Rankin Group, Inc. v. City of Richland, Mississippi
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2007-CA-02259-COA
RANKIN GROUP, INC.
APPELLANT
v.
CITY OF RICHLAND, MISSISSIPPI
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
TRIAL JUDGE:
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE:
NATURE OF THE CASE:
TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION:
DISPOSITION:
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
APPELLEE
12/12/2007
HON. SAMAC S. RICHARDSON
RANKIN COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
SAMUEL D. JOINER JR.
STEPHEN W. RIMMER
CIVIL - OTHER
BILL OF EXCEPTIONS DISMISSED AS
UNTIMELY
AFFIRMED: 03/17/2009
BEFORE MYERS, P.J., GRIFFIS AND ISHEE, JJ.
GRIFFIS, J., FOR THE COURT:
¶1.
The Rankin Group, Inc. (“Rankin”) petitioned the Circuit Court of Rankin County to
issue a writ of mandamus to require the City of Richland (“the City”) to sign and file a bill
of exceptions. The circuit court dismissed the petition for the writ of mandamus, because
Rankin did not appeal the City’s decision within ten days as required under Mississippi Code
Annotated section 11-51-75 (Rev. 2002). Rankin now appeals the dismissal and argues that:
(1) the time for appeal was incorrectly determined to run from the date the board adjourned
the meeting – not the date the minutes were signed, and (2) the City is estopped from labeling
this property a mobile home because the City has taxed it as a homestead since 1965. We
find no error and affirm.
FACTS
¶2.
Rankin entered into an agreement to purchase the disputed property in June 2007. At
this time, George Sanders, Rankin’s president met with the City’s building official, Jeff Sims,
to discuss the property. Sims instructed Sanders to draft a proposal for improvements to the
property for discussion at the City’s next meeting. Sanders attended that next meeting, but
the issue of his property was tabled until the City’s following meeting.
¶3.
The City held its regularly scheduled meeting on September 4, 2007, and recessed this
meeting until September 11, 2007, at which time the meeting was adjourned. Rankin was
not represented during either session. During this two-session meeting, the decision was
made to demolish the structure owned by Rankin under the City’s authority to remove
dilapidated buildings in an effort to clean private property pursuant to Mississippi Code
Annotated section 21-19-11 (Rev. 2007). The minutes from this two-session meeting were
signed by a majority of the members of the governing body of the City on September 18,
2007. The City had published a notice in the local newspaper for two consecutive weeks as
required under section 21-19-11 if the property owner or his address is unknown.
¶4.
On September 27, 2007, Rankin presented the City with a bill of exceptions to sign.
However, the City refused to sign it. On October 12, 2007, Rankin petitioned the circuit
court to issue a writ of mandamus to require the City to sign the bill of exceptions. The City
subsequently filed a motion to dismiss. The circuit court granted the motion to dismiss
2
Rankin’s petition because the petition was filed after the ten-day time period for appeal had
passed. Because of the procedural bar, the circuit court declined to hear Rankin’s argument
on the merits that this structure is actually real property – not a mobile home – and notice
was improper.1
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶5.
Appellate courts “review[] errors of law, which include summary judgments and
motions to dismiss, de novo." Aldridge v. West, 929 So. 2d 298, 300 (¶6) (Miss. 2006)
(quoting City of Jackson v. Perry, 764 So. 2d 373, 376 (¶9) (Miss. 2000)).
ANALYSIS
1.
¶6.
Was the time for appeal incorrectly determined to run from the date the
board adjourned the meeting – not the date the minutes were signed?
Rankin argues that the City’s decision was not final and appealable until September
18, 2007, when the minutes of the September 4, 2007, and September 11, 2007, meetings
were adopted and approved by signing. The City responds that the ten-day period for appeal
begins when the meeting, where the City rendered its decision, is adjourned.
¶7.
“This Court must apply the plain meaning of unambiguous statutes.” Ameristar
Casino Vicksburg, Inc. v. Duckworth, 990 So. 2d 758, 760 (¶9) (Miss. 2008) (citing
Richmond v. City of Corinth, 816 So. 2d 373, 377-78 (¶15) (Miss. 2002)).
¶8.
We begin our inquiry by looking at the plain meaning of section 11-51-75, which
1
Under Mississippi Code Annotated section 21-19-20 (Supp. 2008), the real property
statute, the property owner is entitled to thirty-days notice and a hearing in circuit court.
3
provides in pertinent part:
Any person aggrieved by a judgment or decision of the board of supervisors,
or municipal authorities of a city, town, or village, may appeal within ten (10)
days from the date of adjournment at which session the board of supervisors
or municipal authorities rendered such judgment or decision, and may embody
the facts, judgment and decision in a bill of exceptions which shall be signed
by the person acting as president of the board of supervisors or of the
municipal authorities.
(Emphasis added). The City argues that a decision is rendered and the time for appeal begins
to run once a meeting is adjourned – when a motion to adjourn is made, seconded, and
approved by the majority of the board. Rankin argues that under Mississippi Code Annotated
section 21-15-33 (Rev. 2007), the City does not render a decision until the minutes of a
meeting are signed. Once the minutes are signed and the meeting adjourned, then the ten-day
time period for appeal begins to run.
¶9.
Rankin cites South Central Turf, Inc. v. City of Jackson, 526 So. 2d 558, 562-63
(Miss. 1988) as grounds that a matter is not finally decided and appealable until the minutes
of the meeting are signed. In South Central Turf, Inc., the supreme court was not required
to decide whether the time for appeal began at the adjournment of the meeting or upon the
signing of the minutes from that meeting, because the appeal was filed more than ten days
after the minutes were signed. Id. at 562.
¶10.
We look to section 21-15-33 to determine the effect and validity of municipal minutes.
The statute states in part that:
The minutes of every municipality must be adopted and approved by a
majority of all the members of the governing body of the municipality at the
next regular meeting or within thirty (30) days of the meeting thereof,
4
whichever occurs first. Upon such approval, said minutes shall have the legal
effect of being valid from and after the date of the meeting.
Miss. Code Ann. § 21-15-33. The minutes must be approved at the next meeting or within
thirty days, and once approved, the “minutes shall have the legal effect of being valid from
and after the date of the meeting.” Id. (emphasis added). Rankin argues that meeting means
the meeting when the minutes are approved, not the actual meeting addressed by the minutes.
However, this interpretation is inconsistent with the plain language of the statute.
¶11.
Following Rankin’s logic, if the City did not hold a regularly scheduled meeting
within thirty days, but it approved the minutes within thirty days of the original meeting as
required by section 21-15-33, then the minutes would have no legal effect. In this situation,
there would be no meeting within Rankin’s interpretation of section 21-15-33 to mark the
legal effect of the minutes. Rankin’s argument is without merit.
¶12.
The ten-day time period for appeal began when the City adjourned the meeting on
September 11, 2007, after making a decision about the property. Finding no error, we affirm.
2.
¶13.
Is the City estopped from labeling this structure a mobile home because
the City has taxed it as a homestead since 1965?
Rankin argues that the City is estopped from removing this structure as a mobile home
under section 21-19-11, because the City has taxed this property as a homestead – not a
mobile home – since 1965. The City argues that the timeliness of the appeal is dispositive,
and the underlying merits are irrelevant.
¶14.
The supreme court has held that “[w]hen an appeal and bill [of] exceptions are not
filed within the prescribed 10 days from the day of adjournment of the board of
5
supervisors[’] session, neither the circuit court nor [the appellate court] has jurisdiction [to]
consider the appeal.” House v. Honea, 799 So. 2d 882, 883 (¶9) (Miss. 2001) (citing Moore
v. Sanders, 569 So. 2d 1148, 1150 (Miss. 1990)). As discussed, Rankin’s appeal was filed
outside the ten-day period allowed by section 11-51-75.
¶15.
Rankin’s failure to file the appeal within ten days determines the outcome of this
appeal. We affirm the circuit court’s dismissal based on its lack of jurisdiction due to
Rankin’s failure to timely appeal.
¶16. THE JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT OF RANKIN COUNTY IS
AFFIRMED. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO THE
APPELLANT.
KING, C.J., LEE AND MYERS, P.JJ., IRVING, BARNES, ISHEE, ROBERTS,
CARLTON AND MAXWELL, JJ., CONCUR.
6
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.