Willie Earl Gray v. State of Mississippi
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2008-CA-00682-COA
WILLIE EARL GRAY A/K/A JOE COLLIER
APPELLANT
v.
STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
TRIAL JUDGE:
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE:
NATURE OF THE CASE:
TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION:
DISPOSITION:
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
APPELLEE
10/12/2007
HON. BOBBY BURT DELAUGHTER
HINDS COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
IMHOTEP ALKEBU-LAN
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
BY: STEPHANIE B. WOOD
CIVIL - POST-CONVICTION RELIEF
MOTION FOR POST-CONVICTION
COLLATERAL RELIEF DISMISSED
AFFIRMED: 07/21/2009
BEFORE KING, C.J., GRIFFIS AND BARNES, JJ.
GRIFFIS, J., FOR THE COURT:
¶1.
Willie Earl Gray appeals the dismissal of his motion for post-conviction collateral
relief by the Circuit Court of Hinds County. He claims that his guilty plea was not
voluntarily and intelligently made. Finding no error, we affirm.
FACTS
¶2.
Gray was arrested for the sale of cocaine pursuant Mississippi Code Annotated section
41-29-139 (Rev. 2005). An undercover officer with the Mississippi Bureau of Narcotics
purchased the cocaine from Gray, and the transaction was videotaped. Gray requested the
videotape during discovery. Gray’s counsel received the videotape and viewed it.
¶3.
The State made a plea offer to Gray which expired on July 19, 2004. Gray’s counsel
tried on two occasions – July 15, 2004, and July 18, 2004 – to have Gray view the videotape
while he was incarcerated at the Hinds County Detention Center, but his efforts were
unsuccessful. Gray claims that he was granted permission to watch the videotape, but
permission was rescinded before he could watch the videotape.
¶4.
During a motion hearing on this issue, the trial judge stated that Gray would be
allowed to view the videotape during a recess in his trial. Gray did not view the videotape
before the State withdrew its plea offer of five years on July 19, 2004. Although the record
is unclear, it does not appear that Gray viewed the videotape before he pleaded guilty.
¶5.
On August 4, 2004, Gray pleaded guilty to the sale of cocaine under section 41-29-
139. On November 12, 2004, the trial court sentenced Gray to serve a term of twenty years
in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections. Prior to his sentencing order,
Gray improperly filed his notice of direct appeal with the supreme court on October 7, 2004.
On February 16, 2005, Gray moved to voluntarily dismiss his appeal, and this Court granted
his motion on February 28, 2005.
¶6.
On August 27, 2007, Gray filed his motion for post-conviction collateral relief with
the trial court. The trial court dismissed Gray’s motion. Gray appeals this dismissal and
argues that his plea was not voluntarily and intelligently made because he was unable to view
the videotape.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶7.
A trial court's dismissal of a motion for post-conviction collateral relief will not be
2
reversed on appeal absent a finding that the trial court's decision was clearly erroneous.
Williams v. State, 872 So. 2d 711, 712 (¶2) (Miss. Ct. App. 2004). However, when
reviewing issues of law, this Court's proper standard of review is de novo. Brown v. State,
731 So. 2d 595, 598 (¶6) (Miss. 1999).
ANALYSIS
1.
¶8.
Was Gray’s motion properly before the trial court?
The State argues that Gray’s motion for post-conviction collateral relief was not
properly before the trial court because the dismissal of Gray’s first appeal was a final
judgment. Therefore, Gray was required to obtain permission from the supreme court before
filing a motion for post-conviction collateral relief in the trial court. Gray argues that he was
procedurally barred from appealing his guilty plea directly to the supreme court; accordingly,
his motion was properly filed with the trial court.
¶9.
Gray’s appeal to the supreme court was improper. When Gray pled guilty, Mississippi
Code Annotated section 99-35-101 (Rev. 2007) provided that "[a]ny person convicted of an
offense in a circuit court may appeal to the supreme court, provided, however, an appeal
from the circuit court to the supreme court shall not be allowed in any case where the
defendant enters a plea of guilty." Nevertheless, while a conviction from a plea of guilty may
not be directly appealed, a defendant may directly appeal the sentence given as a result of
that plea. Trotter v. State, 554 So. 2d 313, 315 (Miss. 1989). Gray pleaded guilty and was
not appealing his sentence; therefore, his appeal to the supreme court was procedurally
barred. Gray’s only recourse was to file a motion for post-conviction collateral relief with
the trial court. Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-7 (Rev. 2007).
3
¶10.
The State argues that a dismissal is a final judgment which “requires that the motioner
present any subsequent motion to a quorum of justices of the supreme court for permission
to file in the trial court” under Mississippi Code Annotated section 99-39-7 (Rev. 2007).
Lyons v. State, 881 So. 2d 373, 376 (¶9) (Miss. Ct. App. 2004). But Lyons is factually
distinguishable from this case. Lyons was found guilty by a jury, and he subsequently filed
a direct appeal in accordance with section 99-35-101. Id. at 375 (¶¶2-3). “In an agreement
reached after his notice of appeal, Lyons and the State agreed to a dismissal of [additional
charges against him], if Lyons would withdraw his appeal to the supreme court.” Id. at (¶3).
This Court held that “[t]he dismissal of [Lyons’s] direct appeal from the supreme court was
a final judgment.” Id. at 376 (¶9).
¶11.
Lyons does not address the issue presented here of whether the voluntary dismissal
of a procedurally barred claim constitutes a final judgement within the meaning of section
99-35-101.
¶12.
This Court finds the supreme court’s analysis in Martin v. State, 556 So. 2d 357 (Miss.
1990) helpful. Martin pleaded guilty to the sale of less than one ounce of marijuana, and he
was sentenced to a term of three years in prison. His sentence was suspended, and he was
placed on five years’ probation. Id. at 358. Martin’s probation was revoked after a
subsequent arrest, and he filed a direct appeal to the supreme court. Id. The supreme court
dismiss the motion “without prejudice for Martin to institute [a] post-conviction relief action
under [Mississippi Code Annotated section 99-39-5(1)(g) (Supp. 1998)],” because “an order
revoking probation is not directly appealable.” Id. The supreme court explained:
implicit in the scheme of the [Mississippi Uniform] Post-Conviction Relief Act
4
is the requirement that in order for [the appellate court] to acquire exclusive,
original jurisdiction over a motion filed thereunder, [the appellate court] must
have previously made some final determination going to the merits of the
underlying conviction and sentence. It is not enough . . . that we dismissed an
appeal without prejudice for lack of jurisdiction.
Id. at 359 (emphasis added).
¶13.
Gray voluntarily dismissed his appeal, but if he had not done so, this Court would
have dismissed it due to the procedural bar. Accordingly, we follow the supreme court’s
direction in Martin and find that Gray’s motion for post-conviction collateral relief is not
barred.
2.
¶14.
Was Gray’s guilty plea voluntarily and intelligently made?
Gray argues that his guilty plea was not voluntarily and intelligently made, because
the State: (1) violated his constitutional right to view the evidence against him – the
videotape – and (2) withdrew the plea offer before he was allowed to view the videotape.
¶15.
A plea of guilty is binding only if it is entered voluntarily and intelligently. Myers v.
State, 583 So. 2d 174, 177 (Miss. 1991). Such a plea is voluntary and intelligent when the
defendant is informed of the charges against him and the consequences of his plea.
Alexander v. State, 605 So. 2d 1170, 1172 (Miss. 1992). He must also understand "the
maximum and minimum penalties provided by law." URCCC 8.04(A)(4)(b).
¶16.
Gray argues that his guilty plea was not voluntary and intelligent because the State
failed to comply with Rule 9.04 of the Uniform Rules of Circuit and County Court. He
claims that he had a right to examine, inspect, test, and photograph all of the physical
evidence in the possession of the State under Rule 9.04. However, this is not an accurate
statement of the rule. Rule 9.04(A) states, in part, that:
5
the prosecution must disclose to each defendant or to defendant's attorney, and
permit the defendant or defendant's attorney to inspect, copy, test, and
photograph upon written request and without the necessity of court order the
following which is in the possession, custody, or control of the State, the
existence of which is known or by the exercise of due diligence may become
known to the prosecution:
....
5.
Any physical evidence and photographs relevant to the case or which
may be offered in evidence[.]
URCCC Rule 9.04 (emphasis added).
¶17.
Rule 9.04 states that the defendant or his attorney must be permitted access to the
evidence. The trial judge asked Gray’s counsel if he was able to watch the videotape, and
Gray’s attorney answered that he watched it. Therefore, the State complied with Rule 9.04.
¶18.
Despite Gray’s argument, the record reflects that his guilty plea was entered
voluntarily and intelligently. The trial judge informed Gray of the charges against him, the
consequences of his plea, and the maximum and minimum penalties provided by law. Gray
swore that he understood the elements of the charge against him, listed the elements, and
stated that he met the elements because he sold cocaine to an undercover agent on February
13, 2001. Gray understood the charge and how it related to his actions. Gray was asked if
he understood that the trial judge could sentence him to up to thirty years of imprisonment
and assess of a fine of no less than $5,000 and up to $1,000,000. Gray answered yes. This
Court finds no basis for Gray’s contention that his guilty plea was not voluntary and
intelligent.
¶19.
Furthermore, Gray does not provide this Court with any support for his assertion that
the State acted improperly by setting a deadline for the plea offer and, subsequently,
6
withdrawing the plea offer after that date passed. This issue is without merit.
¶20. THE JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT OF HINDS COUNTY
DISMISSING THE MOTION FOR POST-CONVICTION COLLATERAL RELIEF
IS AFFIRMED. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO THE
APPELLANT.
KING, C.J., LEE AND MYERS, P.JJ., IRVING, BARNES, ISHEE, ROBERTS
AND CARLTON, JJ., CONCUR. MAXWELL, J., NOT PARTICIPATING.
7
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
