Darrius Eubanks v. State of Mississippi
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2007-KA-01201-COA
DARRIUS EUBANKS
APPELLANT
v.
STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
TRIAL JUDGE:
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED:
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE:
DISTRICT ATTORNEY:
NATURE OF THE CASE:
TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION:
DISPOSITION:
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
APPELLEE
07/26/2005
HON. TOMIE T. GREEN
HINDS COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
WILLIAM R. LABARRE
VIRGINIA LYNN WATKINS
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
BY: LAURA HOGAN TEDDER
FAYE PETERSON
CRIMINAL - FELONY
CONVICTED OF CAPITAL MURDER AND
SENTENCED TO LIFE IN THE CUSTODY
OF THE MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS WITHOUT ELIGIBILITY
FOR PAROLE
AFFIRMED: 06/02/2009
BEFORE MYERS, P.J., IRVING AND ROBERTS, JJ.
MYERS, P.J., FOR THE COURT:
¶1.
Darrius Eubanks was convicted in the Circuit Court of Hinds County of capital
murder, with the underlying felony of felonious child abuse. The trial court sentenced
Eubanks to life in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections (MDOC) without
eligibility for parole. Aggrieved by his conviction and sentence, Eubanks appeals, asserting
that the trial court erred in admitting hearsay testimony and deprived him of his fundamental
right to present a defense. Finding no error, we affirm.
FACTS
¶2.
On the morning of November 19, 2003, Eubanks and his girlfriend, Deyasha Johnson,
were off work from their jobs at an IHOP Restaurant. Johnson and Eubanks planned to catch
up on household chores and move furniture into their apartment at 1595 West Highland
Drive in Jackson, Mississippi. Eubanks and Johnson had lived together for about five to six
months. The couple shared the apartment with Johnson’s two children, four-year-old
Daviyon Johnson and two-year, eleven-month-old Inecia McNeil. The children called
Eubanks “Daddy,” but he was not related to them by blood or marriage.
¶3.
The pair had lived in the apartment for about a month, but they did not have a
telephone in the apartment. After doing laundry, Johnson called her aunt from a payphone
about the availability of a family member’s truck to move furniture later in the day. Johnson
discovered, however, that her grandmother was critically ill at Central Mississippi Medical
Center (CMMC), less than ten minutes away from the apartment. Johnson returned to the
apartment to change clothes, and Eubanks offered to watch the children as he had often done
before. Johnson arranged for a ride to CMMC with a friend. At 6:00 p.m. that evening,
about six hours later, Johnson returned to the apartment.
¶4.
Johnson testified that on returning home, she entered the apartment and called to her
children, going up the hallway to their bedroom. In the children’s bedroom, she found
Daviyon lying on the floor with Eubanks standing beside him. Inecia was standing against
2
a wall, not moving, and she appeared “scared.” Johnson asked Eubanks what was wrong,
and he replied that he did not know. Johnson moved into her bedroom and called for her son
to get up. When Daviyon failed to respond, Johnson went back into the children’s bedroom.
Eubanks picked Daviyon up, and Johnson described the child as limp “like a little Raggedy
Ann doll.” Johnson testified she took Daviyon into the bathroom, where she observed that
“the whole side of [his] face was just black and blue and red.” Johnson testified she asked
Eubanks what had happened. He again told her that he did not know, but he added that the
children had both reverted from their toilet training and soiled their clothing. Johnson also
testified that Eubanks told her that Inecia had hit her older brother in the head with a stick
that had been used to secure the apartment’s patio door.
¶5.
Johnson then went to a neighbor’s apartment to telephone her mother and aunt. She
asked them to come to get her and Daviyon and take them to CMMC. She then returned to
the apartment, where she undressed Daviyon, washed him thoroughly, wrapped him in a
blanket, and threw on a coat to meet her mother at the door. Johnson then took her daughter
to an upstairs neighbor, Emma Robinson. When her mother arrived, Johnson testified that
Eubanks said he would stay and clean up the apartment; Johnson was surprised he did not
accompany them to the hospital. Johnson, Daviyon, her mother, and her aunt then left for
the nearby CMMC.
¶6.
CMMC could not stabilize Daviyon, and about an hour later, Daviyon was sent by
ambulance to the University of Mississippi Medical Center (UMMC). Johnson returned to
the apartment to pick up her daughter before continuing on to UMMC. Johnson testified that
3
during the ride to UMMC, Inecia appeared “[q]uiet, scared. Like she was terrified.” Johnson
observed that ordinarily Inecia “never stopped talking,” but she had been silent since Johnson
returned home. In the car, Johnson asked the child, “Raja[,] what happened?” 1 Johnson
testified, over the objection of the defense, that Inecia responded, “[D]addy hit Doc with the
stick in the head a lot of times[,] and he hit me too. Then Doc started crying[,] and [D]addy
wouldn’t stop hitting him. And then Doc stopped crying[,] and he didn’t move no [sic]
more.”
¶7.
Johnson testified that at UMMC, Daviyon could be kept alive only by machine. Two
days later, her son was removed from life support, and he died. Johnson also testified that
when she ultimately returned to the apartment, Eubanks had not cleaned it up. She identified
the stick that had been used to keep the patio door locked. She explained that after the door
was repaired, she placed it in a closet where it had remained, except on one occasion when
Eubanks used the stick to play baseball with neighborhood children.
¶8.
Jackson Police Department child protection officers were called on the night of the
incident to investigate the suspected abuse of Daviyon. Based on their interview of Johnson,
an arrest warrant was issued for Eubanks, who turned himself in the next day and consented
to an interview with the officers.
¶9.
Officer Harvey Davis of the child protection unit testified as to Eubanks’s statement.
Eubanks first said that he heard a loud scream and found Inecia hitting Daviyon with the
1
“Raja” was Inecia’s nickname, and Daviyon was also called “Doc.”
4
stick. Officer Davis testified that Eubanks told the officers that he had hit Daviyon with a
belt because he had written on the wall. Eubanks then stated that he did not know what had
happened because he had smoked marijuana and drank beer earlier. Officer Davis also
testified that Eubanks said he had been playing with the children, tossing Daviyon into the
air and allowing him to fall back onto the mattress. Eubanks also explained that he and
Daviyon had played a punching game, with Eubanks punching the child in the shoulder area,
but not anywhere below the shoulder.
¶10.
Detective Eric Smith testified that he recovered the stick Johnson had previously
identified. He testified that it was found in the living room of the apartment, leaning against
the wall in a corner. He stated that he observed what appeared to be blood on the stick.
¶11.
Dr. Stephen Hayne, who autopsied Daviyon’s body, also testified for the State. He
stated that the cause of death was closed head injury, which was a product of blunt force
trauma to the head. Dr. Hayne also described other injuries, which included bruising and
abrasions on both sides of Daviyon’s head, face, eyes, chest, back, buttocks, and thighs. He
also noted three fractured ribs, tears and bruising to the rectum consistent with penetration,
and bruising and abrasions to the genitals. Dr. Hayne opined that the injuries he observed
had occurred approximately two days prior to death, and the injuries could not have been
inflicted accidentally.
¶12.
The defense put on no witnesses, and Eubanks did not testify. He was subsequently
convicted of capital murder and sentenced to life imprisonment without eligibility for parole.
On appeal, Eubanks argues two assignments of error.
5
DISCUSSION
I.
¶13.
Whether the trial court erred in admitting hearsay testimony.
Eubanks argues that the trial court erred in admitting the hearsay testimony of two-
year, eleven-month-old Inecia. He asserts that the trial court erred in three distinct respects,
so we shall address each separately.
A.
¶14.
Whether Inecia’s hearsay statements were properly admitted as
an excited utterance.
Hearsay statements are excluded under Mississippi Rule of Evidence 801(c), which
defines hearsay as “a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the
trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.” Rule 803(2),
however, provides an exception to the exclusion of hearsay evidence, namely a statement
“relating to a startling event or condition made while the declarant was under the stress of
excitement caused by the event or condition.” The official comment to Rule 803(2)
elaborates, stating in pertinent part:
The underlying theory of the excited utterance exception is that circumstances
may create such an excited condition that the capacity for reflection is
temporarily impeded and that statements uttered in that condition are thus free
of conscious fabrication. . . . [T]he essential ingredient here is spontaneity.
With respect to the time element, the issue is the duration of the excited state.
This, depending on the exact circumstances of a case, can vary greatly. . . .
¶15.
Eubanks asserts that Inecia’s hearsay statement was neither spontaneous nor made
while the child was still under the stress of the incident.
¶16.
Eubanks argues that Inecia was no longer “under the stress of excitement” caused by
the incident. See M.R.E. 803(2). In particular, Eubanks argues that too much time had
6
passed between the beating and Inecia’s statement to her mother. He argues that the beating
was only shown to have occurred at some point during the six hours that Johnson was
visiting her grandmother at CMMC and that, based on Johnson’s testimony, approximately
two hours had passed since she first returned home. Therefore, Eubanks argues that the
beating occurred at least two hours, and at most eight hours, prior to the statement being
given. Eubanks also argues that Inecia’s statement was not spontaneous, because it was
made in response to a question posed by her mother.
¶17.
Mississippi law does not provide a specific time period for a statement to be admitted
as an excited utterance. Smith v. State, 733 So. 2d 793, 798 (¶18) (Miss. 1999) (observing
that twenty-four hours appeared to be the practical limit in prior cases). As the comment to
Rule 803(2) states, the time element, “depending on the exact circumstances of a case, can
vary greatly.” We have noted that “[i]t is important that there has been no intervening matter
to eliminate the state of excitement and call into question the reliability of the utterance.”
McCoy v. State, 878 So. 2d 167, 173 (¶12) (Miss. Ct. App. 2004) (citing Berry v. State, 611
So. 2d 924, 926 (Miss. 1992)).
¶18.
The comment to Rule 803(2) states that spontaneity is “the essential ingredient” in
admitting a hearsay statement as an excited utterance. Nonetheless, our case law is clearly
consistent with the proposition that “[t]he mere fact that the statement . . . was in response
to an inquiry . . . does not necessarily take [it] outside the realm of admissible excited
utterances.” Barnett v. State, 757 So. 2d 323, 330 (¶18) (Miss. Ct. App. 2000) (citing
Sanders v. State, 586 So. 2d 792, 795 (Miss. 1991)). Indeed, the supreme court has held that
7
“[w]here the excited utterance is prompted by a simple question, even from an officer, such
as ‘What happened?’ or ‘What's wrong?’” it may still fall under the exception. Carter v.
State, 722 So. 2d 1258, 1261 (¶10) (Miss. 1998) (citations omitted).
¶19.
Whether to admit hearsay evidence as an excited utterance is entrusted to the sound
discretion of the trial court, and we review such decisions for an abuse of discretion. Davis
v. State, 611 So. 2d 906, 914 (Miss. 1992).
¶20.
On our review of the record, we find that the trial court did not err in finding that
Inecia was still under the stress of the excitement at the time of the statement. While
Eubanks argues that the beating could have occurred up to eight hours before, such does not,
per se, preclude a finding that the child was still under stress at the time she made the
statement. Instead, we must look at the exact circumstances of the case.
¶21.
The record reflects that Inecia, a child of two years and eleven months, was beaten by
a man she regarded as her father. She then witnessed her four-year-old brother receive a
savage beating that left him mortally wounded and comatose. Sometime later, Johnson
returned to the apartment, where she observed that her daughter was in the same room as
Eubanks and Daviyon. Johnson observed that Inecia acted unusual and appeared to be under
great stress. Johnson, however, was preoccupied with her son and, within a few minutes, left
Inecia in the care of a neighbor. When Johnson returned, approximately two hours later, she
observed that Inecia still appeared to be under stress. A few minutes later, Johnson asked the
child, “What happened?,” which prompted the statement that was ultimately admitted as an
excited utterance.
8
¶22.
The record, therefore, indicates that the child spent the great majority of the time
following the incident either in the presence of the perpetrator or in the care of a neighbor.
Once returned to her mother’s care, Johnson testified that Inecia appeared to still be under
great stress, and Inecia made the statement shortly thereafter. Under these circumstances,
the trial court did not err in finding the statement to have been made while the child was
under the stress of the incident.
¶23.
Likewise, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding the statement
spontaneous, notwithstanding the time that passed or that it was prompted by a general
question from Johnson. Essentially, Inecia’s statement was made at the first reasonable
opportunity she had to tell a trusted relative what had occurred. See Heflin v. State, 643 So.
2d 512, 519 (Miss. 1994). Furthermore, the question itself, “What happened?,” has been
specifically cited by the supreme court as an example of a question that, while bearing upon
the spontaneity requirement, does not necessarily preclude admission of the statement as an
excited utterance. See Carter, 722 So. 2d at 1261 (¶10). On our review of the record,
nothing in the question itself or the surrounding circumstances indicates that this was the sort
of leaded or manufactured declaration that the spontaneity requirement guards against. See
Sanders, 586 So. 2d at 795. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
finding the statement sufficiently spontaneous.
¶24.
Having found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding the hearsay
statement was made spontaneously under the stress of the incident, we likewise find that the
trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the hearsay statement as an excited
9
utterance under Rule 803(2). This issue is without merit.
B.
¶25.
Whether the trial court erred in not evaluating whether the child
was competent to testify.
Eubanks argues that the trial court should have held a competency hearing to
determine whether Inecia was competent to testify. The child did not, however, actually
testify at trial. Under Mississippi Rule of Evidence 803, an excited utterance is admissible
notwithstanding the availability of the declarant at trial; the declarant’s present competence
to testify is therefore irrelevant. This issue is without merit.
C.
¶26.
Whether admission of the child’s hearsay statements violated
the Confrontation Clause.
Finally, Eubanks argues that admitting Inecia’s hearsay statements, without allowing
him an opportunity to cross-examine the child, violated his Sixth Amendment right to
confront the witnesses against him.
¶27.
The United States Supreme Court, however, has stated that this right exists only where
the hearsay statement in question is “testimonial” in nature. See Crawford v. Washington,
541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004). In Crawford, the United States Supreme Court declined to provide
a precise definition of “testimonial” hearsay, stating only that “[w]hatever else the term
covers, it applies at a minimum to prior testimony at a preliminary hearing, before a grand
jury, or at a former trial; and to police interrogations.” Id.
¶28.
The Mississippi Supreme Court “has concluded that a statement is testimonial when
it is given to the police or individuals working in connection with the police for the purpose
of prosecuting the accused.” Bishop v. State, 982 So. 2d 371, 375 (¶10) (Miss. 2008)
10
(internal quotations omitted); see also Giles v. California, 128 S. Ct. 2678, 2692-93 (2008)
(“Statements to friends and neighbors about [domestic] abuse and intimidation . . . would be
excluded, if at all, only by hearsay rules . . . .”).
¶29.
From our review of the record, it is evident that Johnson was neither a police officer,
nor was she “working in connection with the police for the purpose of prosecuting the
accused” at the time she received Inecia’s hearsay statement. Accordingly, the hearsay
statement was non-testimonial in nature, and the Confrontation Clause is inapplicable. This
issue is without merit.
II.
¶30.
Whether the trial court erred in granting the State’s motion in
limine.
Eubanks argues that the trial court erred in granting the State’s motion in limine to
preclude him from introducing accusations that Johnson had abused or mistreated her
children on prior occasions. This, Eubanks asserts, violated his constitutional right to present
a defense notwithstanding that it was within the trial court’s discretion under the Mississippi
Rules of Evidence.
¶31.
The United States Supreme Court has stated:
State and federal rulemakers have broad latitude under the Constitution to
establish rules excluding evidence from criminal trials. This latitude, however,
has limits. Whether rooted directly in the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment or in the Compulsory Process or Confrontation
Clauses of the Sixth Amendment, the Constitution guarantees criminal
defendants a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense. This right
is abridged by evidence rules that infringe upon a weighty interest of the
accused and are arbitrary or disproportionate to the purposes they are designed
to serve.
11
Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319, 324-25 (2006) (internal citations and quotations
omitted).
¶32.
When it granted the State’s motion in limine, the trial court clearly stated that its
ruling was conditioned on the absence of any evidence connecting Johnson to Daviyon’s
injuries. The trial court stated that if such evidence were presented, it would revisit the issue
if Eubanks raised it. Eubanks, however, did not raise the issue again, nor did he proffer the
proposed testimony. In fact, on our review of the record, we can find no evidence that tied
Daviyon’s injuries to any prior abuse by Johnson. Instead, the testimony, particularly that
of the medical examiner, was that Daviyon’s many injuries were inflicted on November 19,
2003.
¶33.
On appeal, Eubanks argues that a jury, after hearing accusations that Johnson had
abused her children on prior occasions, could have concluded that Johnson caused the child’s
injuries on November 19, 2003. Other than Johnson’s admission that she was present at the
apartment until approximately noon, Eubanks cites no other evidence supporting this theory.
The Constitution, however, does not entitle a defendant to introduce evidence that “is
speculative or remote, or does not tend to prove or disprove a material fact in issue at the
defendant’s trial.” Holmes, 547 U.S. at 327. This assignment of error is without merit.
¶34. THE JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT OF HINDS COUNTY OF
CONVICTION OF CAPITAL MURDER AND SENTENCE OF LIFE IN THE
CUSTODY OF THE MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS WITHOUT
ELIGIBILITY FOR PAROLE IS AFFIRMED. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE
ASSESSED TO HINDS COUNTY.
KING, C.J., LEE, P.J., IRVING, GRIFFIS, BARNES, ISHEE, ROBERTS,
12
CARLTON AND MAXWELL, JJ., CONCUR.
13
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.