Daniel Athion Watkins v. Carlene Kim Benson Watkins
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2005-CA-02247-COA
DANIEL ATHION WATKINS
APPELLANT
v.
CARLENE KIM (NEE: BENSON) WATKINS
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
TRIAL JUDGE:
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE:
NATURE OF THE CASE:
TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION:
DISPOSITION:
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
APPELLEE
11/7/2005
HON. DOROTHY WINSTON COLOM
CHICKASAW COUNTY CHANCERY COURT
TINA M. SCOTT
REX F. SANDERSON
CIVIL - DOMESTIC RELATIONS
TRIAL COURT DENIED MOTION FOR
CONTEMPT, BUT ORDERED APPELLANT TO
PAY SEPARATE MAINTENANCE AND ALL
COURT COSTS.
AFFIRMED - 5/29/2007
BEFORE MYERS, P.J., CHANDLER AND GRIFFIS, JJ.
MYERS, P.J., FOR THE COURT:
¶1.
This case involves the order of the Chancery Court of Chickasaw County, First Judicial
District, denying Daniel Athion Watkins’ motion for termination of separate maintenance and
assessing court costs against him. Finding no error with the decision of the chancery court, we
affirm.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
¶2.
This Court has reviewed this case once before. Watkins v. Watkins, 942 So. 2d 224 (Miss.
Ct. App. 2006), reh’g denied, 2005-CA-00257-COA (Miss. Ct. App. Aug. 22, 2006), cert. denied,
942 So. 2d 164 (Miss. 2006). There, we affirmed the chancellor’s December 10, 2004, denial of Mr.
Watkins’ motion for termination of separate maintenance payments, denial of modification of
separate maintenance order, and order of contempt for failure to pay child support, attorneys’ fees
and court costs. While the former case was pending in this Court, Carlene Kim Benson Watkins
filed another complaint seeking to have Mr. Watkins held in contempt for failure to comply with the
earlier separate maintenance order and child support order. While at the September 8, 2005 hearing
on the matter, Mr. Watkins again moved for the termination of his separate maintenance obligations,
arguing a different ground. Mr. Watkins’ second motion for termination of his separate maintenance
obligation was denied on November 10, 2005 and he was assessed court costs. He now appeals the
judgment denying his motion to terminate separate maintenance and assessment of court costs.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶3.
“Our scope of review in domestic relations matters is limited by our familiar substantial
evidence/manifest error rule.” Ivison v. Ivison, 762 So. 2d 329, 333 (¶10) (Miss. 2000). “This Court
will not disturb the findings of a Chancellor unless the Chancellor was manifestly wrong, clearly
erroneous or an erroneous legal standard was applied.” Bell v. Parker, 563 So. 2d 594, 596-97
(Miss. 1990). With this standard in mind, we look to the issues raised in this appeal.
DISCUSSION
I.
WHETHER THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DENYING MR. WATKINS’
MOTION TO TERMINATE SEPARATE MAINTENANCE?
¶4.
Mr. Watkins moved ore tenus for termination of his separate maintenance obligations before
Chancellor Colom, arguing that certain conduct of Mrs. Watkins made it impossible for him to
resume cohabitation. More specifically, Mr. Watkins informed the court of an incident in which
Mrs. Watkins pointed a gun at him while standing in the doorway of her home. The court took
testimony that corroborated Mr. Watkins’ factual assertions and requested briefing of the parties on
2
the issue of whether to terminate separate maintenance. Ultimately, the chancellor denied Mr.
Watkins’ motion for termination, admonishing Mrs. Watkins’ behavior, but finding that Mr. Watkins
did not make a good faith effort to reconcile with Mrs. Watkins. Mr. Watkins now appeals the
chancellor’s denial of his motion for termination of separate maintenance, arguing that Mrs.
Watkins’ conduct during the aforementioned incident prevents Mr. Watkins from ever reconciling,
thus barring her entitlement to separate maintenance payments.
¶5.
As our supreme court recapitulated, the initial purpose of separate maintenance decrees were
“to compel the husband to support the wife until he shall restore her to his bed and board." Chapel
v. Chapel, 876 So. 2d 290, 293 (¶11) (Miss. 2004) (quoting Garland v. Garland, 50 Miss. 694, 715
(1874)). As the doctrine developed, our supreme court redefined separate maintenance and provided
guidelines for the award. In Daigle v. Daigle, 626 So. 2d 140, 145 (Miss. 1993), the court stated:
“Separate maintenance is a ‘court-created equitable relief’ based upon the marriage
relationship.” Lynch v. Lynch, 616 So. 2d 294, 296 (Miss. 1993) (quoting Robinson
v. Robinson, 554 So. 2d 300, 303 (Miss. 1989)). “It is well-established that ‘[a]
decree for separate maintenance is a judicial command to the husband to resume
cohabitation with his wife, or in default thereof, to provide suitable maintenance of
her until such time as they may be reconciled to each other.’” Lynch, 616 So. 2d at
296 (quoting Bunkley & Morse, Amis on Divorce and Separation in Mississippi, §
7.00 (2d ed. 1957)).
Termination of such a separate maintenance obligation would be proper “if the husband should, in
good faith, offer to cohabit and treat the wife with conjugal kindness.” Day v. Day, 501 So. 2d 353,
357 (Miss. 1987).
¶6.
In this case, the chancellor found that Mr. Watkins made no attempt to reconcile with Mrs.
Watkins. Although it is noteworthy to mention that the incident at issue in this appeal between Mr.
and Mrs. Watkins occurred at Mrs. Watkins’ home, no testimony was provided indicating that Mr.
Watkins was attempting to return to the home for the purpose of resuming cohabitation or
reconciliation. In fact, in his brief to this Court, Mr. Watkins admits that during the incident where
3
Mrs. Watkins pointed a gun at him, he was not attempting to move in with the family. Without a
showing that Mr. Watkins offered in good faith to return to cohabit, the chancery court’s hands were
tied in terminating the separate maintenance order. Therefore, we affirm the decision of the
chancellor, as this issue is without merit.
II.
DID THE LOWER COURT ERR IN ASSESSING MR. WATKINS ALL
COURT COSTS ASSOCIATED WITH THE CONTEMPT ACTION
ALTHOUGH HE WAS NOT FOUND IN CONTEMPT DUE TO HIS
INABILITY TO PAY?
¶7.
Ruling from the bench at the September 8, 2005 hearing, the chancellor found that Mr.
Watkins had proven an inability to pay, so that his non-payment of the judgment against him was
not contemptuous. In her ruling, though, the judge made clear that the arrearage owed to Mrs.
Watkins still existed, but that Mr. Watkins, having established his inability to pay, would not be held
in contempt. With the finding that the arrearage was still owed, court costs were also assessed to Mr.
Watkins in a written opinion dated October 3, 2005.
¶8.
An assessment of court costs is entrusted to the sound discretion of the chancellor. Harris
v. Harris, 879 So. 2d 457, 465 (¶35) (Miss. Ct. App. 2004). Without a showing of an abuse of
discretion, we cannot overrule such a decision. We do not find that the chancellor abused her
discretion in assessing court costs against Mr. Watkins, although he was not found in contempt due
to his inability to pay the judgment against him.
¶9.
THE JUDGMENT OF THE CHANCERY COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL
DISTRICT OF CHICKASAW COUNTY IS AFFIRMED. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL
ARE ASSESSED TO THE APPELLANT.
KING, C.J., LEE, P.J., IRVING, CHANDLER, GRIFFIS, BARNES, ISHEE,
ROBERTS AND CARLTON, JJ., CONCUR.
4
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.