Dewayne Norman v. Kimberly Norman
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2005-CA-00882-COA
DEWAYNE NORMAN
APPELLANT
v.
KIMBERLY NORMAN
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
TRIAL JUDGE:
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED:
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE:
NATURE OF THE CASE:
TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION:
DISPOSITION:
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
APPELLEE
4/15/2005
HON. SEBE DALE, JR.
LAMAR COUNTY CHANCERY COURT
SAMUEL E. FARRIS
JONATHAN M. FARRIS
E. LINDSAY CARTER
CIVIL - CUSTODY
DIVORCE GRANTED ON GROUND OF
IRRECONCILABLE DIFFERENCES, JOINT
LEGAL CUSTODY OF MINOR CHILD
AWARDED TO THE PARENTS, AND
PHYSICAL CUSTODY OF CHILD AWARDED
TO FORMER WIFE. FORMER HUSBAND
ORDERED TO PAY CHILD SUPPORT.
AFFIRMED - 10/10/2006
EN BANC.
MYERS, P.J., FOR THE COURT:
¶1.
Dwayne Norman sued Kimberly Norman for divorce and custody of their only daughter,
Blaze Maria Norman. Kimberly Norman counterclaimed also seeking a divorce and custody of their
daughter. The Normans agreed to a divorce on grounds of irreconcilable differences, but could not
agree on the issue of primary physical custody of their minor child. The issue was litigated, and the
chancellor awarded physical custody of the child to Kimberly. Aggrieved by this decision, Dwayne
Norman perfected this appeal raising the following issue:
WHETHER THE CHANCELLOR ERRED IN AWARDING CUSTODY OF BLAZE
MARIA TO KIMBERLY NORMAN BY FAILING TO PROPERLY APPLY THE
ALBRIGHT FACTORS .
¶2.
Finding no error, we affirm.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
¶3.
Dewayne and Kimberly Norman were married on April 23, 1994. One child was born to the
marriage, Blaze Maria, who at the time of trial in this matter, was seven years old. During the
marriage both Dewayne and Kimberly were gainfully employed, and by all accounts were good and
loving parents. Dewayne and Kimberly separated in September 2004, and on September 22, 2004,
in the Chancery Court of Lamar County, Dewayne filed a complaint for divorce on the grounds of
habitual drunkenness, habitual cruel and inhuman treatment, and in the alternative, irreconcilable
differences. Dewayne also filed for a protective order for temporary relief and custody of Blaze
Maria. On October 11, 2004, Kimberly filed her answer, counterclaim for divorce, and request for
temporary relief and custody of Blaze Maria; the parties also agreed upon a temporary order and
proposed a trial date of March 3, 2005.
¶4.
A temporary order was entered on November 4, 2004, which provided for joint legal custody
of their minor child, with Kimberly having temporary physical custody of the child subject to the
liberal visitation rights of Dewayne. On March 3, 2005, the court granted the parties’ joint motion
for divorce on the grounds of irreconcilable differences, and a trial was held on the issues of child
custody, visitation, and child support. After hearing testimony from witnesses on both sides and a
court-appointed expert, Dr. John Patrick Galloway, the chancellor, ruling from the bench, awarded
primary physical custody to Kimberly. The chancellor awarded Dewayne liberal visitation and
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ordered him to pay monthly child support in the amount of $285. A final judgment of divorce was
entered on April 18, 2005, which incorporated the March 3, 2005 bench ruling. Dewayne appeals
this final judgment and argues that the chancellor erred in awarding physical custody of Blaze Maria
to Kimberly by failing to properly apply the Albright factors.
LEGAL ANALYSIS
¶5.
The standard of review in domestic relations cases is established and clear. Child custody
matters fall within the sound discretion of the chancellor. Sturgis v. Sturgis, 792 So. 2d 1029, 1023,
(¶12) (Miss. Ct. App. 2001). Therefore, when this Court reviews an award of child custody, the
decision of the chancellor will be affirmed unless it is shown to be “manifestly wrong, clearly
erroneous,” or that the chancellor applied an erroneous legal standard. Roberson v. Roberson, 814
So. 2d 183, 184 (¶3) (Miss. Ct. App. 2002). The chancellor’s decision must be supported by
substantial evidence established by the record of the proceedings. Id.
DISCUSSION
¶6.
Dewayne contends that the trial court erred when it awarded physical custody of his daughter
to his former wife. Dewayne complains that the chancellor did not make specific findings
delineating each applicable Albright factor and that there was no clear evidence to support the
chancellor’s decision to award physical custody of his daughter to Kimberly. Both this Court and
the Mississippi Supreme Court have addressed this issue on several occasions and have steadfastly
held that:
The polestar consideration in matters of child custody is the best interest of the child.
Rushing v. Rushing, 724 So. 2d 911, 916 (¶24) (Miss. 1998). In considering the best
interest of the child, the court must evaluate and apply the factors set out in Albright
v. Albright, 437 So. 2d 1003, 1005 (Miss. 1983). In considering the best interest of
the child, the court must evaluate and apply the following factors: (1) age, health and
sex of the child; (2) a determination of the parent that has had the continuity of care
prior to the separation; (3) which has the best parenting skills, and which has the
willingness and capacity to provide primary child care; (4) the employment of the
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parent and responsibilities of that employment; (5) physical and mental health of the
parents; (6) emotional ties of parent and child; (7) moral fitness of the parents; (8) the
home, school and community record of the child; (9) the preference of the child at
the age sufficient to express a preference by law; (10) stability of home environment
and employment of each parent; and (11) other factors relevant to the parent-child
relationship. Albright v. Albright, 437 So. 2d 1003, 1005 (¶14) (Miss. 1983).
Alderson v. Alderson, 810 So. 2d 627, 629 (¶5) (Miss. Ct. App. 2002).
¶7.
In the case at bar, Dewayne correctly asserts that “a chancellor's failure to make specific
findings as to each individual Albright factor is reversible error.” Davidson v. Coit, 899 So. 2d 904,
911 (¶18) (Miss. Ct. App. 2005) (citing Powell v. Ayars, 792 So. 2d 240, 249 (¶33) (Miss. 2001)).
However, Dewayne incorrectly contends that the chancellor failed in his duty to consider and apply
the Albright factors. The record clearly establishes that the chancellor acted in the best interest and
welfare of the child in awarding physical custody of Blaze Maria to Kimberly, and both considered
and applied the Albright factors.
¶8.
In his bench ruling, the chancellor correctly identified the Albright factors as the controlling
authority in child custody cases. The chancellor found the following Albright factors to be neutral:
age, health and sex of the child; the employment of the parents and responsibilities of that
employment; the physical and mental health of the parents; the moral fitness of the parents; and the
stability of the home environment and employment of each parent. Although not expressly
enumerated, the chancellor’s consideration of the emotional ties of parent and child, and the home,
school and community record of the child are evidenced by the testimony on these subjects offered
at trial and the admission of the child’s school attendance record into evidence. These, too, were
found to be neutral factors. The chancellor found no Albright factors to favor only Dewayne, but
found that a determination of the parent that has had the continuity of care prior to the separation,
which had the best parenting skills, and which had the willingness and capacity to provide primary
child care favored Kimberly. The preference of Blaze Maria as to whom should have physical
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custody is not considered because at the time of trial she was seven years old, an age insufficient to
express a preference by law.
¶9.
Dewayne contends that the chancellor abused his discretion and ruled against the
overwhelming weight of the evidence in his evaluation of which parent had the continuity of care
prior to the separation, which had the best parenting skills, and which had the willingness and
capacity to provide primary child care. Specifically, Dewayne argues that he was the parent that
provided the continuity of care: ensuring Blaze Maria’s school attendance; caring for her after
school; taking her to ball practice; and taking her skating, fishing and camping. Although it is
undisputed that Dewayne was and is a good father, the record indicates that throughout Blaze
Maria’s life Kimberly dressed her for school every day, bathed her, washed her clothes, and cooked
her meals. After considering the above facts, the chancellor reached the conclusion that Kimberly
provided the continuity of care prior to the separation, had the best parenting skills, and was willing
and capable of providing primary child care.
¶10.
We have reviewed the record. Clearly the chancellor considered the custody decision a close
question. In making his decision the chancellor relied on the testimony of the parties, testimony of
family and friends, in equal numbers on behalf of each side, and an independent court-appointed
expert in family matters. The chancellor ultimately determined that both Dewayne and Kimberly
were good parents deserving of custody. However, forced to make a determination as to a grant of
physical custody, the chancellor held that under the Albright factors and based upon continuity of
care prior to the separation, parenting skills, and willingness and capacity to provide primary child
care, the evidence weighed in favor of Kimberly.
¶11.
“We may not always agree with a chancellor's decision as to whether the best interests of a
child have been met, especially when we must review that decision by reading volumes of
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documents rather than through personal interaction with the parties before us.” Hensarling v.
Hensarling, 824 So. 2d 583, 586-87 (¶8) (Miss. 2002) (citing Wright v. Stanley, 700 So. 2d 274, 280
(Miss. 1997); Williams v. Williams, 656 So. 2d 325, 330 (Miss. 1995)). However, in child custody
cases, we are bound by our standard of review and must give deference to the chancellor’s
determination of the “weight and credibility of the evidence.” Alderson at 629 (¶4). It is not our duty
as an appellate court to substitute our judgment for the chancellor’s, rather our duty is merely to
determine if the chancellor’s ruling is supported by evidence. Brewer v. Brewer, 919 So. 2d 135,
141 (¶23) (Miss. Ct. App. 2005). “So long as there is substantial evidence in the record that, if found
credible by the chancellor, would provide support for the chancellor's decision, this Court may not
intercede simply to substitute our collective opinion for that of the chancellor." Id. (citing Bower v.
Bower, 758 So. 2d 405, 412 (¶33) (Miss. 2000)).
¶12.
Here, the chancellor’s findings are supported by credible evidence in the record. Whether
this court may or may not have given greater weight to different testimony is of no consequence.
Our role is simply to determine if there is credible evidence to support the chancellor’s decision. Id.
Therefore, we must affirm.
CONCLUSION
¶13.
The chancellor properly considered each Albright factor and stated the factual findings and
legal conclusions relied upon in awarding custody to Kimberly. There was substantial evidence to
support the chancellor’s ruling, and this Court can find no abuse of discretion by the chancellor. The
issue is without merit. Accordingly, we find no reversible error and affirm the award of primary
physical custody of the minor child to Kimberly Norman.
¶14. THE JUDGMENT OF THE CHANCERY COURT OF LAMAR COUNTY IS
AFFIRMED. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO THE APPELLANT.
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KING, C.J, IRVING, CHANDLER, AND BARNES, JJ., CONCUR. SOUTHWICK,
J., DISSENTS WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION JOINED BY LEE, P.J., GRIFFIS,
ISHEE AND ROBERTS, JJ.
SOUTHWICK, J., DISSENTING:
¶15.
The parties and the majority of this Court agree that the chancellor failed to discuss several
of the Albright factors. Whether to require on-the-record discussions of each factor has already been
decided by the Mississippi Supreme Court. The decision is that reversible error occurs when the
chancellor does not articulate reasoning on each one. Powell v. Ayars, 792 So. 2d 240, 244-45
(Miss. 2001). The state’s highest court has in essence declared that findings on each Albright factor
are a structural requirement for a valid chancellor’s opinion regarding child custody. Perhaps the
Supreme Court’s view is that the advantages of certainty in that obligation trump any need for
prejudice to be shown in a chancellor’s failure to comply.
¶16.
The Supreme Court has in related contexts also required on-the-record findings. As part of
a decision on equitable distribution, the chancellor’s findings on that subject’s analogous list of
Supreme Court-announced factors must be stated. Lauro v. Lauro, 847 So. 2d 843, 847 (Miss.
2003).
¶17.
Itemized findings are not mandated to modify child support. See Staggs v. Staggs, 919 So.
2d 112, 124 (Miss. Ct. App. 2005) (citing Wright v. Stanley, 700 So. 2d 274, 283 (Miss. 1997)
(affirming an increase in child support based upon increase in father’s income, increase in cost of
living, and increased needs of children due to age)). However, if a chancellor determines that the
statutory guidelines on child support would be unjust or inappropriate, there must be on-the-record
findings on the reasons. Chesney v. Chesney, 910 So. 2d 1057 (Miss. 2005).
¶18.
As a final example, the Supreme Court has required chancellors to consider suggested factors
in making decisions regarding alimony, but there does not appear to be a mandate that the
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conclusions as to each factor be articulated on the record. Holley v. Holley, 892 So. 2d 183, 185
(Miss. 2004). The presumption that a chancellor has considered all relevant evidence applies in
decisions concerning alimony. Holcombe v. Holcombe, 813 So. 2d 700, 704 (Miss. 2002).
However, as Powell demonstrates, this presumption does not apply in all areas of domestic relations.
The issues involved in this appeal concern an area in which the presumption is inapplicable.
¶19.
I find that we err in affirming, regardless of the reasonableness of the argument that the
chancellor’s view on each factor was discoverable from the nature of the evidence. I would not
reverse, however. An order could be entered requiring the chancellor to make findings as to each
factor. The parties could then be provided an opportunity to file supplemental briefing after those
findings are made.
¶20.
With respect, I dissent.
LEE, P.J., GRIFFIS, ISHEE AND ROBERTS, JJ., JOIN THIS OPINION.
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