John Willard Graham v. Katrina Kay Knight Graham
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2005-CA-02047-COA
JOHN WILLARD GRAHAM
APPELLANT
v.
KATRINA KAY (KNIGHT) GRAHAM
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
TRIAL JUDGE:
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE:
NATURE OF THE CASE:
TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION:
DISPOSITION:
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
APPELLEE
9/30/2005
HON. SARAH P. SPRINGER
LAUDERDALE COUNTY CHANCERY COURT
JAMES A. WILLIAMS
WALTER T. ROGERS
CIVIL- DOMESTIC RELATIONS
GRANTED DIVORCE AND EQUITABLE
DIVISION OF PROPERTY
AFFIRMED – 12/12/2006
BEFORE LEE, P.J., IRVING AND ISHEE, JJ.
IRVING, J., FOR THE COURT:
¶1.
John Willard Graham and Katrina Kay Knight Graham agreed to an irreconcilable differences
divorce. John and Katrina were able to reach an agreement on some issues; however, others were
submitted to the Lauderdale County Chancery Court for decision. After hearing the evidence, the
chancellor entered a judgment dividing the marital estate. Aggrieved, John appeals and asserts that
the chancellor did not divide the assets equitably.
¶2.
We find no error in the choices made by the chancellor. Therefore, we affirm.
FACTS
¶3.
John and Katrina were married on August 11, 1989, in Kemper County, Mississippi. The
couple have one child, William Anthony Graham, born April 22, 1989. The parties agreed to joint
legal custody, with physical custody granted to John. The parties also agreed to give John the
exclusive use, possession and ownership of the marital home. The agreement gave Katrina a motor
home and a van. Among other issues, John and Katrina could not agree on who should receive
Graham’s Curb Store, a convenience store run by the couple, or on an equitable division of other
marital assets. Therefore, those issues were submitted to the court for adjudication.
¶4.
At trial, Katrina testified that she was working as a convenience store manager for Faye
Palmer when she learned that Palmer was planning to sell the store. She stated that after discussing
it with John, they decided to purchase the store. However, John testified that purchasing the store
was his idea and that Katrina showed no interest in the store. The parties borrowed a total of
$65,000 from Citizens National Bank: $55,000 to purchase the store, and $10,000 to use as operating
capital. About two months after purchasing the store, John and Katrina separated.
¶5.
Katrina testified that she and John agreed that she would oversee the operation of the store,
taking $400 a week as compensation, and John would continue to work as a diesel mechanic and
truck driver until the store turned a profit. However, John quit his job and began working solely at
the store. Prior to working at the store, John worked as a diesel mechanic for eight years and as a
truck driver for sixteen years. John also has the ability to service air conditioners located in
refrigerated trucks. However, at the time of their purchase of the store, he had no experience
operating a convenience store.
¶6.
Additional facts, as necessary, will be related during our analysis and discussion of the issues.
ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION OF THE ISSUES
1. Equitable Distribution
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¶7.
Appellate courts have limited review when examining property division and distribution in
divorce cases. Owen v. Owen, 928 So. 2d 156, 160 (¶10) (Miss. 2006). It is well established that
we will uphold the chancellor’s division of marital assets as long as the division “is supported by
credible evidence.” Id. (citing Carrow v. Carrow, 642 So. 2d 901, 904 (Miss. 1994)). We will
uphold the findings of the chancellor, unless “those findings are clearly erroneous or an erroneous
legal standard was applied.” Id. at (¶11).
¶8.
In Ferguson v. Ferguson, 639 So. 2d 921, 928 (Miss. 1994), the Mississippi Supreme Court
enumerated a list of factors for chancellors to consider in reaching decisions on the equitable
distribution of marital property: (1) contribution to the accumulation of marital wealth, (2)
disposition of marital assets, (3) market and emotional value of the marital assets, (4) value of nonmarital assets, (5) tax and other economic consequences of the property division, (6) deceasing future
friction between the parties, (7) the needs of the parties for financial security with due regard to the
combination of assets, income and earning capacity, and (8) any other factors in equity.
¶9.
John relies on Ferguson for the proposition that “fairness should be the prevailing guideline
in marital division.” Id. at 929. In Ferguson, the court held that “the chancery court has the
authority to order an equitable division of property that has accumulated through the joint efforts and
contributions of the parties.” Id. at 927. Further, the court held that an equitable division is not the
same as equal division, and it is at the court’s discretion to determine exactly how the property will
be divided. Id.
¶10.
John contends that the chancellor’s decision was substantially unfair in awarding the store
to Katrina. The store’s profit for the first eight months of 2005 was $29,592.71, and John uses this
figure to estimate that the store’s total profit for 2005 would be around $40,000. Therefore, John
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contends that Katrina will unfairly receive $40,000 a year for owning the store, while he will have
to perform “difficult physical work” to support himself.
¶11.
The chancellor conducted a thorough analysis of the Ferguson factors and concluded that the
store should be awarded to Katrina. Katrina has a tenth grade education and has never worked
anywhere other than convenience and grocery stores. By contrast, John has experience working in
other areas, such as truck driving and certain mechanical work. Therefore, Katrina has much less
marketability for her skills than does John.
¶12.
In determining the equitable distribution of the marital property, the chancellor noted that
“[t]he allocation of property, both real and personal gives Mr. Graham far more equity in property
than Mrs. Graham. . . . The curb store is a mechanism by which Mrs. Graham can earn a living but
there is no actual equity in the curb store as the loan exceeds the value of the business.”
¶13.
We note that the parties dispute the value of the marital home and the amount of equity in
it. Katrina contends that the house is worth $88,430, with an equity of $38,858.25, while John
estimates the value of the house to be $71,000, with an equity of $21,256.45. Nevertheless, John
argues that the chancellor erred in ordering that he pay Katrina $11,000 to equalize the equitable
distribution of real and personal property set out in the parties’ consent for divorce.1 We understand
John’s argument to be that the value of the store was such that he should not have also been required
to pay Katrina $11,000.
¶14.
The chancellor never explicitly explained how she arrived at the $11,000 figure. John
contends that the chancellor reached this amount by taking half of the value of the equity in the
marital home that John was awarded. We note that, even if we were to accept John’s valuation of
the store as worth $55,000, the difference between the value of the store and the value of the marital
1
It is undisputed that there is no equity in the store.
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home would be $16,000, as John estimates that the house is worth $71,000. Admittedly, $11,000
is more than half of $16,000. However, a chancellor is tasked with making an equitable, not equal,
distribution of the marital estate. Further, in making the equitable distribution, the chancellor must
take the entirety of the marital estate into consideration, not just a single item. Based on the reasons
stated above, we find that the chancellor’s order is supported by credible evidence and John’s
contentions to the contrary are without merit.
2. Periodic Alimony
¶15.
John contends that he is entitled to periodic alimony because the chancellor awarded the store
to Katrina, but failed to characterize the store as an “operating business.” John does not cite any case
law to support his argument, nor does he explain how the chancellor’s result would have been
different even if she had classified the store as an operating business. We note that the chancellor
did in fact take John’s position into consideration as evidenced by her statement that, “Mr. Graham
will need support until such time as he can obtain appropriate employment commensurate with his
work skills.” To provide this support, the chancellor ordered Katrina to pay John $2,500 a month,
for three months. This Court finds that John is not entitled to receive any additional alimony.
¶16. THE JUDGMENT OF THE CHANCERY COURT OF LAUDERDALE COUNTY IS
AFFIRMED. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO THE APPELLANT.
KING, C.J., LEE AND MYERS, P.JJ., SOUTHWICK, CHANDLER, GRIFFIS,
BARNES AND ISHEE, JJ., CONCUR. ROBERTS, J., NOT PARTICIPATING.
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