Raymond Smith v. Petal School District
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2005-CC-01394-COA
RAYMOND SMITH
APPELLANT
v.
PETAL SCHOOL DISTRICT
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
TRIAL JUDGE:
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED:
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE:
NATURE OF THE CASE:
TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION:
DISPOSITION:
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
APPELLEE
6/20/2005
HON. JAMES H. C. THOMAS, JR.
FORREST COUNTY CHANCERY COURT
CHESTER D. NICHOLSON
GAIL D. NICHOLSON
JAMES A. KEITH
CIVIL - OTHER
CHANCERY COURT AFFIRMED SCHOOL
BOARD DECISION WITHOUT GRANTING
ORAL ARGUMENT AND DENIED MOTION TO
EXPAND THE RECORD WITHOUT
DISCUSSION.
AFFIRMED-09/19/2006
BEFORE MYERS, P.J., BARNES AND ISHEE, JJ.
ISHEE, J., FOR THE COURT:
¶1.
The Chancery Court of Forrest County affirmed the decision of the Board of Trustees (“the
Board”) for the Petal, Mississippi School District (“the District”) not to renew the contract of
Raymond Smith, a health and physical education teacher who recently worked as an assistant
football coach. Aggrieved by the Board’s decision and the chancellor’s affirmance thereof, Smith
appeals. Finding no error, we affirm.
FACTS
¶2.
Smith was employed as a teacher and assistant football coach at Petal High School for the
2004-2005 school year. His coaching duties spanned the entire year, including the summer months.
On November 29, 2004, the District’s superintendent forwarded to Smith a letter notifying him that
his employment contract for the 2005-2006 school year would not be renewed. Smith timely
requested a hearing explaining the reasons and factual basis and support for the non-renewal. The
District responded with the reasons and factual basis on December 16, 2004, and a hearing was held
before a hearing officer on January 5, 2005. The hearing officer wrote a report, which he then
submitted to the District, along with the record of the proceedings. At a Board meeting on February
8, 2005, the Board unanimously voted to uphold the administration’s non-renewal of Smith’s
contract.
¶3.
On February 28, 2005, Smith filed a timely notice of appeal, accompanied by the statutory
bond, with the Chancery Court of Forrest County. Smith filed a motion to expand the record on May
16, 2005, and requested oral argument. On June 20, 2005, the chancellor issued an opinion
affirming, without oral argument, the Board’s decision. The only reason provided by the Board for
the non-renewal which the chancellor found to be supported by the record was Smith’s intentional
failure to attend eight out of the twenty-four summer football workouts. The chancellor stated that
this was a sufficient basis for the non-renewal. The chancellor additionally denied Smith’s motion
to expand the record.
¶4.
Aggrieved, Smith timely appeals, asserting that: (1) the action of the Board was arbitrary and
capricious because the coaching rider which the District used to non-renew Smith’s contract by its
own terms did not apply to a non-renewal, but only to resignations and terminations; (2) even if the
rider did apply to non-renewals, it was void as violative of Mississippi Code Annotated section 37-923, and further, the chancellor abused his discretion by failing to permit the record to be expanded
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to include the forms of teacher contracts approved by the State Board of Education, and by taking
judicial notice of the approved forms which appear on the official government website; (3) the rider
was not enforceable because it required Smith to work for no pay and was thus without
consideration, and because it was violative of due process, equal protection, and the Fair Labor
Standards Act; (4) Mississippi Code Annotated section 37-9-111(5) is unconstitutional as applied
in violation of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; and (5) the action of the Board
in not renewing the contract was arbitrary and capricious because it was unsupported by substantial
evidence as required by Mississippi Code Annotated section 37-9-113.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶5.
Under Mississippi Code Annotated section 37-9-113(1)(2) (Rev. 2001), an employee
aggrieved by a final decision of a school board may appeal to a chancery court. The chancery court’s
review is limited to a review of the record made before the school board or hearing officer to
determine if the school board’s action was unlawful for the reason that it was: (a) not supported by
substantial evidence; (b) arbitrary or capricious; or (c) in violation of some statutory or constitutional
right of the employee. Miss. Code Ann. § 37-9-113 (3) (Rev. 2001). Upon appeal to this Court, we
apply the same standard of review as that applied by the chancery court. Harris v. Canton Separate
Pub. Sch. Bd. of Educ., 655 So. 2d 898, 901 (Miss. 1995) (citing Spradlin v. Board of Trustees, 515
So. 2d 893, 898 (Miss. 1987)).
ISSUES AND ANALYSIS
I.
¶6.
Whether the rider is void as violative of Mississippi Code Annotated
section 37-9-23.
Smith argues that the rider was void because it violated Mississippi Code Annotated section
37-9-23 (2006), which states in relevant part:
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The superintendent shall enter into a contract with each . . . licensed employee . . .
who is elected and approved for employment by the school board. Such contracts
shall be in such form as shall be prescribed by the State Board of Education . . . . The
contract shall show the name of the district, the length of the school term, the
position held . . . , the scholastic years which it covers, the total amount of the annual
salary and how same is payable.
Smith argues that, because the rider was not officially approved by the Mississippi Board of
Education, it is void. We disagree. The primary contract was, indeed, a form approved by the Board
of Education. The plain language of the statute does not prohibit superintendents or school boards
from including riders or attachments in employment contracts. While there is no law directly
concerning this point in Mississippi, we find Sims v. Board of Trustees, 414 So. 2d 431 (Miss. 1982),
to be supportive of this view. In Sims, our supreme court held that a teacher’s refusal to sign an
attachment to a proposed employment contract was, in and of itself, sufficient reason to discharge
the teacher. Id. at 435. The attachment, which had been approved only by the school board,
contained excerpts from a new policy manual which had recently been adopted by the school board.
Id.
¶7.
“It is a general rule in construing statutes that this Court will not only interpret the words
used, but will consider the purpose and policy which the legislature had in view of enacting the law.”
Kelly v. Int’l Games Tech., 874 So. 2d 977, 979 (¶7) (Miss. 2004) (quoting Secretary of State v.
Wiesenberg, 633 So. 2d 983, 990 (Miss. 1994)). Smith’s proposed reading of section 37-9-23 would
unduly burden school boards by forcing them to receive approval from the Board of Education for
every minor attachment or rider to a standard employment contract for every teacher they hired.
Such an interpretation obviously reads more into the statute than the legislature intended. The rider
is therefore valid, and the chancellor did not err in finding that Smith failed to perform his duties by
neglecting to attend eight of the twenty-four summer football workouts.
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¶8.
Smith mentions in a footnote in this section of his argument that the chancellor abused his
discretion by denying his motion to expand the record. However, we find none of the authority cited
in that footnote to support his proposition. We consequently affirm the chancellor’s decision as to
the denial of Smith’s motion to expand the record.
II.
¶9.
Whether the rider is not enforceable because it required Smith to work
for no pay and was thus without consideration, or because it was
violative of due process, equal protection, and the Fair Labor Standards
Act.
Smith argues that the rider is not enforceable because it extended the time period named in
his primary contract by two months, but provided no additional monetary compensation. He argues
that the imposition of additional duties without compensation violates the Fair Labor Standards Act
(“FLSA”). This argument holds no merit, as Title 29 of the Code of Federal Regulations section
541.303 (b) clearly exempts from the FLSA teachers in general and, more specifically, those with
coaching duties.
¶10.
Smith further contends that the rider imposed additional duties without additional
consideration. Smith admitted that in all his years of coaching he had been involved in summer
workouts. He freely signed the rider with this knowledge. The two additional months listed in the
rider were not additional duties entitling him to increased compensation; they were merely part of
his usual coaching duties. This argument is without merit.
¶11.
Because the above arguments fail, Smith’s arguments concerning his Fourteenth Amendment
due process rights and equal protection rights are without merit as well.
III.
Whether Mississippi Code Annotated section 37-9-111(5) is
unconstitutional as applied in violation of the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
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¶12.
Mississippi Code Annotated section 37-9-109(b) (Rev. 2001) gives a non-renewed employee
the right to a fair and impartial hearing. Mississippi Code Annotated section 37-9-111(5) (Rev.
2001) states, in relevant part:
The board shall review the matters presented before it, or, if the hearing is conducted
by a hearing officer, the report of the hearing officer, if any, the record of the
proceedings and, based solely thereon, conclude whether the proposed
nonreemployment is a proper employment decision, is based upon a valid educational
reason or noncompliance with school district personnel policies and is based solely
upon the evidence presented at the hearing.
¶13.
Smith asserts that Mississippi Code Annotated section 37-9-111(5) (Rev., 2001) is
unconstitutional as applied in his case. He asserts that the hearing officer’s report contained only
selective citations to testimony, as well as ill-founded legal conclusions. He further asserts that the
hearing officer made an “advocate’s argument” before the Board.1 According to Smith, the hearing
officer, in his report, became what basically amounts to an expert witness. Smith contends that,
because of the hearing officer assuming such a role, he should have been able to get his own expert
witness to rebut the report so that the Board could have the benefit of cross-examination. Thus,
Smith argues that his right to Fourteenth Amendment due process was violated.
¶14.
Smith’s assertions as to this issue, though creative, are simply untenable. We find this issue
to be completely without merit.
IV.
¶15.
Whether the action of the Board was arbitrary and capricious.
Smith contends that the Board’s decision was arbitrary and capricious for two reasons: (a)
because the violation of the coaching rider used to decline renewal of Smith’s contract by its own
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Smith asserts the following as evidencing the hearing officer’s bias: throughout the report,
the hearing officer uses the term “testify” when referring to administration witnesses, while using
words such as “claims” and “admits” when referring to testimony from Smith; the hearing officer
failed to articulate Smith’s concern that the rider did not apply to non-renewal; the hearing officer’s
report failed to address Smith’s working without pay; the hearing officer otherwise failed to analyze
certain testimony from a legal perspective.
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terms did not apply to non-renewal, but only to resignations and termination; and (b) because it was
unsupported by substantial evidence. As these are actually two separate grounds for reversing a
school board’s decision, we will address them separately.
(a)
¶16.
Arbitrary and capricious
“An act is arbitrary when it is not done according to reason or judgment, but depending on
the will alone.” Burks v. Amite County Sch. Dist., 708 So. 2d 1366, 1370 (¶14) (Miss. 1998) (citing
McGowan v. Mississippi State Oil & Gas Bd., 604 So. 2d 312, 322 (Miss. 1992)). An act is
capricious when “done without reason, in a whimsical manner, implying either a lack of
understanding of or a disregard for the surrounding facts and settled controlling principles.” Id.
¶17.
Smith first argues that the rider, by its own terms, applied only to termination or resignation,
but not to non-renewal. Smith argues that the state-approved contract called for him to teach 194
days between August 3, 2004, and May 23, 2005, whereas the rider extended the dates of the term
of employment to encompass the period beginning July 1, 2004, and ending June 30, 2005. He then
points to the portion of the rider which states:
If the employee herewith contracts both to teach and to coach an athletic sport, any
resignation/termination he/she may subsequently submit for his/her coaching
assignment shall automatically constitute a bona fide resignation for his/her teaching
assignment as well, unless a mutual agreement is made between the administration
and the person involved.
Because of this section, Smith argues that the rider only applies to those situations where an
employee submits a resignation or is involuntarily terminated. Thus, he argues, the rider does not
apply to his case. Smith argues that, consequently, the chancellor was in error in finding the rider
enforceable, which he “impliedly did” in order to find Smith’s failure to attend certain summer
workouts as a proper basis for non-renewal.
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¶18.
We disagree. Both the employment contract and rider refer to the single position of
“teacher/coach.” Because the language unambiguously refers to a single position, we cannot say that
the chancellor erred by finding Smith’s failure to attend eight out of the twenty-four practices to be
a sufficient basis for non-renewal. We cannot say that the decision “was not done according to
reason or judgment, but depending on the will alone.” Nor can we say that the decision was made
“without reason, in a whimsical manner, implying either a lack of understanding of or a disregard
for the surrounding facts and settled controlling principles.” Accordingly, this issue is without merit.
(b)
¶19.
Supported by substantial evidence
Smith argues that the Board’s decision in non-renewing his contract was not supported by
substantial evidence of a non-hearsay nature. It is undisputed that Smith defiantly chose not to attend
eight of the twenty-four summer workouts because he felt he was not being compensated for them.
This alone is sufficient to constitute substantial evidence in support of the decision. Accordingly,
this issue is without merit.
¶20. THE JUDGMENT OF THE CHANCERY COURT OF FORREST COUNTY IS
AFFIRMED. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO THE APPELLANT.
KING, C.J., LEE AND MYERS, P.JJ., SOUTHWICK, IRVING, CHANDLER,
GRIFFIS, BARNES AND ROBERTS, JJ. CONCUR.
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