J. W. Clayton, Jr. v. Jeffrey Hartsog
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2006-CA-01694-COA
J. W. CLAYTON, JR.
APPELLANT
v.
JEFFREY HARTSOG
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
TRIAL JUDGE:
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED:
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE:
NATURE OF THE CASE:
TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION:
DISPOSITION:
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
APPELLEE
8/30/2006
HON. WINSTON L. KIDD
HINDS COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
GARY DALE THRASH
JOHN NEWTON SATCHER
ROBERT J. ARNOLD
CIVIL - TORTS-OTHER THAN PERSONAL
INJURY & PROPERTY DAMAGE
TRIAL COURT DENIED APPELLANT’S
MOTION TO REOPEN TIME FOR APPEAL.
AFFIRMED-12/04/2007
BEFORE KING, C.J., BARNES AND ISHEE, JJ.
ISHEE, J., FOR THE COURT:
¶1.
In April 2004, J.W. Clayton, Jr. filed suit against Dr. Jeffrey Hartsog in county court claiming
slander and intentional infliction of emotional distress. That suit was dismissed on Hartsog’s motion
for summary judgment and Clayton was sanctioned $500 for filing a frivolous lawsuit. Clayton
appealed to circuit court, where the trial judge affirmed the ruling of the county court on both
summary judgment and sanctions. Due to a clerical error, however, Clayton did not receive notice
of the circuit court judgment until after the period for timely appeal to the supreme court had lapsed.
Clayton then filed a motion under Mississippi Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(h) to reopen time for
appeal. The circuit court denied this motion. Aggrieved, Clayton appeals, asserting that the circuit
court abused its discretion in denying his Rule 4(h) motion. Finding no error, we affirm the
judgment of the circuit court.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
¶2.
On April 20, 2004, J.W. Clayton, Jr. filed suit against Dr. Jeffrey Hartsog in the County
Court for the First Judicial District of Hinds County, alleging slander and intentional infliction of
emotional distress. In August 2005, Hartsog filed a motion for summary judgment, and in response
Clayton filed motions to compel discovery and for leave to amend his complaint. In October 2005
the county court denied Clayton’s motions, and granted summary judgment to Hartsog, issuing $500
in sanctions against Clayton for filing a frivolous lawsuit.
¶3.
Clayton then appealed the decision of the county court to the Circuit Court of Hinds County.
In June 2006, the circuit court affirmed the rulings of the trial court on both summary judgment and
sanctions. Due to an error in the circuit court clerk’s computer system, however, Clayton did not
receive notice of the circuit court’s ruling until after the period for timely appeal to the supreme court
had elapsed. Clayton then filed a motion under Mississippi Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(h)
seeking to reopen time for appeal, which the circuit court denied. It is from this ruling that Clayton
appeals.
DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS
¶4.
Clayton asserts that the trial court was in error when it denied his motion to reopen time for
appeal under Mississippi Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(h). The denial of motions made under Rule
4(h) is within the discretion of the trial court. Pre-Paid Legal Servs. v. Anderson, 873 So. 2d 1008,
2
1009 (¶4) (Miss. 2004). Therefore, we review denials of motions made pursuant to Rule 4(h) under
an abuse of discretion standard. Id.
¶5.
Rule 4(h) states that
[t]he trial court, if it finds (a) that a party entitled to notice of the entry of a judgment
or order did not receive such notice from the clerk or any party within 21 days of its
entry and (b) that no party would be prejudiced, may, upon motion filed within 180
days of entry of the judgment or order or within 7 days of receipt of such notice,
whichever is earlier, reopen the time for appeal for a period of 14 days from the date
of entry of the order reopening the time for appeal.
Clayton claims that, due to an error in the circuit court clerk’s computer system, he did not receive
notice of the judgment of the circuit court until the period for timely appeal to the supreme court had
expired. This fact is not contested by Hartsog, and is supported by a letter from the Circuit Clerk
of Hinds County, so we accept it as true. Clayton’s attorney acted quickly and efficiently after
receiving notice of the judgment through a letter from opposing counsel, and filed his Rule 4(h)
motion within seven days of receiving notice of the judgment. On these facts, the entirety of
Clayton’s argument is that he has met the prima facie requirements for reopening time for appeal
under Rule 4(h), and so therefore he is entitled to a ruling in his favor on this issue.
¶6.
The comments to Rule 4(h) make clear, however, that “the trial court retains some discretion
to refuse to reopen the time for appeal even when the requirements of Rule 4(h) are met . . . .”
M.R.A.P. 4(h) cmts. In this case, the county court ruled in favor of Hartsog on the issue of summary
judgment and took the extraordinary step of issuing sanctions against Clayton for filing a frivolous
suit. After a review of the case, the circuit court affirmed the county court on both issues. Given
these facts, especially the imposition of sanctions for filing a frivolous suit, we cannot say the circuit
3
court abused the discretion granted to it by Rule 4(h) when it denied Clayton’s motion to reopen time
for appeal. Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court.
¶7.
THE JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT OF HINDS COUNTY IS AFFIRMED.
ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO THE APPELLANT.
KING, C.J., LEE AND MYERS, P.JJ., IRVING, CHANDLER, GRIFFIS, BARNES,
ROBERTS AND CARLTON, JJ., CONCUR.
4
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
