) (Miss. Ct. App. 2005). Brown’s argument simply consists of allegations of
purported negligence, and she has offered no other support by means of affidavits or other
such support anticipated by Rule 56 of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure to prove the
existence of a genuine issue of material fact.
¶7.
Finding that summary judgment in favor of the Casino was proper, we decline to
review Brown’s remaining issues.
¶8.
THE JUDGMENT OF THE TUNICA COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT IS
AFFIRMED. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO THE
APPELLANT.
KING, C.J., MYERS, P.J., IRVING, GRIFFIS, BARNES, ISHEE, ROBERTS,
CARLTON AND MAXWELL, JJ., CONCUR.
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