Vessie Lynn Lee v. State of Mississippi
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2004-KA-00542-COA
VESSIE LYNN LEE
APPELLANT
v.
STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
TRIAL JUDGE:
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED:
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE:
DISTRICT ATTORNEY:
NATURE OF THE CASE:
TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION:
DISPOSITION:
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
APPELLEE
3/24/2003
HON. WILLIAM E. CHAPMAN, III
MADISON COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
MATTHEW W. KITCHENS
JAMES W. KITCHENS
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
BY: DEIRDRE MCCRORY
RICHARD D. MITCHELL
CRIMINAL - FELONY
CONVICTED OF COUNTS I, II STATUTORY
RAPE, COUNTS III, IV, V, VI SEXUAL BATTERY,
AND VII, IX, X GRATIFICATION OF LUST;
SENTENCED TO LIFE IMPRISONMENT FOR
COUNTS I AND II, WITH SAID SENTENCES TO
RUN CONCURRENTLY, THIRTY YEARS FOR
COUNTS III, IV, V, AND VI WITH SAID
SENTENCES TO RUN CONCURRENTLY WITH
EACH OTHER BUT CONSECUTIVE TO THE
SENTENCES IMPOSED IN COUNTS I AND II,
AND FIFTEEN YEARS FOR COUNTS VII, IX,
AND X, WITH SAID SENTENCES TO RUN
CONCURRENTLY WITH EACH OTHER BUT
CONSECUTIVE TO THE SENTENCES IMPOSED
IN COUNTS I AND II AND COUNTS III, IV, V, VI.
AFFIRMED: 11/22/2005
BEFORE LEE, PJ, GRIFFIS AND ISHEE, JJ.
GRIFFIS, J., FOR THE COURT:
¶1.
Vessie Lynn Lee was convicted of two counts of statutory rape, four counts of sexual battery and
three counts of gratification of lust. He was sentenced to life in prison for each count of statutory rape,
thirty years for each count of sexual battery, and fifteen years for each count of gratification of lust. On
appeal, Lee asserts the following errors: (1) the trial court erred in allowing the State to amend the
indictment, (2) the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress items seized from his residence, (3)
the trial court erred in denying his motion for a medical and forensic examination of J.R.G., (4) the trial
court erred regarding the testimony of Connie Evans, (5) the trial court erred regarding the testimony of Jeri
Weaver, (6) he received ineffective assistance of counsel, (7) the verdict was against the overwhelming
weight of the evidence, and (8) the cumulative effect of these errors denied him his fundamental right to a
fair trial.
FACTS
¶2.
On August 11, 2001, J.R.G., who was fourteen years old at the time of trial, accused Lee of
sexually abusing her over an approximate nine month period. At the time the alleged offenses began, J.R.G.
was only twelve years old. J.R.G. claimed that Lee forced her to perform oral sex on him and forced her
to engage in sexual intercourse on two separate occasions. Based on J.R.G.’s allegations, Lee’s home was
searched, his personal items were seized, and his genitals were photographed. Subsequently, Lee was
arrested.
¶3.
Lee was indicted on ten counts of various sex crimes including, Counts I and II statutory rape,
Counts III, IV, V, and VI sexual battery, and Counts VII, VIII, IX, and X gratification of lust. The State
filed a motion to nolle prosequi Count VIII of the indictment, which was granted by the trial court, leaving
only nine counts (Counts I - VII and IX - X). The jury convicted Lee on all counts. He was sentenced
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to serve life in prison for Counts I and II, with said sentences to run concurrently, thirty years for Counts
III, IV, V, and VI, with said sentences to run concurrently with each other but consecutive to the sentences
imposed in Counts I and II, and fifteen years for Counts VII, IX, and X, with said sentences to run
concurrently with each other but consecutive to the sentences imposed in Counts I and II and Counts III,
IV, V, and VI.
¶4.
Lee filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or, in the alternative, a new trial, which
was denied by the trial court. Lee now appeals to this Court.
ANALYSIS
I.
¶5.
Did the trial court err in allowing the State to amend the indictment?
Counts III, IV, V and VI of the indictment state the following:
Count III
On or about the 3rd day of April, 2002, in the county aforesaid and within the jurisdiction
of this court, Vessie L. Lee did willfully, unlawfully and feloniously engage in sexual
penetration as defined in section 97-3-97, Fellation, Mississippi Code Annotated (1972),
as amended, with [J.R.G.], a child whose age was thirteen (13) years of age, at the time,
and her birth date being 10-29-1988, a child who is twenty-four (24) or more months
younger then [sic] said Vessie L. Lee who was forty (40) years of age, without her
consent, in Madison County, Mississippi, in violation of Mississippi Code Annotated, §
97-3-95(1)(d), (1972), as amended.
Count IV
On or about the 6 day of March, 2002, in the county aforesaid and within the jurisdiction
of this court, Vessie L. Lee did willfully, unlawfully and feloniously engage in sexual
penetration as defined in section 97-3-97, Fellation, Mississippi Code Annotated (1972),
as amended, with [J.R.G.], a child whose age was thirteen (13) years of age, at the time,
and her birth date being 10-29-1988, a child who is twenty-four (24) or more months
younger then [sic] said Vessie L. Lee who was forty (40) years of age, without her
consent, in Madison County, Mississippi, in violation of Mississippi Code Annotated, §
97-3-95(1)(d), (1972), as amended.
th
Count V
On or about the 28th day of October, 2001, in the county aforesaid and within the
jurisdiction of this court, Vessie L. Lee did willfully, unlawfully and feloniously engage in
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sexual penetration as defined in section 97-3-97, Fellation, Mississippi Code Annotated
(1972), as amended, with [J.R.G.], a child whose age was twelve (12) years of age, at the
time, and her birth date being 10-29-1988, a child who is twenty-four (24) or more
months younger then [sic] said Vessie L. Lee who was thirty-nine (39) years of age,
without her consent, in Madison County, Mississippi, in violation of Mississippi Code
Annotated, § 97-3-95(1)(d), (1972), as amended.
Count VI
On or about the 30 day of August, 2001, in the county aforesaid and within the
jurisdiction of this court, Vessie L. Lee did willfully, unlawfully and feloniously engage in
sexual penetration as defined in section 97-3-97, Fellation, Mississippi Code Annotated
(1972), as amended, with [J.R.G.], a child whose age was twelve (12) years of age, at the
time, and her birth date being 10-29-1988, a child who is twenty-four (24) or more
months younger then [sic] said Vessie L. Lee who was thirty-nine (39) years of age,
without her consent, in Madison County, Mississippi, in violation of Mississippi Code
Annotated, § 97-3-95(1)(d), (1972), as amended.
th
(emphasis added).
¶6.
Mississippi Code Annotated Section 97-3-95(1)(a) (Rev. 2000) states that “[a] person is guilty
of sexual battery if he or she engages in sexual penetration with another person without his or her
consent.” (emphasis added). Section 97-3-95(1)(d), under which Lee was indicted, states that “[a] person
is guilty of sexual battery if he or she engages in sexual penetration with a child under the age of fourteen
(14) years of age, if the person is twenty-four (24) or more months older than the child.” Lee contends that
the language of Section 97-3-95(1)(a), “without her consent,” which was included in the indictment,
created confusion for the defense by not providing notice as to what portions of the statute under which he
was charged. Lee argues that the indictment was confusing since it was unclear under which subsection
to defend, 97-3-95(1)(a) or 97-3-95(1)(d). As a result, Lee filed a motion to quash the indictment as to
Counts III, IV, V and VI. The trial court denied the motion and granted the State’s motion to amend. Lee
now argues that the trial court erred in allowing the State to amend the indictment since the amendment
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materially altered a defense that the defendant had under the original indictment. See Griffin v. State, 584
So. 2d 1274, 1275 (Miss. 1991).
¶7.
Lack of consent is not an element of this variety of sexual battery. A child under the age of fourteen
has no legal ability to consent to such an act. In this context, the language “without her consent” had no
legal meaning. Its removal did not deprive Lee of a valid defense. It follows that the trial court had the
power to amend the indictment to remove the language “without her consent,” which was not an element
of the offense charged and which purported to give the defendant a basis for a nonexistent defense.
Furthermore, in each count of the indictment, the exact code section and subsection was noted. Thus, the
indictment clearly notified Lee that he was charged with sexual battery as defined in Mississippi Code
Annotated Section 97-3-95(1)(d) (Rev. 2000). Upon review, we find that Lee was not prejudiced by the
amendment. Therefore, the trial court did not err in allowing the State to amend the indictment.
II.
¶8.
Did the trial court err in denying Lee’s motion to suppress items seized from his
residence?
Prior to trial, the defense filed a motion to suppress evidence seized pursuant to the execution of
a search warrant on the ground that the affidavit for the warrant and the warrant itself were “legally
defective and insufficient” in that they described “the inspection sought by the warrant in such vague terms”
that a reasonable person could not “determine what information law enforcement officials were seeking.”
It is important to note that neither the search warrant nor the underlying facts and circumstances used to
obtain it were included in the record. Thus, Lee’s challenge is not properly before this Court. See
McKinney v. State, 724 So. 2d 928, 932 (¶14) (Miss. Ct. App. 1998) (citing Branch v. State, 347 So.
2d 957, 958-59 (Miss. 1977)).
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¶9.
Nonetheless, the trial transcript indicates that the search warrant was specific, despite Lee’s
allegation to the contrary. According to the trial transcript, the search warrant describes what the police
are looking for as “vibrators, described as being hot pink in color and having a knob on one end to turn it
on and off.” Additionally, the search warrant states “one pair of men’s thong underwear with black and
white zebra print.” Both the pink vibrator and the black and white thong were found in Lee’s home.
¶10.
Lee contends that the vibrator and thong should have been excluded as irrelevant. Tools, weapons,
and other physical evidence used or usable in the commission of a crime are admissible into evidence,
provided they are relevant and not too remote. Bryant v. State, 850 So. 2d 1130, 1134 (¶12) (Miss. Ct.
App. 2002). The vibrator and the thong were utilized in the defendant’s enticement of the victim, were part
of the complete story of these crimes, and corroborated the victim’s testimony. A trial judge enjoys a great
deal of discretion as to the relevancy and admissibility of evidence. Fisher v. State, 690 So. 2d 268, 274
(Miss. 1996). We do not find that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to exclude the items from
evidence.
¶11.
Lee also claims that the search warrant is invalid since it was based solely on the uncorroborated
information provided by J.R.G. In support of his argument, Lee relies on State v. Woods, 866 So. 2d 422,
426 (¶14) (Miss. 2003), which held that an informant unknown to law enforcement giving uncorroborated
evidence creates a constitutional problem with a search warrant. However, Lee’s reliance on Woods is
misplaced. Woods dealt with a confidential informant who had never provided any evidence to law
enforcement authorities and was never questioned about his reliability. Id. Here, law enforcement officers
had experience with J.R.G. J.R.G. was not an unknown confidential informant but instead was a victim
reporting an offense committed against her. As the court stated in Walker v. State, 473 So. 2d 435, 43839 (Miss. 1985):
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when information is furnished by an eyewitness rather than from an informant, there is no
need to show the party supplying the information was a credible person. The rationale for
the victim or eyewitness exception is that the statements of such eyewitnesses are based
on their own observation and thus are not likely to reflect mere “idle rumor or irresponsible
conjecture.”
For this reason, the trial court properly rejected the defendant’s reliance on Woods.
¶12.
Lee further argues that a photograph taken of Lee’s genital area should have been excluded based
on its prejudicial effect. “The admissibility of photographs rests within the sound discretion of the trial
judge. Such discretion of the trial judge runs toward almost unlimited admissibility regardless of the
gruesomeness, repetitiveness, and extenuation of probative value.” Martin v. State, 854 So. 2d 1004,
1007-08 (¶7) (Miss. 2003). The trial judge overruled Lee’s motion in limine to exclude the photograph,
noting that the defense’s cross-examination of the victim had put her credibility into issue and that the
photograph went to the victim’s credibility as well as to the crime itself. The photograph corroborated
J.R.G.’s testimony and showed that Lee had a scar on his abdomen and that he shaved his genital area.
Upon review, we find that the probative value of the photograph was not substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice. Thus, we find no error.
¶13.
We find that the trial court did not err in denying Lee’s motion to suppress items seized in his home.
Therefore, this issue is without merit.
III.
¶14.
Did the trial court err in denying Lee’s motion for a medical and forensic
examination of J.R.G.?
Lee filed a motion requesting that the trial court order J.R.G. to be physically examined by an
independent physician to determine whether she had previously had sexual intercourse. Lee also requested
that J.R.G.’s DNA be analyzed in order to determine whether the pink vibrator had her DNA on it. The
trial court denied both requests.
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¶15.
Lee did not present the trial court with any authority for the proposition that a victim in a criminal
case may be compelled to submit to a medical examination. The cases cited in Lee’s brief to this Court
address the propriety of allowing a defendant access to medical records already in existence or allowing
the defense to test medical evidence already in existence. For instance, Lee cites Richardson v. State,
767 So. 2d 195 (Miss. 2000). In Richardson, the defendant contested that there was penetration and
therefore wanted to test seminal fluid evidence. Id. at 198 (¶14). Without the evidence, the case rested
almost entirely on the testimony of the twelve-year-old victim. Id. The court found that the State relied
upon the evidence that semen was present to support the inference that the defendant did in fact sexually
penetrate the victim. Id. at 199 (¶14). The court held that the DNA evidence was relevant and material,
because it could significantly aid the defense by showing that the semen sample found was not the
defendant’s, thus eliminating the semen as objective evidence of penetration. Id. at 199 (¶15). Here, the
prosecution relied upon the presence of the pink vibrator to support the inference that because J.R.G. knew
of its existence, Lee must have sexually abused her. Lee argues that, as in Richardson, the defense should
have been allowed to test the vibrator for J.R.G.’s DNA. However, the DNA in Richardson was found
by the state crime lab on one of the slides of material taken from the victim’s vagina as part of the rape kit.
Id. at 197 (¶8). Here, no such DNA evidence existed.
¶16.
Lee failed to present any evidence to support his position and failed to specifically show how this
proposed examination would aid his defense. The authority Lee relies on addresses medical records and
medical evidence already in existence. This is a fundamentally different issue from that of forcing a victim
to submit to an examination. Thus, the trial court did not err in denying the motion for a medical and
forensic examination of J.R.G.
IV.
Did the trial court err regarding the testimony of Connie Evans?
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¶17.
While cross-examining Connie Evans, who lived across the street from Lee, defense counsel asked
whether she had told Beth Lee, the defendant’s wife, that she did not trust men because Evans’ daughter
had been molested by her ex-husband. Evans testified that she had not made such a statement to Beth and
stated that she would never discuss anything like this with anyone except with her family. Later, while
examining Beth Lee, the defense sought to elicit testimony that Evans had made a statement to Beth about
Evans’ feelings toward men in general. The State objected and the trial court ruled that this was
inadmissible hearsay. Lee now asserts that this ruling constitutes reversible error.
¶18.
Evans’ testimony was not essential to the State’s case. She was not the complaining witness nor
did she observe any criminal behavior on Lee’s part. Evans testified only that she saw Lee walk J.R.G.
from the bus stop to his garage on several occasions. This was straightforward testimony. We fail to see
how Evans’ attitude towards or preconceived notions about men would impact the credibility of this
testimony. Whether Evans had given this information to Beth would have added little if anything to Lee’s
position. Thus, the excluded testimony would be harmless, at best.
¶19.
Because Evans’ testimony was not crucial, the refusal to allow insubstantial impeachment of this
witness is not reversible error. None of the information the statement may have provided contradicted
Evans’ testimony in any significant manner such that the interests of justice would demand this Court’s
finding an abuse of discretion. See Peyton v. State, 858 So. 2d 156, 160 (¶21) (Miss. Ct. App. 2003).
Moreover, it is inconceivable that a different result would have been reached had the testimony been
allowed.
¶20.
Lee next argues that the trial court erred by allowing Evans to give improper opinion testimony.
Evans testified that she did not think J.R.G. would have made up the allegations against Lee. Defense
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counsel objected on the grounds that the witness was speculating. Evans’ response came as a result of
redirect questioning about her conversation with Beth Lee, which had been brought out by the defense.
Q. (By Mr. Wilkerson) You can’t testify to what she said. You can only testify as to what
you told her. What, if anything, did you say to her?
A. I just said, “You need to look at the situation and evaluate what might have happened,”
when I talked to her.
Q. What situation were you referring to?
A. The allegations against Mr. Lee and that [J.R.G.]–you know, I don’t think that she
would have made it up.
The trial court overruled the objection, finding that the witness was explaining her conversation and
testifying as to what she said. The court found that the defense had “brought it out.” After the witness left
the stand, outside the presence of the jury, defense counsel moved for a mistrial on the ground that Evans’
statement constituted improper opinion testimony. The State argued that it had not elicited any opinions
from the witness, and the court agreed.
¶21.
An objection must be specific and contemporaneous to preserve an alleged error for review.
Waldon v. State, 749 So. 2d 262, 268 (¶18) (Miss. Ct. App. 1999). Moreover, “an objection on one
or more specific grounds constitutes a waiver of all other grounds.” Byrom v. State, 863 So. 2d 836, 878
(¶152) (Miss. 2003). The contemporaneous objection lodged below was grounded solely on speculation
and thus constituted a waiver of the objection on the ground of improper opinion testimony. The motion
for mistrial on this ground was made after the witness left the stand and was thus untimely.
¶22.
The jury observed J.R.G.’s demeanor and listened to her testimony. The trial judge found that
J.R.G. was “probably the most credible witness” he had ever heard. It is therefore unlikely that Evans’
opinion had any effect on the outcome of this case. Assuming arguendo that Evans’ statement was
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improper opinion testimony, such testimony was harmless. See Whittington v. State, 523 So. 2d 966,
975 (Miss. 1988).
¶23.
Upon review, we find that the trial court did not err regarding the testimony of Connie Evans.
Therefore, this issue is without merit.
V. Did the trial court err regarding the testimony of Jeri Weaver?
¶24.
During the testimony of Jeri Weaver, the defense sought to elicit information regarding who Weaver
saw at the end of Lee’s driveway on the day Lee was arrested and what they were doing. Weaver is the
mother-in-law of appellant Vessie Lee. The State objected on relevancy grounds and an off-the-record
bench conference was held. The objection was sustained. Following the testimony of Beth Lee, the
defense proffered, outside the presence of the jury, that Weaver would have testified that when she went
to Lee’s home immediately after Lee was arrested, she saw J.R.G. and two other children at the end of
the driveway laughing. The purpose of the testimony was to show that if J.R.G. was indeed afraid of Lee,
as she testified, and if she took the alleged sexual abuse and his resulting arrest as seriously as she claimed,
she would not have been at the end of the driveway laughing right after Lee was arrested. The trial judge
found the testimony irrelevant and not probative on any of the issues. Lee contends the trial court’s ruling
prevented him from impeaching J.R.G. However, in its context, the proffered evidence has no bearing on
J.R.G.’s credibility. The alleged laughing occurred after Lee had been removed from the scene, when
J.R.G. would have had no reason to be afraid of him. Weaver also would not have been able to testify
specifically why J.R.G. and the other children were laughing.
¶25.
The trial court has broad discretion in determining the relevance of evidence. Bryant, 850 So. 2d
at 1134 (¶14). Upon review, we find that the trial court did not err regarding the testimony of Jeri Weaver.
Thus, this issue lacks merit.
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VI.
¶26.
Did Lee receive ineffective assistance of counsel?
Lee contends he received ineffective assistance of counsel. The standard applied to claims of
ineffective assistance of counsel were first articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Strickland
v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). To prove ineffective assistance of counsel, Lee must demonstrate
that his counsel's performance was deficient and that this deficiency prejudiced his defense. Id. at 687.
The burden of proof rests with Lee. McQuarter v. State, 574 So. 2d 685, 687 (Miss. 1990). Under
Strickland, there is a strong presumption that counsel’s performance falls within the range of reasonable
professional assistance. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. To overcome this presumption, “the defendant must
show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for the counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result would
have been different.” Id.
¶27.
“With respect to the overall performance of the attorney, counsel’s choice of whether or not to file
certain motions, call witnesses, ask certain questions, or make certain objections falls within the ambit of
trial strategy and cannot give rise to an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.” Howard v. State, 853 So.
2d 781, 789 (Miss. 1995). “Having a trial strategy negates an ineffective assistance of counsel claim,
regardless of counsel’s insufficiencies.” Hall v. State, 735 So. 2d 1124, 1127 (¶10) (Miss. Ct. App.
1999).
¶28.
In his brief to this Court, Lee lists nine deficiencies in his trial counsel’s performance. However,
Lee has not overcome the presumption that but for his trial counsel’s unprofessional errors the result would
have been different. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. For instance, Lee contends that his counsel was
deficient in failing to introduce Dr. Thomas L. Wiley’s report. However, this decision could easily be seen
a matter of strategy. The medical report indicated that Dr. Wiley “strongly suspect[s] that [J.R.G.] has had
sexual contact in the past. However, on examination, this could not be determined 100%.” Lee’s trial
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counsel could have decided that the report might do more harm than good to Lee’s case, so he did not
introduce it. Also, Lee argues that his trial counsel was deficient in withdrawing jury instruction D-37.
Again, this decision was purely strategic. Lee’s trial counsel withdrew the instruction after concluding that
it might “cut the other way.”
¶29.
The record shows that Lee’s trial counsel filed numerous pretrial motions and jury instructions,
called approximately twenty-two witnesses and zealously cross-examined J.R.G. Thus, Lee has failed to
show that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. See Lott v. State, 844 So. 2d 502, 505 (¶8)
(Miss. Ct. App. 2003). Therefore, this issue is without merit.
VII.
¶30.
Was the verdict against the overwhelming weight of the evidence?
In determining whether a jury verdict is against the overwhelming weight of the evidence, this Court
must accept as true the evidence which supports the verdict and will reverse only when convinced that the
trial court has abused its discretion in failing to grant a new trial. Montana v. State, 822 So. 2d 954, 967
(¶61) (Miss. 2002). Only in those cases where the verdict is so contrary to the overwhelming weight of
the evidence that to allow it to stand would sanction an unconscionable injustice will this Court disturb it
on appeal. Id. at 967-68. “[W]e do not reverse criminal cases where there is a straight issue of fact, or
a conflict in the facts; juries are impaneled for the very purpose of passing upon such questions of disputed
fact, and we do not intend to invade the province and prerogative of the jury.” Thomas v. State, 812 So.
2d 1010, 1014 (¶19) (Miss. Ct. App. 2001) (quoting Evans v. State, 159 Miss. 561, 566 (Miss. 1931)).
The unsupported word of the victim of a sex crime is sufficient to support a guilty verdict where that
testimony is not discredited or contradicted by other credible evidence. McKinney v. State, 521 So. 2d
898, 899 (Miss. 1988). “It is well settled in this State that a conviction of rape may be upheld with the
uncorroborated testimony of the victim.” Id.
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¶31.
In this case, the victim’s testimony was corroborated by her knowledge of the pink vibrator, the
thong underwear, and the appearance of Lee’s genital area. Lee’s attempt to explain this knowledge
simply created an issue of fact for the jury to resolve. The fact that the jury believed J.R.G. gives Lee no
basis for a valid complaint on appeal. Thus, upon review, we find this issue lacks merit.
VIII.
¶32.
Did the cumulative effect of these errors deny Lee his fundamental right to a fair
trial?
Lee lasts contends that his conviction should be reversed on the ground of cumulative error. We
disagree. “Where there is no reversible error in any part, there is no reversible error to the whole.” Brown
v. State, 854 So. 2d 1081, 1086 (¶18) (Miss. Ct. App. 2003) (citing McFee v. State, 511 So. 2d 130,
136 (Miss. 1987).
¶33. THE JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT OF MADISON COUNTY OF
CONVICTION OF COUNTS I AND II STATUTORY RAPE, COUNTS III, IV, V, AND VI
SEXUAL BATTERY, AND VII, IX, AND X GRATIFICATION OF LUST AND SENTENCE
OF LIFE IN THE CUSTODY OF THE MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS
FOR COUNTS I AND II, WITH SAID SENTENCES TO RUN CONCURRENTLY, THIRTY
YEARS EACH FOR COUNTS III, IV, V, AND VI WITH SAID SENTENCES TO RUN
CONCURRENTLY WITH EACH OTHER BUT CONSECUTIVELY TO THE SENTENCES
IMPOSED IN COUNTS I AND II, AND FIFTEEN YEARS EACH FOR COUNTS VII, IX,
AND X, WITH SAID SENTENCES TO RUN CONCURRENTLY WITH EACH OTHER BUT
CONSECUTIVELY TO THE SENTENCES IMPOSED IN COUNTS I AND II AND COUNTS
III, IV, V, AND VI, IS AFFIRMED. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO
MADISON COUNTY.
KING, C.J., LEE AND MYERS, P.JJ., BRIDGES, CHANDLER, BARNES AND
ISHEE, JJ., CONCUR. IRVING, J., CONCURS IN RESULT ONLY.
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