Charles Mathis v. Jackson County Board of Supervisors
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2004-CA-02247-COA
CHARLES MATHIS AND MARIE MATHIS
APPELLANTS
v.
JACKSON COUNTY BOARD OF SUPERVISORS
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
TRIAL JUDGE:
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE:
NATURE OF THE CASE:
TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION:
DISPOSITION:
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
APPELLEE
10/20/2004
HON. DALE HARKEY
JACKSON COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
DAVID ALLEN HILLEREN
GARY S. EVANS
CIVIL - WORKERS’ COMPENSATION
DISMISSED COMPLAINT ON BASIS THAT
PLAINTIFFS’ EXCLUSIVE REMEDY WAS
UNDER WORKERS COMPENSATION
STATUTES.
AFFIRMED - 12/13/2005
BEFORE KING, C.J., BRIDGES AND GRIFFIS, JJ.
BRIDGES, J., FOR THE COURT:
¶1.
On December 27, 2000, Charles and Marie Mathis sued the Jackson County Board of
Supervisors after Charles suffered an injury at the Whispering Pines Golf Course, a county golf course.
At the time of his injury, Charles was a volunteer marshal for the golf course. On October 21, 2004, the
Jackson County Circuit Court held that Charles qualified as an employee of the golf course. Having
determined such, the circuit court decided that Charles’s exclusive remedy was under the provisions of
Mississippi’s Workers’ Compensation Act. Accordingly, the circuit court held that the Mathises’s were
barred from suing the County in the circuit court. Aggrieved, the Mathises appeal.
FACTS
¶2.
In October of 1999, Charles Mathis asked Chad Harrison, the superintendent of the Whispering
Pines Golf Course, for Harrison’s permission to marshal for the course. Harrison agreed to let Charles
serve as a marshal.
¶3.
On Sunday, March 26, 2000, Charles marshaled at the course. Due to rain, course authorities
suspended play. Charles did not leave for the day though, as it was possible that the rain would stop and
play would resume. Charles waited out the rain in the clubhouse, where he played cards with customers.
Sometime between one and two o’ clock p.m., Jamie Holt, the manager of the course, asked Charles to
help her move the golf carts from the clubhouse to the storage shed, where they would shelter the carts
from the weather and charge the cart’s batteries. Charles borrowed a raincoat and hat and helped Holt
move carts.
¶4.
Charles and Holt utilized a particular method to move the carts. Charles and Holt each drove a
cart from the clubhouse to the storage shed. Once they arrived at the storage shed, Charles would store
his cart, then ride back to the clubhouse on Holt’s cart. There, he got another cart and continued the
procedure. They moved carts in this way until approximately 3:00 p.m., when Walterine Bonniewell, a
course employee, arrived to help Charles and Holt.
¶5.
When Bonniewell arrived at the clubhouse, Charles and Holt were at the storage shed. Bonniewell
boarded a cart and drove to the storage shed, where she met Charles and Holt. Because a common golf
cart can only seat two people, Charles let Bonniewell sit on the available seat next to Holt. Charles stood
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on the back of Holt’s cart, gripped the braces that supported the cart’s roof, and planned to ride back to
the clubhouse in that manner.
¶6.
Charles’s head was above the cart’s roof. According to Bonniewell, Holt drove the cart six to
seven feet and turned left to exit the storage shed. As they passed under an overhead beam, Charles struck
his head and fell off the back of the cart. Charles’s cause of action is based on this injury.
¶7.
After Charles’s injury, Jackson County officials notified the Mississippi Workers’ Compensation
Commission of Charles’s injury. The County’s worker’s compensation carrier, TIG Insurance Company,
paid all of Charles’s medical expenses.
¶8.
On December 27, 2000, Charles and Marie Mathis sued the County. On October 21, 2004, the
Jackson County Circuit Court held that the Mathises were barred from suing the County because Charles’s
exclusive remedy was under the Workers’ Compensation Act. Aggrieved, the Mathises appeal.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶9.
This case was tried without a jury, so the trial judge sat as the trier of fact. When a circuit court
judge sits as a trier of fact, he receives the same deference as a chancellor does, regarding findings of fact.
His findings are safe on appeal when they are supported by substantial, credible and reliable evidence.
Miss. Dept. of Public Safety v. Durn, 861 So.2d 990, 994 (¶7) (Miss. 2002). The question of whether
a person is an employee may be one of fact, of mixed law and fact, or of law only. Walls v. North Miss.
Med. Cntr., 568 So.2d 712, 714 (Miss. 1990). However, where the facts are undisputed the question
is one of law. Id. This Court reviews questions of law according to the de novo standard. Duncan v.
Duncan, 774 So.2d 418, 419 (¶4) (Miss.2000).
ANALYSIS
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¶10.
This is an “upside-down compensation case.” See Stubbs v. Green Bros. Gravel Co., 206 So.2d
323, 325 (Miss. 1968). In an “upside-down compensation case” an employee tries to avoid compensation
coverage to escape the exclusive provisions of the workers’ compensation act. Id. (citing I Larson,
Workmen's Compensation Law § 26.10, at 452.11 (1965)). First, the Mathises claim that Charles was
not an “employee” as contemplated by the workers’ compensation act.
I.
Whether the trial court erred by finding that the Plaintiff, Charles Mathis, was an
employee of [Jackson County] such that his exclusive remedy was underprovisions of the
workers’ compensation statutes.
¶11.
The Mathises appeal the circuit court’s determination that Charles was an employee of Jackson
County. Based on that finding, the circuit court concluded that the Mathises’ exclusive remedy was under
the sorkers’ compensation act and that the Mathises could not recover from the County. According to the
Mathises, the chancellor erred when he found that Charles was an employee for purposes of workers’
compensation.
¶12.
For the purposes of workers’ compensation coverage, an “employee” is “any person . . . in the
service of an employer under any contract of hire . . . , written or oral, express or implied . . . .” Miss.
Code Ann. § 71-3-3(d) (Rev. 2000). The elements of a contract for hire are mutual consent,
consideration, and right of control, though they are not rigidly applied in workers’ compensation cases.
Walls, 568 So.2d at 715. The record does not contain an express contract of hire, so Charles can be an
“employee” of the County only if they formed an implied contract of hire.
A. MUTUAL CONSENT
¶13.
According to Black’s Law Dictionary, the term “assent” is interchangeable with“consent.” Black’s
Law Dictionary, 6th ed. 1991. The term “mutual assent” means a “meeting of the minds of both . . . parties
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to a contract; the fact that each agrees to all the terms and conditions, in the same sense and with the same
meaning as the others.” Id.
¶14.
Here, the parties dispute application of the facts but there is no dispute in the operative facts.
Where the facts are undisputed the question is one of law. Walls, 568 So.2d at 714. The record shows
that Charles went to Harrison and requested to work as a marshaland Harrison agreed. Charles consented
to work as a marshal when he asked Harrison’s permission to do so. Harrison consented when he granted
Charles’s request. Applying these facts, we conclude that mutual consent existed.
B. CONSIDERATION
¶15.
Consideration is “(a) an act other than a promise, or (b) a forbearance, or (c) the creation,
modification or destruction of a legal relation, or (d) a return promise, bargained for and given in exchange
for the promise.” Marshall Durbin Food Corp. v. Baker, 909 So.2d 1267, 1273 (¶14) (Miss.Ct.App.
2005) (internal quotations omitted). The fact that a worker does not receive a direct monetary wage from
the employing body is of “little or no consequence.” Walls, 568 So.2d at 717. The payment aspect
regarding a contract for hire does not have to be in money, “but may be anything of value.” Id.
¶16.
The fact that Charles may have been labeled as a volunteer does not affect his workers’
compensation coverage. There is a difference between a person who is labeled as a volunteer and a “mere
volunteer” - a person who provides services without the knowledge or consent of a putative employer.
A volunteer may be an employee if there is an express or implied contract for hire. Dunn, Mississippi
Workers Compensation, § 122 (3d Ed. 1990). However, a “mere volunteer” is not an employee. Id.
¶17.
The Mississippi Supreme Court has held that the Workers’ Compensation Act applies to
volunteers. In Sullivan v. Okalona, 370 So.2d 921 (Miss. 1979), our supreme court addressed the
calculationof workers’ compensation benefits for a volunteer fireman. Sullivan also confirms that workers’
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compensation coverage is not affected by the fact that an employee’s wages are minimal.
Charles
claims that “[t]he facts do not indicate that there was a bargained for exchange that accompanies a finding
that consideration existed.” Here, Charles testified that, in exchange for marshaling, one could play golf
from sun up to sun down the following week with a free cart. Charles knew other marshals received free
use of a cart in exchange for marshaling. Charles also testified that he decided to marshal because he liked
the course, the course needed a marshal, and that it would be more affordable for him to play golf with a
free cart.
¶18.
In exchange for Charles’s promise to marshal, the County, through the golf course, promised to
provide Charles with the free use of a golf cart for a week. The charge for cart rental was nine dollars per
eighteen holes and five dollars for each additional nine holes. Charles testified that he played approximately
three times a week. If Charles only played eighteen holes a day, three times a week, that is a value of
twenty-seven dollars per week. Charles also testified that he sometimes played up to forty-five holes a day.
The cart fee for forty-five holes would be twenty- four dollars. If Charles played forty-five holes a day,
three times a week, that is a value of seventy-two dollars per week. So, in exchange for marshaling, the
record indicates that Charles received the free use of a cart for a week which could value anywhere
between twenty- four dollars and seventy- two dollars per week. As such, the circuit court did not err
when it determined that consideration existed.
C. RIGHT OF CONTROL
¶19.
The right of control, rather than the fact that an employer exercises that control, determines the
status of parties as employer and employee for compensation purposes. Wade v. Traxler, 232 Miss. 592,
100 So.2d 103 (1958). One may establish the right of control by demonstrating that a potential employer
provided equipment and had the right to fire a potential employee. Boyd v. Crosby Lumber & Mfg. Co.,
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250 Miss. 433, 440, 166 So.2d 106 (1964). Where one issues directions and instructions, that is evidence
of one’s right of control. Walls, 568 So.2d at 718.
¶20.
The County claims that the record demonstrates that the County issued instructions and had the
right to fire Charles. Harrison authorized Charles’s schedule change from Fridays to Sundays. Harrison
testified that marshals who did not report for work would lose their cart privileges. Charles followed
posted guidelines and instructions for marshals. One guideline instructed marshals to report a problem
golfer to Harrison. Charles enforced course rules. The County also claims that Charles used equipment
that the course provided. When Charles marshaled, he used a golf cart that the course provided. We
cannot find that the circuit court erred when it found that the County had the right to control Charles through
Harrison.
¶21.
To conclude, the record demonstrates the existence of mutual assent, consideration, and the
County’s right to control Charles. As such, Charles qualified as an employee for the purposes of workers’
compensation. We affirm the circuit court’s decision.
II.
Whether the trial court erred by failing to find that the activity in which Charles Mathis
was engaged at the time of his injury was not within the scope of his employment.
¶22.
The Mathises contends that even if he qualifies as an employee, he should not be precluded from
recovery in the circuit court because he was not acting within the scope of his employment when he hit his
head in the storage shed. If we agree with the Mathises, Charles would not have an exclusive remedy
under the Workers’ Compensation Act and Charles would be able to recover in the circuit court.
¶23.
For purposes of the workers’ compensation act, an employee can recover for an accident “arising
out of and in the course of employment.” Miss. Code Ann. § 71-3-3(b) (Rev. 2000). “The statutory
language ‘arising out of’ and ‘in the course of’ creates a requisite for compensability.” Big “2" Engine
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Rebuilder v. Freeman, 379 So.2d 888, 890 (Miss. 1980). The term “arising out of employment” simply
means there is a causal connection between the employment and the injury. Singley v. Smith, 844 So.2d
448 (¶20) (Miss. 2003). One is injured in the course of employment when an injury results from activity
actuated partly by a duty to serve the employer or reasonably incident to the employment.” Singley v.
Smith, 844 So.2d 448 (¶20) (Miss. 2003).
¶24.
The Mathises advances multiple arguments to suggest he was not acting within the course of his
employment when he injured his head. First, the Mathises claim that Charles injured his head at 3:00 p.m.,
but his duties ended at noon. However, the County points out that the course marshaling schedule only
indicates that Charles was scheduled to marshal on Sundays. The schedule is not specific as to when
Charles’s marshaling duty ended. Additionally, Charles’s own testimony contradicts his argument. Charles
testified that he played cards in the clubhouse because he would have to finish marshaling if the rain ceased.
The record also reveals that it was between 1:00 p.m. and 2:00 p.m. when Holt asked Charles to help put
the carts away.
¶25.
Next, the Mathises suggest that Charles was not acting in the course of his employment because
his duties involved enforcing course rules, not moving golf carts out of the rain. However, the guidelines
for marshals says. “The primary reason you are out there is to protect the course, golf carts and to ensure
the rules are enforced.” (emphasis added). The course authorities decided to close the course and asked
Charles to help put away the carts. Charles moved the carts out of the rain to protect them. Putting away
the carts after the course closed is reasonably incidental to the County’s business of operating a golf course
and Charles’s duty to protect the golf carts. Id. Accordingly, we cannot find that the circuit court erred
when it determined that Charles was injured in the course of his employment with the County.
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¶26. THE JUDGMENT OF THE JACKSON COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT IS AFFIRMED.
ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO THE APPELLANTS.
KING, C.J., LEE AND MYERS, P.JJ., IRVING, CHANDLER, GRIFFIS, BARNES
AND ISHEE, JJ., CONCUR.
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