Michael Ames Williams v. State of Mississippi
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2006-KA-00751-COA
MICHAEL AMES WILLIAMS
APPELLANT
v.
STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
TRIAL JUDGE:
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE:
DISTRICT ATTORNEY:
NATURE OF THE CASE:
TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION:
DISPOSITION:
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
APPELLEE
4/27/2006
HON. ANN H. LAMAR
TALLAHATCHIE COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
TOMMY WAYNE DEFER
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
BY: JOHN R. HENRY
JOHN W. CHAMPION
CRIMINAL - FELONY
FOUND GUILTY OF POSSESSION OF
MARIHUANA IN AN AMOUNT GREATER
THAN THIRTY GRAMS, BUT LESS THAN
TWO HUNDRED AND FIFTY GRAMS, AND
SENTENCED TO SERVE TWENTY YEARS IN
THE CUSTODY OF THE MISSISSIPPI
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AS A
HABITUAL OFFENDER, SAID SENTENCE TO
RUN CONSECUTIVE TO THE SENTENCE
IMPOSED IN CAUSE NO. CR97-12-C-T2.
AFFIRMED – 08/07/2007
BEFORE LEE, P.J., IRVING AND CHANDLER, JJ.
IRVING, J., FOR THE COURT:
¶1.
Michael Ames Williams was convicted by a jury of possession of more than thirty grams of
marihuana, but less than two-hundred-and-fifty grams, and was sentenced by the Tallahatchie County
Circuit Court to serve twenty years in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections as
a habitual offender. The court ordered that the sentence run consecutive to Williams’s sentence in
cause number CR97-12-C-T2, an April 3, 1998 armed robbery conviction. Aggrieved, Williams
appeals and asserts that the court erred in having him restrained in shackles during the trial, in
refusing to grant a mistrial during voir dire, and in denying his motion in limine to exclude certain
evidence about his conduct during his arrest.
¶2.
Finding no error, we affirm.
FACTS
¶3.
On January 26, 2005, law enforcement officers confronted Williams in a pool hall in
Tutwiler, Mississippi, and attempted to serve an arrest warrant on him. Williams struggled with the
officers, and as he did so a small bag of what appeared to be marihuana fell out of his sleeve.
Williams was taken into custody and transported to the county jail, where he was stripped and
searched, a standard procedure upon admission to the jail. During the search, officers found fortytwo bags of marihuana concealed in Williams’s underwear. Thereafter, Williams was indicted for
possession of marihuana with intent to distribute.1
¶4.
Williams initially hired his own attorney to represent him. However, he and his attorney had
a falling out, and that attorney was released from the case. Thereafter, the court appointed an
attorney to represent Williams. On the morning of trial, Williams requested a continuance to get a
new attorney, claiming that his court-appointed attorney had not done enough to prepare for his case.
The attorney, who was present, denied Williams’s allegations and stated that he had prepared
adequately for the trial. The court refused to grant a continuance and stated that the trial would
continue as scheduled. During this time, Williams was extremely belligerent with the court, and the
judge had difficulty speaking over him.
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At trial, the court reduced the charge to simple possession of marihuana.
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¶5.
When the court attempted to begin voir dire, Williams refused to leave the judge’s chambers.
Thereafter, the judge returned to her chambers. At that time, Williams refused to respond to the
court in any way. The court ordered that Williams be put in shackles and returned to the jury room
for trial. The court reasoned that Williams’s demeanor, his history, and the fact that it had taken six
officers to restrain him during his arrest indicated that Williams posed a risk to those in the
courtroom. The court specifically noted that, due to the layout of the courtroom and Williams’s
clothing, it would be exceedingly difficult for the jury to see the shackles unless Williams drew
attention to them. Trial then proceeded, presumably with Williams shackled.
¶6.
During voir dire, the court asked the jury panel if any of them knew Williams. One of the
potential jurors stated that he knew Williams: “I work for the county jail, for CCA, and he’s been
in and out of the jail sometime.” Williams immediately requested a mistrial, which was denied.
Williams took the stand in his defense, and at the close of the evidence, the jury found Williams
guilty of simple possession of marihuana.
¶7.
Additional facts, if necessary, will be related during our analysis and discussion of the issues.
ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION OF THE ISSUES
1. Use of Restraints in Presence of Jury
¶8.
In his first contention of error, Williams claims that the court erred in allowing him to enter
the courtroom in restraints. In general, a defendant has the right to be “free of shackles or handcuffs”
when in front of the jury. Smith v. State, 877 So. 2d 369, 379 (¶17) (Miss. 2004) (citations omitted).
“However, where there is a risk of escape or the possibility of harm to other persons, restraint
devices may be used in the judge’s discretion.” Id. (citing Brown v. State, 798 So. 2d 481, 501 (¶42)
(Miss. 2001)). There must be a showing of prejudice to Williams before we will reverse his
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conviction on this ground. Payton v. State, 897 So. 2d 921, 932 (¶16) (Miss. 2003) (citing Lockett
v. State, 517 So. 2d 1317, 1329 (Miss. 1987); Hickson v. State, 472 So. 2d 379, 383 (Miss. 1985)).
¶9.
The court in this case ordered that Williams be shackled only after he became belligerent and
refused to enter the courtroom under his own volition. The sheriff who was present noted that it had
taken six officers to subdue Williams when he was arrested. The court found that Williams should
be shackled, and explained:
Let the record reflect that Mr. Williams is still refusing to look at the court or to
speak to the court or to answer any questions from the court. So the record will
reflect that Mr. Williams is refusing to cooperate and refusing to talk with his
attorney or to make any record on his own behalf. Based on Mr. Williams’s conduct
this morning, his demeanor before this court, I see him clearly as a security risk at
this time, and I’m going to grant the sheriff’s request to keep him in leg irons as we
are before the court this morning.
The record should reflect that Mr. Williams is indicted for possession of more than
30 grams of marijuana as a 99-19-83 habitual offender. He has two prior convictions
for grand larceny and for armed robbery out of this county. He has, in fact, been
revoked and I believe is doing a ten year sentence at this time on a revoked sentence.
He is a [sic] MDOC inmate and the court has many, many security concerns about
this courthouse, even on a good day.
The sheriff then noted that “based on the clothes that he’s got on, it’s going to be very unlikely
anybody would see handcuffs or leg irons on him anyhow.” The court had also made a previous
finding regarding the visibility of the restraints:
Well, leg shackles have just been placed on this defendant, and I want the record to
be abundantly clear that if Mr. Williams were to walk from the point where he is
right now in chambers and into that courtroom and sit at counsel table, there is a
sufficient bar in that courtroom that would prevent any juror from knowing that he
is, in fact, shackled. There is a solid barrier between the area where the jurors are
sitting and the area of the counsel table. His feet would be completely concealed
where they could not be seen by the jury panel. If Mr. Williams, however, chooses
to and walks out of this chambers and makes a disturbance there in the courtroom,
no doubt the jury panel will be made aware that there are restraints. So, as the court
sees it, that’s up to Mr. Williams how he chooses to handle that.
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Williams’s attorney did not agree with the court’s assessment that it would be impossible for the jury
to see Williams’s feet, as he stated that there were “spaces, cracks in between where you can look
through and see a person’s feet.”
¶10.
Given Williams’s belligerent demeanor, his past history of violence, the fact that it had taken
six officers to arrest him, and his refusal to cooperate in proceeding with the trial, we cannot say that
the court erred in ordering that he be shackled the morning of trial. Furthermore, Williams has
shown no prejudice that resulted from this shackling. In fact, Williams has not even shown that any
of the jurors actually observed the shackles. The court and the sheriff indicated that, due to a
combination of the clothes that Williams was wearing and the layout of the courtroom, it would be
very difficult for the jury panel to see the shackles. Williams has produced nothing to indicate that
the jury was able to see the shackles despite his clothes and the courtroom furniture.
¶11.
This contention is without merit.
2. Denial of Mistrial
¶12.
In his second claim of error, Williams argues that the court erred in refusing to grant a
mistrial after a potential juror stated that he knew Williams because Williams had been in and out
of the county jail. We review the grant or denial of a mistrial under an abuse of discretion standard.
Sipp v. State, 936 So. 2d 326, 331 (¶7) (Miss. 2006) (citing Tate v. State, 912 So. 2d 919, 932 (¶41)
(Miss. 2005)). “The trial court must declare a mistrial when there is an error in the proceedings
resulting in substantial and irreparable prejudice to the defendant’s case; however, the trial judge is
permitted considerable discretion in determining whether a mistrial is warranted since the judge is
best positioned for measuring the prejudicial effect.” Id. (citing Tate, 912 So. 2d at 932 (¶41)).
¶13.
Given the highly deferential standard of review that applies to the denial of a motion for a
mistrial, we cannot say that the court erred, or that “substantial and irreparable prejudice” was done
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to Williams’s case. Williams also contends that the court should have instructed the jury to disregard
the remarks, although Williams did not request any such cautionary instruction. We find that this
contention is procedurally barred from appeal because of Williams’s failure to request such an
instruction. See Rubenstein v. State, 941 So. 2d 735, 760-61 (¶¶89-92) (Miss. 2006). Furthermore,
any error in this regard was harmless. Williams took the stand and testified that he had previously
been in jail for some period of time. Any harm done by a potential juror stating that he knew
Williams from the county jail became harmless when Williams himself openly testified that he had
been in jail prior to trial.
¶14.
This contention is also without merit.
3. Motion in Limine
¶15.
In his final claim of error, Williams contends that the court erred in refusing to suppress
testimony by the arresting officers regarding his arrest, either by granting Williams’s pretrial motion
in limine, or by sustaining his objections made to the testimony during trial. Specifically, Williams
did not want the officers to testify about how he fought with them as they attempted to arrest him.
We will not reverse a trial court for the admission or denial of evidence unless the court abused its
discretion. Mingo v. State, 944 So. 2d 18, 28 (¶27) (Miss. 2006).
¶16.
There are at least two reasons justifying admission of the evidence in question. First, the
marihuana was discovered by the officers when it fell out of Williams’s shirt sleeve as he struggled
with the officers in a futile attempt to avoid being arrested pursuant to an arrest warrant. Therefore,
testimony about the struggle was necessary to relate to the jury the complete story of how the
marihuana was discovered. Second, Rule 404(b) of the Mississippi Rules of Evidence states that
evidence of another crime or bad act is admissible to show “other purposes such as proof of motive,
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.” The
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Mississippi Supreme Court has noted that “it is well settled that evidence of flight or escape is
admissible as an exception to M.R.E. 404(b) in order to show guilty knowledge.” Shumpert v. State,
935 So. 2d 962, 974 (¶48) (Miss. 2006). Likewise, Williams’s struggle with the officers is
admissible because it tends to show his “guilty knowledge” of the marihuana.
¶17.
Even if evidence is generally admissible under 404(b), it must still “be excluded if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues,
or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation
of cumulative evidence.” M.R.E. 403. Given the highly relevant and probative nature of this aspect
of the evidence, we do not find that the dangers of unfair prejudice and confusion outweighed the
reasons for admitting the evidence. Therefore, the court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the
evidence to be admitted.
¶18.
Furthermore, given the overwhelming weight of the evidence against Williams, even were
we incorrect and error flowed from the court’s admission of the testimony, any such error would be
harmless. See Isom v. State, 928 So. 2d 840, 845-46 (¶15) (Miss. 2006).
¶19.
This contention of error is also without merit.
¶20. THE JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT OF TALLAHATCHIE COUNTY OF
CONVICTION OF POSSESSION OF MARIHUANA, IN AN AMOUNT LESS THAN TWO
HUNDRED FIFTY GRAMS BUT MORE THAN THIRTY GRAMS AND SENTENCE OF
TWENTY YEARS IN THE CUSTODY OF THE MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS, AS A HABITUAL OFFENDER, TO BE SERVED CONSECUTIVELY TO
THE SENTENCE IMPOSED IN CAUSE NO. CR97-12-C-T2, IS AFFIRMED. ALL COSTS
OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO TALLAHATCHIE COUNTY.
KING, C.J., LEE AND MYERS, P.JJ., CHANDLER, GRIFFIS, BARNES, ISHEE,
ROBERTS AND CARLTON, JJ., CONCUR.
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