Adam Gonzales, Jr. v. State of Mississippi
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2003-CP-00798-COA
ADAM GONZALES, JR.
APPELLANT
v.
STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
TRIAL JUDGE:
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE:
NATURE OF THE CASE:
TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION:
DISPOSITION:
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
APPELLEE
10/1/2001
HON. W. ASHLEY HINES
WASHINGTON COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
ADAM GONZALES, JR. (PRO SE)
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
BY: BILLY L. GORE
CIVIL - POST-CONVICTION RELIEF
WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS DENIED.
AFFIRMED: 12/06/2005
BEFORE KING, C.J., CHANDLER AND ISHEE, JJ.
KING, C.J., FOR THE COURT:
¶1.
Adam Gonzales, Jr. pled guilty to charges of auto burglary, grand larceny, and receiving stolen
property on July 27, 1998. On October 19, 1998, Gonzales received a seven-year sentence for the auto
burglary charge and five-year sentences for the grand larceny and receiving stolen property charges, all to
be served consecutively. Gonzales then filed a “Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus” on September 26,
2001, in the Washington County Circuit Court, asking the court to set aside his guilty pleas. On October
10, 2001, the trial court denied his motion without an evidentiary hearing. Aggrieved, Gonzales filed his
Notice to Appeal on March 3, 2003. Gonzales raises the following issues on appeal:
(1) Whether guilty pleas were made unintelligently due to the erroneous advise of counsel;
(2) Whether he received ineffective assistance of counsel.
¶2.
The State suggests that since Gonzales’ plea was entered on July 27, 1998, his motion may have
been filed out-of-time on September 26, 2001. An appeal can only be had from a final judgment. There
was no final judgment until Gonzales was sentenced on October 18, 1998. Therefore, Gonzales’ postconviction relief motion was not out-of-time. Hence, we will discuss the merits of his claims.
DISCUSSION
¶3.
Gonzales’ claims that his guilty pleas should be set aside due to ineffective assistance of counsel.
In order to be successful on such a claim, a defendant must prove that his counsel’s performance was
deficient, and that the deficiencywas prejudicial to his defense. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,
687(1984). A defendant faces a strong, but rebuttable presumption, that counsel’s performance falls within
a broad spectrum of reasonable professional assistance. O’Halloran v. State, 731 So.2d 565, 595 (¶ 9)
(Miss. 1999). Only when there is a reasonable probability that but for his attorney’s errors, the defendant
would have received a different result in the trial court, will we find ineffective assistance. Id.
¶4.
Gonzales asserts two claims of his counsel’s deficient performance. Gonzales’ first claim of
deficiency is the alleged erroneous advice on which Gonzales relied when making his guilty pleas. Gonzales
claims that his attorney told him that it was in his best interest to plea, and assured him that any sentences
given would run concurrently because there were no minimum sentencing requirements for the crimes. The
court, however, sentenced Gonzales to three consecutive terms for his crimes. Although Gonzales claims
to have relied heavily on his attorney’s advice when pleading guilty, Gonzales testified, under oath, that he
understood his charges, the plea process, and the consequences of both. When asked if he understood
that the judge was not bound by anything anyone had told him regarding sentencing, and that sentencing
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was in the judge’s sole discretion, Gonzales answered affirmatively. Gonzales also acknowledged that he
understood that the judge was bound only by the maximum sentence allowed by law for each crime, and
could run the sentences concurrently or consecutively.
¶5.
Gonzales offers affidavits from family members in support of his assertions. These affidavits,
however, were first introduced in Gonzales’ brief before this Court, and are not contained in the record.
Since our review of a case on appeal is limited solely to the record, these affidavits can not be considered.
Sherrod v. State, 784 So.2d 256, 259 (¶ 7) (Miss. Ct. App. 2001).
¶6.
At his plea hearing, Gonzales testified under oath that he understood his rights. We recognize that
there is a strong presumption of validity when a statement is given while under oath. King v. State, 679
So.2d 208, 211 (Miss. 1996). Regardless of the advice of his attorney, a plea is considered by this Court
to be voluntary and intelligent if the defendant is advised regarding the nature of the charge and the
consequences of the guilty plea, and it appears he understood these rights. Sherrod, 784 So.2d at 258
(¶ 4). This being so, we find no merit to this part of Gonzales’ argument.
¶7.
Gonzales next contends that his counsel’s performance was deficient due to a severe drug
addiction. However, other than the out-of-time affidavits, Gonzales offers no specific proof in support of
his claim. A mere allegation of impairment due to drug addiction, without more, is insufficient to meet the
deficiency prong of the Strickland balancing. Therefore, we find that Gonzales’ arguments of deficient
performance by his attorney should fail.
¶8.
Gonzales has also failed to show this Court how his attorney’s alleged drug abuse prejudiced him
during the plea proceedings. In his brief, Gonzales claims that if he would have known about his attorney’s
alleged drug problem, he would have had the opportunity to seek other counsel, and “not be misled into
a plea which resulted into a seventeen year sentence.” However, there was no evidence offered by
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Gonzales to show any unusual behavior of the attorney during the plea process which would be indicative
of a drug problem. In fact, when asked by the court if he was satisfied with the assistance that he had been
given by his attorney, Gonzales responded, “yes sir, very satisfied.”
¶9.
Gonzales contends that if an evidentiary hearing had been granted, then he would have proven that
the alleged drug addiction was in fact true, and prejudiced his defense. However, it is well settled that not
every post-conviction relief motion must be afforded a hearing. Potts v. State, 755 So.2d 1196, 1197
(¶ 5) (Miss. Ct. App. 1999). If it appears clearly from the motion, annexed exhibits, and prior proceedings
that defendant is not entitled to relief, the court may make an order for the motion’s dismissal. Id.
Gonzales’ affidavits were not offered to the trial court on his motion for post-conviction relief. All Gonzales
offered to the court was a statement that he had learned of his attorney’s alleged drug abuse, a request for
interrogatories, and production of documents. Since it was clear from all documents submitted that
Gonzales was not entitled to relief, the trial court was correct in refusing to grant an evidentiary hearing.
¶10.
Gonzales’ failed to prove to the trial court that he in fact did receive ineffective assistance of
counsel. Therefore, the court correctly denied Gonzales’ petition. When reviewing denials of postconviction relief motions, we will not reverse the decision of a trial court judge unless it is clearly erroneous.
Williams v. State, 872 So.2d 711, 712 (¶ 2) (Miss. Ct. App. 2004). Finding no error in the trial judge’s
decision, we affirm.
¶11. THE JUDGMENT OF THE WASHINGTON COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT DENYING
POST-CONVICTION RELIEF IS AFFIRMED. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE
ASSESSED TO WASHINGTON COUNTY.
LEE AND MYERS, P.JJ., BRIDGES, IRVING, CHANDLER, GRIFFIS, BARNES AND
ISHEE, JJ., CONCUR.
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