Delron Issac v. State of Mississippi
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2005-CP-01523-COA
DELRON ISSAC A/K/A DELRON ISAAC
APPELLANT
v.
STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
APPELLEE
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
TRIAL JUDGE:
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE:
NATURE OF THE CASE:
TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION:
DISPOSITION:
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
6/22/2005
HON. MIKE SMITH
PIKE COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
DELRON ISSAC (PRO SE)
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
BY: JEFFREY A. KLINGFUSS
CIVIL - POST - CONVICTION RELIEF
PETITION FOR POST - CONVICTION RELIEF
DENIED.
AFFIRMED - 05/29/2007
BEFORE KING, C.J., IRVING AND ROBERTS, JJ.
ROBERTS, J., FOR THE COURT:
SUMMARY OF THE CASE
¶1.
Delron Isaac pled guilty to aggravated assault as a habitual offender pursuant to Mississippi
Code Annotated § 99-19-83 (Rev. 2000). Subsequently, the Pike County Circuit Court sentenced
Isaac to life imprisonment. Isaac filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief, but the circuit
court declined to conduct an evidentiary hearing and dismissed Isaac’s petition. Isaac appeals and,
in effect, raises seven issues to attack the habitual offender portion of his sentence:
I.
WHETHER ISAAC IS INCARCERATED INCIDENT TO AN ILLEGAL SENTENCE.
II.
WHETHER THE CIRCUIT COURT ERRED WHEN IT SENTENCED ISAAC AS A
HABITUAL OFFENDER BEFORE THE CIRCUIT COURT GRANTED THE
PROSECUTION’S MOTION TO AMEND THE INDICTMENT.
III.
WHETHER THE CIRCUIT COURT HEARD SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SENTENCE
ISAAC TO LIFE IMPRISONMENT PURSUANT TO MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-19-83.
IV.
WHETHER AN ERROR IN ISAAC’S SENTENCING ORDER VOIDS ISAAC’S
SENTENCE.
V.
WHETHER THE CIRCUIT COURT ERRED WHEN IT SENTENCED HIM AS A
HABITUAL OFFENDER WITHOUT IMPANELING A JURY.
VI.
WHETHER THE CIRCUIT COURT ERRED WHEN IT DECLINED TO CONDUCT AN
EVIDENTIARY HEARING INCIDENT TO ISAAC’S PETITION FOR POSTCONVICTION COLLATERAL RELIEF.
VII.
WHETHER THE CUMULATIVE EFFECT OF ERRORS MANDATES REVERSAL.
Finding no error, we affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
¶2.
On January 16, 2004, the Pike County Grand Jury returned an indictment against Delron
Isaac and charged him with aggravated assault. Isaac originally pled “not guilty” to the charge. On
April 1, 2004, the prosecution filed a motion to amend the indictment to include a charge that Isaac
qualified for enhanced sentencing as a habitual offender pursuant to Mississippi Code Annotated §
99-19-83 (Miss. 2000).
¶3.
On April 7, 2005, Isaac withdrew his plea of “not guilty,” went before the Pike County
Circuit Court, and pled guilty to aggravated assault as a habitual offender. The circuit court accepted
Isaac’s guilty plea and scheduled Isaac’s sentencing hearing for a later date. On May 3, 2004, the
circuit court conducted Isaac’s sentencing hearing. The circuit court found that Isaac served one year
or more incident to two separate sentences and, as such, qualified for enhanced sentencing as a
habitual offender. Consequently, the circuit court sentenced Isaac to life imprisonment pursuant to
Section 99-19-83.
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¶4.
On May 3, 2005, Isaac filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief. Isaac raised several
issues. Isaac did not take issue with his guilty plea to aggravated assault. Instead, Isaac’s issues
attacked the habitual offender portion of his sentence. On June 22, 2005, the circuit court denied
Isaac’s petition without conducting an evidentiary hearing. Isaac appeals.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶5.
In reviewing a circuit court’s decision to deny a motion for post-conviction collateral relief,
we will not disturb the circuit court’s factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous. Boyd v.
State, 926 So.2d 233 (¶2) (Miss. Ct. App. 2005). However, we review questions of law de novo.
Id.
ANALYSIS
I.
WHETHER ISAAC IS INCARCERATED INCIDENT TO AN ILLEGAL SENTENCE.
¶6.
Isaac submits that the circuit court sentenced him to a twenty-year sentence and then imposed
a greater sentence of life imprisonment. According to Isaac, the circuit court impermissibly imposed
a definite sentence and then illegally imposed a greater sentence. Isaac cites Davis v. State, 933 So.
2d 1014 (Miss. Ct. App. 2006) in support of his contention.
¶7.
Neither Davis nor the record support Isaac’s contention. In Davis, this Court affirmed a
conviction, yet remanded for clarification of sentence. Id. at (¶32). We did so because the appellant
in Davis had been convicted of three charges and simply sentenced “to serve ten years.” Id. Because
the circuit court did not distinguish that sentence among the three charges, we remanded for
clarification of sentence. Id. As guidance, we instructed the circuit court “that once a circuit or
county court exercises its option to impose a definite sentence it cannot subsequently set that
sentence aside and impose a greater sentence.” Id. (citations omitted).
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¶8.
Here, the circuit court began to sentence Isaac to a twenty-year sentence, but the prosecutor
notified the circuit court that Isaac was being sentenced as a habitual offender pursuant to Section
99-19-83. The circuit court then read the statute and sentenced Isaac to life imprisonment. The
circuit court did not impose a twenty-year sentence, adjourn, and then subsequently increase Isaac’s
sentence. Instead, the circuit court imposed a twenty-year sentence, corrected itself, sentenced Isaac
to life imprisonment, and then adjourned. Accordingly, there is no merit to Isaac’s first issue.
II.
WHETHER THE CIRCUIT COURT ERRED WHEN IT SENTENCED ISAAC AS A
HABITUAL OFFENDER BEFORE THE CIRCUIT COURT GRANTED THE
PROSECUTION’S MOTION TO AMEND THE INDICTMENT.
¶9.
Within this issue, Isaac claims, in effect, that the prosecution ambushed him when it amended
the indictment to reflect the habitual offender allegation. Isaac pled guilty to aggravated assault on
April 7, 2004. According to Isaac, he did not know that the prosecution would amend the indictment
when he pled guilty to aggravated assault. Isaac claims that his lawyer did not tell him that the
prosecution sought to amend the indictment. Further, Isaac submits that the circuit court improperly
let the prosecution amend the indictment after Isaac had already unknowingly pled guilty to
aggravated assault. Isaac claims he would not have pled guilty had he been aware of the
prosecution’s intent to amend the indictment. Isaac cites U.R.C.C.C. 7.09 and claims “[t]he limit
of the authority in which the court could exercise in this case was a sentence of zero to twenty years,
non-habitual, since Isaac had been convicted at a time when he was not fully charged as a habitual
offender.”
¶10.
The record does not support Isaac’s version of events. Rather, the record patently discredits
Isaac entirely. The record particularly invalidates Isaac’s recollection of the events on the date he
pled guilty to aggravated assault.
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¶11.
Prior to Isaac’s guilty plea, Isaac took part in discussions in the circuit court judge’s
chambers. Isaac’s court-appointed attorney stated that, on the previous day, Isaac’s attorney met
with Isaac and explained that the prosecution “had already moved to enhance him as a 1983
habitual.” It appears that the prosecution had offered Isaac a plea deal by which he could plead
guilty to aggravated assault and that, should Isaac refuse that plea offer, the prosecution would
amend the indictment to allege that Isaac was a habitual offender. Isaac did not take the plea offer.
True to its word, the prosecution filed a motion to amend the indictment.
¶12.
It is obvious that Isaac was aware of the habitual offender allegation prior to his guilty plea
not only to aggravated assault, but also to his habitual offender status. Isaac was clearly aware of
the habitual offender charge. The prosecution noted that it filed the order amending the indictment
only after Isaac again refused its plea offer. The following exchange is noteworthy:
THE COURT: Mr. Isaac, it has been announced that you wish to withdraw the notguilty plea entered earlier and plead guilty to the charge of aggravated assault as a
Section 19-83 habitual. Is that your desire? (emphasis added).
DEFENDANT ISAAC: Yes.
As the circuit court noted in its order denying relief, Isaac “was fully and knowingly aware of the
habitual status and his sentence.” This allegation is entirely meritless.
III.
WHETHER THE CIRCUIT COURT HEARD SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SENTENCE
ISAAC TO LIFE IMPRISONMENT PURSUANT TO MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-19-83.
¶13.
Isaac claims the evidence was insufficient to sentence him to life imprisonment pursuant to
Section 99-19-83. Isaac bases his argument on the proposition that he never served one year or more
incident to two prior convictions. Isaac admits that he had previously been convicted of cocaine
possession and sentenced to three years. However, Isaac claims that he was sentenced to six months
in the Regimented Inmate Discipline program and that he never served any portion of his three-year
sentence. Isaac also notes that the sentence in that case was imposed on May 19, 1999. According
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to Isaac, at that time he was in prison regarding a separate offense. Isaac concludes that he never
served one year or more in a Pike County criminal case styled as criminal cause 15,555-A. Isaac
reasons that this Court should void the habitual portion of his sentence.
¶14.
Yet again, the record does not support Isaac’s mistaken or fabricated recollection. During
Isaac’s sentencing hearing, the prosecution called Brenda Williams as a witness. Ms. Williams
testified that, in “Case No. 98-072-KA” Isaac was sentenced to a ten-year sentence with five years
to serve and five years on post-release supervision for aggravated assault and possession of a firearm
by a convicted felon. Ms. Williams also testified that, incident to “Cause No. 15,555-A,” a charge
for unlawful possession of cocaine, Isaac was sentenced to “three years and to complete the RID
program.” However, Ms. Williams then testified that, pursuant to an order clarifying the records,
Isaac’s requirement to complete the RID program was removed but Isaac was still required to serve
a three-year sentence. Ms. Williams also noted that Isaac’s sentence in “Cause No. 15,555-A” ran
concurrently with his sentence in “Case No. 98-072-KA.”
¶15.
Serving one year or more of concurrent sentences for separate convictions arising out of
separate incidents at different time amounts to serving more than one year on each sentence for
purposes of the habitual offender statute. Otis v. State, 853 So.2d 856 (¶11) (Miss. Ct. App. 2003).
Accordingly, we find no error.
IV.
WHETHER AN ERROR IN ISAAC’S SENTENCING ORDER VOIDS ISAAC’S
SENTENCE.
¶16.
In this issue, Isaac claims the sentencing order is void. The style of the sentencing order is
titled as “The State of Mississippi vs. Delron Isaac.” Within the body of the sentencing order, the
circuit court refers to Isaac by name four times. However, the sentencing order also references the
name “Otis Bonds.” Specifically, the sentencing order states:
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A sentencing hearing was held and a motion was presented by the State of
Mississippi, by and through the District Attorney, pursuant to Rule 7.09 of the
Uniform Rules of Circuit and County Court Practice, for entry of an order amending
the indictment to assert that the defendant, Otis Bonds, is an [sic] habitual criminal,
having been convicted twice previously.
¶17.
Isaac submits that the sentencing order is void because it references Otis Bonds. The
sentencing order refers to Otis Bonds once. It is styled appropriately and it refers to Isaac four times.
It is clear that reference to Otis Bonds is a harmless clerical or scrivener’s error. We find no
reversible error.
V.
WHETHER THE CIRCUIT COURT ERRED WHEN IT SENTENCED HIM AS A
HABITUAL OFFENDER WITHOUT IMPANELING A JURY.
¶18.
Isaac asserts that a jury should have decided whether he qualified for enhanced sentencing
as a habitual offender. Isaac relies heavily on Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) and
Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004). In Apprendi, the United States Supreme Court held
that criminal defendants are “indisputably entitle[d] . . . to a jury determination that [they are] guilty
of every element of the crime . . . charged, beyond a reasonable doubt.” 530 U.S. at 477 (internal
quotations omitted). In Blakely, the United States Supreme Court held that, “[o]ther than the fact
of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the statutory maximum
must be submitted to a jury.” 542 U.S. at 301 (emphasis added).
¶19.
This Court has considered the argument Isaac currently advances. In Wildee v. State, 930
So.2d 478 (Miss. Ct. App. 2006), this Court interpreted a PCR petitioner’s argument as a contention
that “he was entitled to have a jury determine whether he should be sentenced as a habitual
offender.” Id. at (¶7). We recognized that, in Apprendi, “prior convictions are a recognized
exception to the requirement of jury determination of enhancing sentencing factors.” Id. (citing
Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 482). Accordingly, it was not necessary that a jury determine whether Isaac
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qualified for enhanced sentencing as a habitual offender. As such, the circuit court did not err when
it did not empanel a jury for that purpose.
VI.
WHETHER THE CIRCUIT COURT ERRED WHEN IT DECLINED TO CONDUCT AN
EVIDENTIARY HEARING INCIDENT TO ISAAC’S PETITION FOR POSTCONVICTION COLLATERAL RELIEF.
¶20.
Within his brief, Isaac lists the following as a heading, “Trial court erred in failing to conduct
[sic] evidentiary hearing where factual issues were present which required [sic] evidentiary hearing.”
Isaac did not support his contention with any form of argument or authority. Accordingly, this issue
is procedurally barred. Brown v. State, 534 So.2d 1019, 1023 (Miss. 1988).
VII.
WHETHER THE CUMULATIVE EFFECT OF ERRORS MANDATES REVERSAL.
¶21.
As in the issue directly above, Isaac listed a heading but failed to include an argument. As
his heading, Isaac stated, “The Cumulative effect of the denial of due process in sentencing deprived
Appellant Issac [sic] of a fair trial, in violation of the 5th and 14th Amendments to the United States
Constitution.” We find no error in the circuit court, no denial of Isaac’s constitutional right to due
process, and we certainly find no cumulative effect that would necessitate reversal.
¶22. THE JUDGMENT OF THE PIKE COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT DENYING POSTCONVICTION RELIEF IS AFFIRMED. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED
TO PIKE COUNTY.
KING, C.J., LEE AND MYERS, P.JJ., IRVING, CHANDLER, GRIFFIS, BARNES,
ISHEE AND CARLTON, JJ., CONCUR.
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