Steve Ruth v. London Suzette Burchfield
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2007-CA-02066-COA
STEVE RUTH
APPELLANT/
CROSS-APPELLEE
v.
LONDON SUZETTE BURCHFIELD
APPELLEE/
CROSS-APPELLANT
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
TRIAL JUDGE:
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE:
NATURE OF THE CASE:
TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION:
DISPOSITION:
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
10/19/2007
HON. H.J. DAVIDSON JR.
LOWNDES COUNTY CHANCERY COURT
TIMOTHY C. HUDSON
HAL H. MCCLANAHAN
CIVIL - CUSTODY
GRANTED MOTHER’S PETITION FOR AN
INCREASE IN CHILD SUPPORT AND
DENIED FATHER’S PETITION FOR
MODIFICATION OF CUSTODY
AFFIRMED – 06/30/2009
07/27/2009 – DENIED; AFFIRMED –
12/15/2009
MANDATE ISSUED:
MODIFIED OPINION ON MOTION FOR REHEARING
EN BANC.
IRVING, J., FOR THE COURT:
¶1.
The motion for rehearing is denied. The previous opinion of this Court is withdrawn,
and this opinion is substituted therefor.
¶2.
Steve Ruth and London Suzette Burchfield are the parents of Mara Leigh Ruth, a
minor. Burchfield, Mara’s primary caregiver, filed a motion in the Lowndes County
Chancery Court for modification of child support wherein she requested that Ruth’s monthly
child support payments be increased. Burchfield also requested reasonable attorney’s fees.
Thereafter, Ruth filed a response and counterclaim wherein he sought primary custody. The
Lowndes County Chancery Court granted Burchfield’s request to increase Ruth’s child
support payments but denied her request for attorney’s fees. The chancery court also
declined to modify custody. Aggrieved by the chancellor’s findings, both parties now
appeal. In his appeal, Ruth asserts: (1) that the chancellor erred in failing to find that a
material change in circumstances has occurred that adversely affects Mara which requires
a change in custody and (2) that the chancellor erred in finding that a material change in
circumstances exists which warrants an increase in his child support payments. In her crossappeal, Burchfield asserts that the chancellor erred in failing to award her attorney’s fees.
¶3.
Finding no reversible error, we affirm on both direct and cross-appeal.
FACTS
¶4.
Mara was born on October 31, 1998. Ruth and Burchfield never married; however,
paternity was established in 1999. At that time, Ruth was ordered to make monthly child
support payments of $367.03, and he voluntarily began providing medical and dental
insurance for Mara. Then, in May 2007, Burchfield filed a motion for modification of child
support wherein she asserted that Mara’s financial needs had “materially increased.”
Burchfield also requested that the court award her attorney’s fees. Shortly thereafter, Ruth
filed a response and counterclaim for modification wherein he sought primary custody of
Mara based on his contention that a material change in circumstances had occurred that had
2
adversely affected Mara in the following ways: (1) that Mara had not been properly
supervised while in Burchfield’s primary care, (2) that Burchfield was not properly
addressing Mara’s educational needs, and (3) that Mara had been exposed to conduct that
was detrimental to her moral upbringing. A hearing was held in August 2007. We briefly
summarize the testimony as it relates to the issues raised by Ruth.
¶5.
In his motion, Ruth argued that Burchfield had not exercised good judgment in
selecting babysitters for Mara, namely Christian Alexa Burchfield (Lexie), Burchfield’s
daughter from a previous relationship, and Kim Brasfield.1 Burchfield testified that she did
not see any problem with Lexie baby-sitting Mara, even though Lexie was only twelve years
old, because Lexie was “very mature” for her age.
¶6.
However, Burchfield expressed regret for continuing to allow Kim to baby-sit Mara
after learning that Kim and Burchfield’s twenty-year-old son, Hunter, who lived in her home
at the time, had become involved in an inappropriate relationship. Burchfield admitted that,
prior to learning of the relationship, she had allowed Kim to stay overnight at her home to
baby-sit Mara while Hunter was also in the home. However, Burchfield stated that after she
learned of the relationship, Kim was no longer allowed to stay overnight at her home.
Nevertheless, Burchfield testified that she continued to allow Kim to baby-sit Mara for
another two to three weeks. Burchfield testified that she should have fired Kim immediately
upon learning of the inappropriate behavior.2
1
Lexie was twelve years old at the time that Burchfield allowed her to supervise
Mara, and Kim was fifteen years old when she supervised Mara.
2
Mara testified that there were times when Kim stayed overnight in Hunter’s room.
She also testified that she had witnessed Kim enter the bathroom when Hunter was already
3
¶7.
As for Ruth’s contention regarding Mara’s educational needs, the testimony reveals
that Mara has struggled constantly with her schoolwork. Specifically, Mara’s kindergarten
teacher recommended that she be held back but agreed to reconsider her position, provided
that Mara showed signs of improvement by the start of the following school year. Burchfield
testified that Ruth did not want Mara to be held back and that Ruth stated that it would be an
embarrassment to his wife, Tracey, who taught at Mara’s school. Burchfield stated that she
and Tracey worked with Mara throughout the summer and that Mara was able to move on
to the first grade as scheduled.3 Burchfield testified that Mara continued to be tutored by
family members and Tracey during Mara’s first-grade school year, but Burchfield also stated
that she did not seek assistance for Mara the following school year because, as far as she
knew, Mara was progressing according to schedule. According to Burchfield, she was under
the impression that Tracey was continuing to help Mara once a week when Mara went home
with Tracey after school.
¶8.
Ruth testified that he is actively involved in Mara’s academics. He stated that he
asked Tracey to communicate with Mara’s teachers since she works at Mara’s school.4 Ruth
inside.
3
Shortly after Mara began her first-grade year, her first-grade teacher, Pam Cobb,
discussed with Ruth, Tracey, and Burchfield putting Mara back in kindergarten. Cobb
testified that Burchfield expressed to her that she was willing to do whatever would be most
beneficial to Mara; however, according to Cobb, Ruth stated that he wanted Mara to remain
in the first grade and stated that he would get a tutor for her. Cobb stated that she worked
one-on-one with Mara extensively and that Tracey helped with Mara as well. Cobb noted
that Mara completed the first grade.
4
Mara’s second-grade teacher testified that although she communicated with
Burchfield about Mara’s status, Tracey was the primary person that she spoke with
regarding Mara’s progress.
4
stated that he helps Mara with her schoolwork as much as he can but that he often defers to
Tracey, since she is a teacher. Ruth acknowledged that he did not want Mara to be held back
when she was in kindergarten because he thought that Mara has the ability to learn, even
though she may do so at a slower pace than other students. Ruth testified that since Mara
first began having problems in kindergarten, he would beg Burchfield to “tell [him] what’s
going on.” According to Ruth, he expressed an interest in trying to obtain primary custody
of Mara when she was a little over a year old but decided not to after being informed by his
attorney that he would be fighting an uphill battle.
¶9.
Ruth’s contention as it relates to Mara’s moral upbringing centers around certain
conduct that he contends Mara has been exposed to while in Burchfield’s primary care, such
as Hunter’s use of marijuana while living in Burchfield’s home and Burchfield’s allowing
men to stay overnight while Mara is present.
¶10.
Burchfield testified about when she first became aware that Hunter was using
marijuana while he lived in her home. She stated that she confronted Hunter about it and that
he denied it. Burchfield testified that, despite his denial, she “got on to him” anyway and
informed him that she would not allow him to use marijuana around the children. She
testified that sometime thereafter she confronted Hunter again about his marijuana use and
that he got upset and moved out of the house, only to return within approximately two to
three weeks. Burchfield also stated that Hunter was not living with her at the time of the
hearing, as he had recently moved out.
¶11.
As for Burchfield’s response to Ruth’s assertion that she allowed men to stay
overnight while Mara was present, Burchfield testified that she has had two boyfriends over
5
the past two or three years, not including her current boyfriend. Burchfield testified that her
current boyfriend has never spent the night at her house. However, she admitted that in the
past, she has allowed men to stay overnight at her home. She also admitted that she had had
sexual relations with a man that she allowed to stay overnight while her children were in the
home. However, Burchfield stated that they did so in the privacy of her bedroom with the
doors locked. She also stated that the children were usually asleep by the time she and the
gentleman retired for the night and that he would usually leave for work before the children
awoke.
¶12.
Following the hearing, the chancellor issued an opinion and final judgment wherein
he concluded that it would be in Mara’s best interest to remain in her mother’s primary care.
The chancellor also increased Ruth’s monthly child support payments, finding that Mara’s
financial needs have increased. The chancellor denied Burchfield’s request for attorney’s
fees.
¶13.
Additional facts, as necessary, will be related during our analysis and discussion of
the issues.
ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION OF THE ISSUES
¶14.
It is well settled that “[i]n a case disputing child custody, the chancellor’s findings will
not be reversed unless manifestly wrong, clearly erroneous, or the proper legal standard was
not applied.” Mabus v. Mabus, 847 So. 2d 815, 818 (¶8) (Miss. 2003) (citing Hensarling v.
Hensarling, 824 So. 2d 583, 587 (¶8) (Miss. 2002)). Further, the Mississippi Supreme Court
has held that “[t]he burden of proof is on the movant to show by a preponderance of the
evidence that a material change in circumstances has occurred in the custodial home.” Id.
6
(citing Riley v. Doerner, 677 So. 2d 740, 743 (Miss. 1996)). Additionally, the Mabus court
made clear that in modification proceedings the movant must also show: “(1) that a
substantial change in circumstances has transpired since issuance of the custody decree; (2)
that this change adversely affects the child’s welfare; and (3) that the child’s best interests
mandate a change of custody.” Id. (citing Bubac v. Boston, 600 So. 2d 951, 955 (Miss.
1992)).
¶15.
Ruth argues that the chancellor erred in failing to modify the original custody order
to award him primary custody of Mara. Ruth’s assertions are based on two major points:
that Burchfield has failed to provide Mara with proper supervision, causing her to be exposed
to circumstances that could have an adverse effect on her, and that Mara’s educational needs
are not being met.
¶16.
To support his argument that Mara is not receiving proper supervision, Ruth asserts
that since the initial custody order was entered, there have been instances when Mara was not
properly supervised. The chancellor noted that Ruth only pointed to one instance when Mara
was unsupervised: an instance when Lexie slept late instead of watching Mara while
Burchfield was at work, thereby leaving Mara to fend for herself. The testimony revealed
that Mara passed the time by making herself breakfast and by watching television. The
chancellor then concluded that “there was no showing that the mental and emotional wellbeing of Mara was in danger.”
¶17.
We cannot conclude that the chancellor’s decision, as it relates to this issue, is
manifestly wrong or clearly erroneous. Furthermore, there is nothing in the record which
indicates that the chancellor applied an improper legal standard. Accordingly, we have no
7
authority to reverse his decision. This issue lacks merit.
¶18.
Ruth also asserts that while under Burchfield’s primary care, Mara was exposed to
immoral conduct because of the inappropriate activity that Burchfield allowed to transpire
at her home. In his brief, Ruth states that “the drug use at the home and the sexual activity
between a male of legal age and an underage female in the presence of the child, constitutes
illegal and dangerous activities.” Ruth argues that the chancellor erred in not giving more
weight to these concerns during his analysis of the Albright factors.5 We note that the
chancellor addressed the issues raised by Ruth regarding Mara’s supervision and
Burchfield’s lack of judgment, stating:
There was no proof that these incidences resulted in any adverse effect upon
the child whatsoever even though the possibility existed. The Court would be
more concerned about these activities if Mother had completely shirked her
parental responsibility of care and supervision. She did provide the basics and
also did make the effort to put supervisory safeguards in place. The argument
should be whether or not they were capable of and did put the child at
unnecessary risk. The Court cannot reach that conclusion. Also, from the
testimony, both the teenaged son and the girlfriend/babysitter no longer are
present and the potential for adverse effect has been removed.
There was no specific proof about Father’s parenting skills other than he was
active about the school and health issues of the child and responded to these
quickly. As far as the day-to-day activities, the Court must conclude that there
are no prohibitions or concerns about Father’s parenting skills. For the reasons
stated, Father would be slightly favored.
According to Ruth, the chancellor is not obligated under the law of this state to wait until
Burchfield’s actions negatively affect Mara before modifying custody and cites C.A.M.F. v.
5
In Albright v. Albright, 437 So. 2d 1003, 1005 (Miss. 1983), the Mississippi
Supreme Court established a list of factors that chancellors must consider when determining
which parent should be awarded primary custody of a child.
8
J.B.M., 972 So. 2d 656 (Miss. Ct. App. 2007) for this proposition. In C.A.M.F., this Court
affirmed the chancery court’s decision to change primary custody of a minor child from the
mother to the father. Id. at 658 (¶3). In C.A.M.F. there was testimony that the mother’s
husband had taken nude photographs of the child when the child was approximately six years
old, often walked around the house naked, had “repeatedly exposed himself to neighbors,
relatives, and babysitters,” and had been physically abusive toward the mother in the child’s
presence. Id. at 659 (¶¶6-9). We concluded that the chancellor properly considered the
factors set forth in Mabus and that the chancellor did not err in finding that “while the
‘substantial and material change in circumstances may not have at this time adversely
affected the child, . . . this Court is not obligated to wait until such adverse change has
occurred.’” Id. at 661 (¶19) (citation omitted).
¶19.
Ruth also cites Riley, 677 So. 2d at 744 for the proposition that “[e]vidence that the
home of the custodial parent is the site of dangerous and illegal behavior, such as drug use,
may be sufficient to justify a modification of custody, even without a specific finding that
such environment has adversely affected the child’s welfare.” In Riley, the Mississippi
Supreme Court affirmed a chancellor’s decision to transfer custody of a minor child, Desiree,
from the mother, Connie, to the father, Billy, even though the chancellor concluded that the
father had not met the test for modification. Id. at 745. Our supreme court found that:
[O]nce the chancellor determined that Connie’s home was the site of illegal
drug use, as well as other behavior adverse to Desiree’s welfare, and
determined that Billy’s circumstances had improved such that he was able to
provide a good home for Desiree, it was within his discretion to transfer her
custody from Connie to Billy, despite the fact that he could not discern any
negative effect on Desiree caused by Connie’s home environment.
9
Id. at 744. Further, our supreme court stated the following:
It is evident from the chancellor’s comments that he felt constrained by
doctrine developed by this Court concerning custody modification from doing
what he thought was best for Desiree: transferring her custody from Connie to
Billy. The chancellor stated that there was “absolutely no question that . . . it
would be in the best interest of this child to live with her father,” but that this
Court “puts the child’s best interest third and not first or second” in our test for
custody modification. Since he could find no change in circumstances, the
first element of the test, nor an adverse effect on Desiree, the second element
of the test, the chancellor concluded that he was powerless to consider whether
a change in custody was in Desiree’s best interest - the third element of the test
for modification. We understand and appreciate the chancellor’s adherence to
the test we have articulated. However, we take this opportunity to clarify that
a chancellor is never obliged to ignore a child’s best interest in weighing a
custody change; in fact, a chancellor is bound to consider the child’s best
interest above all else.
Id.
¶20.
While this Court in no way makes light of Burchfield’s actions, we note that our facts
do not compare to what transpired in either C.A.M.F. or Riley; thus, we find both cases
distinguishable from our case. Furthermore, we note at the outset that the issues raised by
Ruth regarding conduct that Mara has been exposed to while in Burchfield’s primary care
are moot. We agree with the chancellor that the potential for Mara to be adversely affected
has been removed based on Burchfield’s testimony that Kim no longer baby-sits Mara, and
Hunter no longer lives in her home. Notwithstanding our conclusion that this issue is moot,
we point out that, pursuant to the law of this state, the chancellor was not required to wait for
proof that Burchfield’s actions had adversely affected Mara. Nevertheless, we affirm the
chancellor’s decision as we note, as did he, that Burchfield has removed the conditions that
could have arguably had an adverse effect on Mara had they been allowed to continue.
Therefore, we find no merit to this issue.
10
¶21.
Ruth also contends that the chancellor erred in increasing his monthly child support
payments to $500. It is well settled that “[t]he burden of proof that must be met by the party
seeking a financial modification is to show a material change of circumstances of one or
more of the interested parties, whether it be the father, mother, or the child(ren), arising
subsequent to the original decree.” McEachern v. McEachern, 605 So. 2d 809, 813 (Miss.
1992) (citing Cox v. Moulds, 490 So. 2d 866, 869 (Miss. 1986)). “The change must occur
as a result of after-arising circumstances of the parties, not reasonably anticipated at the time
of the agreement.” Evans v. Evans, 994 So.2d 765, 770 (¶16) (Miss. 2008) (citing Tingle v.
Tingle, 573 So. 2d 1389, 1391 (Miss. 1990)). Chancellors should consider the following
factors when determining whether a modification in child support is warranted:
(1) increased needs caused by advanced age and maturity of the children (2)
increase in expenses, and (3) inflation factor. Other factors include (4) the
relative financial condition and earning capacity of the parties, (5) the health
and special needs of the child, both physical and psychological, (6) the health
and special medical needs of the parents, both physical and psychological, (7)
the necessary living expenses of the father, (8) the estimated amount of income
taxes the respective parties must pay on their incomes, (9) the free use of a
residence, furnishings, and automobile and (10) such other facts and
circumstances that bear on the support subject shown by the evidence.
Caldwell v. Caldwell, 579 So. 2d 543, 547 (Miss. 1991) (quoting Adams v. Adams, 467 So.
2d 211, 215 (Miss. 1985)).
¶22.
In 1999, Ruth was ordered to pay $367.03, which represented 14% of his adjusted
gross income at that time. On appeal, Burchfield argues that Mara’s needs have increased,
as she is now involved in extra-curricular activities, namely, softball and cheerleading.
Burchfield testified that she needs additional money to pay for Mara’s uniforms, cheerleading
camp, and for gasoline to get Mara to and from cheerleading and softball-related events.
11
¶23.
Our review of the record leads us to conclude that the chancellor’s decision to increase
Ruth’s child support obligation was supported by substantial, credible evidence. The
chancellor stated the following in his opinion and final judgment:
The Court finds that Mother has met her burden of proof and has shown that
there has been a material change in circumstances since the entry of the
original decree. That is, the needs of Mara have increased and the income of
Father has increased as well. Therefore, using $42,993.12 as Father’s current
annual adjusted gross income, which includes deductions of mandated child
support for another child, and applying the statutory guideline percentage of
14%, Father shall pay Mother $500.00 in monthly child support beginning
November 1, 2007, and continuing on the first day of each month thereafter.
Ruth cites Pierce v. Chandler, 855 So. 2d 455, 458 (¶12) (Miss. Ct. App. 2003), wherein this
Court held that “age alone does not constitute a material change in circumstances.” We note
at the outset that Pierce involved modification of custody, rather than a modification of child
support. Nevertheless, we recognize that in both instances the chancellor is required to find
that a material change in circumstances has occurred prior to making a modification. As
evidenced by the statement quoted above, the chancellor not only considered the fact that
Mara was getting older as a reason to increase Ruth’s child support payments, but he also
noted that Ruth’s income had increased since the original order. It is well settled in this state
that an increase in income constitutes a material change in circumstances. Our supreme
court stated the following in Edmonds v. Edmonds, 935 So. 2d 980, 987 (¶19) (Miss. 2006):
Our Courts have found the modification of a child support award (both an
increase and reduction) to be warranted on a number of grounds. See Parker
v. Parker, 645 So. 2d 1327 (Miss. 1994) (affirming reduction in support
because father’s loss of income due to loss of job was a substantial and
material change in circumstances); Setser v. Piazza, 644 So. 2d 1211 (Miss.
1994) (finding father’s support obligation should have been abated due to
material change in circumstance where hurricane destroyed his home and his
truck and trailer needed for his job); Edwards v. Edwards-Barker, 875 So. 2d
12
1126 (Miss. Ct. App. 2004) (affirming increase in support where evidence
showed that costs of supporting children had increased as they got older and
father was making more money than at time of divorce).
¶24.
We cannot conclude that the chancellor’s decision was manifestly wrong or clearly
erroneous, nor can we say that an incorrect legal standard was applied. Therefore, we find
no merit to this issue.
¶25.
In her cross-appeal, Burchfield argues that the chancellor erred in failing to grant her
request for attorney’s fees. In Setser v. Piazza, 644 So. 2d 1211, 1216 (Miss. 1994) (citing
Cumberland v. Cumberland, 564 So. 2d 839, 844 (Miss. 1990)), the Mississippi Supreme
Court stated that “[t]he standard for an award of attorney[’s] fees on a motion for
modification of support is basically the same as that applied in an original divorce action.”
The court further held that “[a]ttorney[’s] fees are not awarded in child support modification
cases unless the party requesting fees is financially unable to pay them.” Id.
¶26.
The record reflects that when asked whether she had money to retain an attorney,
Burchfield responded by saying, “[n]o, not really. No, sir.” Nevertheless, the chancellor
declined to grant her request for attorney’s fees and concluded that “[o]ther than Mother’s
testimony that she could not pay, there was no proof otherwise. The Court notes that she is
employed at a good job, has assets and child support from two sources. She also has equity
in her home.” The chancellor denied Burchfield’s request for attorney’s fees after thoroughly
considering whether she was financially able to pay them. Thus, we cannot second-guess the
chancellor’s determination. Accordingly, we find no merit to this issue.
¶27. THE JUDGMENT OF THE LOWNDES COUNTY CHANCERY COURT IS
AFFIRMED ON DIRECT AND CROSS-APPEAL. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL
ARE ASSESSED TO THE APPELLANT/CROSS-APPELLEE.
13
KING, C.J., LEE AND MYERS, P.JJ., GRIFFIS AND BARNES, JJ., CONCUR.
MAXWELL, J., DISSENTS WITHOUT SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION.
CARLTON, J., DISSENTS WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION JOINED BY
ISHEE, J. ROBERTS, J., NOT PARTICIPATING.
CARLTON, J., DISSENTING:
¶28.
I respectfully dissent. The majority distinguishes this case from the precedents of
C.A.M.F. v. J.B.M., 972 So. 2d 656 (Miss. Ct. App. 2007) and Riley v. Doerner, 677 So. 2d
740 (Miss. 1996). These cases stand for the proposition that where evidence exists to show
criminal or immoral conduct in the home of the custodial parent such as drug use or nudity,
then such evidence may be sufficient to justify a modification of custody, even without a
specific finding that such environment has adversely affected the child’s welfare.
¶29.
The majority finds that the conduct in this case does not compare to what transpired
in C.A.M.F. or Riley. The majority also finds that the conduct that the child was exposed to
is now moot. I respectfully disagree and would remand the case for the chancellor to
reconsider the Albright factors 6 in light of the Riley exception and the potentially criminal
conduct in this case.
¶30.
Traditionally, Mississippi law has held that a change in the circumstances of the non-
custodial parent does not, by itself, merit a modification of custody. Riley, 677 So. 2d at 744.
The Riley court created a narrow exception to this principle. The Riley exception applies “if
the custodial parent’s home environment is found to be contrary to the child’s best interest
and the non-custodial parent’s home environment has improved and surpassed that of the
custodial parent, so that it is now in the child’s best interest to live with the non-custodial
6
Albright v. Albright, 437 So. 2d 1003, 1005 (Miss. 1983).
14
parent.” Lewis v. Lewis, 974 So. 2d 265, 267-68 (¶15) (Miss. Ct. App. 2008).
¶31.
Steve Ruth and London Suzette Burchfield were not married when paternity of their
child was established in 1999. At that time, the court ordered child support, and Burchfield
was awarded physical custody of the child with the parents sharing joint legal custody.7 In
considering the present matter, the chancellor found no material change in circumstances, but
he still conducted an Albright analysis. In the record before the Court, Burchfield admitted
that she allowed her twelve-year-old daughter to baby-sit the child on a recurring basis. This
included all-day supervision during the summer. Such circumstances could be viewed as
child neglect depending on the length of time the child was left in the twelve-year-old’s care.8
Nonetheless, Burchfield defended her choice of this youthful supervision by claiming that
her twelve-year-old daughter was very mature.
¶32.
Then Burchfield also admitted that her other babysitter, age fifteen, engaged in an
inappropriate relationship with Burchfield’s twenty-year-old son. Therefore, the sexual
relationship between the two was more than inappropriate. The babysitter, age fifteen at the
time of the sexual relationship, was not of age to consent to such sexual relations.9 The
7
It does not appear from the record that the chancellor conducted an Albright analysis
when Burchfield was awarded physical custody of the child in 1999.
8
See Miss. Code Ann. § 97-5-39(1)(b) (Rev. 2006) (“If the child's deprivation of
necessary . . . supervision appropriate to the child's age results in substantial harm to the
child's physical, mental or emotional health, the person may be sentenced to imprisonment
for not more than five . . . years or to payment of a fine of not more than . . . $ 5,000.00 . .
., or both.”).
9
See Miss. Code Ann. § 97-3-65(1) (Supp. 2009) (“The crime of statutory rape is
committed when: (a) Any person seventeen . . . years of age or older has sexual intercourse
with a child who: (i) Is at least fourteen . . . but under sixteen . . . years of age.”); Miss. Code
Ann. § 97-5-23(1) (Rev. 2006) (“Any person above the age of eighteen . . . years, who, for
15
relationship was potentially criminal. The record shows that Burchfield expressed regret for
continuing to allow the fifteen-year-old babysitter to continue to baby-sit the child after she
discovered the sexual relationship. No evidence in the record reflects that Burchfield ever
reported this behavior, whether labeled as an inappropriate sexual relationship, statutory rape,
or fondling of a child under the age of sixteen, to the babysitter’s parents, to the Mississippi
Department of Human Services, or to other authorities. She simply fired the babysitter after
another two or three weeks of baby-sitting.
¶33.
Burchfield also admits she discovered that her twenty-year-old son had used
marijuana in her home. She testified that after she confronted him about his marijuana use,
he moved out of the home, only to return within several weeks. The son was not living with
Burchfield at the time of trial. The majority finds the immoral conduct of Burchfield’s son
is now moot. I respectfully submit that the son’s use of an illegal drug constitutes not just
immoral behavior, but also criminal behavior. Such circumstances could fall within the
scope of child endangerment, depending on the facts.10
the purpose of gratifying his or her lust, or indulging his or her depraved licentious sexual
desires, shall handle, touch or rub with hands or any part of his or her body or any member
thereof, any child under the age of sixteen . . . years, with or without the child's consent . .
. shall be guilty of a felony and, upon conviction thereof, shall be fined in a sum not less than
. . . $ 1,000[] . . . nor more than . . . $ 5,000[] . . ., or be committed to the custody of the State
Department of Corrections not less than two . . . years nor more than fifteen . . . years, or be
punished by both such fine and imprisonment, at the discretion of the court.”).
10
See Miss. Code Ann. § 97-5-39(2)(b)(i) (Rev. 2006) (“A parent, legal guardian or
caretaker who endangers a child's person or health by knowingly causing or permitting the
child to be present where any person is selling, manufacturing or possessing immediate
precursors or chemical substances with intent to manufacture, sell or possess a controlled
substance as prohibited under Section 41-29-139 or 41-29-313, is guilty of child
endangerment and may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than ten . . . years or to
payment of a fine of not more than . . . $10,000[] . . . , or both.”).
16
¶34.
Additionally, I do not find that the son’s behavior and influence is now moot. Nothing
prohibits him from moving back into his mother’s home or from visiting, thereby exposing
the child to his conduct. The record contains no evidence of any steps Burchfield has taken
to restrain her son from returning to the home or to rehabilitate him. Burchfield has also
shown an inability or unwillingness to report her son’s illegal behavior to authorities.
¶35.
In sum, I find the criminal conduct and lack of supervision in Burchfield’s home
dispositive in finding that the chancellor abused his discretion when he determined the
custody issue in this case.11 Therefore, I would remand this case to the chancellor for
reconsideration of the custody issue. On remand, I would direct the chancellor to reconsider
the criminal acts of Burchfield’s son that occurred in Burchfield’s home and the lack of
appropriate supervision provided to the child in light of the Albright factors and the Riley
exception.
ISHEE, J., JOINS THIS OPINION.
11
See Weeks v. Weeks, 989 So. 2d 408, 412-13 (¶¶17-18) (Miss. Ct. App. 2008)
(finding that the chancellor properly considered in her Albright analysis the violent behavior
of the mother’s boyfriend and the overall environment of the mother’s home when she
awarded physical custody of the child to the father); Powell v. Powell, 976 So. 2d 358, 362
(¶¶17-18) (Miss. Ct. App. 2008) (reversing and remanding on child custody issue so the
chancellor could reconsider the Albright factors in light of the totality of the circumstances
when the chancellor failed to consider the rape of one of the two children and the mother’s
failure to obtain counseling for this child, as well as the overall unstable home environment
which the mother provided).
17
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