Christopher A. Jones v. State of Mississippi
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2004-CP-02092-COA
CHRISTOPHER A. JONES
APPELLANT
v.
STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
TRIAL JUDGE:
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE:
DISTRICT ATTORNEY:
NATURE OF THE CASE:
TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION:
DISPOSITION:
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
APPELLEE
10/6/2004
HON. SHARION R. AYCOCK
PONTOTOC COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
CHRISTOPHER A. JONES (PRO SE)
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
BY: W. GLENN WATTS
JOHN R. YOUNG
CIVIL - POST-CONVICTION RELIEF
MOTION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF
DENIED.
AFFIRMED: 11/22/2005
EN BANC.
IRVING, J., FOR THE COURT:
¶1.
Christopher Jones pleaded guilty to burglary and armed robbery in December 2003, and was
subsequently sentenced to a total of ten years in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections.1
In July 2004, Jones filed a motion for post-conviction relief, which the court below denied.
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Jones actually received two sentences. The first sentence was for a term of twenty-five years, with
fifteen years suspended. The second was for ten years, to run concurrent with the first sentence.
¶2.
Feeling aggrieved, Jones appeals and alleges that the court erred because (1) there is newly
discovered evidence showing that Jones’s codefendants recanted their testimony; (2) there was a
miscarriage of justice resulting frompolice officers’ and the state’s attorney’s knowing use of false evidence
to obtain the indictment; (3) the ineffective assistance of his counsel deprived him of adequate
representation as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution; (4) the trial judge
violated Jones’s constitutional rights when she denied him the opportunity to hire new counsel; and (5) his
plea was involuntary and unknowing because counsel confronted him with an incriminating statement by
his codefendants in order to coerce him to plead guilty.
¶3.
Finding no merit in any of Jones’s contentions, we affirm.
FACTS
¶4.
On December 5, 2003, Jones pleaded guilty to burglary and armed robbery. Jones was
represented by counsel at his plea hearing, and both Jones and his attorney answered questions from the
court. After Jones expressed dissatisfaction with his lawyer, the court suggested that Jones and his attorney
go confer to attempt to work out the problems. Jones and his lawyer then spent three hours in conference.
When later asked by the court whether he was satisfied with his counsel, Jones replied that he was.
¶5.
The court questioned Jones extensively about his understanding of the various rights he was losing
by pleading guilty. Jones testified that he understood those rights and waived them. Jones told the court
that he had not been threatened, coerced, or promised anything in exchange for his guilty plea. Jones also
testified that he was not under the influence of any drugs or alcohol, was not suffering from any mental
defect, and that he was pleading guilty knowingly and voluntarily.
¶6.
Jones admitted that he was guilty of breaking into a dwelling and using a handgun to rob an
occupant of the dwelling. The judge advised Jones of the potential penalty range for those offenses, and
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also advised him that she could sentence him to the maximum sentences (life and twenty-five years). Jones
testified that he understood the judge was not bound to follow the prosecutor’s recommended sentence.
After questioning Jones and his counsel, the court accepted Jones plea as freely and intelligently made. The
court then sentenced Jones to the prosecutor’s recommended sentence.
ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION OF THE ISSUES
¶7.
The entering of a guilty plea limits what issues a defendant may raise on appeal: “A valid guilty plea,
however, admits all elements of a formal criminal charge and operates as a waiver of all non-jurisdictional
defects contained in an indictment against a defendant. Put another way, all non-jurisdictional objections
to the indictment are waived. . . .” Brooks v. State, 573 So. 2d 1350, 1352-53 (Miss. 1990) (citing
Houston v. State, 461 So. 2d 720, 723 (Miss. 1984); Sanders v. State, 440 So. 2d 278, 283 (Miss.
1983); Winters v. State, 244 So. 2d 1, 2 (Miss. 1971); United States v. Diaz, 733 F.2d 371, 376 (5th
Cir. 1984)). We also note that issues not raised below may not be raised on appeal: “Questions will not
be decided on appeal which were not presented to the trial court and that court given an opportunity to rule
on them. In other words, the trial court cannot be put in error, unless it has had an opportunity of
committing error.” Stringer v. State, 279 So. 2d 156, 158 (Miss. 1973) (citing Boutwell v. State, 165
Miss. 16, 27-28, 143 So. 479, 482 (1932)). “When reviewing a lower court’s decision to deny a petition
for post-conviction relief this Court will not disturb the trial court’s factual findings unless they are found
to be clearly erroneous. However, where questions of law are raised the applicable standard of review
is de novo.” Brown v. State, 731 So. 2d 595, 598 (¶6) (Miss. 1999) (citing Bank of Miss. v. S. Mem’l
Park, Inc., 677 So. 2d 186, 191 (Miss. 1996)).
¶8.
We find that there is no merit to Jones’s second point of error (that false evidence was used to
obtain his indictment), because he waived this claim when he entered his plea of guilty. All non3
jurisdictional issues in an indictment (such as the methods used to obtain evidence during investigation) are
waived by the entering of a guilty plea. Therefore, we will only consider the remaining four points of error
complained of by Jones.
¶9.
Also as a preliminary matter, we address the substance of the guilty plea hearing wherein the court
questioned Jones regarding his plea. Jones specifically testified: that he was not under the influence of drugs
or alcohol; that he had no mental illnesses; that he was able to read and write; that he made his plea
intelligently, knowingly, freely and voluntarily; that he had not been coerced or threatened into making his
plea; that he understood that if at any time he said that he was innocent, the court would not accept his plea;
that he was waiving numerous jury trial procedures by taking his appeal;2 that he understood that he was
giving up the right to appeal his sentence; that he had in fact committed the crimes charged in his indictment;
that he understood the possible sentences that could be imposed upon him; that he was satisfied with the
advice of his attorney; and that he was “deeply sorry” for what took place.
(1) Newly discovered evidence
¶10.
Under this issue Jones claims that he has produced sworn statements by his codefendants recanting
their testimony. We note that the provided statements are actually not sworn. However, even if they were,
it would not matter, for Jones pleaded guilty. Newly discovered evidence is relevant only in situations
where a defendant went to trial and was convicted. If, following the trial, a defendant discovers relevant
and material evidence which could not have reasonably been discovered prior to trial, the defendant may
seek to have his conviction set aside based on the newly discovered evidence. When a defendant pleads
2
The court went through numerous jury trial procedures, such as the right to remain silent,
subpoenas, and the right to interview and examine witnesses for the State. In the interest of brevity, we
do not repeat each point gone over.
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guilty, he is admitting that he committed the offense. Therefore, by definition, a plea of guilty negates any
notion that there is some undiscovered evidence which could prove his innocence.
(2) Ineffective assistance of counsel
¶11.
In order to prove ineffective assistance of counsel, Jones must prove that (1) his counsel was
deficient and (2) that deficiency prejudiced Jones. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).
After reviewing the record before us, we cannot say that Jones’s counsel provided ineffective assistance.
Jones’s counsel negotiated a plea, counseled him, and worked on his behalf. ¶12.
As proof, Jones
points specifically to what happened the day of his plea hearing. On that day, Jones told the judge that he
was unhappy with his counsel. The judge then sent Jones and his counsel to converse in private and see
if they could work things out. Jones and his counsel spent nearly three hours conversing, after which Jones
came back to the court and entered his guilty plea. At that time, Jones testified, in response to questions
from the court, that he was satisfied with his counsel:
Q.
Mr. Jones, you’re standing here with your counsel. . . and just less than three hours
ago we were on the record when you were advising me that you were not satisfied
with your counsel. . . . Have you had meaningful conference with [your counsel]
that resulted in you deciding to enter this plea?
A.
I really didn’t understand.
Q.
Have you been talking with your attorney and are you now satisfied that your
attorney has adequately represented you in this matter and you’re satisfied with the
services that he has offered you this morning leading up to the entry of this plea?
A.
Yes, ma’am.
Q.
Are you satisfied that he has represented your best interest in each of these points?
A.
Yes, ma’am.
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This passage clearly shows that Jones was satisfied with the performance of his counsel. Although he has
provided us with a sworn affidavit from a third party detailing alleged conflicts between him and his counsel,
the affidavit is not sufficient to prove ineffective assistance of counsel. Nothing in the affidavit proves that
Jones’s counsel was ineffective, and Jones’s later testimony to the court shows that he was satisfied with
the services rendered. We find this to be especially indicative of Jones’s feelings toward his attorney, since
Jones had already complained to the court that he was unhappy. If Jones had remained dissatisfied after
going to confer with his counsel, it stands to reason that he would have told the court, since he had done
so before and the court provided him with ample opportunities to say something. Therefore, we find no
merit to Jones’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim.
(3) Opportunity to hire new counsel
¶13.
Jones complains that he was denied a continuance to find new counsel, and that that denial requires
reversal of his conviction. Instead of granting a continuance, the court below sent Jones and his counsel
to discuss matters and see if they could work something out. In a factually similar case, the Mississippi
Supreme Court said:
We acknowledge that real differences arise between litigants and their attorneys, but are
of the view that such differences appearing at the last minute. . . must necessarily be
examined for good faith or efforts thereby to procure a continuance. Although the
defendant gave expression to his unhappiness with his employed trial attorney, thereafter
excellent cooperation between them appeared, and in disposing of post-conviction matters,
the judge commented complimentarily upon the attorney’s services and the appellant’s
cooperation with him.
Nettles v. State, 380 So. 2d 246, 246-47 (Miss. 1980). As in Nettles, Jones expressed dissatisfaction
with his counsel, but later testified that he was happy with his attorney. In the absence of compelling
evidence to the contrary, we find that Jones was satisfied with his counsel, and that there was therefore no
reason for the court to grant a continuance to him. This point of error is without merit.
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(4) Voluntariness of plea
¶14.
Although Jones now claims that his plea was involuntary because of the threatened use of his co-
defendant’s statements, we find that his sworn answers to questions from the court contradict that assertion.
More than once, Jones told the court that his plea was made voluntarily, knowingly, freely, and intelligently.
He testified that he was able to read and write, had no mental illnesses, and was not under the influence of
any drugs or alcohol. In short, Jones made it abundantly clear during the hearing below that his plea was
made voluntarily and knowingly. Jones undeniably had the opportunity to inform the court of any perceived
coercion. Therefore, we find no merit in this point of error.
¶15. THE JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT OF PONTOTOC COUNTY DENYING
THE MOTION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF IS AFFIRMED. ALL COSTS OF THIS
APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO PONTOTOC COUNTY.
KING, C.J., LEE AND MYERS, P.JJ., BRIDGES, CHANDLER, GRIFFIS,
BARNES AND ISHEE, JJ., CONCUR.
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